TRESSIE O. STEVENS v. EMMA T. MEADOWS, MARK B. MEADOWS, T. J. MEADOWS, and EMMA T. MEADOWS and MARK B. MEADOWS as Executors of the Last Will and Testament of SUSIE L. MEADOWS, Appellants
Division One
January 5, 1937
100 S. W. (2d) 281
Moore & Moore for respondent.
The testatrix was Susie L. Meadows. Plaintiff Tressie O. Stevens, and defendants, Emma T. and Mark B. Meadows, are the daughters and son of testatrix. Defendant, T. J. Meadows, is the surviving husband and father. Emma and Mark were made executors under the will and were also made defendants as such. Testatrix died seized of considerable property, real and personal, and by her will gave it all to defendants, except $5 to plaintiff. The alleged will was executed March 2, 1929. “A few days after” January 18, 1929, prior to the execution of the will in question, testatrix executed a will, identical with the present will; except in the first will contestant was given $500. At the time of the execution of these wills testatrix was about sixty years old, and lived on her farm with the family, which (when the second will was executed) consisted of herself, the husband and the daughter Emma and the son Mark. At that time Emma was thirty-five years old, Mark was thirty-two, and contestant somewhat over thirty-six, being fifteen months older than Emma.
Plaintiff alleged undue influence of Emma and Mark and an insane delusion on the part of testatrix. Undue influence was, by the trial court, withdrawn from the jury‘s consideration. The alleged insane delusion pleaded and found by the jury to exist was that testatrix, at the time of the execution of the will, was under the insane delusion “that it was wrong for any of her children to marry and leave home or have any association with or receive attentions from any person of the opposite sex, and said pretended will was the product of said delusion and not of the real judgment and mind of testatrix.” The answer, among other things, denied the existence of the alleged insane delusion.
Error is assigned on the refusal of proponents’ demurrer to the evidence at the close of the whole case and on an instruction given on behalf of contestant. The verdict, as stated, was for contestant, that is, against the alleged will, hence in ruling the assignment on the demurrer we accept as true all the evidence tending to support the verdict, together with all favorable inferences therefrom and will disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. [Berkemeier et al. v. Reller et al., 317 Mo. 614, 296 S. W. 739; Yerger v. Smith et al., 338 Mo. 140, 89 S. W. (2d) 66; Evans v. Partlow, 322 Mo. 11, 16 S. W. (2d) 212.] The record discloses that testatrix was a strong-willed woman; that she was the “head of the house” in all matters; that she was boss and general manager in the full sense that these terms imply. She managed the farms, borrowed money when necessary and gave her own note. Neither her husband, nor anyone else, had any part in the business affairs of the family. Testatrix had what the witnesses called a high temper and it appears that when “her will was opposed” she became excited and angry, and that she did most of the talking whatever the subject. But, with all this, it is conceded that her mind was strong and that she was a very capable and competent business woman, and no complaint is made concerning her mental capacity except on the alleged insane delusion. Testatrix was generous with her children as to money matters and bought for them about whatever they asked for.
The circumstances related by contestant to support the alleged insane delusion are substantially these: Contestant testified that the first time there was any question raised by her mother about boys was when a young man named Crowley wrote contestant and asked if he could take her to a nearby town. The mother had contestant to write this young man and tell him that “he couldn‘t come.” After that, Crowley “called up” and asked to take contestant out and the mother talked to him. Contestant did not hear what her mother
Then later, the Meadows family was in Excelsior Springs one night at a street dance; they stood in front of a clothing store “and the door went back and it was dark in the back entrance of the door and they wanted me to stand back there and I kept going back in the light. (Contestant had seen Stevens in the crowd, but had not spoken to him.) Finally, my mother took hold of my sleeve and just jerked me back and told me to stand back there. I jerked away from her and told her I would stand out in the light and went on back out in the light and stood there. Contestant says that when the family got home that night her mother and sister “jumped on” her; that the mother said that “I ought to be ashamed of myself—making a fool of her down on the street and so I said, ‘Well, I am going to leave; if a thirty-five year old woman can‘t stand where she wants
Later contestant “commenced communicating with Ernest again,” and noticed that her letters were disarranged. She sometimes put her letters under the sheets and pillow cases in her room, but usually kept them in a drawer. Contestant finally left home in February, 1929, and shortly after the execution of the first will. She described her final leaving thus: “At the time I left home the last time, I wanted to go to Lawson with Mark, and I told Emma to tell Mark to wait, that I wanted to go to town with him. Emma said, ‘If you go out of that door, you will never come back.’ Mother came in
It appears in an additional abstract by contestant that a Dr. Shasberry became interested (time not shown) in her and that she asked her mother if he could come to see her (contestant) and that the mother said that “no young man would ever darken her gate to see either one of her daughters.” Proponents state in their brief that the evidence about Dr. Shasberry was stricken out, but there is nothing here to support this assertion. Contestant brought such evidence here by her additional abstract. Our Rule 11 prescribes the procedure for attack upon an additional abstract. This rule, among other things, provides: “Objections to such additional abstract shall be filed with our clerk within ten days after service of such abstracts upon the appellant, and a copy of such objections shall be served upon the respondent in like time.” No objections, as the rule contemplates, were filed, hence we take the additional abstract as a part of the record.
Contestant further testified respecting her mother‘s treatment, her temper and disposition as follows: “All the time I was at home my mother treated me all right except when this question of Ernest Stevens came up. Mother was very liberal with her money, couldn‘t spend enough money on us children and would get us anything we wanted. I never had any trouble of any kind with my mother except over Ernest Stevens. My mother was a kind woman, but was very firm in character and disposition. The family always did what-ever my mother wanted done. She had a very high temper and would fly off awful easy at little things. I never knew her to change her mind after she had once taken a position on anything.” It also appears from contestant‘s evidence that Stevens was distantly related by blood to the Meadows family.
Mrs. Maud Hufft, Margaret Ford, Miss Reba Stevens and Mrs. Cora Stevens, lay witnesses for contestant, gave their opinion as to the mental slant of testatrix. Mrs. Hufft thought testatrix was of unsound mind because “she had to go right with” her children when they went out among young people; that testatrix “wanted to go where the children went.” Margaret Ford said that she had resided at Excelsior Springs for seventeen years, and for seven years had been a nurse in the office of Dr. James; that prior to going to Excelsior Springs she resided at Lawson, near the Meadows family,
Mrs. Cora Stevens, mother of contestant‘s husband, considered testatrix of unsound mind “because she did not allow her children to have company and go out with other children and be like other children. She did not put confidence in them to risk them with anybody. I know she did not, because I have been there with them and they have been at our house. . . . I have seen Mrs. Meadows have wild fits of anger several times.”
Mrs. Kate Myers, sister of contestant‘s father, testified that on one occasion she was in the Meadows home and that Mark “was studying” and that she said, “Well, Mark, you stay with your books. We want you to be a lawyer. We haven‘t a lawyer in our family and we want you to be one;” that thereupon testatrix said, “I don‘t want you to come out here and put mischief in my child‘s head;” that on this same occasion or another, testatrix said that “if any of her children were to disobey her and left home, that she would disown them;” that upon this remark witness said, “Well, now Susie (testatrix), you know that if Mark would leave home, disobey you and leave home, that you couldn‘t disown him,” and that testatrix said, “Yes, I would.” Mrs. Myers further testified
Dr. W. J. James, who had been the physician of the Meadows family for twenty years, testified as follows: “Assuming that the evidence in this case shows, and there is evidence in the case that tends to show, that Mrs. Meadows was a woman of high temper; that at times she showed violent temper; that she made a statement a few years before the marriage of her daughter that if any of her children ever left home, she would disown them; that she made a statement to her oldest daughter that no man should ever darken her gate for the purpose of seeing one of her daughters; that she compelled or insisted that her oldest daughter, after she was of marriageable age, not receive the attentions or correspond with two young men who wished to visit her or correspond with her; that on one occasion she became very violent because she claimed that her daughter was assisting her brother in his attentions to a young lady; that she told her daughter to pay no attention to Ernest Stevens, another young man who was at that time a close friend of the family; that afterwards, when her daughter had married Ernest Stevens and the marriage was mentioned to her, on two different occasions, she became very much excited, talked in a loud tone of voice and on one occasion hollered that ‘Aunt Kate wants us to forgive Tressie’ and repeated it over and over (no evidence that this was repeated over and over), and on another occasion became very much excited because of a suggestion to her that instead of losing a daughter she had gained a son, and said that she hadn‘t any son and had lost her daughter—assuming all of the foregoing facts with reference to Mrs. Meadows, I would say that she was a person of unsound mind on the question of the marriage of her children.”
The evidence on behalf of the proponents is for the most part contrary to that for contestant. The sum and substance of the evidence of proponents is that contestant is a “chip off the block;” that she and her mother did not get along well and never had, and were frequently in disagreement. Emma, testifying about the oc-
It is well known that lay witnesses, giving their opinion as to mental condition, when their opinion is that the person whose mental condition is in issue, is or was of unsound mind, must state the facts upon which such opinion is based, and this because “the opinion of a lay witness as to the insanity of an individual is of no weight when not based on facts inconsistent with sanity. [37 S. W. (2d) 430; Kaechelen v. Barringer (Mo.), 19 S. W. (2d) 1033, l. c. 1037; State v. Finley, 321 Mo. 621, 12 S. W. (2d) 27, l. c. 28; State v. Cockriel, 314 Mo. 699, 285 S. W. 440; State v. Liolios, 285 Mo. 1, 225 S. W. 941; Hunter v. Briggs, 254 Mo. 28, l. c. 54, 162 S. W. 204; In re Walter‘s Estate (Mich.), 184 N. W. 529; In re Murray‘s Estate (Mich.), 188 N. W. 381; In re Paczoch‘s Estate (Iowa), 211 N. W. 500; Zander v. Cahow (Iowa), 206 N. W. 90.] Also, it is the rule that courts will scan with care the evidence of lay witnesses that an individual is or was of unsound mind, to see that such witnesses have detailed “facts from which they can express an opinion upon mental capacity.” [Frohman v. Lowenstein et al., 303 Mo. 339, 260 S. W. 460.]
Contestant‘s lay witnesses based their opinion that testatrix was of unsound mind on the subject of her children having attention from the opposite sex on what they saw and observed more than on anything that testatrix said. Dr. James stated that he based his opinion solely on what was incorporated in the hypothetical question; that he had “considerable opportunity to observe Mrs. Meadows in the ordinary affairs of life and business matters,
All the mental capacity required to make a valid will, so far as judicial expression can settle, is that the testator must have “had sufficient understanding to comprehend the nature of the transaction that he was engaged in, the nature and extent of his property and to whom he desired to give it, and was giving it without the aid of any other person.” [Sayre v. Trustees of Princeton University, supra.]
In Conner v. Skaggs, supra, it appears that a father disinherited a daughter, who contested the will. The contest was on the grounds of undue influence and lack of mental capacity. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the evidence and on appeal this action was
In the present case the record shows that Mrs. Meadows first talked to her banker about the will, and when she executed both the first and last will, she was not in a transport of temper, but on the contrary, she was calm and deliberate. She went alone to her banker, Mr. Zimmerman, and told him she wanted to make her
In Everly v. Everly, 297 Mo. 196, 249 S. W. 88, it is ruled that “the question of mental capacity involves whether the testator‘s mind was in such condition that he recognized his obligation to the objects of his bounty and their relation to him. Undoubtedly, a very unjust disposition of his property, a disposition which would disinherit a deserving child, would be some indication of failure to understand his obligation to the child.” The rule, as stated in the Everly case, was reannounced in Evans v. Partlow, 322 Mo. 11, 16 S. W. (2d) l. c. 216. Herzog‘s Medical Jurisprudence, section 697 says: “While the law recognizes the fact that a man may dispose of his property in such a way as to deprive some of those related to him by marriage or family ties of any share in his estate for good reasons, it also takes cognizance of the fact that to do so without very potent reasons is likely to be due to a deranged mind, to insane delusions relating to such member of his family as he ignores or disinherits by his will.” Able counsel do not call our attention to any case supporting their theory, and with diligent search, we have found none.
We are constrained to rule that contestant failed to present any substantial evidence tending to show that the will in question is the result of the alleged insane delusion. It is unfortunate that a parent should ever be so headstrong and self-determined as was Mrs. Meadows as reflected by the record, and it would be more agreeable to reach a different result than that to which we feel impelled, under the law, to reach. Mrs. Meadows may have been grievously unjust to her daughter, but if a parent, mentally capable, as this record discloses Mrs. Meadows was, disinherits her son or daughter, there is no redress if the settled law on the question of mental capacity
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded with direction to set aside the verdict of the jury and the judgment entered thereon, and enter judgment that the paper writing in question is the last will and testament of Susie L. Meadows, and it is so ordered. Ferguson and Hyde, CC., concur.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by BRADLEY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All the judges concur.
