In this negligence action, appellants seek damages for an injury to 14-year-old Patrick Stevens. They claim that appellees Carroll J. Hall and Joe Roy Blakney struck him with their motorcycles during a hit- and-run accident in front of the Stevens family home on Ontario Road, N.W. on August 24, 1975. The motions judge granted both appellees’ motions for summary judgment. Appellants seek review of these rulings. We affirm summary judgment for appellee Blakney; the record establishes that he was not involved in the accident. We reverse and remand as to appellee Hall.
I.
Witnesses testified that Patrick Stevens, who was playing with a neighbor at approximately 10:30 p. m., ran into the street from between two parked cars. He was struck by a blue motorcycle, running without a headlight. Witnesses also testified that a red or green motorcycle with its headlight on had preceded the blue motorcycle down the street. One of the witnesses, 15-year-old Pierre Whitney, chased after the two motorcycles and managed to copy down the license number of one of them, which had stopped at a nearby traffic light. Whitney told investigating police officers that he had written down the license number of the blue cycle; but, when the police located its owner, Joe Roy Blakney, they found that the vehicle was green. Appellee Blakney told police that he had been riding his motorcycle in the neighborhood with an ac *794 quaintance, Carroll J. Hall (the other appel-lee); that they had visited a friend, Ms. Beatrice Poindexter, on Ontario Road; that because Hall had had some problems starting his cycle when they left Ms. Poindex-ter’s house, Blakney had been running some distance ahead of Hall as they rode their cycles up Ontario Road toward Kalorama Road; that while Blakney was stopped at the first traffic light he had encountered after turning onto Kalorama, Hall had run the red light at that intersection; and, finally, that when they both stopped at a traffic light some blocks later, he recalled Hall’s asking him, “Did you see that kid?”
Appellee Hall, who owned a blue motorcycle, confirmed to police that he had been riding in the neighborhood with Blakney on the evening in question, and that because he had to roll his vehicle downhill to jump-start it, he had been some distance behind Blakney as they rode up Ontario toward Kalorama. Hall claimed, however, that he had turned on his light when he turned his cycle around; and he denied any knowledge of hitting a child on Ontario. The police charged Hall with reckless driving and leaving the scene of an accident. He entered a guilty plea to the latter charge; the first charge was dismissed.
II.
Defendant-appellees’ motions for summary judgment rested on separate grounds. Mr. Blakney argued, first, that despite the initial confusion caused by witness Pierre Whitney’s statement to police (that he wrote down the license number of the blue motorcycle), there could be no question that it was Hall’s cycle, not Blakney’s, that struck Patrick Stevens. Second, Blakney contended there was no evidence that he had been involved in a race or any other joint venture with Hall which, under the laws of this jurisdiction, might make him a joint tortfeasor should Hall be held responsible for the accident. We consider both points to be well taken.
Although “[t]he function of the court on a summary judgment motion ‘is limited to ascertaining whether any factual issue pertinent to the controversy exists,’ ”
Weiss v. Kay Jewelry Stores, Inc.,
152 U.S. App.D.C. 350, 352-53,
First, the witnesses unanimously testified that Patrick Stevens was struck by a blue motorcycle; Blakney’s cycle was green. Second, all witnesses testified that the youth was struck by the second cycle. Both Blakney and Hall stated that Hall had had difficulty starting his motorcycle and, as a consequence, was running behind Blakney as they rode along Ontario Road. Furthermore, Blakney’s statement is undisputed: while he was stopped for the first traffic light after turning from Ontario onto Kalorama, Hall rode through it. Thus, there is no room for dispute over the order in which the motorcycles of Blakney and Hall passed the scene of the accident on Ontario, or over the conclusion that Blakney’s cycle, as the first one to pass the Stevens home, did not strike Patrick Stevens. 1
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Nor do we find in the record of complaint, answers, interrogatories, affidavits, and depositions any indication that appellee Blakney was engaged in a race or a joint venture with Hall which could serve as a basis for attributing Hall’s actions to Blak-ney for purposes of assessing negligence. In reaching this conclusion, we need not assess the vitality in this jurisdiction of the view adopted elsewhere that all who engage in a race with motor vehicles on a public road are liable for an injury sustained as a result by a third party. See, e.
g., Haddock
v.
Stewart,
In the absence of a “genuine issue as to any material fact,” defendant-appellee Blakney was entitled to summary judgment, pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56.
III.
Appellee Hall’s motion for summary judgment was based upon the assumption, solely for the sake of argument, that Hall was operating his vehicle in a negligent fashion. He contends, nevertheless, that the accident was proximately caused by Patrick Stevens’ running into the street from between two parked cars without first looking for oncoming traffic and, further, that Hall did not have a “last clear chance” to avoid the collision.
In support of this assertion, appellee Hall argues that (1) the child’s violation of traffic regulations constituted contributory negligence per se and, in any event, (2) on the basis of undisputed facts in the record, the motions judge had to find the child contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
As to the first argument, we note that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in developing the law of negligence for this jurisdiction, has rejected automatic application of the negligence per se rule.
See Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co.,
Even though the per se rule, limited by the “statutory purpose” gloss, has retained its validity, the courts of this jurisdiction have been wary of extending it to minors. In
Herrell v. Pimsler,
[A] proper charge to the jury . should clearly state that a violation of a traffic regulation is only one factor to be considered in determining whether minor plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence and that the jury should consider whether minor plaintiff exercised reasonable care in light of his age, education, training, and experience. [Herrell v. Pimsler, supra at 1171 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).] 3
We agree with Judge Youngdahl’s formulation; it reflects the only feasible way to evaluate negligence when a statutory or regulatory violation must be combined with the traditional standard of care applicable *797 to minors. 4 Appellee’s per se contributory negligence argument, as a basis for summary judgment, accordingly fails. 5
We therefore turn to appellee Hall’s second argument, namely, that even if the doctrine of per se negligence has no applicability in this case, the Stevens child was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Appellee asserts that the question whether his headlamp was on is immaterial — that the affidavits and depositions of witnesses to the accident indicate there was sufficient light on the street for Patrick Stevens to see the motorcycle. This argument is not at all persuasive. The record establishes at least three genuine issues of material fact bearing on the question whether Patrick Stevens was contributorily negligent. In the first place, several witnesses testified that it was “pretty dark,” “real dark,” or “very dark.” Second, there was testimony that the sound of the first cycle, ridden by Blakney, made imperceptible the sound of Hall’s approaching vehicle. Thus, there was a factual dispute over the importance of Hall’s unlighted headlamp to the contributory negligence issue. Finally, there was conflicting testimony over how close the motorcycle was traveling to the parked cars. Given the possibility that the vehicle’s headlamp was not on, the position of the vehicle on the roadway — and thus the opportunity for the youth to see the motorcycle through the line of parked cars without stepping out on the roadway — would be material to the factfinder’s deliberations about contributory negligence.
In summary, the question whether a youth of Patrick Stevens’ age and capacity should have been expected to see a motorcycle without a headlight coming along this particular residential street at 10:30 p. m. in late August — and thus avoid the collision— is for the jury, not for summary judgment by the court. Because we reject appellee Hall’s assertion that Patrick Stevens was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, we need not consider the proximate cause issue, including appellee’s contention that he did not have a “last clear chance” to avoid the accident.
Accordingly, the judgment on appeal as to appellee Blakney is affirmed. As to ap-pellee Hall, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
So ordered.
Notes
. It is true, as appellants point out, that when the police asked Pierre Whitney for the license number of the blue motorcycle, which reportedly struck Patrick Stevens, he gave them a number which corresponded to Blakney’s green vehicle. However, in a later deposition, while recalling that only one of the cycles had stopped at the traffic light where he noted the license number, Mr. Whitney had no independent recollection of the color of the cycle.
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Although the court does not evaluate the credibility of the material presented to it on a summary judgment motion,
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp.,
. This “statutory purpose” gloss on the per se negligence rule has resulted in use of the per se rule for most motor vehicle accidents. “Our Court of Appeals has consistently held in personal injury cases involving vehicles that if an applicable traffic regulation is violated negligence has been established as a matter of law, thus leaving only the question of proximate cause to be decided.”
Herrell v. Pimsler,
It is important to emphasize in this connection that even when the per se negligence rule is applicable, the jury may have a difficult threshold question as to whether, in fact, the relevant statute or regulation has been violated.
See, e. g., Yellow Cab Co. of D.C. v. Griffith,
D.C.Mun.App.,
. In dicta, the circuit court of appeals in
D.C. Transit System v. Bates,
. Judge Youngdahl announced one exception to his formulation (with which we need not deal here). “[T]he Court is in agreement with those jurisdictions which hold minor automobile drivers and motorcycle riders to the adult standard of care and the negligence per se rule . . .”
Herrell v. Pimsler, supra
at 1172. This exception has been justified on the ground that a minor who drives a car or motorcycle “engages in an activity which is normally undertaken only by adults, and for which adult qualifications are required.”
Prichard v. Veterans Cab Co.,
. Even if the per se negligence rule were applicable to Patrick Stevens here, there would remain the question of proximate cause. The evidence shows that both Carroll Hall and Patrick Stevens may have violated traffic regulations — Hall, the regulations requiring drivers of vehicles to exercise “due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian,” Highways and Traffic Regulations for the District of Columbia, Part I, § 54, and to display “lighted lamps” from “a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise,” id., Part I, § 118, and Stevens, the regulation requiring pedestrians to “yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway” except at marked crosswalks or intersections. Id., Part I, § 53. Where both sets of regulations may have been violated, per se concepts which, in their strict application, would support a finding of negligence by both parties, are of limited assistance in resolving the question of liability, given the jury’s complex responsibility of sorting out proximate cause.