Stevens v. DukeStevens v. Duke
As to the first assignment of error the record shows that as the result of the collision the driver of the defendants’ motor vehicle was killed. The plaintiffs’ driver, one Graham, was severely injured in the accident and was removed to a hospital in Palm Beach County for medical аnd surgical care and treatment. The day following the accident, one Purtle, a Florida Highway Patrolman in charge of investigating the accident in Martin County, requestеd one Randall, a Florida Highway Patrolman stationed in Palm Beach County, to interview Graham and secure from him a written statement concerning the details of the collision. Acting pursuant to his instructions, Randall interrogated plaintiffs’ driver and the answers given in response to this interrogation were written down by Randall in longhand and signed by Graham as his statement of the accident. Thereafter, the signed statement was forwarded by Randall to Purtle to enable the latter to complete his accident report to be filed with the State Department of Public Safety. Whether the statement furnished by Randall to Purtle was ever incorporated in the report made by Randаll, is not shown by the record.
When this case came on for trial in the court below the defendants called Randall as a witness for the purpose of having him testify to the substance of the statement made to him by plaintiffs’ driver.
It is our view that the trial court did not commit reversible error in excluding the proffered testimony.
By reason of the requirements of
The appellants rely on certain California cases cited in their brief to support their position that error was committed in excluding the proffered testimony of the witness Randell, but in our оpinion the cases cited are either not in point or are easily distinguishable on the facts. A California case later in point of time than those contained in the brief is Carpenter v. Gibson, 80 Cal.App.2d 269, 181 P.2d 953, and we think that a close analysis of that case will support the conclusion we have reached herein. Ritter v. Neiman, 329 Ill. App. 163, 67 N.E.2d 417, has been cited by the appellants to support their position, but we think it is distinguishable. For in the case it was not shown that the statements made by the participant in the accident which later were tеstified to by the investigating officer were made to him for the purpose of forming a basis for the official report required to be filed by the participant.
In Haddad v. Brown Root, Tex.Civ. App., 175 S.W.2d 269, overruled by Brown Root v. Haddad, 142 Tex. 624, 180 S.W.2d 339, the оnly question was whether an accident report made and filed by an investigating officer (which, so far as the record showed, contained no statements by the participants in the accident to the investigating officer) could be used by the defendant to impeach the investigating officer with respect to certain statеments made by him at
Airline Motor Coaches v. Howell, Tex. Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 713, appears at first glance to support the pоsition of the appellants but it, too, has its distinguishing features. In the case a portion of a written statement made by a participant in an accident to an investigating officеr was allowed in evidence, over objection of the adverse party, for the purpose of impeaching the participant as to contradiсtory statements made by him on the witness stand. Later, the objecting party placed in evidence the entire written statement. Though the court made certain observatiоns with respect to the propriety of such a statement or portion thereof being admitted as evidence in the trial, under the Texas motor vehicle laws, wе think the real question in the case was whether the introduction of the entire statement by the objecting party operated as a waiver of the objection made to the introduction of a portion thereof by the adversary.
We would be less than fair to the parties were we not to concede that certain cases from other jurisdictions appear to support the contentions advanced by the appellants. However, such cases are not binding upon this court but are only persuasive, and we are under no duty to follow them if we think another course is more consonant with justice and reason. We hold that the trial judge aсted correctly in excluding the testimony of the witness Randall.
The second contention made by the defendants is that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to admit into evidence a certified copy of the proceedings in a criminal case prosecuted in the County Court of Martin County, and subsequently affirmed on appeal by the Circuit Court of Martin County, wherein the driver of the plaintiffs’ motor vehicle was convicted of a violation of the traffic laws of the State for his рarticipation in the accident which gave rise to the pending civil trial.
We find no error in this ruling. It is a general rule supported by the great weight of authority that a judgment оf conviction in a criminal prosecution cannot be given in evidence in a civil action to establish the truth of the facts on which it was rendered. Though the rule is not without its exceptions, the facts of the case at bar do not come within any of the recognized exceptions. See 30 Am.Jur. pp. 1002-1006, Judgments Secs. 289-294; Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301, 31 A.L.R. 261; 57 A.L.R. 504; Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711, 80 A.L.R. 1145; 130 A.L.R. 690.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADAMS, C.J., and CHAPMAN and HOBSON, JJ., concur.