61 Minn. 104 | Minn. | 1895
It appears that the property for which the plaintiff seeks to hold the garnishee liable was, at the time of the service of the summons, in the possession of the garnishee, merely as common carrier,foj transportation from St. Paul, in this state, to West' Superior, Wisconsin, the place of consignment; that the car in which the property was formed a part of a regular train operated’an transporting freight between the places named; that the train was already made up, and was standing on a siding in St. Paul, ready to start for Superior; that thereafter the property was transported to West Superior, and there delivered to the consignee.
We do not deem important the fact that the train had not yet moved out of the St. Paul yard. The property was none the less in the possession of the garnishee, as common carrier, for transportation to the place of consignment. In contemplation of law, It was in transit.
The courts have not infrequently been confronted with the question whether a common carrier can be held liable to judgment on the process of garnishment merely on the ground that it may, at the time of the service of the process, have had property in transit on its route belonging to the defendant debtor. The objections, on grounds both of public policy and of injustice to the carrier, to holding the carrier liable under such circumstances, have been fully recognized by the courts, and have led them, notwithstanding the broad language of the statutes, to deny or limit the liability of
It is a well-settled rule of construction that courts may, under certain circumstances, adopt a restrictive construction of the general words of a statute. This has often been done in the case of statutes of the kind now under consideration. See Staniels v. Baymond, 4 Cush. 314, in which it was held that a person might have the possession or control of the property of another, and yet not be subject to the trustee process. One limitation which all courts agree in imposing upon the language of such statutes, so as to make an exception to their general words, is that the personal property which may be arrested in the hands of the garnishee must be within the state, so that it may be seized and sold to satisfy any judgment obtained against the principal debtor. Upon the question whether it must be within the state' at the time of the service of the process, or whether it is enough if it is so at the time of the-garnishee’s disclosure, the decisions are not entirely agreed. But that question is not material here.
The proposition is fundamental in the law of garnishment that the property is arrested, if at all, subject to all the rights of the garnishee. Our statute expressly provides that “the garnishee-shall not be compelled to deliver any specific articles at any other time or place than as stipulated in the contract between him and the defendant.” G. S. 1894, § 5325. Under this statute, we think
Judgment reversed.