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Steven Waters v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
291 S.W.3d 873
Tenn.
2009
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*1 review, acknowledged this Court present directly

State could matter regardless grand jury of the order prior opin- In an expunging records. Craig ion authored Justice Martha ex- Daughtrey, Court ruled punction legal efficacy” order had “lost its proceedings when the State continued the defendant. The State was “free ... prosecute the case as if the entered,”

order had never been regardless failure to object appeal State’s expunction proceeding. the initial Id. at

Conclusion circumstances, Under these the trial judicial court took properly notice of its prior proceedings. own Because the first timely indictment was pending at the grand jury time the returned the second indictment, one-year statute of limita- applicable tions to misdemeanors was expunction tolled. The order of should not have been entered and is of no effect. The is, therefore, judgment the trial court appeal affirmed. Costs of this as- are appellant, sessed to the Mack Neddie Law- son, surety, and his for which execution necessary. if issue al.

Steven WATERS et FARR, Reagan Commissioner of Revenue for the State

of Tennessee. Tennessee, Supreme Court of at Knoxville. 7,May 2008 Session.

July *4 Farr,

gan Commissioner of Revenue the State of Tennessee.1 Lomonaco, Knoxville, A. Philip Tennes- see, for appellee, Steven Waters.

OPINION WADE, J.,

GARY R. delivered the court, opinion of the in which M. JANICE HOLDER, C.J., and WILLIAM M. BARKER, J., joined. WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., separate J. filed a opinion concurring part dissenting part, in which CLARK, J., A. CORNELIA joined. 1, 2005, January

Effective the Tennes- *5 Assembly see General enacted a tax on the possession of unauthorized substances for purpose the generating of as- revenues to state local agen- sist and law enforcement cies in their to drug efforts combat crimes. Subsequently, Steven Waters was assessed taxes, penalty, and interest in the $55,316.84 by total amount of the Tennes- Department see of Revenue after purchas- nearly kilogram ing a of cocaine a from declaratory confidential informant. In a judgment Chancery suit the of Court County, challenged Loudon Waters the constitutionality of grounds the statute on self-incrimination, of jeopardy double and process. The due chancellor the declared statute unconstitutional and set the aside On assessment. direct appeal, the Court affirmed, Appeals holding of that the en- Assembly’s the actment exceeded General Appeal from by Permission of Court II, taxing power under article section 28 of Appeals, Chancery Eastern Section Court the Tennessee Constitution. we Initially, 10710; County, for Loudon No. Frank V. hold that the statute imposing III, Williams, Chancellor. does unauthorized substances not violate Jr., Cooper, Attorney Robert E. General protections against the constitutional self- Moore, Reporter; Michael E. Solicitor jeopardy incrimination and double General; Buchanan, H. abridge procedural and Brad Assistant due guarantee of General, Because, however, Attorney appellant, process. for the Rea- the tax cannot Ap- appeal 1. In party place accordance with Tennessee Rule of a stituted as Farr, 19(c), pellate Reagan cur- Procedure predecessor, Chumley. of his Loren L. Revenue, rent Commissioner of sub- been merchants, ters, use of been unaware of his a tax on had as either classified illegal substance. as privileges, a tax on peddlers a tax constitution, the by our state authorized morning of April On the Wa- Appeals is af- judgment telephone a from an indi- ters call received year firmed. known a vidual he had for about half, he used cocaine and with whom had informed past. in the individual Wa- Facts “nearly had kilograms ters that she nine (‘Wa- 25, 2005, Steven Waters April On from and that pure” cocaine Miami she ters”), fifty-one-year-old resident “trying get was to move it and out town County, pur- was arrested after Loudon the cocaine at a fast.” She offered sell nearly kilogram of cocaine from chasing $17,000 per price kilogram arranged part of a “re- informant a confidential lot parking of a meet Waters in the sting” officers verse conducted trying a small bakery in Knoxville. After Knox County Sher- Narcotics Unit of sample, the cocaine as a Waters amount of posses- Based Waters’ iffs Office. high acknowledged quality cocaine, the De- Tennessee purchase. sion Later that but eve- declined (“Department again of Revenue of- partment ning, telephoned the woman Revenue”) price the cocaine at a reduced issued an assess- fered subsequently $12,000 Waters, kilogram. per believing newly enacted tax on un- ment under the greater value far than the street then authorized substances.2 Waters At consented the terms. price, constitutionality of the tax challenged *6 planned explained he that he had hearing, judgment filing declaratory action cocaine little at a time” and to use the “a the Commissioner Revenue against that he had intention to either claimed no (“Commissioner”). Tennessee give anybody it to sell the substance arrest, Waters, a By the time of his else. in trim specializing and interior carpenter Waters, to the individual Unbeknownst homes, in new had worked in and work purchase he had agreed from whom to for his County twenty around Loudon was a confidential informant work- cocaine in the trade. evi- thirty-five years ing cooperation with the Narcotics Unit in the indicates at dence record that some (“Sher- County Sheriffs Office the Knox time, during point period Waters Office”). Captain Lyon, iffs Bernie “[wjeekend began to use cocaine on a ba- twenty-seven-year veteran Sheriffs that sis.” He claimed substance Office, acquain- that testified he had been “[kjind better,” feel [him] made approximately ted with the informant for him to him “feel gave “a little burst” make that years, he had known her to twenty explaining better about work.” While he drugs past, use in the and that had purchased regularly he his cocaine in an try her to to sell the cocaine to instructed area off of Western Avenue” in “down Captain Lyon further testified Waters. County, Knox he insisted that he had nev- “going price” gram for a of co- drug anyone. er sold the to He believed the street” per caine “on was about $100 arrest, wife, After on the gram.3 agreed that until his his Naomi Wa- Waters had 1, 2005, (codified January 2. 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1840 stances became effective on prior four months to Waters' arrest. less than §§ Tenn.Code Ann. 67-4-2801 -2811 (Supp.2004)). tax on unauthorized sub- explained Captain Lyon that street dealers they can stretch often dilute cocaine "so price, Captain Lyon Office, and Ser- purchase technician at the Sheriffs complet- Hammond, the geant supervisor James of ed a form Department for the of Revenue Unit, provided the Narcotics the informant documenting the arrest and the amount of with brick of cocaine from the vault cocaine provided seized. The form the Sheriffs Office. The package money 75% of the collected from the tax weighed grams, indicating 999.2 that the on the cocaine that possessed Waters had estimated street value of the cocaine Wa- was to be distributed to the Sheriffs Of- $12,000 agreed purchase ters had fice, with the remaining payable 25% $99,200. high could have been as as the Department of Revenue.4 On or about 20, 2005, May Eugene Johnson of the De- The officers followed the informant to partment of Revenue’s Unauthorized Sub- parking lot of a restaurant near the stance Tax Reports intersection office in Knoxville Springs of Walker Road and Knoxville, hand-delivered Kingston Pike in to the where Waters Waters residence a $12,000 Notice of paid drugs. for the Assessment When and Demand for (“Assessment”) informant respec- Payment and Waters drove their in the sum of scene, $55,316.84, away tive vehicles from the Captain $49,940 which included in tax Lyon followed the informant liability5 $5,376.84 retrieve plus in penalty and in- money Sergeant Hammond sev- later, terest. One week Department eral other officers followed Waters. After Revenue notified Waters mail that it mile, quarter about a of a the officers had filed a lien the residence he Waters, truck, apprehended searched his jointly owned with his wife in order to and recovered the cocaine. Waters was payment secure Further, of the tax. trial, then jail. arrested and taken to At Department of Revenue sent a Levy Noti- Captain Lyon both and Sergeant Ham- fication and Notice of Levy to several acknowledged mond that there was no evi- banks in East Tennessee in an attempt to dence suggesting that had ever Waters recover assets that those might banks drugs sold or intended to sell any drugs, have holding been for Waters. After- including the cocaine he purchased had wards, *7 the Department of Revenue re- from the informant. $3,800 ceived approximately from the policy accordance with a developed checking account Waters had at First Ten- January of Karen Phillips, drug nessee Bank.6 powder

their out a little bit further.” He also amended § at Tenn.Code Ann. 67-4- 2803(a)(4) (2006)). knowledge stated that purity he had no of the Although the cocaine that Waters, level of the cocaine sold to purchased weighed and that grams, Waters 999.2 the substance was not tested the Tennessee amount of the apparently Assessment was Investigation prove Bureau of grams other than to based on the Phillips 998.8 had was, fact, that it cocaine. Waters registration testified written on the tax form that that the Department informant told him the cocaine she faxed to the of Revenue. "nearly pure.” Depart- 6.Waters testified that the Tennessee -4—2809(b)(2) § Safety possession See Tenn.Code Ann. ment of took of his truck 67— (Supp.2004). gave option purchasing him the it back $5,000. from the state for its value of Coun- 5. "An excise tax is levied on any unauthorized sel for the Commissioner stated that tak- possessed, actively ing substances either satisfy con- of Waters’ truck "was not to assessment," structively, by following dealers at the Department rates: and that the (3) ($50.00) Fifty ... gram, knowledge dollars for each taking. Revenue had no of such thereof, fraction representative Department Safety cocaine.” Tenn.Code No 67-4-2803(a) (codified § (Supp.2004) Ann. testified. unauthorized sub- ruling that the tax on History

Procedural the state and federal stances violated wife, and his Waters July On against com- prohibitions constitutional par- as a subsequently dismissed who was self-incrimination, crimi- imposed in the a pelled filed suit Chan- ty litigation, to the County against the Loudon cery Court for penalty, and au- nal rather than a civil Commissioner, declaratory and in- seeking a tax far in excess of thorized The Office of the Attor- junctive relief.7 drugs. paid amount Waters a copy served with ney General was De- The trial court further held that the on behalf of the appeared complaint, partment procedures of Revenue’s for as- Commissioner, represented Com- of the tax on un- sessment and collection the course of these throughout missioner satisfy failed to authorized substances alleged that Ten- proceedings.8 Waters process requirements of procedural due unauthorized substances nessee’s tax on the state and federal constitutions. Be- and federal constitution- violated state jury empaneled a had not been cause self-incrimination al protections the trial prosecution, failed to Waters’ criminal jeopardy also and double of law. process afford due yet had court found that Waters not been allega- An exposed jeopardy. to double proceeding, At the conclusion assessment, tion was not addressed.9 entrapment the trial court abated Office, proce- Attorney perhaps in an asserts that the General's effort 7. The Commissioner ruling in Tennessee Code Annotated dure outlined to facilitate a on the merits of claim 1—1801(a)(1)(B) provides § an indi- any procedural deficiency, rather than 67— opportunity challenge fair vidual with a challenged joinder party. the lack of as a possession of unauthorized Beeler, assessment for Cummings v. 189 Tenn. See Tenn.Code Ann. 67-4- See substances. (1949) (indicating S.W.2d that the (2006 agree, Supp.2008). While we a & Attorney party General be named "a defen- option presenting a taxpayer has the also any proceeding dant in where the constitu- challenge constitutionality a to the facial tionality legislature of the Act of the is before filing declaratory judgment a tax statute declaratory judgments proceed- the Court on Pipeline Morgan, Co. v. action. Colonial circumstances, ing”). Under all of these (Tenn.2008). S.W.3d joinder issue as to has been waived. See 36(a). R.App. P. opinion upon Nothing in this casts doubt long-standing requirement this state 25, 2005, April the events of a 9.Based challenge parties who statute’s consti- County grand jury Knox indicted Waters for through declaratory judgment tutionality ac- grams of more than three hundred their tion must serve notice of suit on deliver, intent A of cocaine with Class *8 Attorney General. Office of the Tenn.Code felony providing prison for a sentence of be- 14—107(b)(2000); Cummings § v. Ann. 29— sixty years up fine tween fifteen and and a 595, Shipp, Tenn. 3 S.W.2d 1063 156 $500,000. § Tenn.Code Ann. 39-17- (1928); (ex- see also Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04 417(j)(5) (Supp.2004); § Tenn.Code Ann. 40- requirement beyond panding de- the notice 35-111(b)(1) (2003). pursued While Waters actions). claratory judgment Waters com- declaratory judgment in his action the trial gave plied requirement proper with this and court, proceedings the criminal were held in notice federal and state constitutional of his 29, 2008, abeyance. January On Waters by serving copy complaint challenges a of his guilty pleaded to the lesser-included offense of Attorney General's Brad H. on the Office. cocaine, Buchanan, with intent to deliver a attorney in the Office's Tax Division, felony, B Class Tenn.Code Ann. 39-17- complaint filed the answer to the 417(a)(4), (b) placed (Supp.2004); he on appeared and on the Commissioner’s behalf Thus, eight years probation a term of and or- during appeal. for at trial this and fines, costs, $3,427 ably represented pay dered to court people’s have been interests Moreover, throughout proceeding. fees. this appeal, Appeals Appeals, On direct Court of holding while ruling the trial but affirmed court based its the tax on unauthorized substances violat- upon Ap- grounds. different The Court of ed legislature’s powers taxing under held that on peals unanimously constitution, the tax our state did not address self- substances unauthorized exceeded or process protections, incrimination due Assembly’s power Tennessee General to the grounds upon which trial court had impose provided a tax arti- privilege as Because relied. this case impor- involves II, cle section 28 of Tennessee Consti- tant questions of constitutional authority Chumley, tution.10 v. E2006- Waters No. statutory interpretation, this Court 02225-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL at granted application the Commissioner’s 2007). *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept.6, In an permission appeal. (now Justice) opinion Judge written Lee,

Sharon G. the Court of de- Appeals Standard of Review the legislature’s power privi- scribed to tax When called to construe a leges “extremely broad” but entire- not statute, we must first ascertain and then unlimited, ly observing that the General give full effect to the General Assembly’s Assembly may levy a privilege tax that purpose. intent and v. Waldschmidt Reas “arbitrary, is or unrea- capricious, wholly Co., sure Am. Ins. 271 S.W.3d Carson, (quoting Id. Hooten Life sonable.” v. (Tenn.2008). Our chief concern is to (1948)). 186 Tenn. 209 S.W.2d carry the legislature’s out intent without levy “Because Legislature] [the seeks to a broadening either restricting the statute engage tax privilege an activi- beyond scope. Houghton its intended v. ty that ... previously has [been] declared Res., Inc., Aramark Educ. 90 S.W.3d crime, be a privilege,” not a the Court (Tenn.2002) (quoting Owens Appeals “necessarily conclude[d] that (Tenn.1995)). 908 S.W.2d Drug arbitrary, Every Tax capricious, and un- word in reasonable, therefore, presumed a statute “is to have invalid under meaning purpose, given and should be the Constitution state.” Id. at *3. full if so doing effect does not violate The Court of also Appeals determined that tax obvious intention of the Legislature.” unauthorized substances was not C.K.G., (Tenn.2005) re “consistent with the rationale S.W.3d supporting Henderson, imposition tax, privilege (quoting which Marsh (1968)). 193, 196 holds that recompenses such a S.W.2d When the statutory language state for the secure and nurturing unambigu environ- clear and ous, provided ment it has the activity apply plain meaning or occu- we its without pation upon which the tax is Id. complicating levied.” the task. Eastman Chem. Johnson, (Tenn. opinion characterized the prop- state’s Co. 151 S.W.3d deterrence, 2004). role er as one of rather than ambiguous, When statute is how sustenance, ever, of protection one of individ- we reference the broader statu scheme, possess uals who tory legislation, Tennessee sub- the history of the *9 stances. Id. or other to its meaning. sources discern (3) generally only judicial 10. “Review will prevent prejudice pro- extend to to to the review,” presented those issues 13(a). but an R.App. cess.” Tenn. P. We believe appellate "may court in its discretion consid- appropriate that was an circumstance for order, among er other issues in other reasons: Appeals the of Court to exercise such discre- (1) (2) prevent litigation, pre- to needless to tion. injury vent to the of public, interests the 882 Salerno, 739, 745, 2095, 107 at 836. 481 U.S. S.Ct. 263 S.W.3d We Pipeline,

Colonial (1987). Assembly 95 L.Ed.2d 697 the General presume that of enactments knew prior aware its History of Taxes Unauthorized passed law at the time it

the state the of Owens, Substances legislation. 908 S.W.2d the constitutionality the challenges Waters interpre of constitutional Issues taxing statute on unautho- of Tennessee’s law, of which we questions tation are re substances, valid- rized both as its facial without any presumption view de novo of application and as to the of the statute ity to the given legal conclusions correctness specific to these circumstances. In consid- Pipeline, the courts below. Colonial claims, examine ering helpful his it is It well-settled in 263 S.W.3d at 836. history legislation taxes on imposing the not decide con Tennessee that “courts do unauthorized substances. questions stitutional unless resolution is determining absolutely necessary by I. Levied the Federal Taxes and adjudicating issues in the case and Other Government Taylor, rights parties.” State v. 70 States (Tenn.2002) 717, Owens, (citing S.W.3d 720 926). activities, including charge taxing illegal 908 S.W.2d at Our and sale sub uphold constitutionality of a statute Pickett, stances, long history 211 has a at both possible. wherever State v. (Tenn.2007). 696, years level. 150 700 “In evaluat federal and state Over S.W.3d statute, constitutionality States ing ago, Supreme of a we United an that could licenses begin presumption Congress require with the that act of held Assembly that were forbid the General is constitutional.” for businesses otherwise Elam, they Id. v. 104 the laws of the states in which (quoting Gallaher S.W.3d den 455, (Tenn.2003)); Vogel penalties could impose 459 also v. were located and see Servs., purchase S.W.2d for the failure to such licenses. Fargo Wells Guard 937 (Tenn.1996) (“A Cases, 72 858 statute comes to a License Tax U.S. 5 Wall. presumption Throughout court ‘clothed in a of constitu 18 L.Ed. 497 consistently tionality Legislature years, does our Court has highest [since] an that from un intentionally pass upheld principle gains unconstitutional ” v. act.’ lawful activities are taxable. See James (quoting Grey Cruz Chevrolet Iron, States, 213, 221-22, 81 Corp., Div. 398 Mich. 366 U.S. Gen. Motors United (altera (1976)) (1961) (overrul 117, 247 L.Ed.2d 246 N.W.2d S.Ct. ing tion in of con Internal Revenue v. Wil original)). presumption Comm’r of cox, L.Ed. stitutionality greater with even 327 U.S. 66 S.Ct. applies (1946), funds party force a facial chal to hold embezzled brings when embezzler); income to the Rut lenge validity to the of a Gallah are taxable statute. States, 130, 137-38, er, at 459. In such in kin United U.S. S.W.3d (conclud stance, challenger 96 L.Ed. must establish that S.Ct. ing money no set of obtained extortion is circumstances exists under which income, statute, written, and observing taxable would valid. Jellico, widespread and settled Lynch v. 205 S.W.3d has been City “[t]here (Tenn.2006) judicial recognition administrative. and (quoting Davis-Kidd Bo oksellers, many McWherter, of unlawful taxability gains Inc. S.W.2d (Tenn.1993)); *10 Internal Revenue [the 525 States v. kinds under United

883 Sullivan, Code]”); 274 this States v. area was the Harrison Narcotic Act of United 1914, 259, 263, 1970), 47 71 L.Ed. 1037 38 Stat. 785 (repealed S.Ct. which U.S. (1927) govern sought posses that the federal “to exert control (holding over the narcotics, may specifically ment tax income from a business that sion and sale of co law). opiates, caine and by requiring producers, “[t]he under federal While distributors, repeatedly purchasers register has indicated Government, activity pre does not with the Federal unlawfulness of assess taxation,” ing against Marchetti v. taxes parties registered, vent its United so States, 39, 44, 697, 19 by regulating 390 U.S. 88 S.Ct. the issuance of prescrip (1968), Gonzales, 10-11, 889 it also has established tions.” 545 at L.Ed.2d U.S. 125 Congress reach its limits principle passed S.Ct. later govern when either the tax or the itself Marihuana Tax Act of 50 Stat. 551 1970), procedures (repealed mental to collect the tax col which the Harrison “[l]ike taxpayer’s lides with the constitutional Act ... did not outlaw the States, rights. Haynes v. 390 sale of marijuana outright” imposed United U.S. but (1968) 85, 100, 722, 19 registration L.Ed.2d 923 similar reporting require S.Ct. (holding privilege that “the ments for produced, constitutional individuals who im distributed, sold, provides ported, self-incrimination a full marijua or dealt alleged “required defense” to violations of a firearm na and the payment of annual registration requirement primari directed taxes in addition to transfer taxes whenev Gonzales, ly people possessed who the firearm er the changed hands.”11 States, 11, 125 illegally); 390 545 Grosso United U.S. S.Ct. 2195. The United 65-67, Court, Supreme 19 L.Ed.2d States citing U.S. S.Ct. the cases (1968) (holding occupa preserving types that a federal taxes on other of illegal activities, wagering, required upheld tional tax on which the constitutionality of gambler provide, threat criminal both the Harrison Act and the Marihuana Sanchez, prosecution, might information that he rea Tax Act. United States v. 42, 44-45, sonably supposed have would be made U.S. 71 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed. 47 (1950) authorities, available to prosecuting (upholding violat Marihuana Tax Act and gambler’s privi noting beyond question ed the Fifth Amendment “[i]t serious crimination); Marchetti, lege against self-in that a tax does cease to be valid mere (same). 48-49, ly regulates, discourages, 390 U.S. at because it S.Ct. definitely even deters activities illegal drugs The taxation of at the fed- taxed”); Doremus, United States v. eral level followed a path similar 63 L.Ed. 493 U.S. S.Ct. that of taxes on other unlawful activities. Act). (upholding Harrison fact, drug regulations “most domestic prior generally guise to 1970 came Both the Harrison Act and the Marihua- laws, na Tax Department repealed by Compre- of revenue with the Act were Treasury serving Drug as the Federal Gov- hensive Abuse Prevention and Con- 91-513, primary ernment’s enforcer.” Gonzales trol Act of Pub.L. No. (1970). Raich, 1, 10, repeal 545 U.S. 125 S.Ct. 162 Stat. 1236 Prior to the Act, however, leading L.Ed.2d 1 statute in the Marihuana Tax the Su- "[Wjhile compliance marijua- practically the Marihuana Tax Act did not curtailed the se, Gonzales, drug illegal per declare the the onerous na trade.” 545 U.S. at requirements, prohibitively administrative S.Ct. 2195. taxes, expensive and the risks attendant *11 884 (noting although Leary did not hold opportunity had the to once

preme Court ramifica- consider its constitutional the Marihuana Tax Act to be unconstitu- again Timothy Leary, tional, a former Har- Dr. it the ... Act a crippling tions. “dealt notorious advocate for professor vard and in holding requirement blow its order form self-incrimination”). drugs, was convicted of know- psychedelic amounted to Since concealing and facilitat- ingly transporting, effective, the 1970 Act became the federal transportation and concealment of ing laws, government has used the criminal paying the transfer tax marijuana without code, regulate rather than the tax by Leary the Marihuana Tax Act. required possession illegal drugs. trade States, 6, 11, v. 395 U.S. 89 S.Ct. United illicit Although the taxation of sub- (1969). 1532, Leary chal- 23 L.Ed.2d 57 stances has fallen out of favor at the feder- conviction, lenged his and the Court con- level, passed al a number of states have terms, to its according cluded that “read taxes, drug named for the stamp stamps so [Leary] Tax Act compelled the Marihuana possess individuals who or sell an appreciable to a ‘real expose himself required unauthorized substance are self-incrimination, within in the risk’ purchase from their state’s revenue de- Marchetti, meaning of our decisions partment and affix to the substance.12 Un- Haynes.” Leary, 395 Grosso U.S. laws, like the drug federal which were 16, Leary’s 1532. Because invoca- S.Ct. primary method of enforcement privilege against tion of self-incrimina- trade, drug drug the state proper complete tion was and constituted a stamp taxes co-exist with criminal statutes charge violating to the the Mar- defense punish and sale of Act, ihuana Tax reversed Court his drugs through penal system. 29, conviction. Id. at 89 S.Ct. 1532. Al- taxes, however, drug stamp state do share though the 1970 Act was to re- intended significant one characteristic with them place compre- tax laws with “a in that counterparts, federal their constitu- regime hensive the international combat tionality challenged repeatedly has been drugs,” and interstate traffic in illicit Gon- the courts. zales, 2195, U.S. S.Ct. Thirty forty-nine of the other states also, policy shift federal at least in passed posses- have statutes that tax the part, response Supreme to the Court’s or sale sion of unauthorized substances. rejection in Leary case of the federal Twenty-one thirty of these states have illegal drugs. taxation scheme for Id. at 11-12, 2195; Frey drug stamp taxing v. statutes that are S.Ct. United still (5th Cir.1977) States, codified,13 558 F.2d while nine of the have states States, (3d government, like the federal have A Treatise on the Law Taxation ed.1903) many years. (noting taxed purpose activities for This that “one of taxa- business, illegal activity may held that discourage tion sometimes is to taxed, existence”). Speed, Foster v. 120 Tenn. perhaps put it out of See (1908), Sexton, S.W. 925-26 and that the taxa- Youngblood also Mich. illegal activity give J.). tion of an does not (Cooley, taxpayer a license to the criminal violate laws State, (2003); §§ of this state. 103 Tenn. 13. Ala.Code 40-17A-1 to -16 Blaufeld (1899); (2008); §§ 53 S.W. 1091-92 Palmer Conn. Gen.Stat. 12-650 to -660 (2005); §§ 88 Tenn. 13 S.W. Ga.Code Ann. 48-15-1 to-11 Ida- (2007) (as §§ decision in Foster drew ho Code 63-4201 to -4211 treatise Ann. Laws, written taxation noted constitutional schol- amended 1990 Idaho Sess. ch. 1); (2006); Michigan Supreme Comp. ar and Court Justice 35 Ill. Stat. 520/1-520/26 (2007); Cooley. Cooley, §§ Thomas M. See Thomas M. Ind.Code 6-7-3-1 to -20 Iowa

885 subsequently repealed legislation requiring and state protections, constitutional most twenty-three drug stamps.14 commonly Of other the Fifth Amendment rights drug stamp state taxes have been self-incrimination or double jeopar- courts, by appellate state dy considered elev- equivalents.16 their state Four upheld en have been considered, as constitutional.15 states have recently but reject- taxes, ed, Twelve of the state stamp how- the idea of a tax on unauthorized sub- ever, stances,17 have been found to violate federal while the remaining fifteen (2006); 2577, 1092, §§ Code Ann. 453B.1-.16 Kan. Stat. S.Ct. 135 L.Ed.2d on re aff’d (1997 §§ Supp. mand, Ann. 79-5201 to -5212 & Servs., Covelli v. Comm'r Revenue 2008); Ky.Rev.Stat. §§ Ann. 138.870-.889 257, (1996), 239 Conn. 683 A.2d 737 cert. (2006); §§ La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 47:2601-:2610 denied, 1174, Crystal, Covelli v. 520 U.S. 117 64K, (Supp.2009); Gen. Mass. Laws ch. 1445, (1997); S.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d 551 State v. (2001); §§ §§ 1-14 Minn.Stat. 297D.01-.13 (Iowa Lange, 1995); 531 N.W.2d 108 State v. (2007); §§ Neb.Rev.Stat. 77-4301 to -4316 915, Gulledge, (1995); 257 Kan. 896 P.2d 378 (2003); §§ Nev.Rev.Stat. 372A.010-.130 Bird, Commonwealth v. (Ky. 979 S.W.2d 915 (1997); §§ N.C. Gen.Stat. 105-113.105 to 1998); Triplett, Sisson v. 428 N.W.2d 565 (2007) (as by .113 amended 1995 N.C. Sess. (Minn. 1988); Stubblefield, State v. 249 Neb. Laws, 340, 1, 1, 1995; § ch. eff. Oct. 1997 436, (1996); 543 N.W.2d 743 State v. Ballen 292, 1, 1, § N.C. Sess. Laws ch. eff. Oct. 179, ger, N.C.App. (1996), 123 472 S.E.2d 572 1997; 218, 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. eff. curiam, 626, per 345 N.C. 481 S.E.2d 84 aff'd 31, 1998); 68, §§ Oct. Okla. Stat. tit. 450.1-.9 (1997); State, (Okla. White v. 900 P.2d 982 (2001); §§ R.I. Gen. Laws 44-49-1 to -16 Crim.App.1995); Dep’t McMullin v. S.C. - (2005); §§ S.C.Code Ann. 12-21-5010 to Taxation, 475, Revenue & 321 S.C. 469 S.E.2d (2000); §§ 6050 Tex. Tax Code Ann. 159.001- (1996); Ward, parte 600 Ex 964 S.W.2d 617 (2008); §§ .301 Utah Code Ann. 59-19-101 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). (2008); §§ to -107 Wis. Stat. 139.87-.96 (2009) (as amended 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws Maurello, (Colo. 16. See State v. 932 P.2d 851 27, 2979m, 1, 1998). § eff. Jan. (double Ct.App.1997) jeopardy); Dep’t Fla. (re- § 14. Ariz.Rev.Stat. 42-3401 to -3406 Herre, (Fla. 1994) Revenue v. 634 So.2d 618 1998, 1, pealed by 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. (self-incrimination); Smith, State v. 120 Idaho 157, 1, 1999); § eff. Jan. Colo.Rev.Stat. 77, (1991) (self-incrimination); 813 P.2d 888 §§ (repealed by 39-28.7-101 to -109 Revenue, 306, Dep’t Wilson v. 169 Ill.2d 1996, 96-133, 2,§ Colo. Sess. Laws S.B. eff. 849, (1996) (double Ill.Dec. 662 N.E.2d 415 25, 1996); (re- § Mar. Fla. Stat. 212.0505 State, jeopardy); Bryant v. 660 N.E.2d 290 1995, 95-140, pealed by 1995 Fla. Laws c. (Ind.1995) (double jeopardy); Comm'r Rev 7, 10, 1995); July § eff. Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. Mullins, 406, enue v. 428 Mass. 702 N.E.2d 1 36, §§ (repealed by tit. 4433-4436 1995 Me. (1998) (double jeopardy); Dep’t Revenue v. 1995, 281, 24, 21, 1995); § Laws c. eff. June Ranch, 767, 1937, Kurth 511 U.S. 114 S.Ct. Comp. (repealed §§ Mich. Laws 335.301-.307 (1994) (double 128 L.Ed.2d 767 jeopardy); 1978, 368, by 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts No. State, 195, Desimone v. 116 Nev. 996 P.2d 405 25101, 30, 1978); Sept. § eff. Mont.Code (2000) (double jeopardy); N.M. Taxation & (repealed §§ Ann. 15-25-101 to -123 Whitener, 130, Dep’t Revenue 117 N.M. 74, 18; 4, 446); Mont. Laws Sec. Ch. Sec. Ch. (double P.2d (N.M.Ct.App.1993) jeopar §§ (repealed by N.M. Stat. 7-18A-1 to -7 Roberts, (S.D. dy); State v. 384 N.W.2d 688 1, July § 1995 N.M. Laws ch. eff. 1986) (self-incrimination); Brunner v. Collec 1, 1995); §§ N.D. Cent.Code 57-36.1-01 to- Div., (Utah 1997) (double tion 945 P.2d 687 Laws, (repealed by § 1995 N.D. ch. Hall, jeopardy); State v. 207 Wis.2d 1, 1995); Aug. eff. S.D. Codified Laws 10- (1997) (self-incrimination). N.W.2d 778 (repealed by 50A 1987 S.D. Sess. Laws 1-15). §§ ch Arkansas, 17. These four states are see Arkan- Bureau, (Ala.Civ. IlLegal Drugs sas News Tax 15. See Milner v. Bill to So.2d 500 (Mar. 2007), App.1994); Stalls in Covelli v. House Committee Comm'r Revenue Servs., (1995), http://www.mpp.org/st 235 Conn. 668 A.2d 699 ates/arkansas/news/ vacated, Crystal, bill-to-tax-illegal-drugs-stalls.html; Covelli v. 518 U.S. Mississip- (B) substances]; A ed unauthorized do not the District Columbia states and legislation.18 possesses such who ... an illicit alco- proposed person to have appear beverage for sale.” Tenn.Code Ann. holic *13 Tax on Unauthorized B. Tennessee’s 67-4-2802(3) (2006). Significantly, § Substances only “dealer” in terms of statute defines legislative environment only in this un- It was and levies the tax possession Assembly General Tennessee that possessed. authorized substances passed a on unautho- considered and prescribes proce- The enactment a clear in 2004.19 The statute rized substances compliance. possession Those dure 4 of Title 67 of the Chapter codified in illegal drugs required pur- are Annotated, which is enti- Tennessee Code stamps Depart- chase tax issued “Privilege and Excise Taxes.” The tled affix permanently ment of Revenue and gener- the statute “to purpose of stated sub- stamps those to the unauthorized and local law en- ate revenue for state possession in their in order to stances agen- for use those agencies forcement verify they paid necessary have combat, prevent and investigate, cies - 67-4-2805(a), §§ Ann. tax. Tenn.Code crimes, general and for the reduce (2006). payable “The tax is within § Ann. 67-4-2801 fund.” Tenn.Code after the ac- forty-eight hours dealer (2006). excise tax The statute levies “[a]n possession actual or constructive quires possessed, ... unauthorized substances substance”; non-tax-paid unauthorized actually constructively, by or deal- either otherwise, delinquent “the tax will become variety rates for a specified ers” at interest.” penalty and shall accrue substances, including marijua- enumerated §Ann. 67-4-2806 Tenn.Code stalks, marijuana plants, na stems and co- Department of Revenue will assess a tax caine, controlled or “any other substance an un- possesses “dealer who drug,” low-street-value and illicit alcoholic stamp authorized substance to which a has §Ann. beverages. Tenn.Code 67-4-2803. § not been affixed.” Ann. 67- Tenn.Code “any “Dealer” is defined in the statute as (A) 4-2807. “The dealer seek review of following: person A who actual- provided in” Tennessee constructively assessment ly possesses more than 67-1-1801, seq. amounts of the enumerat- Annotated section et prescribed Code [the Vermont, Required Washington, Virgi- pi, Drug sylvania, West Tennessee Dealers see 13, 2005), (July Wyoming. Buy Stamps tp://www. hi nia and Tax tennes- redorbit.com/news/health/173172/ sponsor, 19. Both House Charles Curtiss see_drug_dealers_re- Randy (D-Sparta) sponsor, and the York, Senate quired_to_buy_tax_stamps/; New see (R-Oak McNally Ridge), stressed that similar Richburg, New Keith B. York 'Crack Tax' Pro- "twenty-seven taxes had been enacted Derided, Post, posal Washington Is Feb. language A05; other states” and that the Virginia, see Bad Bills: legislation patterned Tennessee after the Drug Virginia Legislature, Tax Dies See, existing e.g., tax in North Carolina. (Feb. 2007), Drug War Chronicle available Curtiss, Session, Rep. Statement of House http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/472/ 19, 2004; McNally, May Statement of Sen. drug_tax_bill_dies_in_virginia_legislature. Session, May Senator Senate McNally apparently also observed that "the reason for 18. The states that have not for- figures trigger mally proposed leg- ... threshold the tax or otherwise considered what in the North Car- to tax the or sale of unau- that's was used [are] islation Alaska, California, drugs successfully de- statute that had been thorized include olina Hawaii, Missouri, Delaware, Maryland, in court.” Statement of Sen. McNal- New fended Ohio, Session, 20,May Jersey, Oregon, ly, Hampshire, New Penn- Senate just If a local or state law enforcement over Of Id. million.21 $5 million in $5 collections, $3,070.67, an unautho- agency 0.06%, Tennessee seizes total came tax stamp rized to which a from the voluntary purchase substance of tax stamps. affixed, must agency not been make a Id. The remaining 99.94% of collections forty- to the within report Commissioner came about after agencies law enforcement Ann. eight hours. 67-4- Tenn.Code seized unauthorized substances and the 2805(b). The Department “state or local law enforce- of Revenue subsequently lev- agency investiga- assessments, ment conducted ied penalties and interest. tion of a dealer that led assessment” to the Id. *14 proceeds

will receive 75% tax when Analysis made, report remaining such a is with the paid general be 25% to into the fund. Some commentary initial is in order be- 67-4-2809(b)(2). §Ann. Tenn.Code we begin analysis. use, fore our The pos- session, illegal and drugs sale of place an According to a for spokesperson the De- enormous our burden state and na- Revenue, of partment the enactment of the The tion. Office of Drug National Control tax required on unauthorized substances Policy estimated that between 1988 and ten-person agency the creation of a at 2000, Americans between spent billion Cruz, $54 a one-time cost of million. Ten- $1.2 annually billion on drugs.22 $154 illicit Dealers, Targets nessee with Users New crime, In effort to deter our Tennessean, 29, General Levy, 2004, The Dec. Assembly prescribed lengthy sen- Department 1A. The of Revenue forecast tences and for hefty fines individuals con- the annual costs of enforcement be manufacturing, victed of $800,000. delivering, or Department Id. Data from sell- the ing illegal drugs, possessing or illegal of Revenue indicates total collec- drugs manufacture, for the of purpose tions made under Tennessee’s unautho- de- livery, § or sale. rized substances tax were in Tenn.Code Ann. fiscal 39-17- $298.30 (“FY”) (2006 2005,20 year $884,851.49 2006, 417(b) (j) Supp.2008). FY & For exam- — $1,578,182.26 $1,794,808.47 2007, ple, possession in FY or grams of 300 more 2008, $756,819.59 FY with through the first cocaine the intent to sell is a Class A felony $500,000. half of FY 2009. See up Collections Summar- a fine of Tenn. § ies June 17—417(j)(5). June June Ann. posses- Code The for 39— & June 2008 Dec. http:// twenty-six available sion or grams more of co- www.tennessee.gov/revenue/statistics/ caine with the to sell intent is a B Class felony, arehives.htm# summariesarch. The total subjecting the offender to a fine of $200,000. amount of collections over first four toup TenmCode Ann. 39-17- was, 417(1). years therefore, tax’s existence The grams 0.5 year begins Finance, July McNally, 20. Tennessee’s fiscal Statement of Sen. Senate through following Committee, and extends June 2004; Ways Apr. & Means see year. Because the tax on unauthorized sub- Cruz, Dealers, Targets also Tennessee Users 1, 2005, January became stances effective on Tennessean, Levy, with New The Dec. Department of Revenue made collections 2004, at 1A. only under tax for six the last months of FY 2005. Drug Policy, 22.Office of National Control Spend Illegal Drugs: What America’s Users fiscal The note on the Senate version of the 1988-2000, (Dec.2001), http:// at 3 available at (S.B.2419) legislation projected that annual www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications under collections the unauthorized substances /pdf/american_users_spend_2002.pdf. approximately $3.6 tax would be million. The Fifth Amendment to the to sell is a with the intent more of cocaine provides, States Constitution much United a fine of as felony with B Class ... shall com person part, “[n]o § 39-17- TenmCode Ann. $100,000. to be a criminal case witness pelled 417(c)(1). prisons, for jails, cost Const, amend. V. against himself.” U.S. substantial, and law enforcement privilege against Fifth Amendment care and social services expense health to the applies states self-incrimination enormous, tragedy lies in but real through Fourteenth Amendment. life and loss human its waste Rogers, n. 4 188 S.W.3d upon family effect inevitably deleterious (Tenn.2006) Hogan, Malloy (citing context, legisla- our friends. L.Ed.2d 653 U.S. S.Ct. its worthy commendation ture is (1964)). The Tennessee Constitution simi incident defray costs effort to in all guarantees criminal larly “[t]hat Even drugs. un- against struggle ... shall not be prosecutions, the accused however, circumstances, it is our der these give him compelled evidence rule dispassionately apply duty to Const, I, § 9. art. re *15 self.” With manner, impartial uns- in a fair law self-incrimination, this gard to Court has concerns, public parti- wayed by genuine I, “traditionally article 9 to interpreted interests, fear or of criticism. san Fifth be no broader than the Amendment.” 3(B)(2). 10,R. Canon Sup.Ct. 20, (Tenn. Martin, v. State 950 S.W.2d 1997). Both and state provi the federal and State Constitutional I. Federal from “protect being sions the accused com Issues provide to of a pelled evidence testimonial might that later or communicative nature” the consti- complaint contested Waters’ against in a be used him criminal case. of the unauthorized substances tutionality States, Id.; see also Fisher United right against the self-incrim- light tax 408, 1569, 391, 96 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. ination, jeop- against double protection the (1976); Walton, State S.W.3d guarantee procedural due ardy, and the (Tenn.2001). the evidence Where is not trial on each process. The court ruled nature, a testimonial or communicative issues, Appeals but did these Court protection self-incrimination is in As means of avoiding not them. address Cole, State v. 155 S.W.3d applicable. litigation further any delay occasioned (Tenn.2005). 898-99 issues, involving the same we will consider noted, As States Supreme United challenges. constitutional these previously found certain taxes illegal violate activity to the Fifth A. Self-Incrimination protection against Amendment self-incrim that the tax on unau- Waters contends Marchetti, In ination. the Court ad right violates his thorized substances applicability privilege dressed against compelled self-incrimination under registration the context of an extensive state the federal and constitutions. The requirement occupa related to a federal that agreed, holding statutory trial court tax tax on wagering. tional himself. “requires expose required It [Waters] scheme bookmakers submit a say take that he some action to Internal requires registration form to the Revenue (“IRS”), I am in way process some have also served a tax Service which as indicated, return, they crime.” were indicating engaged committed a As wagers accepting did in the business of Appeals Court of not address issue. including personal both their information ihuana Tax Act ‘real “created a and appre agents employees. of their and that ciable’ hazard of incrimination” because Marchetti, 697. 390 U.S. 88 S.Ct. compliance with provisions those would The IRS made this information available have Dr. required Leary identify him federal law enforcement au state and self a member of a “selective group thorities, regularly it in criminal who used inherently suspect of criminal activities.” prosecutions gambling for offenses. Id. 395 U.S. at 89 S.Ct. 1532. 47-48, Further, 697. bookmakers S.Ct. In reviewing the constitutionality of required post stamp, were a revenue taxes, “ their drug stamp states’ other state tax, payment which ‘con denoted courts have determined that Marchetti their spicuously’ principal places of busi created three “criteria for determining ness, or ... their persons.” Id. at constitutionality of tax statute challenged S.Ct. on fifth grounds.” amendment Sisson v. Marchetti, high Court ruled that Triplett, 428 571 (Minn.1988); N.W.2d privilege’s the “central standard Briney Dep’t Revenue, see also v. State application has been whether the claimant 120, 122 594 So.2d (Ala.Civ.App.1991); ‘real,’ is confronted substantial and (Okla. White v. 900 P.2d 988-89 merely trifling imaginary, hazards Hall, Crim.App.1995); 207 Wis.2d Id. at incrimination.” 88 S.Ct. 557 N.W.2d The three Although the Court reiterated that “prongs” Marchetti are as follows: government may generally ac *16 (1) tivities, regulated activity whether the is in it “every portion held that of [the “permeated area statutory] with criminal stat- requirements” of the tax on wa utes,” and the tax aimed at gering “had the direct and individuals unmistakable consequence “inherently suspect the incriminating” individu criminal activi- 49, paid als who the tax. Id. at 88 S.Ct. ties”^] registrants 697. Because could “reason (2) required, whether an is individual ably expect registration payment that and prosecution, under pain criminal tax occupational significant [would] provide information which the individual ly enhance prosecu the likelihood of their might reasonably suppose would be acts, tion for future and readily [would] authorities!; prosecuting available to provide evidence which facilitate [would] and] convictions,” registration their require the (3) whether such information would the privilege against

ments violated self- prove significant in a link a chain of 697; incrimination. Id. at 88 see S.Ct. tending guilt. evidence establish Grosso, 65-67, also 390 U.S. 88 S.Ct. Sisson, Similarly, 709.23 in Leary, the Court held 428 (quoting N.W.2d 571 Mar chetti, 697). that provisions 47-48, the transfer tax of the Mar U.S. at 88 390 S.Ct. “Taking language” cue wagering its from in Mar- tax information. United States v. Grosso, Congress Sahadi, Cir.1977). chetti and (2d made several 555 F.2d 25 “The changes to wagering the federal tax on in wagering 1974 revisions of the federal tax (1) including: deleting requirement change Treasury laws and concomitant registrants conspicuously display that their Department practices ... eliminated 'real demand; (2) stamp produce upon tax or it no appreciable’ and hazards of self-incrimination longer requiring IRS provide local offices to prior that existed under law.” United wagering tax information to local law en- (6th Currency, States v. U.S. 626 F.2d 13 agencies; enacting specific forcement Sahadi, Cir.1980) 27). (quoting 555 F.2d at restrictions disclosure use 890 Department improp that the information specific either these three applying

When “central is it is erly the broader stan discloses inadmissible unless elements source”); with the tax compliance dard” of whether obtained from another State in and real hazards of Durrant, substantial creates 769 P.2d Kan. crimination, courts have held some state (1989); Sisson, 428 N.W.2d at taxpayers were re the information (Minn.1988); Garza, 242 Neb. drug quired to under their states’ provide (1993); White, 496 N.W.2d privilege against violated stamp taxes 988-91; Tax Zissi v. State P.2d at See, e.g., Dep’t Fla. self-incrimination. 1992). (Utah Comm’n, P.2d (Fla. Herre, 618, 620 634 So.2d Revenue Assembly The Tennessee General 1994) pro (holding confidentiality that the specific language included this state’s tax statute were un drug visions on unauthorized substances an effort tax De provision allowing dermined privilege violative of the process to avoid a taxpayers’ Revenue to release partment of self-incrimination. By the terms against en “to state federal law information information legislation, regarding all long officials as as those offi forcement of unauthorized substances subpoena”); State v. Rob present cials volun obtained connection with the (S.D.1986) (“We erts, 384 N.W.2d tary payment of the tax must remain “con import clear of [the believe and, ob independently fidential unless incriminate, is to statute] tax stamp tained, may in a not be used criminal unconstitutional.”); chapter thus Ann. 67-4- prosecution.” Tenn.Code Hall, (holding 557 N.W.2d at Either (Supp.2004).24 disclosure require and affixation purchase statute’s improper inspection information unconstitutionally compelled ments both by Department employee of Revenue self-incrimination). Conversely, other a criminal constitutes offense. Tenn.Code upheld drug stamp state taxes have courts (c) 67-l-1709(a), §§ Finally, Ann. challenges face of constitutional in the required give are their “[d]ealers *17 privilege self-incrimi based the number, name, address, security social determining that the informa after nation identifying other information on the form” by revenue as a obtained authorities tion to they request stamps, fill out the and (1) payment the tax result may paid stamps may be be “[t]axes (2) confidential, not divulged could be by person.” either mail or in issued authorities, law the enforcement 67-4-2805(a). compari Ann. Our Code not used in criminal subsequent be could provisions of these with those enacted son except those prosecutions for violations in other states leads us to conclude that See, e.g., Briney, the tax statute itself. stamp tax is more close Tennessee’s (observing at 122-23 that the 594 So.2d aligned statutory provisions with “nothing ly less than an those statute contained rule, exclusionary whereby any that have survived constitutional chal- absolute expressed perhaps court his own home a friend person, 24. The trial about in concerns obtained,” phrase independently community, the "unless re- or someone the who then stating argument "the that that can [Waters] that ports it.” Of note is the General Assem- consequences, and suffer the do this no unless bly exception the removed confiden- this about he information what has done inde- tiality by deleting requirement in 2007 obtained, always pendently that runs risk phrase 2007 Tenn. Pub. from the statute. by ... it’s obtained who’s ... an someone not (codified §Ann. 67-4- Acts at Tenn.Code employee engaged of the state or en- law (Supp.2008)). forcement, private but obtained from some fix privilege against stamp, in the the revenue lenges grounded may state use the presence stamp self-incrimination. as evidence in a criminal prosecution possession for the upon the Wisconsin Su- Waters relies Hall, or sale of illegal drugs. Contra opinion support in Hall as preme Court’s N.W.2d at 786 (characterizing Wisconsin’s tax on for his contention that Tennessee’s requirement affixation as “an incriminating right violates unauthorized substances his testimonial communication that the dealer case, In that against self-incrimination. knowingly intentionally possesses a highest Wisconsin’s court held that both particular quantity drugs”). of unlawful purchasing stamps the act of In requirements stamps summary, that the be af- Tennessee’s tax on unau- displayed upon fixed to and thorized substances acqui- ensures that the drugs privilege against violated the self- sition of drug stamps anonymous, Hall, incrimination. 557 N.W.2d at 785- information obtained the Depart- law, face, only 87. Wisconsin’s “on its ment of Revenue must remain confidential protection from and provide[d] dealer cannot be disclosed law enforce- ment, of information ob- direct-not derivative-use and that or use of [Department drug stamps may tained part Revenue] not be used as through compliance criminal investigation with the statute.”25 or prosecution. Thus, view, payment Id. at 787. In our Tennessee’s tax is of the tax under these significantly, different. Most Wisconsin’s circumstances does not create a substan- tial, taxing protections statute contained no real and appreciable hazard of self- Moreover, taxpayer’s the disclosure of the incrimination. although the tax information, either to law enforcement offi- is aimed at “inherently suspect individuals activities,” subsequent proceedings cers or in criminal of criminal confidentiality payment provisions unrelated to the of the tax. of the statute ensure that the contrast, the provisions of Tennessee Code information is not to be used a criminal Annotated section 67-4-2808 do contain prosecution, will not be made available to Further, safeguards. such law although enforcement or prosecuting authori- ties, requires significant Tennessee statute and cannot become a link affixed, stamps provides tending our statute a chain of evidence to establish “[sjtamps part issued pursuant prohibiting violation of the criminal laws prosecution drug possession not be used in a criminal In consequence, and sale. prosecution imposition other than a for a violation of of the tax on Waters does *18 part.” Ann. 67-4-2808. not violate his privilege against Tenn.Code self-incrim- Thus, possessor in illegal drugs while ination under either the United States or required purchase Tennessee is and af- Tennessee Constitution. Notably, legislature "remedy compelled the Wisconsin fol- intent for it to self- suggestion supreme problem lowed the of its state's incrimination identified in Hall.” Jones, adopted, legisla- court in Hall and "almost verba- N.W.2d at 651 Idaho tim,” confidentiality provisions confidentiality provision ture added a likewise neighbor, drug pass tax statute of its to its Minnesota. statute order consti- Jones, 319, Smith, State v. 257 Wis.2d 651 N.W.2d tutional muster. State v. 120 Idaho 305, Hall, 888, 77, (1991) (citing (holding (Wis.Ct.App.2002) 315 557 813 P.2d that the 890 791; 27, Laws, N.W.2d at 1997 Laws amendments ch. Wis. Sess. of 1990 Idaho Sess. 2979m, 1, 179, 1998). § eff. Jan. The Court of 1 cured the deficien- self-incrimination statute); original Appeals subsequently held that in the v. Wisconsin cies Harms Con- CV06-34-S-LMB, language way, the amended be No. 2007 WL should construed 2265116, (D.Idaho 2007) (same). consistently legislature's Aug.6, with the at *6 Wisconsin

892 all sanc Jeopardy imposition hibit the additional Double

B. could, parlance,’ that ‘in common tions that Tennessee’s also asserted Waters v. punishment.” described as Hudson violated substances tax on unauthorized States, 93, 98-99, 522- 118 United U.S. protections constitutional federal state and (1997) (quoting 450 S.Ct. 139 L.Ed.2d At the conclu- jeopardy. against double United, Hess, ex rel. Marcus v. States hearing declaratory on the sion 537, 549, 63 S.Ct. 87 L.Ed. 443 U.S. suit, trial court determined judgment Illinois, (1943)); see also Moore U.S. imposed penalty a criminal that statute 13, 19, 13, 14 14 How. L.Ed. 306 than a civil sanction and assessed rather Instead, protects only Clause “[t]he of the amount Waters tax far in excess multiple criminal against imposition illegal drugs, both of which paid for the offense, punishments for the same jeopardy in a double key components are only then when such occurs successive Because, however, had jury analysis. Hudson, proceedings.” U.S. prosecu- in a criminal empaneled not been (internal omitted); tion, had S.Ct. 488 citations see the trial court held Waters yet exposed jeopardy. Conley, to double also State v. 639 S.W.2d been (Tenn.1982) (“[N]ot every deprivation visit guilty attaches when a Jeopardy ed one who violates state’s laws is unconditionally by a trial plea accepted ‘punishment’ purposes to be considered Todd, 654 S.W.2d court. State clause.”); jeopardy applying the double (Tenn.1983). Here, entered a Waters Metro. Nashville & Davidson Gov’t of charge to the criminal on Janu guilty plea Miles, County v. 524 S.W.2d ary well after the assessment of (Tenn.1975) (“[0]nly actions intended to it undisputed the tax. Because punishment authorize criminal as distin eventually exposed to criminal Waters was subject guished from remedial actions however, misdeeds, for his punishment ” (quoting to ‘jeopardy.’ defendant Cush judicial efficiency principles suggest Bar, way Ga.App. jeopardy we the double claim. address (1969))). S.E.2d the Fifth Amendment to the Both I, Constitution and article United States key issue for our consider 10 of the section Tennessee Constitution ation, therefore, imposition is whether the shall, provide person that no “for the same of the tax on unauthorized substances put ... be twice of life jeopardy offence qualifies penalty. as a “civil” or “criminal” “Three protections limb.” fundamental latter, If lawfully Waters could not encompassed principle are in the of double subjected “prosecu have been to a second £(1) jeopardy: protection against a second tion.” will question, To answer this we (2) prosecution acquittal; protec after employ overlapping two similar and tests against prosecution tion a second after developed by that were States United conviction; protection mul recently Supreme applied Court and to the ” tiple for the punishments same offense.’ unauthorized substances tax our Court *19 840, v. Thompson, State 285 S.W.3d 847 Shields, See Appeals. Criminal (Tenn.2009) Denton, (quoting State v. 938 W2007-01861-CCA-R9-CD, No. 2008 WL 373, (Tenn.1996)). S.W.2d at 378 As to the 2008). Oct.7, (Tenn.Crim.App. 4491739 protections, third of these the one that case, of these tests a might apply in this first is the United States two-pronged, analysis multi-factored used Supreme “long recognized Jeopardy whether action pro the Double Clause does not to determine

893 (7)“whether criminal civil in This it appears state is or nature. excessive in re- is, lation to initially, “at a mat purpose least alternative as- determination signed.” is, statutory construction.” That we ter of ‘in legislature,

must ascertain “whether Hudson, 99-100, 522 at U.S. 118 S.Ct. 488 mechanism, establishing penalizing in Kennedy (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, impliedly either or a expressly dicated 144, 168-69, 554, 372 U.S. 83 S.Ct. 9 ” for one label or the other.’ preference (1963)); Shields, L.Ed.2d 644 see also 2008 Hudson, 99, 4491739, 522 at S.Ct. 488 U.S. 118 *2. WL at No one these guide- Ward, 448 (quoting United States U.S. posts dispositive, should be considered “as 248, 242, 2636, they 100 65 742 ‘may point S.Ct. L.Ed.2d often in different di- (1980)). Hudson, 101, If the rections.’” legislature intended es at U.S. punishment, a (quoting tablish criminal then the S.Ct. 488 Kennedy, U.S. at “ 169, 554). ends, However, inquiry ‘only because the S.Ct. punishment proof clearest qualifies penalty purposes as a criminal will suffice to legis- for override If, however, lative intent jeopardy. legis and transform what has double been denominated a civil a penalty, remedy intended to establish a into criminal lature civil Hudson, penalty.” duty statutory our is to U.S. review scheme Ward, (quoting S.Ct. 488 U.S. at is to ensure that it not “so punitive[,] 2636).26 100 S.Ct. effect,” turn purpose either as to punishment. civil into a intended sanction criminal analysis Our does not end our con- son, Hud 522 U.S. at 118 sideration of the Hudson/Kennedy factors. Ward, (quoting at 248- S.Ct. U.S. Our tax on unauthorized substances must 2636). following 100 S.Ct. factors compared with the taxing statute that our guide consideration: Department was at issue in Revenue v. Ranch, Kurth 511 U.S. 114 S.Ct. (1) “[wjhether the sanction involves an Ranch, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 In Kurth restraint”; disability affirmative Court, Supreme the United States for the (2) “whether it has been re- historically time, first invalidated a tax statute garded punishment”; as a grounds abridged that it the Fifth Amend- (3) “whether it play only comes into right against ment jeopardy. double Id. at ” scienter; finding a 780-83, 114 S.Ct. The Court ob- served that Montana’s Dangerous Drug operation promote “whether its will Act27 high” Tax had “remarkably punishment-retri- the traditional aims of intended, “beyond question,” rate deterrence”; bution and deter possession marijuana. Id. (5) “whether the behavior to which it 780-81, 114 S.Ct. 1937. The Montana crime”; applies already statute also exhibited two “unusual fea- (6) “whether purpose an alternative apart tures” that “set from most [it] taxes” may rationally and, ruled, it which be connected is the Court the line crossed be- assignable it”; for tween civil tax and criminal punishment. two-pronged Hudson/Kennedy (Tenn. analysis Dep’t Safety, 26. The 32-34 963 S.W.2d analogous determining 1998). to the test pun whether forfeiture constitutes criminal ishment that was forth in States v. set United (re- §§ 27. Mont.Code Ann. 15-25-101 -123 267, 288, Ursery, 518 U.S. 116 S.Ct. 18; pealed by § 1995 Mont. Laws ch. (1996), applied L.Ed.2d 549 Ten under 446). ch. *20 law Court in v. nessee Stuart State 894 (Iowa 108, Lange, v. First, 531 116-17 N.W.2d 781, Mon- 114 S.Ct. 1937.

Id. at 915, Gulledge, State v. 1995); Kan. stamp only hinge[d] 257 896 drug tax “not tana’s crime,” v. 378, (1995); Commonwealth but also of P.2d 389 on the commission Bird, of State only 915, the arrest the (Ky.1998); after 917 was exacted 979 S.W.2d that 436, the conduct Stubblefield, 249 Neb. taxpayer precise “for v. 543 N.W.2d in the obligation to the tax first Ballenger, gives (1996); rise v. 743, State 123 748 Second, Id. imposed tax was place.” 179, 572, (1996), 575 N.C.App. 472 S.E.2d longer no goods of that ‘possession’ “on 626, 481 S.E.2d per curiam 345 N.C. aff'd never taxpayer law- exist[ed] (1997); Dep’t McMullin v. S.C. Reve 84 of 783, 114 S.Ct. Id. fully possessed.” Taxation, 321 S.C. 475, nue and 469 none of the four features was 1937. While 600, 602-03 S.E.2d dispositive, their combination necessarily The Hudson case, which was decided tax that “a concoction of created a Ranch, Kurth overruled United after anomalies, crucial too far-removed in re- 435, 109 Halper, v. States 490 U.S. S.Ct. from a standard tax assessment spects (1989), 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 decision punishment characterization as escape the Kurth Ranch upon by majority. relied analysis.” jeopardy purpose double Nevertheless, the Hudson Court reaffirm Id. Ranch, of Kurth vitality indicating ed Kurth Ranch opinion, several After the Kennedy-like test” had by footnote “a drug ruled that their state state courts applied Kurth Ranch before strik been taxes, along when considered stamp “the ing down tax as functional prohibiting the criminal laws prose criminal equivalent of successive substances, vio sale of unauthorized Hudson, 6, 118 at 102 n. 522 U.S. cution.” See, e.g., jeopardy principles. lated double Ranch, Kurth (quoting 511 S.Ct. U.S. Revenue, 306, Dep’t v. Ill.2d Wilson Shields, 784, 1937); see also 114 S.Ct. 849, 415, 214 Ill.Dec. N.E.2d 419-21 4491739, Moreover, at *2 n. 1. 2008 WL State, v. (1996); 290, Bryant N.E.2d Hudson dealt with the civil crimi while Revenue v. (Ind.1995); Comm’r of 296-97 general, nal nature state actions Mullins, 1, 406, 428 Mass. 702 N.E.2d 5-8 Ranch Kurth propriety considered State, v. (1998); Desimone 116 Nev. very type drug stamp law-a state (2000); Brunner v. 996 P.2d 410-11 will, is at issue here. We there tax-that Div., (Utah 945 P.2d Collection 689-91 fore, consider both whether Tennessee’s 1997). however, courts, state con Other is a civil tax on unauthorized substances drugs cluded that their tax on did penalty rather than a criminal sanction not contain “unusual features” Hudson/Kennedy factors under rejected jeopardy Montana tax and double sufficiently distinguish the tax whether See, Kurth Ranch. challenges based drug stamp able from Montana e.g., Milner v. So.2d Supreme invalidated Comm’r Covelli (Ala.Civ.App.1994); Ranch. Kurth Servs., 539, 668 Revenue A.2d Conn. (1995), vacated, Covelli 703-07 Hudson/Kennedy Analysis Crystal, 518 U.S. 116 S.Ct. Hudson, stated, remand, under threshold As Cov (1996), L.Ed.2d 1092 aff'd Servs., Assembly General inquiry is whether our elli v. Comm’r Revenue (1996), unauthorized cert. characterized the tax on sub- de Conn. 683 A.2d 737 nied, civil than criminal Crystal, rather Covelli stances 520 U.S. view, (1997); passes In our the statute nature. S.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d 551 *21 Initially, alties have qualifying punishment. this standard. not been viewed as Hudson, terms of Tennessee Annotated sec- Code 522 U.S. at 118 S.Ct. 488 provide that the specifically Mitchell, tion 67-4-2801 (citing Helvering 303 U.S. gener- is “to purpose taxing statute (1938)). 58 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed. 917 ate revenue for state and local law enforce- disability restraint,” “[A]ffirmative in agencies agencies ment for use those term, ordinary use of the is something combat, investigate, prevent and reduce to “the punishment’ akin ‘infamous of im crimes, general and for the fund.” Hudson, prisonment.” 522 U.S. at Secondly, within payable forty- the tax is 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting Flemming v. Ne eight acquisition hours of the of the unau- stor, 603, 617, U.S. S.Ct. substance, thorized actual or con- whether (1960)). L.Ed.2d 1435 As our Court of § structive. Tenn. Code Ann. 67-4-2806. Appeals concluded, Criminal “[p]ay Thirdly, the legislation includes a state- o ment f tax bears little resemblance to ment that the of the tax shall enforcement deprivation liberty of one’s when incar prosecutions. not interfere with criminal Shields, cerated.” 2008 WL at (“Noth- § See Tenn.Code Ann. 67-4-2801 factors, therefore, *3. The first two weigh part this manner ing provide favor of the tax being classified as a civil immunity from criminal for a prosecution remedy rather than a criminal penalty. an person possesses who sub- The third factor is whether the tax on stance.”); § Tenn.Code Ann. 67-4-2810 unauthorized substances comes play into (2006) (“The provisions part this shall scienter, only on a finding of or knowledge any immunity not be construed to confer so, -wrongdoing. If the legislation is prosecution from criminal or conviction for likely more implicate double jeopardy chapter a part violation title principles. taxing Tennessee’s statute upon any person voluntarily pays who does contain a requirement. scienter imposed by who part or otherwise contrary, To the imposes it strict liability complies provisions with the of this part.”). “dealers,” only who are defined Finally, legislative history buttresses possession terms of their speci- certain plain language of the statute indi- fied amounts of unauthorized substances. cating Assembly the General intended Tenn.Code Ann. sup- 67-4-2801. This a to create civil sanction.28 ports finding qualifies that the tax as a Next, we shall each of the consider sev- civil sanction.29 en Hudson/Kennedy guideposts. first two factors are The fourth Hudson/Kennedy related: guidepost “[w]hether sanction involves an affirmative disability operation addresses whether or restraint” and it has “whether histori- tax on pro- unauthorized substances “will cally regarded punishment.” been mote the of punishment,” traditional aims From a historical perspective, money pen- namely retribution deterrence. This response query Representative 28. to a from proposed dissent’s construction of the (R-Niota) taxing pro- Bob McKee whether statute would attach inference as to -an scienter intent to sell distribute con- posed "just tax on unauthorized substances trolled substances-to the of certain punishment,” Rep. another adds level of Cur- quantities of those substances. Such a read- responded "going tiss that the tax would ing suggest would the tax is more a from them the civil side...." Statement of punishment penalty, criminal than civil Curtiss, Finance, Rep. Ways House & Means regard least with to this third factor of the Committee, 18,May Hudson/Kennedy test. *22 to was “insufficient already a crime this was question difficult more a presents particu- criminally punitive hand, purpose render [them] the stated one On Court. context.” jeopardy revenue for state in the double larly generate of the tax is (citations in or- agencies omit- law enforcement at 118 S.Ct. and local U.S. ille- combating ted). costs of both the fourth though der to reduce Even §Ann. 67-4-2801. drugs. Tenn.Code a criminal gal suggestive of factors were fifth purpose suggest that would Hudson, This nevertheless the Court penalty nor retribu- deterrence the tax is neither very simply [was] that “there concluded hand, other deterrence On the tion. of the ‘clear- say nothing showing, little cer- discouraging process act or “[t]he Ward,” that required by proof est fear,” behavior, by particularly tain were question and sanctions penalties (8th ed.2004), Dictionary Law Black’s civil, thereby implicat- than more criminal definition, imposition of by this Id. ing jeopardy. double has a de- unauthorized substances tax on there factor considers whether The sixth of those possession on the purpose terrent to which the purpose exists an alternative to that of other that is similar substances may ra- substances on unauthorized tax Im- enact.30 governments that “sin taxes” already have tionally connected. We be however, Supreme Court portantly, taxing both a civil that the tax is observed that “deterrence indicated expressly reve- general contributing to as criminal measure as well ‘may serve civil Hudson, remedial measure at fund and a civil 522 U.S. nue goals.’” the enormous Ursery, designed mitigate 518 U.S. (quoting S.Ct. 488 2135). upon this di- related to Based of law enforcement 116 S.Ct. costs rective, fourth factor is that the government. we believe and local control for state retributive, which mildly fact, appear either neutral to be purposes these dual criminal in more suggest purpose would a a the tax. When law forces behind driving analysis. jeopardy in the double nature investiga- conducts an agency enforcement assessment, that leads to a tion amount of Because re- of the revenue receives 75% agency in Ten- prescribed controlled substances charges criminal gardless whether section 67-4- Annotated nessee Code remaining 25% becomes are filed. The Tennessee, 2802(3) the fifth is a crime general fund. of the State’s part that clearly an indication factor is more 67-4-2809(b)(2). All of the § Ann. Code pen- a criminal taxing imposes statute under Tennessee’s voluntarily paid funds course, States Su- the United alty. Of go directly unauthorized substances tax on that the fact held in Hudson preme Court Ann. general fund. Tenn.Code into money penalties for which conduct 67-4-2809(c). generation Because the imposed were and debarment sanctions effects), Graff, are sin taxes See, perceived harmful their State Taxation e.g., Samantha K. discouraging the tar as much at Circumventing often aimed Sales: Online Tobacco Quill, making expensive it more geted By Fla. behavior Bright Line Penned Archaic revenue.”); raising see also (2006) they (noting are that sin taxes L.Rev. Ranch, 114 S.Ct. 1937 U.S. at Kurth indulging in harmful buyers "deter from C.J., dissenting) (arguing (Rehnquist, making products more ex products by those types of 'sin' obtain”); compared to similar "[w]hen Peñal pensive Eduardo Moises ciga as alcohol ver, taxes on items such L.Rev. Takings, 104 Colum. Regulatory rettes,” drug stamp tax was not ("Because the Montana the activi 2203 n. 94 only explained as high it can "so typically frowned by sin taxes are ties covered purpose”). serving punitive (often, though always, because of pur- legitimate, per gram of revenue is alternative rate set $50 section 67-4- 2808(a)(4) pose, weighs this sixth factor favor of to approximately translates 50% *23 the tax classified as civil in nature. being of the of product. market value the Hudson/Kennedy seventh and final view, In our per gram a tax of $50 of guidepost is whether tax unautho- cocaine is not excessive when compared to in rela- appears rized substances excessive its civil purpose generating revenue to — purpose assigned tion to the civil to it. drug fund control efforts of law en- Waters asserts the tax is excessive In forcement. dissenting opinion her $12,000 kilogram he paid because for Ranch, Kurth Justice O’Connor wrote that of then cocaine and was assessed with a State and “[t]he Federal Governments tax, totaling penalties and interest over spend drug vast sums on control activi- $55,000. agreed, The trial court holding ties,” and that the state legitimate “has a that the tax attempt was “an to force him nonpunitive interest in defraying the costs money of pay amount ... far in of such activities.” at U.S. of value of the item that he excess ob- (O’Connor, J., tained, S.Ct. 1937 cocaine, dissenting). ... Gov- a kilo of for which he $12,000.” expenditures ernmental paid for drug control at the time of Kurth Ranch were significant. Initially, the paid amount of that Waters Id. (observing the Bureau of Justice cocaine, $12,000, for the the “value at the Statistics United States Department of the item that he obtained.” The unre- of Justice estimated that approximately testimony hearing futed at the established spent billion was on drug control $27 approxi- street value for the cocaine at 1991). Today, speculate we safely can mately per gram. The “retail” mar- $100 cocaine, then, law enforcement ket value of the of costs attributable to kilogram $100,000.31 Thus, approximated greater.32 the tax control are even Given the price powder 31. The justice expenditures wholesale of cocaine in al $36 criminal exceeded December 2006 in Knoxville was between billion. That amount was dwarfed slate $20,000 $24,000 per kilogram, $20 and spending and local on law enforcement Justice, gram. $24 per Dep’t U.S. of National approximately $69 which was billion Drug Illicit Prices: December Table 3: billion, respectively. $104 Depart- U.S. Cocaine, (Feb.2007), Powder at 10 available Justice, Programs, ment of Office of Justice http://www.methadonesupport.org/Drug Statistics, Expendi- Bureau of Justice Direct Prices.pdf. approxi- This wholesale value is 1982-2006, Government, ture Level avail- of $12,000, mately price $12 double the of http://www.oj p.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/ able per gram, paid drugs. that Waters for the (last tables/expgovtab.htm visited June 2009). example, 32. For the federal executive branch of Tennessee and its local commu- requested support $15 over billion its high nities have not been immune from these Drug Strategy National Control in FY expenditures costs. In Ten- approximately $3.5 target- billion of which is Department Safety nearly nessee were ed towards domestic law enforcement. These addition, $140 million. In the combined ex- figures represent an increase from the final penditures Shelby County of the Sheriff’s De- budget $13.3 program billion for the entire partment Memphis Department Police $3.5 billion for domestic law enforcement million, expenditures $233 exceeded Drug in FY 2008. Office of National Control County Metropolitan Policy, Drug Nashville/Davidson Strategy: National Control FY million, Department $101 Police exceeded Budget Summary, Drug Table 1: Federal Function, expenditures County combined of the Knox Spending by Control available at h Department ttp://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/ Sheriff’s and Knoxville Police De- million, (last Obudget/index.html partment publications/policy/1 $50 exceeded and the com- 9, 2009). FY2006, expenditures visited June County total feder- bined the Hamilton costs, tax, qualifies assessment as crimi- then the has failed Waters enormity of these jeopardy purposes. nal double that the amount clearly establish is exces- substances unauthorized Ranch, Supreme In Kurth Thus, weighs factor the seventh sive. had a rate Montana enacted observed that legislation mar- of the classification more 400% of the favor than taxation marijuana remedy. and 800% of a civil ket value of (the leaves, stems, of “shake” value Hudson/Kennedy Having considered marijuana plant). loose parts other *24 determined that five we have guideposts, n. 774 & n. 780 & at U.S. of the tax on weigh favor factors tax rate as It characterized the S.Ct. 1937. being classified as substances unauthorized high” and as “unrivaled” “remarkably sanction, weighs one factor toward a civil jurisdiction. Id. at 780 & n. any other and one being penalty, tax criminal toit 1937. The Court also found S.Ct. marginally on either neutral or factor is “beyond question” Montana “[t]hat be qualifying as a of the statute the side peo- the tax to deter intended Legislature As the Court of Crimi- penalty. criminal marijuana.” at Id. ple possessing from Shields, we “that Appeals ruled in hold nal 780,114 1937. S.Ct. civil intent that the tax is legislative tax rate on note is the 50% Of in nature has not than criminal rather is far imposed by legislation our cocaine ... ‘the clearest been overcome rates of taxation considered less than the ” required as is under law. proof,’ high Ranch. Fur- by the court Kurth By at application *7. WL observed, ther, Tennessee as we have standard, Hudson/Kennedy Tennessee’s Assembly tax passed the on unau- General not, does tax on unauthorized substances substances, part, at least thorized therefore, punish- as a criminal qualify drugs. We deter ment. dispositive, these facts do not find

however, expressly indi- because Court high rate of taxation cated that “neither a Analysis 2. Kurth Ranch automat- purpose nor an obvious deterrent tax turn to whether Tennessee’s We now of punish- this tax as form ically marks sufficiently on unauthorized substances fact, “many pre- ment.” In taxes are Montana tax that distinguishable from the valid, cigarettes such as taxes on sumed alcohol, in Kurth Supreme Court invalidated high [in amount] are also both and by an inter- taxing motivated to some extent Ranch. If our statute contains 780-81, 114 est in deterrence.”33 Id. at present in the Montana “unusual features” Discussion, Reg. J. Chattanooga 14 Yale Department Police at a Rational Sheriff’s nearly Department $47 million. Brian were Hickman, noted, from A. & J. Bureau of the total amount of revenues Reaves Matthew As Statistics, Manage- on unauthorized substances over Justice Law the tax Enforcement Statistics, years just ment Administrative 2000: four of the tax’s existence was first Agencies Data and Local $5 Individual Stale over million. for 58-59, (2004), with or More Officers By way comparison, raised 33. Tennessee http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ available cigarettes $0.20 tax on from http://www.ojp.usdoj. state excise pdl71ema002a.pdf its l, July per pack $0.62 effective 2007. 2007 "State and lo- gov/bjs/pub/pdf/Iema002b.pdf. Considering drug Acts 488-89. all such government expenditures Pub. cal en- 1, 2009, July tax taxes as of Tennessee’s more difficult to state forcement are substantial but among fifty thirty-ninth states and Juan R. Torruel- ranks precision.” determine Columbia, la, half and is less than Drugs”: Judge's Attempt the District The "War One “Thus, high only upon goods while a tax rate that the taxpayer neither S.Ct. 1937. possessed to the owned nor purpose support lend at the time it and deterrent punish- imposed. tax Id. as characterization S.Ct. themselves,

ment, features, in and of Court observed that tax on ‘posses- “[a] these necessarily puni- goods longer render the tax sion’ of that no exist do not and that 781,114 taxpayer lawfully never possessed tive.” Id. at S.Ct. punitive unmistakable character.” Id. features” that led the The two “unusual The Court also found it “curious” that one Danger- the Montana to invalidate of the two alternative measures of the right Tax violative of the Drug ous Montana tax was the market value of mari- great- are of even jeopardy double that, course, juana, a substance could of taxation or significance er rate lawfully not be sold. Id. at 783 n. First, the Mon- purposes. deterrent S.Ct. 1937. only hinge[d] tana tax “not on the commis- crime,” of a but also was “exacted Because sion Tennessee’s on unautho *25 only taxpayer after the been arrest- rized substances ha[d] was modeled after the precise g[ave] drug stamp conduct that rise tax in neighboring ed for the our state of Carolina,34 place.” in the first obligation experience to the tax North that state’s Ranch, at Kurth U.S. S.Ct. its statute the wake of Kurth is, taxpayer particularly 1937. That the Montana had Ranch is instructive. The pay any to file a return or North obligation drug stamp “no Carolina tax was first arrested,” tax unless and until he Id. enacted in 1989. The Fourth [was] Circuit Ranch, meaning Appeals, invoking 114 S.Ct. that those Court of Kurth possessing marijuana original “arrested for consti- held that version of North taxpayers drug the entire class of sub- tax tute[d] Carolina’s statute was criminal Montana tax.” Id. at rather ject penalty Lynn to the than a civil tax. West, (4th Cir.1998), 1937. The second “unusual feature” 134 F.3d S.Ct. 589-93 only applied of the Montana tax was that it cert. denied 525 U.S. 119 S.Ct. (1998).35 that had been seized after an L.Ed.2d 36 The tax drugs has since Moreover, consequence, arrest. the tax was levied been amended three times.36 average per average pack price per $1.27 of the state excise tax of of the retail 22% Kids, cigarettes pack. Campaign for Tobacco-Free Tennessee. Cigarette Rankings Excise Tax Rates & 28, 2009), 19; Cruz, (updated May http:// Supra available 34. note Bonna de la Tennes- Dealers, rg/research/fact Levy, Targets www.tobaccofreekids.o with New see Users Tennessean, 29, 2004, sheets/index.php?CategoryID=18. The aver- Dec. at 1A. age price cigarettes per pack retail in Ten- included, including nessee with all Lynn drug taxes addressed North Carolina’s tax, per pack $1.01 $4.36. federal Cam- stamp claiming tax in the context of a suit Kids, paign deprivation rights for Tobacco-Free State Excise and civil under U.S.C. Cigarettes: § Taxes Per Pack Total 134 F.3d at The Fourth Sales 583-84. May holding Rankings (updated ultimate was that because Amounts and State Circuit's 28, 2009), http://www.tobaccofree penal- available at North Carolina’s tax is a criminal ty, proceedings kids.org/researcb/factsheets/index.php? all to enforce it must include Cate- Thus, safeguards the constitutional that attach to goryID=18. compar- even Tennessee’s proceedings. criminal Id. at 593. atively cigarette tax amounts to small excise average price per pack. over retail 14% (as §§ When one takes into account the Tennessee 36. N.C. Gen.Stat. 105-113.105 to. 113 8.5%, Laws, applies ciga- sales tax of which also ch. amended 1995 N.C. Sess. Id., 1, 1995; rettes, responsible for eff. Oct. 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws see state taxes are distinguished courts have dealers. Because the North North Carolina Carolina’s drug stamp tax from the Mon payable their state’s within forty-eight becomes in Kurth tana tax invalidated Ranch: taxpayer hours after the into pos- comes substance, session of the it is not a tax Sub- The North Carolina Controlled Tax, goods, as it was effect at all confiscated as was case stance tax, to this ... pertinent times case contains with the Montana which became due upon of the “unusual features” only upon taxpayer’s pos- neither arrest Supreme which the relied in session substance....

nor is it assessed on Kurth Ranch to conclude that Montana’s whether the stance Tax ed or ment The North dangerous drug controlled for double charged Carolina Controlled taxpayer is not substance has been arrest- with criminal tax constituted jeopardy purposes. property predicated that nec- conduct, punish- Sub- ble We hold that the North Carolina Con- the same offense contained in the Dou- tics as to bition trolled Substance Tax does not have such [*] * * Jeopardy fundamentally against multiple render Clause. it violative punitive characteris- punishments for prohi- Ballenger, (emphasis S.E.2d at 574-75 essarily has been or de- confiscated added) (internal omitted); citations see ... stroyed. obligation The tax is not Shields, (dis- also 2008 WL at *6 contingent upon the dealer’s arrest cussing interpretation of the North which, events, in the normal course .of *26 tax). Subsequent opinions Carolina have in would result the confiscation and de- Ballenger reaffirmed and indicated that struction of substance. The dealer the Fourth Circuit’s characterization of the satisfy obligation by can his tax paying drug stamp North Carolina tax a crimi- acquisition tax as upon the substance penalty nal by permanently binding then is not on them state’s affixing there- by recently, courts.37 Most a stamps Secretary to issued federal district court payment. Revenue to indicate held the amended North long So Car- affixed, tax, stamps as the remain olina statute a civil no addi- is not a criminal tax thereafter though penalty. Hough tional is due even v. Mozingo, No. 1:04 CV (M.D.N.C. may 609, 1168462, substance be handled other 2005 WL at *7-8 292, 1, 1, 1997; § ch. eff. Oct. 1998 N.C. manner consistent with the law as inter- 31, 1998). Sess. Laws ch. eff. Oct. preted by the federal courts. Assembly designed North Carolina General N.C. Sess. Laws 1998-218. amendments to the statute in both 1995 and Moore, specifically to address the concerns of N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. N.C. (2005) (reaffirm- Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit 614 S.E.2d 515-16 punitive Creason, and make the ing statute less Ballenger)', for dou- State v. jeopardy purposes. ble preamble (1996), to the N.C.App. 473 S.E.2d states, part: 1998 amendments to the law in per curiam 346 N.C. 484 S.E.2d 525 aff’d (N.C.1997) (same); Adams, State v. Whereas, upon challenge further in the fed- (1999) N.C.App. courts, 513 S.E.2d eral the controlled substance tax (affirming Ballenger light and Creason in was found in 1998 to penalty, criminal Lynn, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in which Supreme and the United States Court let is, therefore, binding courts); is not on ruling North Carolina the federal stand ... state it Milligan v. N.C.App. the intent of North Carolina General Assembly modify (reiterating the tax in S.E.2d 331-32 & n. 2 accordance ruling, drug with the recent federal penalty court that the tax so that is not criminal Lynn the tax continue binding). to be assessed in a is not Gilchrist, 2005); forthcoming.39 Furthermore, see also Nivens v. Tennes- Apr.29, Cir.2003) (4th (dis- 151, 155-58 319 F.3d on see’s tax unauthorized substances does length the amendments cussing at did, not apply, the Montana tax only to drug stamp tax and hold- North Carolina’s already items that have been seized and controlling not in a ing Lynn was case longer are no in taxpayer’s possession. tax). of the involving post-1995 version Instead, imposed the tax dealers possession who are than more tax in The unauthorized substances Ten- specified certain amount of an unautho- provisions nessee contains same substance, rized regardless of whether distinguished have the North Carolina that substance has been seized. See Tenn. from the invalidated stamp tax Mon- § law, Ann. Code 67-4-2803. tax. Like the North Carolina The amounts tana prescribed who under acquire those “dealers” Tennessee section 67-4-2803 also based, of an un- actual constructive are not as Montana’s tax on mari- on taxes authorized substance which have juana part, “market value” of required purchase been paid are tax short, those substances. our stamps Department from the Revenue taxing statute unauthorized substances permanently hours and forty-eight within neither contains of the “unusual features” stamps those to the affix unauthorized sub- present that were in the Montana drug possession. Compare stances in their stamp tax considered Kurth Ranch. It § Ann. 67-4-2806 with N.C. TenmCode therefore, may, be properly classified as a Thus, GemStat. 105-113.109. unlike the civil measure rather than a pun- criminal tax, statutory Montana Tennessee’s ishment. requires prompt payment scheme After careful consideration of the tests upon coming into possession Supreme set forth the United States tax, unauthorized substance. Tennessee’s Ranch, Court in both Hudson Kurth therefore, contingent is not an arrest. *27 our conclusion is tax that Tennessee’s the a contrary, To “dealer” owes the tax unauthorized substances is not a criminal if is even he or she never arrested.38 In fact, punishment for of purposes the of the double Department Revenue as- prosecution the tax if no criminal jeopardy sess even clause of the federal and state legislative history ty attempting illegal activity. 38. The that of to tax an establishes the anticipate many sponsors did bill's not that taxpayer’s voluntary ignore choice to his or drug pay would dealers tire tax ahead of ar- obligations her tax should not be the determi- Moreover, prosecution. Department and rest evaluating native factor in tax [the] whether only very Revenue reveal that a of statistics punishment jeopardy in the constitutes double of stem small fraction collections from the Covelli, context.” A.2d at But see 668 706. voluntary purchase drug stamps. Howev- (“The Lynn, possi- F.3d 134 at 591 theoretical er, “many pay the fact that dealers refuse to drug voluntarily bility pay that dealer could tax tax the does not transform the into one Drug the Tax does take the tax not out prosecution.” only assessed criminal penalty category.”). criminal Bouker, (10th Simpson v. 249 F.3d Cir.2001) (addressing drug stamp Kansas's debate, During legislative Representa- the petition tax in the of a for context writ of (D-Clarksville) Tommy tive Head stated holding corpus habeas and that State v. Jen- possibility you "it convict is a cannot sen, (1996), Kan. P.2d of a but Ranch, someone offense can collect upheld light which Kurth Head, Rep. Fi- tax.” Statement of House analysis was also consistent in Hud- nance, Ways Committee, May ). & Means practicalities surrounding son “The the im- merely ... position of the tax reflect the reali- 18, 39, Tobacco, 496 erages U.S. conclu- and The trial court’s constitutions.40 (quoting L.Ed.2d 17 S.Ct. penalty tax is criminal that the sion Atchison, Fe Ry. & Santa Co. Thus, Topeka to plea guilty Waters’ erroneous. 280, 285, O’Connor, him, 223 U.S. S.Ct. against which charges criminal omitted). (1912)) (footnotes 56 L.Ed. 436 imposition to the subsequent occurred contest, however, need Revenue, opportunity This to did Department of the tax and precede the assessment collection not jeopardy principles. double implicate not of the tax: Due Process Procedural C. that a need well established [I]t process for provide predeprivation assets were “seized not Because Waters’ object,” Allowing opportunity taxpay- to the exaction of taxes. notice or without prior tax liabilities Department litigate that the ers to their held the trial court government’s payment might for assessment threaten procedures Revenue’s by creating both un- security, sub- financial the tax unauthorized collection of satisfy the due interim revenue shortfalls procedural predictable stances failed easily the State cannot and fed- which process requirements state consideration, by making ultimate prepare, Our next eral constitutions. validly imposed more therefore, collection of taxes Department is whether difficult. pro- the due procedure violates Revenue’s the Fourteenth Amendment clauses of cess 2238; McKesson, at 496 U.S. S.Ct. arti- States Constitution and the United Taxation, Harper Dep’t accord v. Va. I, of the Tennessee Constitu- cle section 8 100-01, 113 S.Ct. 509 U.S. the taxing because statute Initially, tion. applied This Court has L.Ed.2d 74 civil in nature rather than qualifies as holding that principles, similar criminal, the enforcement of the tax does power has the assess taxes state safeguards the constitutional trigger not and fix methods for the collection there- proceedings. criminal accompany of, matter if it these reme- does 184 F.3d 593. In conse- Lynn, Contra nature, summary long in their dies be so quence, only consider whether we will way, in some taxpayer as the some re- procedural process due tax meets given stage proceedings, op- quirements a civil tax. portunity to be heard have his compe- before some rights determined proceedings challenging tent tribunal. tax, government of a must imposition *28 Currier, Brewing E. 126 Tenn. Co. to be in a mean taxpayer heard allow (1912). 541, 535,150 544 S.W. way. Specifically, satisfy the ingful “[t]o Due of the Process Clause The tax on unauthorized substances is requirements with, manner provide taxpayers ... must assessed in the same as other the State Tennessee, may and dealers seek opportunity challenge the taxes only not a fair of tax review of an assessment for legal validity of their accuracy provided as also a certain unauthorized substances obligation, but ‘clear and Annotated section any erroneous unlawful tax Tennessee Code 67-1- remedy’ for or § Ann. seq. et Tenn.Code 67-4- opportunity to ensure that collection taxpayer against whom the tax is a one.” 2807. meaningful “[I]f contest made believes assess- Corp. v. Div. Rev assessment McKesson Alcoholic of being punish- a holding disposes upon based the tax criminal also of substan- 40. Our remedy. ment a civil process claim that has made rather than tive due Waters

903 incorrect,” his exercise unjust, illegal taxing power to be or of ment exclusive tax file “pay are to either remedies to the legislature. Waterhouse Bd. of or for tax” “file suit a claim refund & Schs., President Dirs. Cleveland Pub. ... challenging the commissioner (1876); Sears, 68 Tenn. 400 see also any portion all assessment Woods, Roebuck & Co. v. 708 S.W.2d tax, including any penal- such interest and (Tenn.1986); 383 Bank Commerce & ty with the tax.” associated Tenn.Code Senter, Trust Co. 149 Tenn. (a)(l)(A)(B). §Ann. 67-1-1801 he Because (1924). S.W. pro Because taxes presented challenge a facial to the consti- duce the revenue which the govern tutionality of the tax on unauthorized sub- ment operates, legislature has wide stances, had the option, Waters also which adoption measures, discretion of tax exercised, declaratory he filing judg- judgment and its must great be accorded chancery ment action in the court. Colo- Genesco, Woods, respect. Inc. v. Pipeline, nial at 840. S.W.3d (Tenn.1979), S.W.2d superseded dispute Waters not does grounds by on other 1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts argument process State’s that the for chal (codified at Tenn.Code Ann. 67-1- an lenging assessment under Tennessee 801(a)(2) (2006)); see also Vertrees v. Code Annotated sections 67-4-2807 and Elections, State Bd. 141 Tenn. complies process 67-1-1801 the due with (1919) (“[A] S.W. constitutional McKesson, requirements East outlined power limitation taxation will Co., Brewing their progeny. Tennessee never be inferred implied.... [T]he contrary, To the procedural pro his due power legislative respect in this only can argument entirely holding cess relies positive restrained a distinct and ex that the tax a criminal penalty. constitutes law.”). pression in the fundamental Having rejected already the foundation for argument, we statutory legislature’s power tax, however, his hold that the is not procedure imposition appealing unrestrained, altogether as in courts the tax on unauthorized substances does validate tax if statute it runs afoul of the not due process violate the clauses of the Sears, federal or state constitution. Roe federal and state constitutions. Co., 383; buck & 708 S.W.2d at Evans v. we

While have concluded that the tax on McCabe, 164 Tenn. 52 S.W.2d unauthorized substances does violate rights against

Waters’ self-incrimination jeopardy and double and is otherwise com- History II, A. of Article Section pliant procedural process, due fully question does not resolve the of con- determining Before whether the determine, stitutionality. We also must unauthorized substances ais valid exercise did, Appeals the Court of whether the tax power, Assembly’s taxing General Assembly’s taxing the General exceeds we must first history scope review the *29 II, power under article section 28 the of II, the power granted by of article section Tennessee Constitution. Constitution, of spe- 28 the Tennessee and cifically provision per- the in that section Assembly’s Taxing II. The General merchants, taining peddlers, privi- to and II, Power Under Article leges: Section 28 Legislature power The shall have to tax power belongs The to tax to merchants, the in sovereign capacity, peddlers, privileges, State its the in and no higher be to farmland could taxed they from time tile may as manner such may direct, Legislature the than non-arable land. Constitu- rate time fundamentally merchants receipts tax on of gross tional Convention levy a ad valorem in lieu of Ten- the of taxation in and businesses altered structure II, of merchandise inventories Specifically, on the article section taxes nessee. and businesses such merchants held of pro- of the Tennessee Constitution portion of a exchange. The or for sale as follows: vides pur- used the Capital Merchant’s deed, taxation, held by to All lands liable to sold him of merchandise chase stock, lots, town bank grant, entry, or the beyond and sent non-residents of ages the twelve slaves between higher at a rate than not be taxed shall property such other as fifty years, and on property. tax the ad valorem time time Legislature may from to Const, II, § This language art. All expedient, shall be taxable. deem days of our origin in the earliest its finds according to its shall be taxed property statehood, legislature per- first when value; to that value be ascertained potential a source of as ceived commerce Legislature shall manner as such Assembly the General In revenue. direct, equal so that the same shall be alia, inter “retail upon, a tax imposed throughout the State. No and uniform stores, and hawkers within pedlers from species property of which other Pub. Acts Before state.” 1803 Tenn. collected, taxed tax be shall be merchandize,” of these “any article selling species proper- than other higher twenty- required pay were taxpayers equal Legislature ty of value. But one-year license to the five dollars for merchants, ped- power have to tax shall they county in which were clerk of lars, and in such manner as privileges, Id. 28-29. doing business. time, A may, time to direct. they from the license Assembly increased General laid, in polls tax on white shall be such fifty “any pedlar” tax on hawker amount, may manner and of such an they should and determined dollars by law. prescribed wag- tax for each fifty-dollar the same pay they used in their busi- carriage Journal the Convention Pub. Acts 61-62. 1819 Tenn. ness.42 Tennessee, the Purpose Convened for 1830s, Revising Amending the Constitution And beginning of the contro- By the (Nashville, Hasell Hunt & W. brewing Ten- was versy over taxation Thereof ' 1834) Journal”) (“1834 Convention Co. I, 26 of Ten- Article section nessee. added). change to taxation (emphasis required land nessee Constitution value, its in- property of real based uniform manner based on be taxed in a result, only productive acreage, fer- stead of its acreage.43 As al., II, Lyons et Poli- article section 28 that 43.William Government and 41. The version (2001); Replacement of Ten- Robert E. Cor- appears in the 2007 tics Tennessee lew, (2d erroneously History ed. Annotated substi- A Short nessee Code Tennessee: ("For 1990) "pur- many years "purpose” for the word taxation clause— tutes the word provided equal land which for taxation of all chase.” lots, might (except taxes be as town which land) later, high as those for acres Assembly years 42. Three General —had flesh who a thorn in the of small farmers peddlers twenty-five been reduced occupied oth- *30 carriage. land less valuable than that of per wagon or 1822 Tenn. dollars areas."). ers, valley basin especially in the and Pub. Acts 10-11. prohibited citizen, significant ap- modification Tennessee’s as to other proach to taxation in the 1834 Constitution. perceive. subscribers cannot well by An A. amendment offered John McKin- Proceedings Journal the Conven- of of ney expressly authorizing legislature (Nashville, Delegates Jones, tion of merchants, privileges, to “tax pedlars, and 1870) (“1870 Co., Purvis & Convention may, in as from they such manner time to Journal”) added). (emphasis See also time, eco- growing direct” reflected Mathes, (8 Friedman Bros. v. 55 Tenn. diversity nomic in state.45 The 1834 Heisk.) 488, (1872) (“[TJhis proviso was Constitution made the of “[c]ontinuance palpable intended discrimination ‘merchants, the practice taxing ped- of against the occupations and classes therein dlers, ... privileges’ permissive,”46 mentioned, power of [ ] taxation as subject requirement rather than to the them, is left to the sound discretion of in elsewhere the section that property the legislative department.”); Adams equal taxed at an rate based value. (2 Somerville, Head) Mayor 39 Tenn. of Although taxation was not one of the (noting key 365-66 distinc- driving forces for the Constitutional Con- tion in the 1834 Constitution between taxa- vention of modify convention did tion of property and taxation of privileges). the General Assembly’s taxing power The 1870 Convention declined to extend II, article delegates, section 28. Several principle equality the taxation of representing the concerns of commercial merchants, peddlers, privileges. See interests, aggressively challenged the ex- Logan’s Supermarkets, Atkins, Inc. v. emption principle from the equality (1957) (cit- 304 S.W.2d II, taxation that was embodied article ing cases for the proposition that “the section 28 of the Constitution of 1834. Legislature is not bound the rule of argu- Their concerns are reflected by the uniformity prescribed in cases of taxes on Joseph ments of B. Heiskell:47 did, however, property”). It propose to We think that the principles constitu- II, amend article section 28 to address the government tional require every expressed by concerns Heiskell and oth- class men shall be entitled to the Journal, ers. 1870 Convention at 369-70. protection same against oppression and ratified, II, As finally adopted and article against unequal burthens which are empowered section 28 the General Assem- guaranteed other provi- classes. The bly to Convention, sion inserted bor- Peddlers, Merchants, privileges, rowed from the Constitution of they declares all such manner as from men shall be time taxed equally to time except peddlers. portion merchants and direct. of Mer- Why they singled Capital should be out and used in the purchase chant’s subjected absolutely to a rule of taxation himby Merchandise sold to non-resi- McClure, McKinney, delegate from Hawkins Coun- 46. Wallace State Constitution-Mak- ty, driving ing Especial was also a force in the debate over With to Tennessee 53 Reference modifying (1916). acreage- the taxation land from based taxation to value-based taxation. 1834 4; Journal, Stanley Convention J. Folms- delegate Shelby 47. Heiskell was a from Coun- ah, (1960). History bee et Tennessee ty. Attorney He served as General and Re- porter Riley from to 1878. of Tennessee Laska, Darnell, Secretary Lewis L. Tennessee Consti- C. Tennessee Blue tution 7 Book 2007-2008 508. *31 (1971). noted, cur As the beyond the shall Convention sent and

dents II, explic the ad of article section higher rate than rent version at a taxed tax Assembly to itly empowers on the General property. valorem in “merchants, peddlers, privileges, and Journal, A at 421-22. Convention may to they from time such manner as of years after the Convention mere two past, this Court direct.” the time work, this ad- completed its the phrase the inclusion of observed that significance of the amend- the dressed they from to “in as time such manner II, to section 28: ments article the framers’ intent reflected time direct” 1870, a of There was the Convention Assembly dis the General broad give opposition engrafting very energetic merchants, peddlers, and to tax cretion Constitution, the clause of New upon the Dwyer, 75 Tenn. privileges. Kelly which seemed the Old Constitution Bros., (1881); Friedman 188-89 harshly invidiously so and operate (8 493; Ewin, 55 Tenn. Jenkins community. We the commercial Heisk.) question pre The which excludes mer- refer to that clause case, course, of is whether sented this chants, from privileges, and peddlers, falls the tax on unauthorized substances equali- the protection principle the taxing power as legislature’s the within When, however, finally it was ty. by constitution.48 defined our state protest presented was adopted, a solemn by representatives large against it Merchants and Peddlers B. Taxes on shortly constituencies. And

commercial thereafter, question the clause now in argues The Commissioner And brought adopted. forward and was by focusing only erred Appeals Court of upon intended as a limitation this was authority to tax a lack of constitutional general power Con- conferred aas possession of unauthorized substances 182k, regarded and was stitution of thereby failing to address privilege, triumph in the merchant. great behalf of Assembly, General possibility that the (em- Bros., Tenn. at 496-97 Friedman tax, properly exer- the enactment added). phasis power mer- corresponding its to tax cised II, peddlers.49 28 remained chants Commissioner

Although article section equates statutory definition of “deal- years, one it unchanged for over hundred ers” in Tennessee Annotated section 1982 and 2006. The Code was amended 67-4-2802(8) with the “merchants” slightly altered ratified amendment II, “peddlers” language of article section regarding the taxation of language commonly defined or merchants, 28 as those terms are peddlers, privileges. interpreted by prior deci- have been and Debates the Constitutional Journal II, leges” provision part is a of article 48. Because Tennessee's tax unauthorized existing 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. upon tax in section based substances Carolina, noting none it is worth North upholding argument law the decisions that tax ad- raises The Commissioner this noted, Carolina dress whether it exceeds the North first time in Court. As the trial Assembly's taxing power upon under that was based the self-incrimi- General court's order issues, process Neither article II of the and the Court state's constitution. nation and due Constitution, requesting party either Appeals, North Carolina which concerns without issue, II, powers legislature, fully V of that article section 28 nor article brief the document, taxes, legislature’s pow- its decision which addresses finance based "merchants, described in that section. privi- privileges er to tax peddlers and include the *32 907 Assembly’s taxing power claims that eral article He further under sions of this Court. target II, was to those legislative purpose if section 28 it can be classified as in illic- peddlers who traffic merchants and peddlers either a merchants and tax or a and “ensure that this unfor- it substances tax on privileges. commerce is

tunately expansive sector of Traditionally, peddlers merchants and escape the sort of and thus does not taxed have been treated as two distinct classes of by placed that is on and borne tax burden traders, stationary, “the one the other mi legitimate commerce.” (7 gratory.” v. Sprinkle, 26 Tenn. Indeed, legislature au Hum.) (1846). 36, 39 A “merchant” is peddlers tax merchants and thority to buying selling whose business is and “[o]ne power and from its separate distinct goods profit.” for Black’s Law Dictionary II, Article section 28 rec privileges. (8th ed.2004). seems the busi “[I]t authority to tax ognizes legislature’s buying selling ness of be should merchants, if those merchants are not even pursuit party, by and avocation of a which Jenkins, exercising privilege. a 55 Tenn. living, he makes his that he order shall Jenkins, made the at 474. In this Court regarded as a merchant.” State v. following observation: Smith, (5 Hum.) 394, (1844); 24 Tenn. Upon principles well settled of constru- Memphis Dwyer, see also Tenn. Club statutory provi- constitutional or ing (1883); Lovell, 79 Tenn. Simons v. sions, the enumeration of “merchants” (7 Heisk.) Ped tax- objects as distinct “peddlers” have an occupation dlers similar to mer ation, generally be taken as ex- would chants, the chief being with difference embracing the intention of them cluding goods a merchant sells at a fixed and “privileges,” under the term which is business, permanent place ped while subject a distinct designated also as itinerant doing dler has more mode of to tax “merchants” power taxation. 38-39; Sprinkle, business. 26 Tenn. at distinctly recog- “peddlers” is as (1 Bumpass, 8 Tenn. Mart. & Greer objects of taxa- nized these terms as Yer.) (describing “the station “privileges,” in the term and the tion as merchant, ary with merchandise on his fact that the framers of the Constitution pedler, “the hawker or shelves” and specified peddlers merchants and as dis- pack”). peddler person them in his A is a to indicate objects, tinct would seem for the place place who travels from they “privi- did not use the word goods. 1819 Tenn. purpose selling his definition, in its ei- leges” including (referring Pub. to “itenerant Acts. 61-62 “peddlers,” ther “merchants” or but that State, pedlars”); & 165 Tenn. Co. they might be taxed as they intended Swift (1932) (“[T]he 55 S.W.2d dis and not as peddlers, merchants and peddling tinctive is the concur feature privileges. selling delivering.”); rence of Wool Later, Kelly, 75 Tenn. at Id. at 473-74. (2 Swan) man v. 32 Tenn. 189-90, the held that a merchant (1852) (“By ‘peddler,’ the term we under who at retail and alcoholic groceries sells country, travels stand one who about beverages at wholesale be taxed as a vehicle, kind of or in on foot or some merchant, having for the privilege manner, goods other and sells or small license to sell alcoholic bever- wholesaler’s retail.”); Dic commodities Black’s Law The unauthorized sub- ages, both. ed.1990). (6th tax, therefore, within the Gen- tionary stances falls dissent, “pivotal we do not believe the ordinary meaning Given *33 “peddler,” question” statutory analysis “merchant” and we can in this “is terms to Appeals failing fault the Court among possess- not whether all the individuals the tax on unauthorized whether consider ing quantity a substantial of cocaine there tax ped substances is a on merchants and sell, barter, any are individuals who dlers, runs interpretation because such barter, sell, trade or intend to or trade the taxing counter to the statute’s definition of Instead, dispositive cocaine.” issue legislation “dealer.” The defines “dealer” under this section of the Tennessee Consti- only in terms of actual or constructive tution is whether there is credible pur not in terms of the possession, and interpretation plain language of the of the goods. chase and sale of TenmCode Ann. pos- statute that could the tax sustain 67-4-2802(3). Moreover, § the statute peddlers session as a merchants and tax. only a tax levies “on unauthorized sub Although required every we are to make stances Tenn.Code Ann. possessed.” in favor of the presumption statute’s con- added). (emphasis plain 67-4-2803 stitutionality, language employed statute, therefore, language places of the a 67-4-2802(3) section defining subject those only upon possession tax the control or requires ques- to the tax us to answer this upon substances and not their negative. tion in the transfer or sale. There is no reference in By readily acknowledging that the stat- to either statute sale those expressly anticipate ute “fails to that an sell, or the intent to substances whether at possession individual in of a large quantity a fixed location or in an itinerant capacity. of an might unauthorized substance not be “dealer,” Thus, the term as defined peddler a merchant or of the substance” legislation, not fall does within the tradi II, under article section the dissent meaning peddler tional of a merchant or a and, therefore, concedes the conflict between the taxing exceeds the broad statute authority the General and our state Assembly. afforded constitution. The dissent remedy problem by effectively would carefully legisla- We have reviewed the amending the to statute create a rebutta- tive history associated with the passage of presumption ble pos- individuals who the unauthorized sug- substances tax. As quantities sess the of unauthorized sub- dissent, gested by the some members of 67-4-2802(3) specified stances in section Assembly the General express did a desire barter, purposes do so for sale or trade. impose to a tax on illicit drug transactions The dissent’s rationale is that section 67- however, opposed possession; as mere to 4-2807, permits taxpayer which to seek cardinal of statutory interpretation rule review of provided the assessment as precludes legislative the consideration of Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-1- commentary interpret statutory lan- seq., requires et the taxpayer guage when that language is clear and either to the tax See, Waldschmidt, pay and file a claim for unambiguous. e.g., refund or file instance, suit S.W.3d at 176. In this Commission- specif- chancery ic er in court. A showing terms of the statute that the levy only upon taxpayer the possession merely possessed unauthorized unautho- sub- use, stances and not rized personal seller or one who substances for the dis- possesses with the intent sent argues, to sell. would indicate that More- the tax- over, the specific purpose of the payer statute is is neither a merchant nor a peddler enforcement, to raise revenue for law and that the not statute is unconstitutional as to tax the illegal drug trade. applied. approach Unlike the This ignore would tra-

9Q9 principles statutory construc- his requisite ditional amount of tion, “amendments” prohibit qualify which to a cocaine to aas “dealer” as the term by judicial directive. Ten- legislation. statute Under is defined in the An individual Annotated section subject nessee Code 67-1- to the unauthorized sub- 1801(a)(1), tax, objective challenge written, in a stances even if the evi- an assessment determine whether it dence does establish that he or she “unjust, illegal, qualifies or incorrect.” The dis- aas merchant or a peddler of the *34 approach open sent’s would the door for a substances. as-applied challenges, slew of in which analysis Our of the applicability of the required courts would be to consider merchants peddlers provision and of arti- taxpayers, including

whether those who II, cle might section 28 be different if the clearly are in violation of the statute’s legislature statutorily had defined “deal- plain language, avoid should assessment ers” as those who sell or intend to sell upon based a lack of evidence of either a substances, unauthorized rather than those or an intent sell. In summary, any sale in possession of illegal drugs.51 As remedy the taxing for statute’s constitu- written, however, the statute does not au- deficiency tional for the legislature, is not persons sell, barter, thorize a tax on who branch, judicial to develop. exchange or unauthorized substances for Instead, value. opinion today solely upon plain Our based language places a tax on those who principles statutory merely possess well-established construction, drugs. In consequence, the not the facts of this case. tax does not Nevertheless, fall within the the record below merchants peddlers does illus- and II, classification difficulty trate the under article classifying the un- section 28. authorized a proper levy substances tax as Privilege C. Taxes under the merchants peddlers provi- and proof sion. The introduced at trial estab- it Because is not a tax on merchants and lished Waters’ livelihood as carpentry, peddlers, and the tax on unauthorized sub- not, possession absent inferences from his may only sustained, all, stances if at as large drug, a amount of the as a “mer- privileges II, a tax on under article section chant” “peddler” Indeed, or of cocaine.50 Waters the tax on unauthorized sub- subject however, stances, written, was tax liability, as is more defensible as a Although pleaded guilty January "producing, cultivating, manufacturing, Waters im- felony 2008 to the Class B porting, transporting, distributing, acquiring, deliver, plea cocaine with intent to was purchasing, storing, selling, using, or other- thirty-two entered months after Waters was possessing” marijuana wise or a controlled assessed with the tax and seventeen months substance). appear Other states to have fo- hearing declaratory judgment after the on his drug stamp cused their tax statutes exclusive- action. ly drugs. sale or transfer of the See 35 Comp. (defining Ill. Stat. “dealer” as "a 520/2 Tennessee, 51. Unlike a number of other states manufactures, person produces, ... who have included individuals who sell or transfer ships, imports, transports, sells or transfers or See, drugs among subject as those to the tax. possesses with intent to deliver to another 40-17A-l(3) e.g., (defining § Ala.Code "deal- person” the cannabis or controlled sub- manufactures, person er” as ... “[a] who stance); 372A.070(1) (impos- § Nev.Rev.Stat. sells, uses, distributes, produces, ships, trans- “sell, ing tax on those who offer to sell or ports, imports any ... or or in manner ac- possess quires possesses” with intent to sell a controlled marijuana sub- or a con- substance); registering Ky.Rev.Stat. stance” without first trolled Ann. as dealer 138.870(4) (defining tax). activity” paying prescribed "taxable business, a license from require which a tax on mer- than as privileges

tax on authority, designated by language proper some peddlers. chants law, all, in- legislature open suggests general statute privileges.52 one, power to be one license. It is a the tax without such tended under Title First, was codified privi- the statute alone to create Legislature 4; of the Tennes- chapter Chapter forbid their exercise without leges, and “Privilege Annotated is entitled see Code license. designation Taxes.”

and Excise Mayor (quoting 55 Tenn. at 475 Colum- have used the terms we significant because (3 Head) Guest, 413, 414 40 Tenn. bia v. inter- and “excise tax” tax” “privilege (1859)); see also Wiltse & Pratt Senter, 260 S.W. at 148 changeably. (8 Heisk.) 544, (1873) (noting 55 Tenn. (“Whether in the tax be characterized privileges adopted word “that the tax or an excise tax privilege statute as 1870, in the in the retained Constitution words, synonymous a choice of is but *35 it used in the in which was Constitu- sense privilege tax is an indirect or an excise 1834, by as ascertained and settled tion of tax.”); v. Creighton also Foster & Co. see The earliest judicial interpretation”). 570, Graham, 412, Tenn. 285 S.W. 573 154 a topic “privi- consider the defined cases to (1926). Secondly, section 67-4-2803 of the activity that lege” any occupation as or “Excise tax—Methods of statute is entitled authori- enjoyed legal not be without could Further, there measuring quantities.” a ty, by way which is conferred license legisla- references in the also are internal payment. requires from the state that substances tax as tion to the unauthorized (3 Sneed) State, See, v. 35 Tenn. e.g., Cate view, tax.”53 In our the use of an “excise (1855); Tarver, 120, Mabry 121-22 v. a strong “excise tax” is indication the term (1 Hum.) (1839) 93, (holding Assembly to tax that the intended General permission, the license or privilege “is possessing unauthorized “privilege” terms, specified to do that which upon II, empowered by article substances as general prohibited”). in is constitution. section 28 of our opinions of this from matter, Numerous Court privileges designate As an initial early the nineteenth and twentieth centu- and more indefinite class of ob- larger legislature’s power that the jects ped- suggested of taxation than merchants and ries Lewis, II, privileges 3 Tenn. to tax under article section Phillips dlers. Cases 230, legislative virtually The “fixed and without limitation. In one 28 was judicial “privilege” case, definition” of the term example, for this Court held that the 1870 adopted Legislature as in Constitution was to declare power of “[t]he unlimited,” by set forth Chief Justice A.O.P. Nicholson privileges tax and “[i]ts in Jenkins: regard in this cannot be re- discretion strained or controlled the courts.” privileges, question are is a

What Whitice, Hill 149 Tenn. H.G. Co. dependent upon general construction (1924); e.g., see Kurth v. law. have defined it in several cases 258 S.W. We (1887) be, exercise of an or 86 Tenn. occupation S.W. contrast, By generate law en- neither the word "merchant” revenue for state and local "peddler” appears anywhere nor the word agencies....”); Tenn.Code Ann. forcement the statute. 67-4-2803(a) ("An § excise tax is levied on possessed, substances either ac- unauthorized ("The Tenn.Code Ann. 53. See 67-4-2801 dealers....”). constructively, by tively or part levy purpose of this is to an excise tax to (“A legislature pensation taxpayers is whatever the from the privilege to the state in return the protective for tax environment privilege, and to choose to declare provided state has (“[T]he activity Jenkins, such.”); 55 Tenn. at 479 Senter, occupation question. merchants, to tax Legislature power upheld corporate excise privileges, was unlimited and peddlars, and income. doing, In so it stressed the fact unrestricted, might be exercised corporations operating in Tennessee manner and mode their discre do so under the protection: state’s tion.”). Certainly, legislature Taxation the privilege upon occupations taxed manifold activities and occupation or activity carried on amid See, through privilege e.g., tax. Madi social, economic, and industrial envi- son Suburban Util. Disk Davidson ronment, protection under of the state. Carson, County v. 191 Tenn. opportunity Without the protection (use Hooten, tax); S.W.2d state, afforded none of those (sales tax); Humphries 209 S.W.2d at 275 classed and taxed as privileges could Carter, 172 Tenn. 112 S.W.2d exist; every element that enters into the (1938) (license nursery operate composition of a supplies civilized state Fort, greenhouse); Corn v. 170 Tenn. them sustenance strength; and it is (1936) (tax 95 S.W.2d 623-24 cor often true that the property visible at- Co., & porate capital); Creighton Foster tendant the exercise privi- *36 (tax storage 285 S.W. at on and sale of 573 lege inconsequential is as compared to Senter, gasoline); (corpo 260 S.W. at 147 the or earnings profits flowing from the tax); rate excise Knoxville & R.R. Ohio activity occupation. licensed or Harris, 684, 115, v. 99 Tenn. 43 Co. S.W. Excising the result of an occupation or (tax (1897) operation 119-20 of railr activity in the may modern state oads).54 likened the to ancient custom hunts- of sharing men with dispensing gods the of legis- Given the vast discretion that the bounty portion a small captured the enjoyed lature historically taxing has in Senter, (internal game. 260 at 146 S.W. privileges, question naturally the arises as omitted). Similarly, citation in uphold- whether to there exists outer bound- ing corporate capital, a tax on this Court ary on power classify its to activities or has further observed as follows: occupations subjects proper as of taxation. corporation Since a can exist sub- only More cases recent have defined the term ject to the will of the sovereign, right its and, precision “privilege” greater to exist or to do in corporate business assessment, our perime- have established subject form is to such terms re- and taxing authority ters on the of the state. may strictions as the place state the right, including payment such While earlier decisions de may taxes as sovereign exact for the merely privilege scribed a as a license privilege existing doing or business. legislature to do that which is other prohibited, wise Corn, our more recent cases to tax power S.W.2d privilege therefore, have considered the tax com- as privileges, is restricted to those We privilege pursuit also have made clear that the a or occupation. to business of an transaction, Dance, 114, single tax apply can to a act or Knoxtenn Theatres v. 186 Tenn. Kennedy, Springs (purchase Seven Water Co. v. 156 Tenn. 208 S.W.2d of the (1927); tickets); Ogilvie Hailey, 299 S.W. ex rel. ater 141 Tenn. Co., (1919) (operation Onnes v. Tenn. Finance Tenn. 210 S.W. auto (1925), S.W. 1119-20 limited pleasure). is not mobiles for pronouncement a sound basis for the to which the occupations activities Appeals that the General the Court of protection measure of some state affords not, under Assembly may even its broad words, Legis “the other support. II, 28, im- taxing power in article section be a tax something name cannot lature is a tax on conduct that pose privilege first privilege.” it is a able unless privilege wholly prohibited. MacFarland, 206 Tenn. Jack Cole Co. A logic second Despite inarguable 337 S.W.2d an act not legislature proposition that the unlawful does significant limitation is qualify privilege, a the Commissioner tax impose privilege not a century-old our decision contends that capricious wholly unreason “arbitrary, Speed, 111 S.W. Foster 274; see, Hooten, able.” 209 S.W.2d (1908), upholding basis for provides a Corn, (imposition at 624 e.g., 95 S.W.2d as a the tax unauthorized substances simple partnership, tax “on a privilege retail privilege operated tax. Foster a individuals, and composed excepting County liquor Shelby in a location store individuals, may, single perhaps, be who where, school, it proximity due to the in the kind of business as engaged same clerk of illegal liquor. to sell partnership arbitrary capric ... court issued distress warrant ious”).55 he Foster’s because had failed business the tax on sub By enacting liquor on the sale pay tax retail stances, an ac legislature did tax not general law of imposed by revenue tivity occupation to Tennessee which filed paid 1903. Foster the tax but then strength.” paid, provided arguing “sustenance and suit to recover amount Legislature Nor the state for that “the did intend compensate does the which could not license and tax business protect activity that occurs under its Foster, lawfully.” be conducted 111 S.W. contrary, ion.56 As To General *37 unanimously upheld at 925. The Court posses sembly strictly prohibited the of even the taxation Foster’s business sion the included the of all of substances though location was unlawful. Id. at its definition of “unauthorized substances” 925-26; v. Carpenter also see 67-4-2802(10). Ann. Tenn.Code (1908) (reaffirm- Tenn. 113 S.W. 1042 legislature’s prohibition wholesale the Foster). ing can possession of unauthorized substances not reconciled with the of ruling distinguishable be classification Our Foster is the was activity privilege. the same as a There is facts. While Foster’s business right right belonging every person, to cases found the General As- this Other have privilege.”). as cannot be taxed ability sembly's privileges be to tax to limited applicable not to on unau- reasons the tax legislative history supports propo- 56. The this such, thorized As we need not substances. floor, During the sition. debate on House McCabe, Evans address them here. See (R-Mt.Ju- Representative Lynn when liet) Susan (holding at 162 that restraint “[a] S.W.2d the it "said for the record” that wanted power to tax incomes ... is inevita- Assembly "recognizing ... was not General 2,” bly specifi- implicit in 28 of article section it, industry" by taxing legitimizing this or cally taxing clause income derived from Representative responded that it was Curtiss not ad stocks and bonds are taxed valo- "certainly legislation not the intention of this Butler, rem); Gallagher legitimize drug trafficking or of to the sale Evans); (1964) (reaffirming S.W.2d any illegal the State substance in of Tennes- Cole, ("Since Curtiss, see Jack 337 S.W.2d at 456 Rep. also Ses- see.” Statement sion, House right earnings May receive income or is a unlawfully privilege, because of its loca- to be a absent operating “amending” the view, not, by judicial statute fíat.57 In our tion, per it is liquor the retail sale of such just judiciary an “amendment” se, hand, illegal activity. an On the other that would realize the dissent’s fear of of an unauthorized sub- possession “short-circuiting the process.” democratic as defined in An- stance Tennessee Code alternative, therefore, only principled Our 67-4-2802(10) violates the notated section is to declare entire statute unconstitu- general regardless law Our its location. tional. research confirms extensive upheld Court has never the constitutionali- Conclusion

ty taxing a completely illegal statute taxing possession statute of un- privilege powers. acts under the Because authorized substances does not violate the Assembly may impose General federal and state protections constitutional privilege activity tax on an it has against self-incrimination and double jeop- unlawful, declared the tax otherwise ardy abridge guarantee procedur- on unauthorized even substances exceeds reasons, al process. due For different taxing authority the broad of the General however, statutory scheme cannot be II, Assembly under article section 28. characterized as imposing either tax on stated, Our charge, uphold the merchants, peddlers, a tax on or a tax on constitutionality pos- of a statute whenever privileges, as authorized under our state sible, and to that we have that if end held Obviously, prohib- constitution. this state unconstitutional, partially statute is “it possession its the of cocaine. As observed duty provision would be our to elide the our Court of Appeals, objected to rather than to strike down the substance is no privilege. Fur- taxing statute.” Int’l Harvester Co. ther, legislation only issue taxes Carr, 225 Tenn. 212- S.W.2d possessors and makes no reference to one circumstances, however, These or, by virtue quantity who sells broad, have generally involved omnibus factors, the cocaine other displays the taxing provision statutes in which one Finally, intent to we are sell. not inclined unconstitutional, but the remainder augment a statute an effort to make cases). statute is sound. Id. at (citing it within the fit framework the constitu- situations, In these typically courts have responsibility tion. That falls within the *38 statute, chosen to invalidate the entire capable Assembly. hands of the General but have “a more taken reasonable view judgment The Appeals ... part providing that the law for affirmed. are taxed to Reagan Costs Fain improper the exemption should be de- capacity in his the as Commissioner of instance, clared void.” Id. In this howev- Tennessee, Revenue for the State of for er, way there is no for us to strike down which execution issue if necessary. any particular offending provision within the invalidating statute without the entire KOCH, JR., J. WILLIAM C. filed tax. cannot a tax on posses- We transform in separate part and opinion concurring sors of substances a tax on dissenting part, into merchants in in which CORNELIA CLARK, J., peddlers, classify illegal activity joined. and A. suggests identify any specific, objec-

57. opera- The dissent the that “delicate does dissent might legislation portion might tion" save the from the state tionable of the statute that be legislature's bring constitution’s limitations on the removed in order to the statute within Nowhere, however, II, taxing powers. broad the boundaries of article section agencies enforcement KOCH, JR., J., local law and C. WILLIAM expendi- dramatically in increased dissenting part. resulted part and concurring per- for law enforcement additional tures the invalidates Unau- today The Court defenders, sonnel, prosecutors public and Tax on the ground Substances thorized courts, to and correction facilities Assembly’s the General that it exceeds drug-related convicted of persons house II, Article Section under taxing power crimes. The Court Constitution. of the Tennessee despite prece- conclusion reaches this society coun- question of how should statutes in interpret us to requiring dents illegal drugs the harmful effects teract sustains, de- rather than that a manner illegal drug in the engaged those and deter feats, though Even constitutionality. their that presents complex policy issues trade conclusions I with the Court’s concur de- legislative for particularly suited are Tax does not Substances the Unauthorized regard to mer- and action. With bate and federal constitu- of the state run afoul illegal drugs, peddlers and chants jeopardy double prohibitions tional Assembly, like Con- General Tennessee it is and that consis- and self-incrimination has tra- legislatures, state gress other process, of due requirements tent with ditionally emphasized through deterrence its that this concur with decision I cannot prosecution and incarceration.1 criminal imposed a constitutional tax cannot significant possess who persons however, manner recently, As- More General drugs illegal purpose quantities to sembly additional tools ad- has created of resale. em- illegal drug trade. It has dress law enforcement authorities

powered I. personal real and confíscate seize illegal drug trade or used property hydra-headed drug trade is a illegal proceeds from the obtained society. It preys our monster proper- then to forfeit this drug trade and lives and tears families destroys individual proceeds from its use it ty undermines our economic well- apart. It law defray drug-related the costs of sale impairing productivity, requiring being by activities.2 It enacted the enforcement treat- expense to bear taxpayers Act of to facil- Drug Court Treatment abus- drug ment and social services for courts for families, specialized the creation of itate forcing pub- ers and their reducing the incidence of purpose of drug- expenses lic to the collateral bear use, addiction, and com- drugs” drug drug crimes The “war on cur- related crimes. state, and addic- federal, mitted a result of use being waged by many rently felony up 17—417(b)—(j)(Supp. carries with it fine of Ann. Tenn.Code 39— *39 $200,000. 2008) § for prescribes the fines and sentences 39-17- Tenn.Code Ann. manufacturing, persons deliver- convicted of § Ann. 417(j)(5). Tenn.Code 39-17-418 drugs ing, illegal selling, possessing for (2006) prescribes fines and sentences manufacturing, delivering, purpose of or sale. posses- simple of persons who are convicted Possessing grams 0.5 of cocaine with intent to exchange of sub- or the casual controlled sion felony that carries with it a sell is a Class B stances. $100,000. up fine Tenn.Code Ann. of 17—417(c)(1). Possessing grams § of 39— 53-11-201, §§ -204 2. Tenn.Code Ann. See felony a Class B with intent to sell is cocaine - 53-11-451, §§ Tenn.Code Ann. and $200,000. up a fine that carries with it 17—417(i)(5). §Ann. Possess- Tenn.Code 39— A ing grams of is a Class 300 or more cocaine Accordingly, Assembly governments. en- the General In tion.3 Assembly the State with provided Act to General Liability Dealer Drug acted the weapon against illegal drug traf- by illegal drugs another injured provide persons damages ficking when it enacted the Unauthorized of action for a civil cause purpose Tax.6 The of this tax Substances knowingly participate who against persons tax-exempt was to end the status of mer- market in Tennessee.4 illegal drug in the illegal drugs and to peddlers chants and Assembly recognized The General a tax on their require pay profits. them to that drive drugs products are illegal that enormous, legis- busi- The Unauthorized Substances Tax illegal underground many patterned legisla- lation was after similar in Tennessee enterprises operating ness recognized already tion that had been enacted other It has also and elsewhere.5 As a result of the General Assem- illegal merchants of states. peddlers action, joined nineteen bly’s their Tennessee long operate been able to drugs have taxes, a tax on the impose pos- de- other states paying without illegal businesses illegal drugs.7 or sale of Some financial burdens their session significant spite other states’ statutes local earlier versions of impose on the State and enterprises 2006”). 16-22-101, Drug report December This §§ -114 Prices: Tenn.Code Ann. 3. See price powder also stated that the (Supp.2008). midlevel $28 and cocaine in Knoxville was between per gram, price retail $53 and that the street 29-38-101, § -116 4. Tenn.Code Ann. See powder gram. $100 Na- per cocaine was (Supp.2008). Drug tional Illicit Prices: December at Thus, considering tbl. 3. without either the the United Nations estimated 5. engaging other costs of business drug generates $300 more than bil- trade diluting profit derived from or the additional gross in retail sales which exceeds lion drug purity to increase the amount product of of the world's coun- domestic 88% sold, drug kilogram purchasing a dealer States It also estimated that United tries. expect at could powder cocaine wholesale drug of all retail sales. accounted for 44% $76,000 $80,000 profit from of between Crime, Drugs United Nations Office of selling powder in Knoxville in 2006. cocaine 127-28, 2.2, Drug Report § World http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_ available at 20, 2004, May ch. 6. Act of (last 2005/volume_l_web.pdf visited June (codified at Tenn.Code Ann. Pub. Acts 1840 ("World 2009) drugs Drug Report”). Illegal 67-4-2801, (2006 Supp.2008)). §§ & -2811 they profitable move from become more January effect on These statutes took Drug Report producers to consumers. World 2.2, trade, § In the the “[t]otal at 127. (Ala. § include Alabama Code 40- 7. The states is, average, producer income 4% (2003)), through § Con- 17A-1 40-17A-16 highest profits "the final retail value” with (Conn. through § Gen.Stat. 12-650 necticut [being] the wholesale and re- made between (Ga.Code (2000)), Georgia Ann. § 12-660 2.2, Drug Report § World tail level.” (2005)), through § Idaho § 48-15-11 48-15-1 illegal drugs price (Idaho The increase in the through § § 63- Code Ann. 63-4201 (2007)), (Ind.Code the wholesale to the retail level holds § from 6-7-3-1 Indiana (2007)), (Iowa States true in Tennessee. In United through § 6-7-3-20 Iowa Code (2006)), reported that Department through § § of Justice 453B.16 Kansas 453B.1 (Kan. through § Decem- price powder § cocaine in 79- wholesale Stat. Ann. 79-5201 $20,000 (1997 Kentucky (Ky.Rev. Supp.2007)), between ber 2006 Knoxville was & $24,000 equates through § per kilogram which 138.889 Stat. Ann. 138.870 Justice, (La.Rev.Stat. (2006)), gram. Dep’t Ann. per $20 $24 U.S. Louisiana *40 2006, through (Supp.2008)), § Drag § December 47:2601 47:2610 National Illicit Prices: 64K, (Mass. (Feb.2007), http:// Gen. Laws ch. 10 tbl. 3 available Massachusetts (2001)), (Minn. DrugPrices.pdf through § § Minnesota www.methadonesupport.or^ (2007)), 10, 2009) ("National through (last § § 297D.01 297D.13 Illicit Stat. visited June drugs adequate- passed unanimously by had failed to the General taxing illegal As- against self-incrimination or ly safeguard sembly, facially unconstitutional. A de- protections double had run afoul facially cision declare a statute unconsti- However, judicial jeopardy. through the tutional requires extraordinary caution to testing process, understanding a coherent avoid short-circuiting pro- the democratic constitutionally permissible approach by preventing embodying cess laws illegal drugs developed, to the taxation of will of people, expressed through and the statutes were and re- amended representatives, their elected being from Iowa,8 Kansas,9 present, At fined. implemented in a manner consistent with Minnesota,11 Nebraska,12 Kentucky,10 the federal and state constitutions. See Carolina,13 North and South Carolina14 Su- Grange State v. Repub. Wash. Wash. State Courts, preme the Oklahoma Court of 442,-, 1184, Party, 552 U.S. 128 S.Ct. Appeals,15 Criminal and the Alabama (2008). 1191, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 While this Appeals upheld Court of Civil have all Court never perform should hesitate to its illegal drugs against their state’s tax on assigned role as the constitutional check constitutional challenges. various Tennes- on the actions of the other branches of see’s Unauthorized Tax Substances re- government, we appropri- should maintain flects the resulting refinements from the ate respect breathing for the room neces- litigation involving constitutionality sary representative democracy for a similar statutes other states. thrive.17 respect This reflected

II. rules of construction that this Court has today traditionally adjudicating concludes that followed when the Un- Tax, authorized Substances a statute challenges constitutional to statutes. (Neb.Rev.Stat. through (Minn. § Nebraska Triplett, 77-4301 11. Sisson v. 428 N.W.2d 565 (2003)), (Nev.Rev.Stat. 1988). § 77-4316 Nevada (2007 § through § 372A.010 372A.130 & Stubblefield, (N.C. 12. State v. 249 Neb. Supp.2007)), North Carolina Gen.Stat. (1996); Garza, N.W.2d 743 State § v. Neb. through § 105-113.105 105-113.113 (1993). (2007)), (Okla. 496 N.W.2d 448 § Oklahoma Stat. tit. 450.1 (2001)), (R.I. through § 450.9 Rhode Island Moore, 13. N.C. School Bds. Ass’n v. 359 N.C. § through § Gen. Laws 44-49-1 44-49-16 (2005). 614 S.E.2d 504 (2005)), (S.C.Code § South Carolina Ann. 12- (2000)), through § 21-5010 12-21-6050 Dep't 14. McMullin v. S.C. Revenue and Tax- (Tex. through § Texas Tax Code Ann. 159.001 ation, (1996). 321 S.C. 469 S.E.2d 600 (2008)). Michigan 159.301 also taxes the drugs through general sale of but does so its State, (Okla.Crim. 15. White v. 900 P.2d 982 Dep’t Treasury, sales tax. Greer v. State, (Okla. App.1995); Hillv. 898 P.2d 155 Mich.App. 377 N.W.2d 837-39 Crim.App.1995). The Oklahoma Court of (1985). Appeals Criminal is Oklahoma’s court of last Watkins, resort for criminal matters. John J. Baehler, (Iowa State 604 N.W.2d 601 Appel Division Labor Between Arkansas's 1999); (Iowa Lange, 531 N.W.2d 108 Courts, late Ark. 17 U. Little Rock L.J. 1995). . (1995). 210 n. 152 Jensen, 9. State v. 259 Kan. 915 P.2d 109 (Ala.Civ. Milner 658 So.2d 500 (1996); Gulledge, State v. 257 Kan. App.1994). (1995). P.2d 378 Bickel, 17. See M. Danger- Alexander The Least Bird, 10. Commonwealth v. 979 S.W.2d 915 Supreme ous Branch: The Court at the Bar of (Ky.1998). Politics 16-18

917 II, gin strong Section 8 of the Tennessee with the presumption Article that the legislative power challenged vests all statute Constitution constitutional. Assembly. Penn., Included in this v. the General McCarver Ins. Co. State 208 of of 380, explicitly recognized (Tenn.2006); in Article 384 power, and S.W.3d Lynch v. 28, Jellico, (Tenn. II, power City 384, is the of taxation. 205 Section S.W.3d 390 matter, 2006); (2 power As a constitutional to State Cooper, v. 10 Bank Tenn. Yer.) 599, exclusively J.). levy assigned taxes has been 622-23 (Kennedy, Sears, Assembly. presumption places the General Roebuck & This heavy burden (Tenn. Woods, 374, person Co. v. 708 S.W.2d 383 on the challenging the statute. 1986). Elam, Accordingly, 455, the General Assem v. Gallaher 104 S.W.3d 459-60 (Tenn.2003); bly’s legislative power, E.N.R., exercise of its in Adoption In re 42 taxation, 26, (Tenn.2001); cluding power is limited S.W.3d 31 State ex rel. Leech, only by 534, the state and federal constitutions. Maner v. 588 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn.1979). v. Perry County Laurrence Election Comm’n, 548, 551, 219 Tenn. 411 S.W.2d Consistent with the presumption of a 538, (1967); Carr, 539 v. 218 Williams validity, statute’s we must resolve every 564, 578, 522, (1966); 404 S.W.2d 529 doubt in favor of a statute’s constitutionali McCabe, 675, 672,

Evans v. 164 Tenn. 52 Pickett, ty. 696, State v. 211 S.W.3d 700 (1932). 159, 160 S.W.2d (Tenn.2007); Bailey v. County Shelby, 539, (Tenn.2006). Because the Tennessee ex Constitution 188 S.W.3d 543 Because pressly assigns legislative power all to the we uphold must a statute possi whenever ble, Pickett, Assembly, separa 700; General the doctrine of S.W.3d II, powers, County 117, 121, tion of reflected in Article Sec v. Frye, Unicoi 197 Tenn. Constitution, 381, (1954), tion 2 of the Tennessee con 270 S.W.2d adopt we must power strains this to invalidate the Court’s reasonable construction of a statute Assembly’s General legislative preserve actions. that will the statute and avoid Nolan, 222, 233-34, Peay 157 Tenn. 7 constitutional conflict. Jordan v. Knox (1928). 815, (Tenn. 751, respect County, S.W.2d We must 213 S.W.3d 780-81 2007); Assembly’s the General Taylor, exercise its State v. 70 S.W.3d (Tenn.2002). matters, legislative discretion in all broad As the States United Su including Logan’s preme seventy years matters of taxation. noted over Court Atkins, Supermarkets, ago, Inc. v. 202 Tenn. cardinal principle statutory “[t]he (1957); destroy.” S.W.2d construction is to save and not to Mayor Adams v. & Aldermen Somer NLRB v. Laughlin Corp., Jones & Steel (2 ville, Head) 363, (1859). 1, 30, 39 Tenn. 366-67 301 U.S. 57 S.Ct. 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937). Accordingly, we must refrain from invali dating grounds a statute on constitutional A challenge to a statute’s constitutionali- clearly plainly

unless it is unconstitu ty give does not Court license Perry tional. v. Lawrence County Elec second-guess Assembly’s the General poli- Comm’n, tion 219 Tenn. at 411 cy judgments or to import person- our own 539; Holly City S.W.2d Elizabeth statutory Drap- al views into the text. See an, 46, 53, 193 Tenn. S.W.2d Westerfield, er v. 181 S.W.3d (1951); 1004-05 Koen v. 162 Tenn. (Tenn.2005); Goodman, State v. 90 S.W.3d 573, 582, 39 S.W.2d (Tenn.2002). prerog- It is not our

When this ative inquire asked address into the motives of the statute, constitutionality of Assembly. Cosmopolitan we must be- General Life *42 918 541, that constitutional issues must Northington, by holding 201 Tenn. v.

Ins. Co. (1957). 911, be raised in the trial court “unless the 558, 918 Nor first 300 S.W.2d obviously unconstitu wisdom,18 statute involved so expedi- we review the statute’s face to obviate the necessi reasonableness,20 tional on its desirability.21 ency,19 ty for discussion.” Lawrence v. Stan matters entrusted to the These are 927, (Tenn.1983); ford, 655 929 S.W.2d electorate, not the courts. See State ex County, v. 204 City Elizabethton Carter 625, Lindsay, Tenn. rel. v. 103 Robinson (1958). 452, 463, 822, 321 827 Tenn. S.W.2d (1899); 640, 950, Henley 954 v. 53 S.W. patently in the absence of a Accordingly, 665, 679-82, 352, State, 41 98 Tenn. S.W. defect, obvious facial constitutional this (1897); State ex rel. v. 354-55 Coleman consistently declined to consider Court (Shannon) 355, 366 Campbell, 3 Tenn.Cas. challenges to statutes that constitutional (1875). trial have not first been asserted have an parties III. court where the would had to introduce evidence that opportunity Both this and the General Assem- material “might pertinent consid bly developed jurisprudential princi- have validity Law ering the statute.” to constitutional ples applicable challenges. 929; Stanford, v. rence 655 S.W.2d see principles assure that These time-tested M.L.P., 394; In re 281 also S.W.3d parties joined, are proper Valentine, 539, n. re 79 S.W.3d 544 3 clearly properly issues are focused (Tenn.2002). drawn, and that State has full and opportunity fair to defend the constitution- jurisprudential principle, A second em ality challenged Many statute. 29-14r-107(b) of the § bodied in Ann. Tenn.Code principles these have not been followed (2000), 24.04, Tenn. R. P. Civ. and Tenn. this case. 32, R.App. requires parties challenging P. constitutionality notify of a statute to

A. Attorney Reporter General and principle appellate prac challenge by serving copy papers One cardinal of their Attorney tice who fails party purposes is that to raise General. The trial court right requirements issue waives its these are two-fold. M.L.P., First, appeal. raise that issue on In re the notice enables the Office of the 387, (Tenn.2009); Dye Attorney discharge responsi 281 S.W.3d 394 v. General to its (Tenn. Corp., bility constitutionality 216 S.W.3d to defend the Witco 2007); Reg’l Med. Ann. Cookeville Ctr. v. Hum state statutes. Tenn.Code 8-6- 109(b)(9) (Tenn.2004); Second, phrey, (Supp.2008). joinder 126 S.W.3d 905-06 Blount, Attorney Black v. 938 S.W.2d General assures that the (Tenn.1996). This expressly ap vigorously Court has statute will be defended. Com plied principle involving pliance in cases chal and the related this statute Beeler, lenges constitutionality mandatory. Cummings to the of a statute rules is v. Johnson, 290; Draper Westeifield, 18. Green v. 249 S.W.3d v. 181 S.W.3d at 318-19 (Tenn.2008); Dorsett, Express Hoover Motor Co. v. Wausau Ins. Co. 172 S.W.3d Hammer, 270, 275, 201 Tenn. 298 S.W.2d (Tenn.2005). (1957). Atkins, Mobilphone 21. Nashville Co. v. 1, 7, Olgiati, Kirk 308 S.W.2d (Tenn.1976). S.W.2d (1957); Estep 183 Tenn. 325, 335, 192 S.W.2d 151, 158, parties *43 189 Tenn. 223 S.W.2d consider issues that the have not (1949); Cummings Shipp, 13(b). However, 156 Tenn. R.App. raised. Tenn. P. (1928). 595, 597, S.W.2d This the comments to Tenn. RApp. P. 13 make litigant’s that a Court has noted failure to that clear “control over issues should give Attorney General notice of chal in parties, reside not the court” and lenge constitutionality to of a statute appellate courts “sparingly” should compounds its failure to raise constitution exercise their to discretion consider issues challenges al in the trial court. re that have not been by parties. raised of E.N.R., 42 Adoption at 33. S.W.3d R.App. Tenn. advisory P. 13 comm’n cmt. subdivision b. A jurisprudential principle third is that

parties thoroughly must brief the issues 13(b) Tenn. RApp. signals P. also they appellate expect courts to consid- the appellate courts should limit their dis- er. principle This is reflected in Tenn. to cretion consider by issues not raised 13(b) that, RApp. P. which provides parties to extremely important circum- the exception involving of issues the sub- stances, (1) prevent such as to needless ject jurisdiction of matter the trial and (2) litigation, prevent to injury to the inter- courts, appellate appellate “gener- review ests of the public, and to prevent preju- ally only will extend to those pre- issues dice the judicial process. to This Court Thus, appellate sented for review.” courts has never specifically invoked Tenn. may properly decline to consider issues 13(b) RApp. P. in proceeding by- a civil to have been raised and briefed in pass the requirement that constitutional accordance with the applicable rules. See issues must be raised in the trial court Melton, State rel. ex D’Amore v. 186 Tenn. the first instance.22 S.W.2d This principle judges enables to be “more confi- B. dent in the results of their deliberations” II, Mr. never Waters asserted an Article “they

because have heard the issues ar- Section 28 challenge in the trial court. gued by attorneys duty-bound that are he While complied with Tenn.Code Ann. fully develop opposing positions.” their 29-14-107(b) R. Tenn. P. 24.04 Civ. Northern, State v. 262 S.W.3d 766 by serving Attorney with pa- General (Tenn.2008) (Holder, J., concurring and pers raising constitutional challenges dissenting). self-incrimination, based jeopar- double appellate dy,

The current permit rules re- and due process, complaint neither his viewing mentioned, courts to exercise their nor other papers discretion his plain 22. While the doctrine of error is fre- research ... where counsel has made no at- quently by appellate issue, used courts to consider tempt to address the we will not reme- issues criminal cases that were not raised defect, dy especially 'important where ... courts, in the no lower there is doctrine anal- questions far-reaching significance' are in- ogous "plain proceedings. error” in civil Northern, volved." S.W.3d at 767 13(b) This R.App. Court has invoked Tenn. P. (Holder, J., concurring dissenting) (quot- plain and the error doctrine in a criminal ing Regan, Carducci F.2d case to consider issue that had been raised (D.C.Cir.1983)). The 2009 amendment in the trial court but had not been raised in 36(b) R.App. plain P. that codifies Appeals. the Court of Criminal State v. not, terms, error doctrine does its own Northern, dissent, 262 S.W.3d at 764 n. 10. In dispense requirement with the that constitu- Holder, quoting now Judge Chief Justice then challenges tional to a statute must be raised Scalia, "appellate asserted that courts do not in the trial court in the first instance. legal sit inquiry as self-directed boards of Instead, II, Chumley brief. to, 28 Robbins v. an Article Section alluded even specifically only Thus, addressed sup- cannot Commissioner the record challenge. expressly presented arguments “those that Mr. Waters ever port the conclusion However, out filed during the the brief Waters.” Attorney General notified caution, the an abundance of Commis court that he was in the trial proceedings appellate court requested Substances sioner challenging the Unauthorized original reply II, its brief and brief Section 28.23 consider Article Tax based on *44 the Chumley appeal, v. “[t]o the Robbins shortcomings in the to the In addition permit[ted] that the Court Waters extent court, rec- the trial proceedings before ‘adopt’ incorporate by reference.”26 to Mr. did not Waters ord demonstrates II, case Appeals The Court of decided the Section a based on Article assert claim solely ground in on the that the Unauthorized he filed the Court of 28 in the brief II, Tax violated Article Section comply he failed to Substances Accordingly, Appeals. not in that Mr. Waters had requirement Tenn. 28—an issue the notice in the or in the requirement argued raised or trial court briefing P. R.App. 32 and 27(a)(4) Thus, Instead, Gen- Attorney court. appellate in P. & R.App. put ap- was never on notice that the Appeals eral provided Mr. Waters actively considering was an pellate court copy taxpay- a brief that another with a and, therefore, II, Section 28 claim separate, appeal er unrelated Article had filed in directly to Appeals opportunity in not afforded an the Court of was pending before Sub- appellate address whether the Unauthorized and informed the Nashville24 II, in Tax violated Article Section “adopting] was stances [this brief] court that he its appellate court handed down analysis” detailed before total for more opinion. in own brief.25 he had raised his issues It is difficult to read the record in this of Revenue did not

The Commissioner to objectively coming in without the con- all the issues raised case respond to Chumley opinion, taxpayer v. had 8 of its the Court 25. Robbins 23. In footnote to that the tax on unauthorized sub- Mr. Waters’s failures assert asserted brushes aside II, Assembly’s stances exceeded the General Article Section claim the trial an II, Attorney power Article Section but the provide the General under court and to rejected argument. by observing had this Rob- required notice that the trial court with the 63-IV, Chumley, Attorney challenged v. No. 05-23 Memoran- "has not the lack bins General (Davidson Opinion quite clearly p. and Order joinder party.” The State dum Chan, 10, 2006). July filed points its brief filed in this Court that out in challenged never the Unautho- Mr. Waters Tax in the trial court based rized Substances generously Even if 26. one were construe II, to raise a on Article Section Failure incorpo attempt an Mr. Waters's brief as is, facto, ipso II, issue a failure to constitutional argument in the rate Article Section 28 29-14-107(b) comply §Ann. with Tenn.Code Chumley v. into his brief filed brief, Robbins Any 24.04. other inter- and Tenn. R. Civ. P. improper permit it would have been requirements pretation these undermines 27(j) R.App. him to do so. Tenn. P. allows salutary purpose which is to ensure the their adoption “any part of the brief another vigorous of statutes whose constitu- defense involving multiple parties. party” in cases challenged. tionality juris- However, been These appellate I am "unaware of prudential principles exist for the benefit of incorporate by whereby procedure one can courts, and thus the invoke courts in reference a brief from unrelated case parties not. them when have volving even parties parties who are not Lunati, appeal.” v. 665 S.W.2d State Del Chumley, (Tenn.Crim.App.1983); No. v. M2006-01730- Robbins cf. (Tenn.2002). linger, S.W.3d 462 n. COA-R3-CV. Attorney elusion that the General lenges); 845 S.W.2d Burford (Tenn.1992) given opportunity (upholding full and fair in either the facial con- stitutionality of trial appellate court or the court to Post-Conviction Proce- dure Act’s statute of defend the limitations while in- Unauthorized Substances Tax validating application its particular to a challenge a constitutional based on fact, prisoner). we have entertained II, Article Section 28. The result is that types both of constitutional challenges to being Court is pass asked to See, tax statutes. e.g., FMC Corp. v. constitutionality of a statute based on a Woods, (Tenn.1981), 618 S.W.2d flawed incomplete I record. cannot superseded by recognized statute as but help believe that the outcome of this Olsen, Kellogg Co. 675 S.W.2d 708- case has been influenced these proce- (Tenn.1984). dural irregularities.

A facial challenge to a statute involves a claim that the statute fails an applicable IV. constitutional test and should be found in Despite procedural irregularities applications. valid all United States v. normally would a scuttle challenge to a Salerno, 739, 745, 481 U.S. 2095, 107 S.Ct. constitutionality, statute’s the Court has (1987). 95 L.Ed.2d 697 A facial challenge held that the Unauthorized Substances to a statute is the most difficult challenge Tax is unconstitutional its face. This to mount successfully. Lynch v. City of means that the determined that Jellico, 205 (quoting S.W.3d 390 United absolutely there are no circumstances in Salerno, States v. 745, 481 U.S. at 107 tax applied which this could be in a consti- 2095). presumption S.Ct. of a stat tutional manner. ute’s constitutionality applies with even statute, including statute, A greater force when a facial challenge is be found to be constitutional in some cir- Elam, made. Gallaher v. 104 S.W.3d at but cumstances others. McConnell 459; Burson, 768, In re 909 S.W.2d 775 Lebanon, City 498, 514, v. 203 Tenn. 314 (Tenn.1995). of Accordingly, challenger 12, (1958); S.W.2d 19 Int’l Harvester Co. must establish that no of set circumstances Carr, v. 244, 207, 225 Tenn. 466 S.W.2d exists under which the statute would be (1971) cases). (listing 212-13 Accordingly, valid. Grange Wash. State v. Wash. State recognized this Court has the distinction Republican -, 552 Party, U.S. at 128 between facial challenges and “as applied” S.Ct. at 1190 (quoting United States v. challenges to a statute’s constitutionality. Salerno, 745, 2095); 481 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. See Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. Dentistry, Jellico, Lynch City v. 205 S.W.3d at 390 of of 446, (Tenn.1995) 913 (per- S.W.2d 454-55 Booksellers, (quoting Davis-Kidd Inc. v. mitting administrative agencies McWherter, (Tenn. to consider 520, 866 S.W.2d 525 applied” challenges 1993)).27 “as but not facial chal- way, Stated another the ehal- unique 27. We adoption recognized are not in our regularly of this invoke the same regarding principle challenges facial principle. to a stat- e.g., See v. Native Vill. of constitutionality. 389, ute’s (Alaska Nunapitchuk, United States Su- 156 P.3d 405 2007); preme Montour, 489, pointed Court has out that in People order to v. 157 P.3d 499 face, (Colo.2007); be found Dep't City unconstitutional its stat- Fla. Revenue v. Gainesville, 250, every (Fla.2005); ute must be unconstitutional in conceiv- 918 So.2d 256 Falls, City 232, able circumstance. Members Council Lochsa L.L.C. v. 147 Idaho Vincent, 963, Angeles Taxpayers (2009); Los v. Napleton 466 207 P.3d 971-72 v. 796, 789, 2118, Hinsdale, 296, U.S. 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d 772 Vill. 229 Ill.2d 322 Ill.Dec. (2008); supreme Other state courts have also 891 N.E.2d 845 State v. 922 288, 347, A, S.Ct. law can TV U.S. that the demonstrate

lenger must (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) anyone. L.Ed. 688 constitutionally applied to not be Tribe, Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. (quoting Constitu H. American 1 Lawrence (3d ed.2000) 33, 39, 3-31, Emigration, U.S. at 611 v. Comm’rs tional Law (1885)). Third, (hereinafter Constitutional 28 L.Ed. 899 “American 5 S.Ct. ”). challenges threaten to short circuit “facial Law by preventing laws process the democratic challenge a facial considering Courts people the will of the from embodying with caution and proceed should statute implemented a manner consistent being holding facially a statute because restraint Wash. State with Constitution.” unnecessary may result unconstitutional Republican Party, v. Grange Wash. State governmental legitimate interference 1191; at-, 128 S.Ct. see 552 U.S. City Erznoznik Jack- functions. See N. v. Planned Parenthood Ayotte also sonville, 95 S.Ct. 422 U.S. 329, 126 Eng., S.Ct. New 546 U.S. (1975). Accordingly, the L.Ed.2d 125 (2006) (quoting Regan 163 L.Ed.2d “manifestly invalidity as facial courts view 641, 652, Time, Inc., 468 U.S. S.Ct. sparingly it strong medicine” and invoke opin (plurality 82 L.Ed.2d last resort. Broadrick only ion)). 601, 613, Oklahoma, U.S. S.Ct. *46 (1973). 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 Thus, facial a successful constitutional wholesale invalida- challenge results for the are at least three reasons There passing on the on tion of the statute. While invalidate statutes courts’ reticence effi- First, invalidity validity of a statute wholesale claims of facial their face. abstract, any often gain run the cient in the speculation and thus often rest by losing taught by the interpretation of offset the lessons “premature risk States, v. factually particular. Sabri 541 the basis of barebones United statutes on 608-09, 124 1941. For this Grange v. U.S. at S.Ct. records.” Wash. State Wash. at-, reason, many applied” courts view “as Party, U.S. Republican State 552 United, building of challenges at v. as the “basic blocks” (quoting 128 S.Ct. 1191 Sabri 1941, States, 600, 609, adjudication. v. 124 constitutional Gonzales 541 U.S. S.Ct. Carhart, 168, 1610, (2004)). Second, 124, 127 facial 550 U.S. S.Ct. 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2007) (quoting 167 480 Richard contrary to the fundamen L.Ed.2d challenges “run Fallon, Jr., by As-Applied invit H. and Facial judicial of restraint” principle tal Challenges Third-Party Standing, a rule of con ing the courts to “formulate (2000)). 1321, “As required law broader than is 113 Harv. L.Rev. 1328 stitutional because, ap applied” challenges preferred it are precise facts to which is to be successful, they Grange they if are do not render plied.” State v. Wash. Wash. at-, completely inoperative. Party, 552 U.S. entire statute Republican State Dennis, 404, 1191; 410-11 Sanger v. v. 148 P.3d 128 see also Ashwander S.Ct. Hamit, 659, 512, 226, (Iowa 524- 237 271 Neb. 715 N.W.2d Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 2002); 554, (2006); City Bryant, v. Minne Minn. Voters Alliance v. N.C. 614 25 State 359 683, (Minn.2009); 479, apolis, (2005); 766 N.W.2d 688 v. S.E.2d 485-86 Groch Gen. 237, (Mo.2009); Perry, 275 S.W.3d 240 192, State v. Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 883 N.E.2d Motors Urbach, Towing Corp. v. N.Y.2d Moran 99 377, (2008); County, Allegheny v. 386 Clifton 513, 624, 443, N.Y.S.2d 787 N.E.2d 627 757 1197, (Pa.2009); v. A.2d 1222 Alston 969 (2003); Orgs. & Others Ed. Council 456, for Commonwealth, 759, 274 Va. 652 S.E.2d Governor, 557, Parochiaid v. Mich. About 455 n. 5 464 208, (1997); v. 566 N.W.2d 214-15 Hamit

923 (2d 167,174-75 Cir.2006); Suffolk, Redmond v. 463 F.3d (Colo.Ct.App.2006); City of 875, Ana, 664, Moore, City Cal.Rptr.2d P.3d 878 Tobe v. Santa 40 Wash.2d 91 290, 402, 1152-53; Konrath, (2004); Napleton 218 Wis.2d 892 P.2d at v. (1998); Hinsdale, Village n. see also 322 Ill.Dec. 577 N.W.2d 3-31, Upholding ap Law at N.E.2d 845-46. an “as American Constitutional circumstances, plied” challenge constitutionality the courts to the In some 610-12. addressing intent a statute obviates the need for legislature’s fulfill the can best appli- challenge City a facial to the statute. only the unconstitutional prohibiting Res., LLC, statute, allowing the Knoxville v. Entm’t of a while S.W.3d cations (Tenn.2005) (Drowota, C.J., in other cir- 659-60 enforce the statute State to concurring). cumstances. applied” challenge presumes

An “as Mr. other Waters’s constitutional chal- valid. See Tobe v. generally lenges the statute to the Unauthorized Substances Ana, City phrased Santa Cal.4th Tax were in the broad terms of a However, Cal.Rptr.2d 892 P.2d challenge. facial because he nev- Ritter, (1995); Developmental Pathways v. er challenged constitutionality of the (Colo.2008); 524, 533-34 In re 178 P.3d Unauthorized Substances Tax based on D.L.C., II, (Tex.App. 124 S.W.3d Article Section it would be useless 2003); 165 P.3d attempt Sanderson to characterize Mr. Waters’s II, (Wyo.2007). merely specif It asserts challenge based on Article Section 28 as are applications ic of the statute unconstitutional. challenge applied” either a facial or an “as City Jeffersonville, Dow dell challenge. The appellate intermediate (Ind.Ct.App.2009); 907 N.E.2d 564-65 opinion court’s the reasoning tracks associ- Request Advisory Opinion In re Re challenge. ated with a facial The brief Mr. *47 Constitutionality 2005 PA garding Waters filed in this tracks the rea- Court of (2007); 479 Mich. soning Appeals. N.W.2d of the of In its Court Moore, at City Redmond v. 91 P.3d 878. opinion, goes great lengths the to to Court of Thus, applied” challenge only re “as expressly any reasoning analy- eschew or that quires challenger the to demonstrate normally ap- sis associated with an “as operates unconstitutionally the challenge. Accordingly, statute the plied” Court challenger’s particular when to the applied only addressing in this case can be circumstances. Lochsa Falls v. constitutionality L.L.C. facial of the Unauthorized State, 971-72; v. 207 P.3d Gillenwaters Tax. Substances (Tex.Crim. 205 S.W.3d 536 n. 3 App.2006); Comp. Tex. Workers’ Comm’n V. (Tex. Garcia, n. 16 893 S.W.2d today holds that While 1995). II, taxing power under Article Section 28 the General challenges require enough permit courts is broad to applied”

“As Assembly impose persons a tax on who constitutionality to of statutes to consider basis, that City illegal drugs, sell it also holds case-by-case on a Tobe of Ana, Substances Tax enacted Cal.Rptr.2d Santa 892 P.2d Unauthorized Assembly facially in 2004 is analyze partic to the facts of the the General inquiry upon which appli unconstitutional. The ular case to determine whether constitutionality facial of this tax turns challenged deprived cation of statute as much constitutionally question requiring is a at least challenger protect of a legal analysis. piv- County common sense as right. Day, ed Field LLC question among large enough quantities all the “with otal is whether uals quanti- possessing a been drugs prove they individuals substantial to that have sell- ty cocaine there are individuals who drugs they or that ing planning are sell, sell, barter, or trade or intend that drugs.”28 He selling indicated barter, If or trade the the answer cocaine. “trigger[ illegal “selling drugs tax’s was ]” question “yes,” to the is the Unauthorized Represen- in the Tennessee.”29 facially Tax unconstitu- Substances somebody tative added that “once Curtiss because it can constitu- applied tional be pre- with a it is caught fixed amount tionally to those individuals. they that purpose have it for the sumed Johnny Representative resale.”30 “analysis that of the

The Court states its Shaw indicated under the Unautho- applicability peddlers of the merchants anyone going Tax into rized Substances II, might of article provision section lay “that business needs to a little [mon- legislature statutorily if the different had ey] aside taxes.”31 ‘dealers’ as sell or in- defined those who substances, to sell rath- tend unauthorized During the floor House of debate in the than er those Curry Representatives, Representative illegal drugs.” My with the disagreement pointed Todd out that “the of this intent analysis upon this precisely Court’s turns legislation drug is those that are out there sell, barter, point. Individuals who trafficking and continue to this and do sell, barter, or who trade intend to profit, way actually make a this is are trade unauthorized substances includ- impose they their profits Assembly’s within the ed General defini- making regard are fact, they precise- tion “dealer.” In are M. Representative Lynn trade.”32 Susan ly the individuals at whom the General placed the tax in a noted that the State Assembly aimed this tax. position “appearing from the profit illegal drugs;” accordingly, sale of she clar- A. (cid:127) taxation not an thereupon ified was legislative history Unautho- trade illegal drug endorsement but rized Substances Tax unam- demonstrates money “using” drug instead was trade biguously Assembly that the General “taking money back” from en attempting *48 impose a tax on the mer- terprise order to counteract this illicit peddlers chants and sub- of unauthorized activity.33 by taxing possess stances who individuals When the bill quantities was considered substantial of these substances. Finance, During Ways consideration bill in Senate Commit- of the and Means Committee, tee, Judiciary Representa- House Randy McNally, sponsor Senator Curtiss, bill, explained “gets tive Charles of the that sponsor the tax bill, noted that the tax to individ- applied profits drugs.”34 During Curtiss, Shaw, Representative Representative Johnny 28. Charles House Ju- 31. House Judi- Committee, Committee, diciary ciary May May 2004. 2004. Todd, Curry Representative 32. House Ses- Curtiss, Representative 29. Charles House Ju- sion, May 2004. Committee, diciary May 2004. Lynn, Representative 33. Susan M. House Ses- Curtiss, sion, Representative May 30. Charles House Ju- 2004. Committee, diciary May Finance, Randy Ways McNally, 34. Senator Senate, floor debate in the Senator Steve Similarly, the Tennessee Pattern Jury In- Cohen, addressing quantities structions following: include the substances included the definition of a It be inferred from the amount of “dealer,” “I think that probably stated controlled possessed substances by an appropriate an amount because that does offender, along with other relevant facts ... somebody probably indicate that has arrest, surrounding the that the con- personal possession.”35 more than [for] trolled substance or substances were Senator Cohen also noted the existence of possessed with the purpose of selling or a presumption drugs of intent to sell otherwise dispensing them. existed the criminal context and asked 31.04, T.P.I.—Crim. 7 Tenn. Practice: support for for an amendment he was of- Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions fering to a different bill that same legisla- Criminal The Tennessee tive provide conformity session so as to for Court of Criminal Appeals rejected has presumed between the amounts for intent argument that the inferential link between to sell under the Unauthorized Substances possession large amounts of drugs Tax and the criminal law measure.36 and the intent to sell drugs is irration- al.38

B. Assembly’s The General definition of a In accordance with statutory infer- “dealer” possession individual in ence and the accompanying jury instruc- quantities substantial of an unauthorized tion, the Appeals Criminal rationally substance is connected with the repeatedly relied the inference aris- legislative purpose of the Unauthorized ing from the possession of a large quantity taxing Substances those profiting of controlled uphold substances to Tax— criminal fact, from the sale of these substances. In convictions and sentences for § Ann. TenmCode 39-17-419 ex- with intent to sell or distribute those sub- pressly provides that instances, many stances. the quantity may be inferred from the

[i]t amount of of cocaine found to be support sufficient to a controlled substance or substances an inference that it possessed for the offender, possessed by an along with purpose selling or distributing has been other surrounding relevant facts the ar- less than required imposition rest, the controlled substance or the Unauthorized Substances Tax far possessed substances were pur- less than Mr. Waters had in posses- his pose selling or otherwise dispensing.37 sion.39 Committee, Apr. and Means purpose selling not with the or otherwise dispensing." Tenn.Code Ann. 39-17-419. *49 Cohen, Session, 35. May Senator Steve Senate 38. Williams v. 506 S.W.2d (Tenn 1973). App. Crim. Cohen, Session, May

36. Senator Steve Senate 20, 2004. grams 39. Mr. Waters had 999.2 of cocaine in possession his when he was arrested. For the Thus, Tax, possession purpose grams the mere of the Unauthorized 0.5 Substances exposes possessor Assembly cocaine to a B General has defined a Class “dealer” felony charge. Alternatively, possession "a casual ex- as an individual in of more than 7 change among grams of a individuals small amount of cocaine. Tenn.Code Ann. 67-4- 2802(3)(A) (2006). of a following controlled substance" lead to the are a few "possessed examples inference that the substance many pos- defendants who c. history of the Unautho- legislative sup- unambiguously Tax rized Substances Assembly enacted Un- The General As- that the General ports the conclusion impose Tax to a tax authorized Substances impose a tax endeavoring sembly was sale profit who from persons on peddlers of unautho- merchants and The statute is of controlled substances. Assembly The General rized substances. that individuals assumption on the based of unauthorized the tax on “dealers” levied quantities of con- possessing substantial a “dealer” as and defined substances legal without authoriza- trolled substances of a substantial possession in individual sell, barter, these intend to or trade tion substance. an unauthorized quantity of therefore, and, are merchants substances possession of between The connection This is peddlers of these substances. of an unauthorized quantity substantial that draws consider- assumption a rational ped- merchant and being a substance and applied from the inferences support able a rational one. dler of that substances has, prosecutions. the context of criminal fact, Assembly by stat- General ute, inference criminal cases created an constitutionality of the Unau- The facial quantities of certain possession that the hinges Substances Tax on wheth- thorized the con- support can controlled substances are circumstances under er there possessing those that the individual clusion application which its would be constitution- purpose for the had them substances reasonably con- al. If there is no set of distributing them. Tennessee’s selling the tax ceivable circumstances which consistently affirm criminal convic- courts constitutionally applied, then it could be with intent to sell possession tions If, however, be down. there must struck possession by heavily upon relying in which it can be con- are circumstances quantities of controlled sub- defendant of then the tax stitutionally applied, must than that possessed much less stances challenge. a facial upheld in this case. Mr. Waters possessed speci- who more than the amount quantities of cocaine smaller than that sessed required for assessment Unauthorized Tax fied in the Unauthorized Substances but and whose have Substances Tax convictions and whose convictions less than Mr. Waters appeal against sufficiency been affirmed appellate when the court simi- were affirmed based, challenges part, on the evidence drugs they pos- larly the amount of relied on statutory large inference that of a (30.1 grams), sessed: Joshua J. McKissick quantity provides a for con- of cocaine basis (20.2 grams), Kendrick D. Rivers Marvin cluding defendant intended to that the sell (9 grams), Wilkerson and Jermaine R. Wise- Bradley Haynie, Justin deliver the cocaine: McKissick, (66.9 grams). v. No. man State Morris, Anthony and Judson F. Jonathan M2006-01996-CCA-R3-CD, WL (2.7 grams), Reginald Anthony Laye Ouzts Oct.l, 2007), (Tenn.Crim.App. *4at (5 (2.7 Hyon grams), Wilfred Warren (Tenn. 28, 2008); perm. app. Jan. State denied Haynie, grams). v. No. State W2006-01840- Rivers, W2006-01120-CCA-R3-CD, No. CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL at *14-16 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2008 WL at *2-3 Dec.7, 2007), (Tenn.Crim.App. perm. app. de- Jan.7, 2008) (No R.App. applica- Tenn. P. (Tenn. 2008); May Laye, nied State v. No. Wilkerson, filed); E2006- tion State No. M2006-02020-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 01743-CCA-R3-CD, WL at *3 Dec.13, (Tenn.Crim.App. at *3-4 Oct.9, 2007), perm. app. (Tenn.Crim.App. de- 2007) (No R.App. application P. 11 Wiseman, 2008); (Tenn. Mar. State v. nied Warren, filed); No. E2007-02304- *50 M2006-00400-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL No. CCA-R3-CD, WL at *3-4 Oct.31, (Tenn.Crim.App. June 2008) (No at *3-4 (Tenn.Crim.App. Tenn. 2007) (No filed). R.App. application P. application following R.App. P. 11 The filed). many examples are a few defendants manner, a Assembly’s The General definition of tutional Mr. Waters’s facial chal- lenge Ann. fail. in Tenn.Code 67-4- to tax must “dealer” 2802(3) assumption on the rational rests presumption that a statute is consti- persons quanti- possessing that substantial applies greater tutional with even force in to ties of unauthorized substances intend the face of a challenge. facial constitutional today’s opinion, them. In the Court sell Elam, 459; Gallaher 104 S.W.3d at appears disregarded assump- to have this Burson, re S.W.2d 775. Mr. Waters by concluding tion that there are no mer- has failed to rebut this presumption by those peddlers among pos- chants who demonstrating tax obviously that this is so quantities substantial unauthorized sess unconstitutional on its face as to obviate that there no substances or exists rational necessity for any discussion. Because possession of relationship between the burden, Mr. Waters has not carried his large quantities of unauthorized sub- Court has no concluding basis for that the intent stances and the to sell them. Unauthorized Substances Tax facially is particularly Court’s conclusion unconstitutional. light many in of the fact that surprising VI. lengthy

Tennesseans have prison received Where the Assembly sentences and substantial fines based on General erred was not, Court, possessing by the inference that an found in drafting individual its quantity a substantial of an unauthorized definition of too narrowly “dealer” possesses thereby substance that substance with the missing ped- merchants and intent substances, to sell distribute it. Given dlers of rath- unauthorized but proof heightened by drafting standard of er ap- the definition of “dealer” too context, plies broadly. the criminal law I am With one exception,40 narrow perplexed as to how Tennessee courts can Unauthorized Substances Tax to ex- fails pressly anticipate sustain those convictions and sentences on pos- individual in hand, one on the large while other hand deter- session of a quantity of an unautho- mine that is not there even rational rized substance not be a might merchant relationship possession peddler between of sub- or example, substance. For quantities essentially stantial of unauthorized Mr. sub- Waters asserts in this case being peddler only stances and a merchant or ishe a bulk consumer of cocaine considering thereof when personal tax assessments. for his use and that he is neither a merchant nor a of cocaine. If peddler who possess Individuals substantial true, Mr. impos- Waters’s assertion then quantities of unauthorized substances for ing the Tax Unauthorized Substances purpose selling, bartering, or trad- him Assembly’s would exceed the General ing unquestionably them are merchants II, power under Article Section 28 II, peddlers purpose for the of Article peddlers. merchants and Accordingly, Section 28. the Unautho- rized Tax may applied provides adequate, Substances be law a plain, Current persons them without offending speedy remedy possessing the Tennessee Constitution. Because the a substantial of an quantity Unauthorized unauthorized can applied Substances Tax for their personal consti- substance use who have part apply possession "The tax levied does not the time the of the sub- dealer’s substance of a dealer stance is law." authorized Tenn.Code possess who is authorized law 2804(a) the sub- §Ann. 67-4— exemption only during applies stance. This *51 taxes, fran- variety notably of most Sub- wide Unauthorized erroneous received an and use taxes.41 chise and excise and sales Tenn.Code Ann. assessment. stances Tax legal busi- operators the of these Unlike provides that a (Supp.2008) § 67-4-2807 enterprises, peddlers merchants and ness of the assessment review may seek “dealer long able illegal drugs have been to 18, of part this chapter in provided as engage profit-making in their illicit en- Thus, taxpayers, a dealer like other title.” Thus, taxation. escaping deavors while in his or her assessment may challenge enterprises im- though even their business manner: following the on the and on pose significant costs State against whom the as- taxpayer [I]f ped- governments, merchants and local assess- believes the is made sessment been, essence, illegal drugs have dlers incorrect, unjust, illegal or ment to tax-exempt on operating in Tennessee be as fol- remedies shall taxpayer’s Assembly The General addressed basis. lows: it problem 2004 when enacted the (A) taxpayer may the tax pay Tax. Substances Unauthorized of the tax a claim for refund and file Notwithstanding “wide-reaching ef- provided part; in this proceed striking on their fects” of down statutes or Booksellers, face, Inc. v. Davis-Kidd (B) against taxpayer file suit McWherter, the Court S.W.2d chancery court in the commissioner Assembly’s today General finds state, county in this appropriate effort address the enormous costs im- any portion of all or challenging taxpayers as a result posed on Tennessee’s tax, including any of such assessment drug uncon- illegal facially trade penalty associated interest stitutional. Whether Unauthorized the tax. Tax is is not for Substances wise foolish 67-l-1801(a)(l) § Ann. Tenn.Code Accepting this Court to decide. the fact quanti- of a possessor Where a substantial Assembly that the General decided unani- actually ty is not a merchant or of cocaine mously not dealers should es- cocaine, peddler it would be unconsti- taxation, cape only our task is to measure tutional, illegal, apply hence the Unau- requirements this tax Tax that individual. thorized Substances state and federal constitutions. If Mr. the merchant or Waters While Unauthorized Substances Tax Assembly, peddler that General constitutionally per- imposed cannot be officials, Depart- law enforcement and the peddlers, sons who are not merchants or it presumed him ment of Revenue have imposed persons can be who are. be, prevail he on his constitutional should Among persons included in the defini- the tax assessment on an challenge to “as- possess persons tion “dealer” are who applied” basis. large drugs without illegal amounts le- VII. sell, authority and intend to bar- gal who ter, trade, distribute Legitimate businesses Tennessee— otherwise these persons are mer- drugs. from to multi-national cor- These proprietors sole peddlers who can be porations paying chants and taxed responsible —are Advisory Taxes A Fiscal Primer III generally 41. See Tennessee Commis- in Tennessee: Intergovernmental (2003), & http://cber.utk.edu/pubs/ sion on Relations Uni- available at versity 2009). (last Tennessee Center for Business and tacir203.pdf visited June Research, The Economic Structure *52 II, peddlers). consistent Article Section 28. As or It has healthy removed stat- ruling today, result the Court’s (the these utory application tissue of the tax to and peddlers illegal drugs merchants persons who are merchants peddlers) cannot be though they may taxed even By as well. finding that the Unauthorized criminally prosecuted Substances Tax facially unconstitutional, drugs same with intent to sell. the Court has effectively prevented the pre-

This Court’s exclusive constitutional enforcing State from the tax in circum- rogative constitutionality to assess the stances where it would be clearly constitu- weighty state statutes is a responsibility tional to so. do extraordinary that demands caution and I am authorized to state that Justice precision. Like a surgeon performing a Clark concurs in opinion. operation delicate to remove diseased tis- sue from a vital organ, we must no remove

more nor no less necessary. tissue than

By deciding the Unauthorized Sub- unconstitutional, Tax is facially

stances gone Court has than removing farther dis- (the statutory eased tissue application of persons the tax to who are not merchants

Case Details

Case Name: Steven Waters v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date Published: Jul 24, 2009
Citation: 291 S.W.3d 873
Docket Number: E2006-02225-SC-R11-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tenn.
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