*1 BEFORE: RYAN, COLE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
COLE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Steven Simpson appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee, Vanderbilt University, on his claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, et seq ., (“ADA”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq ., (“Title VII”). For the following reasons, we AFFIRM .
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual background
Simpson, a registered nurse, began working the night shift in the 7 North Cardiac Step-Down Unit of Vanderbilt University Medical Center (“Vanderbilt”) on September 10, 2001. In November 2004, Simpson moved to the 6 South Cardiac Step-Down Unit and was elevated to the position of night-shift charge nurse, supervising the other nurses on duty, but he sometimes still worked as a *2 regular staff nurse. Renee McKibben, the assistant manager of the 6 South unit, was Simpson’s direct supervisor until she left for another job in November 2006. On October 5, 2005, Judy Araque became the manager of both units, serving as Simpson’s supervisor and McKibben’s direct supervisor.
1. Simpson’s health problems and transfer requests
In 2003 or 2004, Simpson was hospitalized for chest pains and heart palpitations. Simpson’s physician, Dr. Travis Calhoun, told Simpson that his health problems could be alleviated if he worked the day shift. Simpson relayed this information to McKibben, his supervisor at the time, but never submitted any medical documentation to support his transfer request.
In late 2005, soon after Araque had become his supervisor, Simpson’s medical difficulties worsened. In particular, in November 2005, Simpson began to have significant sleep problems; four or five days per week, he would sleep for only two and one-half to three hours. Simpson also was suffering from migraine headaches and panic attacks. Because of his health problems, Simpson took leave from work under the Family and Medical Leave Act from February 12, 2006, to March 6, 2006, with a diagnosis of paroxysmal cardiac arrhythmia, fatigue, hypertension, hypersensitivity to medication, and nausea/anorexia. When Simpson returned to work, he again broached the subject of transferring to a day-shift position with McKibben and Araque, but was never transferred. The parties dispute whether Simpson properly applied for a transfer. Vanderbilt claims that it had changed its transfer policy by February 2006, requiring employees interested in a transfer to submit an application through the human resources department and be interviewed. Simpson claims he was never informed of this policy change or of specific day-shift positions that were open in 2006.
2. Simpson’s disputes with Araque
Simpson cites a number of interpersonal conflicts that occurred in the year leading up to his termination in support of his discrimination claims, including the following: In December 2005, after a dispute between Simpson and a female coworker, Araque took the female employee’s side before hearing his side of the story, sending her flowers and reprimanding Simpson. In February 2006, Simpson and Araque clashed over who was responsible for covering for an employee who had gone home sick. In March 2006, while Simpson was giving an oral report outside a patient’s room to an incoming nurse, Araque grabbed Simpson’s arm and shoved him into the patient’s room because he was supposed to give the report at the patient’s bedside. Simpson was giving the report outside the patient’s room because the patient had requested that her terminal cancer not be disclosed to her family. At a meeting between McKibben, Araque, and Simpson in March 2006, Araque told Simpson that he intimidated the other nurses with his deep, male voice and the way he stood with his arms crossed or with his hands on his hips. Later that spring, Simpson was not chosen to attend a nursing educational program even though he had seniority over the two female nurses chosen to attend, and the original announcement for the program indicated that seniority would be the sole factor in determining who would attend. That summer, McKibben hired a female night-shift charge nurse and allowed her to work on weekends only, even though this deprived Simpson and the other male night-shift charge nurse, Gary Houston, of the hourly bonus given for weekend work. Finally, in October 2006, Araque again sided with a female employee about whom Simpson had complained. Simpson complained to McKibben and other employees about Araque’s conduct towards him several times during 2006.
3. December 13, 2006, incident and Simpson’s termination Vanderbilt terminated Simpson after an investigation into the events that took place during his shift on December 13, 2006. On that night, Simpson was working as a staff nurse, under the supervision of Houston, who was the charge nurse. Simpson felt ill before arriving at work; he had a migraine headache and he had been experiencing episodes of cardiac arrhythmia, shortness of breath, and faintness. Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m., Simpson’s symptoms worsened and he asked Houston if he could leave work early. Houston denied Simpson’s request and told him to go to the emergency room instead. When Simpson reasserted his request to go home, Houston “became aggressive, stood up and put his finger in [Simpson’s] face, stating, ‘You ain’t going no damn where.’” As Simpson turned away, Houston hit him from behind and knocked him into a supply cart. Simpson then contacted the house supervisor, John Chaballa, for permission to leave early. Chaballa gave Simpson permission to leave early and directed him to turn over to Houston each of the four patients he was responsible for that night.
At Vanderbilt, patient charting is carried out electronically with accompanying handwritten records. Simpson asserts that he completed the electronic charting for two of his patients, but that when he attempted to save the information a computer error caused him unintentionally to delete the data, though at the time he believed it to be saved. Simpson did not complete electronic charting for the other two patients, claiming that Houston ordered him to turn over his notes and leave before he could do so. Simpson claims that, before leaving, he went room-to-room with Houston, giving Houston a verbal report on each patient. Although Vanderbilt contends that Simpson was responsible for documenting the care that he provided to his assigned patients before taking ill, *5 Simpson argues that it was the dual responsibility of Simpson and Houston to make arrangements to cover for Simpson, and that the only 6 South unit policy was that nurses had to complete an admission assessment within eight hours of a patient’s arrival to the floor. Before clocking out for the night, Simpson emailed Araque explaining his altercation with Houston.
The next morning, Araque learned of the incident and reported it to Vanderbilt’s human resources department. The following day, Simpson met with Araque and Marta Stinson, Vanderbilt’s Employee Relations Representative. In addition to reviewing what happened the night of December 13, 2006, Simpson complained to Stinson about Araque’s treatment of him, including the various incidents that had taken place over the course of the previous year. In accordance with Vanderbilt’s policy concerning allegations of physical altercations, both Simpson and Houston were placed on administrative leave pending an investigation.
Vanderbilt’s investigation of the physical altercation was forestalled because Simpson and Houston gave conflicting accounts of what happened and there were no other witnesses. However, as part of the investigation, Araque reviewed the patient records for Simpson’s patients that night. Based on this review, Vanderbilt determined that Simpson failed to properly chart any of his four patients. While Simpson concedes that the electronic records for his patients were incomplete, he contends that he properly cared for those patients and kept handwritten records, which Araque failed to review.
On December 21, 2006, Vanderbilt terminated Simpson for the stated reason of failing to properly chart the patients in his care that night. Vanderbilt contends that the decision to terminate Simpson was made jointly by Araque, Stinson, and each of their immediate supervisors. Vanderbilt *6 fired Houston for the same reason.
B. Procedural background
In January 2007, following his termination, Simpson filed an internal complaint with Vanderbilt. On February 6, 2007, he filed a discrimination claim with the EEOC, which he amended on February 13, 2007, to include a claim of disability discrimination. After receiving his “right-to- sue” letter from the EEOC, Simpson filed a complaint in federal district court against Vanderbilt and Araque on November 16, 2007. His claims included disability, reverse-sex, and age discrimination, as well as related retaliation claims.
On March 11, 2008, the district court dismissed Simpson’s claims against Araque. On November 25, 2008, the district court granted Vanderbilt’s motion for summary judgment on all of Simpson’s remaining claims. On December 22, 2008, Simpson timely appealed the district court’s summary judgment order on his disability and reverse-sex discrimination claims. We have jurisdiction over the district court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.
Sullivan v. Or. Ford, Inc
., 559
F.3d 594, 594 (6th Cir. 2009). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings,
the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch.
,
B. ADA claim
First, Simpson claims that his termination and Vanderbilt’s failure to transfer him to a day-
shift position constituted unlawful discrimination under the ADA. The district court correctly
granted summary judgment on Simpson’s ADA claim because he failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether he qualified as “disabled” under the ADA. To prevail on his disability-
discrimination claim, Simpson must show that: (1) he was “disabled” under the ADA; (2) he was
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable
accommodations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; (4) Vanderbilt knew or had reason
to know of his disability; and (5) a non-disabled person replaced him.
Nance v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.
,
Simpson claims that he put forth sufficient evidence to show that his ailments constitute a disability under the ADA because they substantially limit his ability to sleep. Further, he asserts that Vanderbilt regarded him as disabled. The district court correctly rejected both of these arguments.
1. Simpson was not actually disabled under the ADA
While this Court considers sleep to be a major life activity for purposes of the ADA,
Verhoff
v. Time Warner Cable, Inc.
,
Simpson asks us to follow the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Desmond v. Mukasey
,
2. Simpson was not “regarded as” disabled by Vanderbilt
Simpson also has failed to demonstrate that Vanderbilt regarded him as disabled. Under the
ADA, an individual who is “regarded as” disabled by his or her employer qualifies as disabled for
purposes of the Act.
See
42 U.S.C. § 12102. “This part of the [ADA] is intended to allow
individuals to be judged according to their actual capacities, rather than through a scrim of ‘myths,
fears, and stereotypes’ accruing around a perceived impairment.”
Mahon
,
Simpson’s ADA claim fails as a matter of law because he did not present sufficient evidence to show that he was actually disabled or that Vanderbilt regarded him as disabled. Therefore, the district court was correct in granting Vanderbilt summary judgment on these claims.
C. Title VII claims
Simpson next alleges that his termination and Vanderbilt’s failure to transfer him violated Title VII. He presents three related Title VII claims: (1) reverse-sex discrimination, (2) retaliation, and (3) creation of a hostile work environment. We consider each of these claims in turn and find that the district court correctly granted Vanderbilt summary judgment on each claim.
1. Reverse-sex discrimination
Simpson’s first Title VII claim is that Vanderbilt discriminated against him because he is
*11
male. To survive a motion for summary judgment, he must adduce either direct or circumstantial
evidence of unlawful discrimination.
See DiCarlo v. Potter
,
(a)
Simpson has failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse-sex discrimination
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that
he (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the job or promotion sought; (3)
experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside of the
protected class or was treated differently than similarly situated employees outside the protected
class.
Arendale v. City of Memphis
,
The district court correctly held that Simpson’s prima facie case of reverse-sex discrimination
failed on the fourth prong because he failed to provide adequate evidence of a similarly situated
female employee being treated more favorably. In an affidavit, Simpson presented allegations about
a female staff nurse, Dorothy Terrell, who supposedly failed to chart a patient assigned to her for an
entire shift, but was not terminated. As a threshold matter, this evidence cannot be considered on
summary judgment because it is inadmissible hearsay.
See Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare
Prods. Sales Corp.
,
(b)
Simpson has failed to establish pretext
Even if we were to find that Simpson established a prima facie case of reverse-sex
discrimination, his claim would still fail because he cannot establish that the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason Vanderbilt gave for terminating him—failure to chart his patients—was
pretextual. To establish pretext, a plaintiff must show that an employer’s stated reason: (1) had no
basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the challenged conduct; or (3) was insufficient to explain
the challenged conduct.
Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co.
,
It is undisputed that Araque and Stinson investigated the events that occurred on December
13, 2006, by interviewing Simpson, Houston, and several other employees before concluding that
certain required documentation on Simpson’s patients was missing. It is also undisputed that the
electronic charting on Simpson’s four patients was not completed, and that it was at least partially
his responsibility to chart those patients. Although Simpson argues that Vanderbilt’s “honest belief”
in its decision is undercut by the fact that Araque only looked at the electronic records and regarded
Simpson with anti-male animus, his own unsupported speculation that Vanderbilt’s charges were
trumped up is not enough.
See Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co.
,
2. Retaliation
In addition to his reverse-sex discrimination claim, Simpson claims that his termination was
unlawful retaliation for his complaints about Araque mistreating him because of his gender. “Title
VII prohibits retaliation against an employee ‘because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ in connection with an
allegedly unlawful employment practice.”
Hunter v. Sec’y of U.S. Army
,
(a)
Simpson established that he engaged in protected activity
Protected activity includes “opposing any practice that the employee reasonably believes to
be a violation of Title VII . . . . whether or not the challenged practice ultimately is found to be
unlawful.”
Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati
,
(b) Simpson cannot establish a causal connection between his “protected activity” and his termination
Although Simpson engaged in protected activity, his retaliation claim fails because he did
not establish a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination. To establish
causation, Simpson must produce sufficient evidence from which an inference can be drawn that he
would not have been fired had he not engaged in the protected activity.
See Nguyen v. City of
Cleveland
, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000). Causation can be inferred from indirect or
circumstantial evidence, including “evidence that [the] defendant treated the plaintiff differently
from similarly situated employees or that the adverse action was taken shortly after the plaintiff’s
exercise of protected rights.”
Id.
;
see also Allen v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.
,
Simpson has failed to establish a causal connection between his informal complaints and his termination. First, Simpson failed to establish that Araque, one of the principals in deciding that Simpson should be terminated, was even aware of his complaints about her behavior. Further, the bulk of his complaints were made during the investigation of the December 13, 2006, incident, *17 negating any inference that the incident was used as pretext to terminate him for his complaints. The conduct resulting in the termination occurred before the bulk of his complaints, and Vanderbilt was already investigating that conduct. Simpson cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation because he failed to establish a causal connection.
3. Hostile work environment
Finally, Simpson claims that Vanderbilt violated Title VII because it created a hostile or
abusive work environment by engaging in reverse-sex discrimination.
See Williams v. Gen. Motors
Corp.
,
With respect to the second and third prongs, this Court has specifically held that the
harassment need not be explicitly sexual in nature, but that if the conduct in question is “non-
sexual,” the plaintiff must show that but for his sex, he would not have been the object of
harassment.
Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ
.,
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.