Steven J. CASPER, M-8294, Appellant, v. Joseph RYAN, and the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania, and the District Attorney for Philadelphia County.
No. 86-1346.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Feb. 19, 1987. Decided June 26, 1987.
Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied July 22, 1987.
822 F.2d 1283
Edward H. Weis (argued), Defender Ass‘n of Philadelphia, Federal Courts Div., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Donna G. Zucker, Asst. Dist. Atty., Suzan Willcox (argued), Asst. Dist. Atty., Gaele McLaughlin Barthold, Deputy Dist. Atty., William G. Chadwick, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Ronald D. Castille, Dist. Atty., Philadelphia Dist. Atty‘s Office, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SLOVITER, Circuit Judges, and ROTH, District Judge*
Steven Casper appeals from the district court‘s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Casper contends that he was improperly tried for theft and criminal conspiracy in Pennsylvania because Pennsylvania violated Articlе III(a) of the
I.
Facts
Casper was arrested on May 31, 1980 in Philadelphia for burglary and related charges. Before trial, Casper jumped bail and fled to Florida where he was arrested on two counts of burglary. On July 22, 1980, the Philadelphia District Attorney‘s office lodged detainers in Florida against Casper.
On December 2 and December 8, 1980, Casper was sentenced in Florida on the two burglary charges. At the December 8 hearing, Casper entered a plea agreement which provided that the Florida sentence would be concurrent with any sentence imposed on charges then outstanding against him in Pennsylvania and that he would waive extradition and return to Pennsylvania. App. at 35.
On December 11, 1980, the Philadelphia District Attorney initiated proceedings to secure the return of Casper so that he could stand trial pursuant to Article IV(a) of the IAD. That Article entitles a prosecutor in a jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending “to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party State” made available upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the
Article IV(b) of the IAD provides that upon receiving the request for temporary custody, the authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the requesting authority with a certificate containing information regarding the prisoner‘s sentence, time served and remaining to be served, good time, parole eligibility, and decisions of the state parole agency. Form 3, entitled “Certificate of Inmate Status,” effectuates this provision. The custodial authorities also complete and send the requesting authorities Form 4, an “Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody,” which requires the inmate‘s signature and contains the offer of the custodial state to deliver temporary custody of the prisoner for trial. See App. at 122, 121. The custodial authorities must also furnish similar certificates and notice to the other authorities in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner.
Under Article III(c), when a detainer is lodged against a prisoner, the custodial official must inform the prisoner of the detainer and of the prisoner‘s right to request a final disposition of charges on which the detainer is based. Form 1 is used for this purpose. Article III(a) gives the prisoner the right to request a final disposition of the untried charges, which the prisoner can initiate by sending Form 2, the “Inmate‘s Notice of Place of Imprisonment and Request for Disposition of Indictments, Informations, or Complaints,” which contains a waiver of extradition.
Article III(a) of the IAD requires that the request of the prisoner for final disposition “shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decision of the State parole agency relating to the prisoner,” which is the same language used in Article IV(b) to describe the information needed. Forms 3 and 4, which are used when proceedings have been initiated by the prosecutor from another jurisdiction under Article IV, must also be attached to Form 2, used when an inmate requests disposition under Article III.
When the prosecution initiates the return of the prisoner for trial under Article IV, the trial must begin within 120 days of the prisoner‘s return to the receiving state. In contrast, when the prisoner initiates his or her return under Article III, trial must begin within 180 days after the receiving authorities receive the prisoner‘s request for trial.
In Casper‘s case, the first relevant date is December 11, 1980 when Philadelphia initiated the proceedings by sending a request for temporary custody to Florida. Although the Florida authorities completed the responsive forms (3 and 4) by December 19, 1980, App. at 122, 121, they were not then sent to Philadelphia. The Florida authorities also prepared a notification of detainer and rights (Form 1) which was delivered to Casper on February 25, 1981. App. at 123.
Casper then wrote a letter dated February 27, 1981, which was notarized, stating that he wished to return to Pennsylvania to dispose of all charges. App. at 124. This letter, addressed to “Philadelphia City Hall,” was received in the Philadelphia District Attorney‘s office on March 12, 1981. Since Casper‘s letter did not include a Form 3, the Philadelphia District Attorney‘s Office was not provided at this time with the information regarding time served, parole status etc. which the statute provides must
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania had burglary charges pending against Casper, and on March 9, 1981 it also sent a Form 5 to Florida requesting temporary custody. App. at 125. In response, the Florida authorities completed the Certificate of Inmate Status (Form 3) and the Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody (Form 4) on March 24, 1981. App. at 126, 127. On March 27, 1981, Casper completed what was аpparently his first Form 2 request for disposition of outstanding indictments, informations or complaints. App. at 128. These forms were not transmitted to either the Philadelphia or Montgomery County prosecutors at that time.
Upon receipt of Casper‘s letter on March 12, 1981, Richard DiBenedetto, the Philadelphia Deputy District Attorney for Intergovernmental Affairs, telephoned the Florida correctional facility where Casper was imprisoned asking about Florida‘s offer to deliver custody, and was told that Casper could not be sent to Philadelphia until authorization was received from Charles Lawson, the Florida Interstate Compacts Administrator. App. at 94. On March 27, 1981, Lawson told DiBenedetto that inmates were not being sent until procedures had been instituted for pretransfer hearings for prisoners who did nоt waive extradition, as required by a recent Supreme Court decision. App. at 95; see Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981).3
On April 16, 1981, Lawson wrote to DiBenedetto that Casper refused to waive extradition for Montgomery County and “is not interested in being transported to Pennsylvania at this time under the Agreement on Detainers.”3 By that time, Casper had written to Philadelphia, albeit informally, to request trial, and had signed a Form 2, which contains the waiver of extradition, for Montgomery County. App. at 128. There is no explanation in the record for Lawson‘s statement with respect to Casper‘s disinterest in returning to Pennsylvania.4
Without explanation for the delay, Florida sent Forms 2 and 4 which had been signed by Casper as well as the Form 3 certificate to the Philadelphia District Attorney‘s office on June 4, 1981. App. at 130. Casper arrived in Pennsylvania on June 24, 1981. He was triеd by a jury in Philadelphia on burglary, theft and conspiracy charges at a trial which began on October 6, 1981. This was less than 120 days after Casper‘s arrival in the state, and thus met the requirement of Article IV of the IAD, applicable when the transfer is initiated by the receiving state. It was, however, 208 days after Casper‘s letter to “City Hall” was received by the Philadelphia District Attorney‘s Office, and hence more than the 180 day period provided by Article III.
Casper was convicted of criminal conspiracy, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, and theft by receiving stolen property.5 In his unsuccessful post-trial motion
in the Pennsylvania trial court, Casper argued that trial was governed by Article III of the IAD, applicable when a prisoner initiates the transfer, and that Pennsylvania failed to comply because it brought him to trial more than 180 days after it received his request for trial. Casper appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court assigning the IAD claim as error. The Superior Court held that both the 180-day limit of Article III and the 120-day limit of Article IV applied since both Casper and the prosecution made requests for Casper‘s return. App. at 31. The Superior Court “as-sume[d] arguendo” that the letter Casper wrote requesting a speedy trial, which was received on March 12, 1986, was effective and concluded that based on that date, the trial beginning on October 6, 1981 did not begin within the 180-day limit. App. at 31. The Superior Court, however, relying inter alia on the April 16, 1981 letter from Florida, concluded that Casper withdrew his only effective request to be tried in Philadelphia pursuant to Article III(a), App. at 32, and stated, “We are convinced that this street-wise and prison-wise aрpellant was playing with the system to suit his own whims and desires.” App. at 31. The Superior Court affirmed Casper‘s conviction on March 22, 1985. Casper filed a petition for allowance to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, alleging that his trial was untimely under the IAD. His petition was denied.
Casper next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
The district court concluded that Casper‘s IAD claim was without merit. Although the district court noted that “[o]n the amplified record now before this court, there is reason to doubt the accuracy of the Superior Court‘s assessment” of Casper‘s efforts to return to Pennsylvania and that “it might well be that petitioner‘s trial was untimely by a couрle of weeks,” App. at 184, the court concluded that Casper‘s constitutional rights had not been violated and denied the writ. Casper appeals. We granted a certificate of probable cause, and thus reach the merits of his contentions.
II.
Propriety of Habeas Relief
Casper argues that because he was not tried within 180 days of his request for a full and speedy disposition of the Pennsylvania charges against him as required by Article III of the IAD,7 he was entitled to a dismissal of the charges with prejudice under Article V(c) of the IAD.8 Casper also
We consider first the District Attorney‘s argument that habeas relief is not available for the type of violation of the IAD that is at issue here. As a general rule, “‘collateral relief is not available when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements’ of a rule of criminal procedure in the absence of any indication that the defendant was prejudiced by the asserted technical error.” Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 2305, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429, 82 S.Ct. 468, 472, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962)). “[T]he appropriate inquiry [is] whether the claimed error of law was ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,’ and whether [i]t... present[s] exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.” Id. (quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 428, 82 S.Ct. at 471).
In dismissing Casper‘s application for a writ of habeas corpus based on an IAD violation, the district court appeared to construe the scope of
In addition, the district court did not discuss the effect of our decision in United States v. Williams, 615 F.2d 585 (3d Cir.1980), upon which Casper relies. In Williams, we held that a claimed violation of Article IV(e) of the IADA, which requires the receiving authority to dispose of all pending charges prior to returning the defendant to the original place of imprisonment, amounted to a “fundamental defect” or “exceptional circumstance” and we concluded that “Williams’ allegation of an IADA violation is the type of statutory claim cognizable in a section 2255 action.” Id. at 590. Even before the Williams decision, we had held in United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 834-39 (3d Cir.1975), that a state prisoner stated a cause of action cognizable under
We believe that Casper confuses two separate issues: the question whether a claim
In this case, the district court did not hold that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as Casper states. Appellant‘s Brief at 16. Instead, the court considered and dismissed the petition on the merits of the claim based on the amplified record before it, which included the record of the Pennsylvania proceedings. While the district court‘s limited view of section 2254 was erroneous, it is also possible to read its opinion as holding that Pennsylvania‘s “possible tеchnical violation” of the IAD in commencing Casper‘s trial “a couple of weeks” late does not provide a basis for granting habeas relief.
We are bound by our holdings in Williams and Esola that a violation of the anti-shuttling provision of the IADA may warrant habeas relief, even without a showing of prejudice,9 notwithstanding that this is contrary to the mainstream of precedent elsewhere. See Greathouse v. United States, 655 F.2d 1032, 1034 (10th Cir.1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 926, 102 S.Ct. 1289, 71 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982) (“Absent special circumstances, violations of [Article IV(e) of] the IADA are not grounds for collateral attack under § 2255“); Huff v. United States, 599 F.2d 860, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 428, 62 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (alleged violation of Article IV(e) trial before return provision not cognizable under § 2255 absent showing of prejudice); Edwards v. United States, 564 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.1977) (per curiam) (violation of Article IV(e) trial before return provision not cognizable under § 2255 because no showing of fundamental defect). But see Webb v. Keohane, 804 F.2d 413, 414 (7th Cir.1986) (violation of Article IV(e) trial before return provision cognizable in a federal habeas petition).
However, neither Williams nor Esola stands for the proposition that any minor violation of any IAD provision requires a federal court to grant habeas relief.10 It is
Of course we recognize that in Williams, one of the reasons given for the holding that a violation of IADA Article IV(e) is a fundamental defect was Congress’ provision of the remedy of automatic dismissal of the charge with prejudice. Based on that language the court in Shack held that a state‘s failure to provide a prisoner with a pre-transfer extradition hearing as required by IAD Article IV(d) did not constitute a fundamental defect warranting habeas relief since the IAD provided no comparable sanction for that violation. 776 F.2d at 1173.
Concededly, the IAD also provides the remedy of dismissal with prejudice as the sanction for a trial that is untimely under Article III or Article IV. See note 8 supra. If we believed that under our controlling precedent, the sanction alone elevates such untimeliness, irrespective of how short the delay, to a fundamental defect for which habeas relief is mandated, we would be obliged to suggest that this matter be reconsidered by the in banc court. We believe, however, that the mandatory sanction of dismissal was just one of the factors that led the Williams court to its decision. More significant, we believe, was the court‘s concern about the effect of shuttling a prisoner. We stated, “The basic goal of the Act is to prevent transfer back and fоrth between competing jurisdictions, its theory being that such transfers under-
mine the right to a speedy trial and the rehabilitative process of the system in which the prisoner is currently serving a sentence.” Williams, 615 F.2d at 588. We cannot view a violation of the anti-shuttling provision, which involves the removal of the prisoner from one jurisdiction, transfer, and return without trial, as comparable to the inception of a trial several weeks after required, particularly when the 120 day and 180 day provisions of the IAD themselves allow for an extension of the time for good cause. See Articles III(a), IV(c).
Thus, we are free to consider whether delay in a state trial for less than a month beyond the 180 day limit, which is all the prisoner alleges in his application for habeas corpus, is such a fundamental defect that a federal cоurt is required to grant a writ of habeas corpus releasing the prisoner. We believe that such a holding would be counter to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Davis. See Kerr v. Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 929, 106 S.Ct. 263, 88 L.Ed.2d 269 (1985) (violation of the 180-day time provision of Article III(a) does not constitute a fundamental defect entitling a prisoner to relief under § 2254 absent a showing of prejudice arising out of the alleged violation).
Although the IAD itself provides strict sanctions for noncompliance with its mandated time schedules and a federal court applying the IADA would be obliged to impose those sanctions in a federal criminal proceeding, we believe that our function as a habeas court is not to act as an appeal court for minor violations of the statute by state authorities. Such action would trivialize the habeas corpus writ. It is significant that Casper did not allege that the claimed IAD violation prejudiced his ability to defend at trial or the circumstances of his incarceration.
III.
Conformance of Plaintiff‘s Request
As an alternative basis for affirming the district court‘s order, the District Attorney contends that Casper‘s letter did not satisfy the requirements of Article III and thus did not start the 180 days running. He bases his argument of nonconformancе on Casper‘s failure to include a Form 3 certificate from the appropriate custodial official which must include the full information required by statute, such as the length of time served, good time, and parole eligibility. The District Attorney argues that the 180 days did not begin to run until June 4, 1981, when it received Forms 2, 3, and 4; since Casper‘s trial began 124 days after receipt of the forms, it met the 180 day requirement of Article III.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court “as-sume[d] arguendo” that the letter written on February 27, 1981 and received on March 12, 1981 met all the requirements of the IAD. App. at 31. Were we obliged to defer to the Superior Court‘s conclusion that Casper had withdrawn his only effective request to return to Pennsylvania, App. at 31-32, we would also be able to avoid deciding whether Casper‘s letter con-11stituted an adequate request fоr disposition under Article III.
We must give the Superior Court‘s findings of fact a presumption of correctness unless we determine that they are not fairly supported by the record.
The other basis referred to by the Superior Court, Cаsper‘s testimony at a Philadelphia hearing relating to a sentence on a charge different than the matter before us, was quoted somewhat out of context. The Superior Court quoted Casper‘s testimony as follows:
The Defendant: Just listen to me, your honor ... What I did is I was pushed to come to Philadelphia on the grounds that I could come back here and get help and stuff in the beginning before anything happened.
App. at 32 (emphasis added by Superior Court). As quoted, it suggests Casper was
Just listen to me, your Honor; I tried committing suicide a few times. I have had that feeling. What I did is I was pushed for the petition to come back here in Florida before Philadelphia on the grounds that I could come back here and get help and stuff in the beginning before anything haрpened. I want to get everything out of my way. I want to do it with all the cases I have, but I am scared.
App. at 141. The full quotation suggests Casper also had a desire to resolve all pending cases. In light of Casper‘s many uncontradicted attempts to initiate his return, we are unable to say after “review[ing] the record as a whole,” that the Superior Court‘s conclusion that Casper withdrew the February 27 letter is “fairly supported by the record.”
We must determine, therefore, whether Casper‘s February 27, 1981 letter was an effective request under Article III of the IAD. Neither the Superior Court nor the district court made conclusive findings on this issue. Casper‘s letter stated:
I recently received notice from my classification officer that I have a detainer placed against me from your jurisdiction. I am presently incarcerated with the Florida Department of Corrections for a five year sentence. I have charge No‘s M.C. 8005-3179 Burglary, C.P. 8005-1686 Attempted Burglary, C.P. 8003-1330 Burglary pending in your jurisdiction. I wish to dispose of these and any and all other charges, if any, as fast and easily as possible. Please consider this my formal request for a fast and speedy trial in these matters. I also waive extradition at this time. Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter.
App. at 124. Neither the certificate from the Florida officials nor any information other than the length of Casper‘s sentence was provided by Casper at this time.
In the portion of our opinion in Nash v. Jeffes, 739 F.2d 878 (3d Cir.1984), rev‘d sub nom., Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985), that was not the subject of the Supreme Court‘s reversal, and which therefore remains binding on us, see 1B J. Moore, Moore‘s Federal Practice ¶ 0.402[2] at 25-26 nn. 2-3 (2d ed. 1984), we noted that “courts have generally required that prisoners must strictly comply with IAD procedures before they will dismiss charges on the basis of a violation of [the 180-day provision of] Article III.” 739 F.2d at 884; see also Williams v. Maryland, 445 F.Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.Md.1978) (letter to state district court requesting trial on state charge did not satisfy the requirements of Article III); Gray v. Benson, 443 F.Supp. 1284, 1986 (D.Kan.1978) (letter to U.S. Attorney requesting disposition of detainer which did not include the necessary certificate and was not delivered to the appropriate court was not sufficient to trigger Article III of the Act); Beebe v. Vaughn, 430 F.Supp. 1220, 1223-24 (D.Del.1977) (letter addressed to court clerk informing court of inmate‘s incarceration and providing “notification to the court for a fast and speedy trial” did not satisfy the requirements of the IADA since letter did not inform officials that IADA was being invoked and little information was given about inmate‘s current term of incarceration). But see Franks v. Johnson, 401 F.Supp. 669, 672 (E.D.Mich.1975) (quashing detainer where receiving state knew of prisoner‘s whereabouts and prisoner communicated with receiving state authorities requesting a speedy trial and final disposition even though prisoner refused to waive extradition).
There are persuasive reasons for requiring a prisoner to comply with the procedures required by Article III(a) as a predicate for invoking Article V(c)‘s severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice. If a prisoner uses what is now the standardized Form 2 request form, see note 2 supra, and includes the certificate mandated by Article III(a), the receiving jurisdiction will be on notice that Article III has been invoked. As we stated in Nash, “the prosecuting authorities cannot be expected to analyze each communication from a prisoner with a fine-tooth comb to determine
Casper argues that his letter must be considered an effective Article III demand because of our decision in Nash v. Jeffes. We believe Nash is distinguishable. Our conclusion in Nash that the prisoner had satisfied the requirements of Article III was not based on the contents of his letters to New Jersey, which could be considered comparable to Casper‘s letter in this case, but on the fact that a letter from the New Jersey probation department informing Nash that a hearing would be held as soon as an attorney could be appointed for him “constituted an acknowledgement on the part of New Jersey that Nash‘s letters were being treated as a request for disposition” of the charges against him. Nash, 739 F.2d at 885. We stated, “On the basis of that letter, Nash was justified in taking no further action when, two weeks later, the Pennsylvania authorities provided him with a ‘detainer procedure notice.‘” Id.12 We held that New Jersey, rather than Nash, should bear the responsibility for the delay.12
In this case, there is no basis for charging Pennsylvania with the responsibility for the delay in securing Casper‘s return. Unlike New Jersey in Nash, Pennsylvania sent Casper no communication upon which he arguably relied in delaying further action.
Strict compliance with Article III may not be required when the prisoner has done everything possible, and it is the custodial state that is responsible for the default. See, e.g., Schofs v. Warden, FCI, Lexington, 509 F.Supp. 78, 82 (E.D.Ky.1981) (letters to clerk and state‘s attorney requesting final disposition of charge against him written by federal prisoner who was denied the necessary forms through no fault of his own satisfied the requirements of Article III). Florida‘s delay in sending the forms prepared by its custodial officials and signed by Casper months earlier cannot reasonably be charged to Casper. Nor do we deem it decisive that Casper failed to send his letter by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, which Article III(b) requires to be used by the custodial official when forwarding the prisoner‘s request and the Form 3 certificate. That provision is designed to insure that the request is received. Casper‘s request, despite its inadequate addressee designation, was in fact received by the appropriate Pennsylvania officials.
A prisoner who seeks to rely on the default of the custodial state to excuse his or her failure to satisfy the procedural requirements of the IAD must nonetheless show that s/he substantially complied to the extent possible. In this case, Form 1, which Casper received February 25, 1981 and which precipitated his letter to Philadelphia, advised him that he must include the necessary certificate of the custodial authority with his request for prompt dis-
IV.
In summary we have held that Casper‘s allegation that the IAD was violated by the failure to try him within 180 days of his request raised a claim cognizable in a proceeding under
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, Jr.
Circuit Judge, concurring.
I agree with the result of the majority and join only in Part III of the opinion.
Louis J. ORLANDO, Jr., individually and t/a Time, Date and Number Co. v. BILLCON INTERNATIONAL, INC. and Automated Business Products, Inc. and Currency Counting Consultants, Inc. (Wayne, Pennsylvania) and Ronald Brunner c/o Currency Counting Consultants and Currency Counting Consultants, Inc. (Montebello, California) and Paul Brunner c/o Currency Counting Consultants, Inc.
Nos. 86-1666, 86-1674.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued May 15, 1987. Decided June 29, 1987.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 10, 1987.
Notes
In response to your request of March 6 and March 12, 1981, this is to advise that this individual has been contacted by Mr. Fortner, Classification Supervisor at Marion Correctional Institution, on March 27, 1981 at which time he indicated that to date we have not received a detainer from Philadelphia. However, this individual has refused to sign the Form 2 for Montgomery County, Pennsylvania indicating that he is not interested in being transported to Pennsylvania at this time under the Agreement on Detainers.
Because of a recent Supreme Court ruling, Cuyler vs. Adams, U.S. Supreme Court No. 78-1841, we are not in a position to make a Florida inmate available to another state under the Agreement on Detainers until we are in a position to formalize our procedure for judicial hearings. It is therefore requested that you maintain contact with us in order to indicate your interest at a later date in returning this individual to Pennsylvania under the provisions of the Agreement on Detainers. App. at 129.
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party State, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party State any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer‘s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint: Provided, That, for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in article III or article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.
In my letter to Mr. DiBenedetto on April 16, 1981, I informed him that you had refused to sign Form #2 from Montgomery County as you indicated that you were not interested in being transported at that time. My information was obtained from Mr. Fortner, who was your Classification Supervisor. However, a memo, date stamped April 27, 1981, was received with copies of Forms 2, 3, and 4, signed by you. The date of March 27, 1981 was typed on Form #2, assuming that this was the date or sometimes thereabouts you did indeed sign it.
App. at 133. This letter was written subsequent to the decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court.