445 F.2d 660 | D.C. Cir. | 1971
Lead Opinion
Appellant Xydas was convicted on one count
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The charge on which appellant was convicted arose out of a burglary committed on the night of 22 August 1964 in Washington, D. C. On that evening, three individuals, Barnes, Baker, and Hamilton, all acquaintances of appellant Xydas, broke into the French Poodle Dress Shop at 1211 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., and stole some 96 furs and fur-trimmed articles of women’s clothing. The furs were placed in a rented truck and initially transported to the house of one James Skeens in Landover, Maryland. From there, at about 3:30 a. m. on the morning of 23 August 1964, the furs were taken to appellant Xydas’ house in Prince George’s County, Maryland, and shortly thereafter, still in the truck, were transported to a garage in River-dale, Maryland, owned by Xydas’ sister. The furs were then unloaded from the truck and stored in the garage to await their anticipated sale to buyers from New York.
Appellant admitted his acquaintance with Barnes and Skeens and agreed that the furs had indeed been brought to his house and then transferred at his suggestion to his sister’s garage. He denied, however, any knowledge of the theft of the furs prior to its occurrence, and testified that his first involvement in the situation came when he received a telephone call from Skeens at about 3:15 a. m. on the morning of Sunday, 23 August, informing him that Skeens and Barnes wanted to come over to see him. He claimed that he first became aware of the furs and the fact that they were stolen when shortly thereafter Skeens and Barnes arrived at his home with the truck. He testified that he arranged for the storage of the furs in his sister’s garage in order to turn Barnes and Skeens over to the FBI, and that he kept the two furs given him by Barnes in order to provide the FBI with evidence. Some three weeks later, and long after the furs had been removed from the garage and presumably sold by Barnes,
II. THE DEFENSE SUBPOENA OF XYDAS’ FBI INFORMANT’S FILE
Appellant argues that he was unfairly hindered in the presentation of his defense by the Government’s refusal to produce, pursuant to subpoena, the entire contents of the FBI file relating to Xydas.
The theory of the prosecution was that Xydas had aided and abetted the interstate transportation of the stolen furs by agreeing prior to the theft to provide a place to store them.
The defense theory, on the other hand, was that Xydas did not become involved in the transaction until after the transportation from the District of Columbia to Maryland had been accomplished, and therefore he could not be an aider and abettor of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Xydas’ storing of the furs was presented as not being the result of any prior-to-the-theft arrangement, but rather as an attempt on his part to aid the FBI in capturing Barnes and Skeens. To buttress this view, the defense sought to show that Xydas had been acting as an unpaid confidential informant of the FBI for a number of years prior to the instant offense. In order to establish Xydas’ past relationship with the FBI, prior to trial the defense attempted to subpoena the entire FBI file containing all memoranda of agents who had contacted Xydas periodically since 1959.
In response to this claim of privilege,
[T]here is nothing vitally important to you [the defense] contained in those records, but first the Court finds that there has been no showing of a particularized need for the disclosure of these confidential records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There is nothing of an exculpatory nature contained therein, and there is nothing that is material or relevant to the indictment in the pending ease. As I previously pointed out, many of these contacts referred to a period of time long before the present offenses were even committed, and had no connection whatsoever with that offense.
Accordingly, the court granted the Government’s motion to quash the subpoenas. Prior to the trial court’s quashing of the subpoenas, the Government, in response to the reasons stated by the defense as to why the production of the FBI file was necessary, offered a stipulation as to certain facts reflected in the file. As modified under the guidance of the trial judge after his in camera inspection of the file, the stipulation was accepted by the defense and provided the following information:
(1) the fact of appellant’s displayed willingness expressed in June of 1959 to provide information on a confidential basis;
(2) the names of the FBI agents with whom appellant had principally been in contact;
(3) the date of each such contact as reflected in the FBI files ;
(4) the pertinent instances in which appellant took the initiative in making the contacts; and
(5) a general description of the subject matter of the information provided by appellant.7
Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate.9
A reading of the transcript compels the conclusion that the principal issue tendered to the jury was not whether Xydas had cooperated with the FBI on other occasions, but rather why, if Xydas’ intent in assisting in the storage of the stolen furs was to help in the apprehension of Barnes and Skeens, did he not get in touch with his FBI contacts until over three weeks had passed and the furs were long gone from his sister’s garage.
III. THE PROSECUTION’S NONDISCLOSURE OF “EXCULPATORY” INFORMATION
Even if Xydas’ claim that he assisted in storing the furs only to aid the FBI is rejected, however, Xydas’ conviction for aiding and abetting the interstate transport of the stolen furs must rest upon proof of some assistance rendered by him before or during the occurrence of the interstate transportation. The Government’s case in this respect rested upon the testimony of Barnes that Xydas had agreed on the morning of the French Poodle burglary to supply an interim storage place for the furs. As recounted supra, Xydas denied any prior knowledge of the burglary or the making of any prior arrangement with Barnes. Thus,
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the truckload of furs was first taken from the District of Columbia to the house of James Skeens in Maryland. Subsequently the furs were taken to Xydas’ house, and then to his sister’s garage. Prior to the commencement of the trial Xydas’ counsel requested access to the grand jury minutes of a number of individuals involved in or related to the offenses charged in the indictment. Among these was Marsha Skeens, the wife of James Skeens. In addition to requesting this testimony generally under the doctrine of Dennis v. United States
Subsequent to the trial of this case, while appellant’s counsel was engaged in the trial of a related case, he came across a portion of the grant jury testimony of Marsha Skeens in which she testified as follows:
Well, when the furs were stolen, they had taken them to my house to begin with, and my neighbors were having a —you know, they watch me anyway. So they decided not to leave them there and they took them to Steve Xydas’s sister or mother' — somebody’s—I don’t know whether it was his sister’s or his wife’s garage.
Granting, then, that the statement has some significance for the defense case, the question becomes whether it was sufficiently “favorable” to appellant that the failure of the prosecution to provide it was reversible error under Brady v. Maryland.
In the first place, this case is distinguishable from Levin, in that there the defense did not learn the threshold information which would have served to stimulate its own inquiry into the subject upon which the prosecution failed to disclose information until after the trial was already in progress.
Given the defense’s knowledge that the furs were initially taken to the Skeens’ house, and that Marsha Skeens was “privy” to this, these, and only these, possibilities present themselves with respect to the nature of the defense’s pretrial preparation:
1. The defense did not even attempt to interview Marsha Skeens.
2. An attempt was made by the defense to interview Marsha Skeens but she could not or would not provide them with any relevant information.
3. Marsha Skeens was interviewed by the defense and she either (a) confirmed the fact that Xydas was not contacted until after the furs had reached the Skeens’ house, or (b) indicated that prior storage arrangements had in fact been made with Xydas.
Only in the first of these cases would the pre-trial knowledge of Marsha Skeens’ grand jury statement have any effect whatsoever on the conduct of the defense’s case. And in such a situation, given the defense’s knowledge of the stop at the Skeens’ household, and its already formulated theory of the case, failure to attempt to interview such a crucial witness
We therefore hold that the failure of the prosecution to disclose the contested grand jury statement was not reversible error, since under the circumstances here reasonable pre-trial preparation by the defense would either have confirmed, denied, or rendered immaterial the latent implication in Marsha Skeens’ testimony that appellant Xydas may not have made prior arrangement to store the furs. Given the facts of this and the related Wallace case, and appellant’s counsel’s demonstrated knowledge of those facts, that no direct proof along the lines of the possible implication in the grand jury testimony was introduced is the best indication such proof did not exist.
We have considered the remaining points urged by appellant as requiring reversal but find them without merit. The judgment of the trial court is therefore
Affirmed.
. Appellant and several others were originally named in a multicount indictment charging conspiracy and a number of substantive offenses. Upon motion, appellant was tried separately on three substantive counts charging burglary, grand larceny and interstate transport of stolen goods. He was acquitted on the first two charges and convicted on the third. Pursuant to a stipulation, the conspiracy charge was dismissed following trial of this case.
. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 provides in pertinent part:
“Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, * * * shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
. The furs were removed from the garage and apparently sold before the arrest of appellant or any of the others involved.
. Barnes, a professional burglar, was the key witness in a number of cases involving the operations of a burglary ring in the District of Columbia. See Wallace v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 50, 412 F.2d 1097 (1969) ; Hamilton v. United States, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 433 F.2d 520 (1970). Appellant was tried after the Wallace trial, but before the Hamilton trial.
. Barnes testified that the furs remained in the garage approximately four days.
. “The Government may be required to produce documents in its possession unless it makes a valid claim of privilege.” Mackey v. United States, 122 U.S.App. D.C. 97, 98, 351 F.2d 794, 795 (1965).
. The entire stipulation as agreed to and entered into evidence was as follows (the names appearing above the text .of the stipulation were written in by counsel on the margin of the actual stipulation in the places indicated herein by asterisks to represent the agent or agents with whom appellant was principally in contact during the respective periods indicated) :
Bob Franklin
It is agreed and stipulated between counsel for the United States that on June 25, 1959, the defendant Xydas was first contacted by a Special Agent of the FBI concerning the possibility of his furnishing information to the FBI on a confidential basis. Inasmuch as he dis-
played a willingness to supply sucb information, he was thereafter * contacted either at his request or at the request of various Special Agents on the following dates: 7/20/59; 7/23/59; 8/8/59; 9/22/59; 10/23/59. On 11/13/59 contact with defendant Xydas was terminated.
Carl Giovanetti
Contacts with defendant Xydas were reinstituted by the FBI on 9/23/60 and he was thereafter contacted on the following dates: 9/28/60; 11/2/60; 12/12/60; 1/9/61; 1/13/61; 2/4/61; 2/21/61; 3/10/61; 4/7/61; 4/12/61; 5/9/61; 6/5/61; 6/22/61; 7/11/61; 7/17/61; 8/18/61; 9/26/61; 10/2/61; 10/6/61; 11/17/61 ;* 12/14/61; 1/18/62; 2/4/62; 3/21/62; 4/19/62; 5/14/62; 6/26/62; 8/9/62; 9/6/62; 9/24/62; 10/22/62; 11/16/62; 12/31/62; 1/21/63; 2/28/63; 4/2/63;*664 5/3/63; 5/6/63; 5/7/63; 6/12/63; 6/18/63; 6/19/63; 6/27/63; 7/8/63; 8/5/63; 8/23/63; 9/4/63; 9/23/63; 11/4/63; 11/5/63; 11/7/63; 11/21/63; 11/23/63 ; 11/24/63; 12/5/63; 1/10/64; 2/18/64; 3/10/64; 4/9/64; 4/10/64; 5/14/64. On the latter date contacts with defendant Xydas were again terminated.
Richard Marquise
Edward Wills
On 9/15/64, the defendant Xydas contacted Special * Agents of the FBI and furnished information concerning the burglary of the French Poodle Dress Shop. Xydas took the initiative in this contact, having come to the Washington Field Office of the FBI. He was also interviewed about this matter 9/16/64; 9/22/64; 9/23/64; 10/2/64; 11/3/64, during which interviews he was not then being “operated” as an informant.
Gib McNeely
On 12/2/64 defendant Xydas was recontacted to renew attempts to develop him as an informant concerning these and other matters. He was thereafter contacted on the following dates: 12/3/64; 12/8/64; 12/9/64; 1/9/65;* 2/8/65; 3/8/65; 3/15/65; 4/6/65; 4/29/65; 6/8/65; 6/22/65; 7/20/65; 8/19/65; 9/15/65; 10/5/65; 11/5/65.
Since regular contact was ceased by the FBI on 11/18/65, no further effort was made to develop Xydas as an informant. However, on 1/7/66, the defendant Xydas contacted an agent of the FBI concerning an investigation currently being conducted by the Internal Investigative Unit of the Washington, D. O. Metropolitan Police Department. A similar contact was again made 5/2/66, upon Xydas’ initiative.
Some of the above referred to contacts beginning in 1969 resulted in obtaining no information concerning the matters inquired into and some resulted in obtaining merely non-specific, general information. The information supplied to the FBI by the defendant Xydas, as a result of the contacts since 1959, has largely concerned gambling matters and has been of generally intelligence-type information concerning his associates.
. While the documents here involved were sought via subpoena under Rule 17, Fed. R.Crim.P., this, where the subpoena seeks documents in the possession of the Government, is simply an alternative means of obtaining information available under Rule 16 motions to produce for inspection and copying. Although Rule 17 was not intended as a discovery device, prior to 1966 its use involved discovery consequences because it permitted the pre-trial production of certain “evidentiary” material which could not have been obtained under Rule 16. The 1966 amendment, however, broadened Rule 16 to the point where there is no longer any information obtainable via subpoena which is not covered by Rule 16. See 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 274 (1969). For the purposes of this case, we see no relevant differences between Rules 16 and 17 in the criteria governing disclosure of the documents here sought. We therefore deal with appellant’s contention that the subpoena was improperly quashed by evaluating it in light of the trial judge’s power to control discovery under Rule 16.
. It is true that discovery under Rule 16 (a) is, as a rule, almost automatically available to the defendant since no showing of any kind is required of him as a prerequisite to production of the documents sought. However, where, as here,
. See Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558 (1st Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Curry, 278 F.Supp. 508 (N.D.Ill.1967).
. Appellant’s counsel argued that the records should be made available to him in order to (1) show that Xydas had in fact cooperated with the FBI; (2) learn the dates of Xydas’ contacts with the FBI in order to show their continuity; (3) learn which agents had contacted Xydas during various periods in order to know which agents to call as defense witnesses;
(4) learn to what extent Xydas had initiated the contacts. In view of the Government’s claim of privilege we think that these purposes were all adequately fulfilled by the stipulation.
At another point, however, counsel stated:
These are subpoenas issued for these documents. I think I have a right to look at them and see if there is anything in the documents that could be helpful to the defense. That is the reason I subpoenaed them.
This, of course, is nothing more than a statement of a desire to go on a “fishing expedition” in confidential government records in the hope that something “lieli>ful to the defense” might turn up. In such circumstances, privilege may properly be invoked by the Government to prevent such disclosure.
. As noted supra, Barnes testified that the furs were removed from the garage after four days. On cross-examination Xydas admitted that when he finally went to the FBI some three weeks later, he stated that he wanted to get his involvement in the French Poodle offense “off his conscience.”
. 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966).
. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
. Levin v. Katzenbach, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 363 F.2d 287 (1966), on appeal after remand, Levin v. Clark, 133 U.S.App. D.C. 6, 408 F.2d 1209 (1967). In a document filed in the trial court prior to trial the Government set forth its understanding of its duty to be that “Brady and Levin require that the Government disclose such evidence which in the context of the given case might lead the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.” The Government then represented that it had examined its files and found nothing, not already disclosed, that was required to be provided to the defense under Brady and Levin.
. Marsha Skeens was not called as a witness by the Government, anil therefore, under the Dennis case, general discovery of her testimony was not available to the defense. See Allen v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 61, 390 F.2d 476 (1968). Apart from the requirements of Dennis, however, appellant was entitled to exculpatory information in the Government’s possession, including any contained in the grand jury minutes, whether or not the witness testified at trial. For example, in the instant case, a portion of the grand jury testimony of James Skeens, which was of an exculpatory nature as to appellant’s involvement in the offenses charged in the first two counts of the indictment, was provided to the defense prior to the trial, even though Skeens himself never testified at trial.
. Brady held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
. Levin v. Clark, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 9, 408 F.2d 1209, 1212 (1967).
. Id., 133 U.S.App.D.C., at 19, 408 F.2d, at 1222.
. Id., 133 U.S.App.D.C., at 11 n. 29, 22, 408 F.2d, at 1214 n. 29, 1225.
. Indeed, as part of its preparation, the defense prepared a map showing the relative distances from the site of the French Poodle burglary to both Skeens’ and Xydas’ houses. This map was introduced into evidence as part of the defense case.
. Tr. Yol. I, p. 39. Xydas’ counsel had been one of the defense counsel in the prior Wallace trial, see note 4, supra, the transcript of which we take judicial notice, where Barnes, while testifying regarding the French Poodle burglary, had related that the furs were first taken to Skeens’ house and that Marsha Skeens had actually been present at the French Poodle while the burglary was in progress.
. From the high caliber of the defense’s presentation of its case, as evident in the record, we deem it highly unlikely that any such failure occurred. Rather, in all probability Marsha Skeens was interviewed on the very point at issue but failed to provide sufficient information to justify calling her as a witness.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring) :
I concur in the Court’s analysis of the issues in this case. Though the question of prejudicial error is very close for me, I agree that this conviction must be affirmed.
I would like to add, however, that I do think that Marsha Skeens’ statement was sufficiently “favorable” to appellant
I think this case indicates again the hazards of relying on the prosecutor and the trial judge to look after the defendant’s interests.