46 Wis. 497 | Wis. | 1879
The learned counsel for the appellant insists that the court below erred in holding that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for an injury resulting from the insufficiency of the railroad track which it did not own, and was not bound to keep in repair; and seeondli/, that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, “ that if they found that negligence of the defendant’s employees caused the injury, or contributed to it, the defendant would not be liable,” and because, in reply to such request, the judge said he did not think there was any negligence on the part of anybody running that train, “ I mean the train hands; that the negligence, if any, was higher up; ” and thirdly, that the damages were excessive, and that the verdict should have been set aside, and a new trial granted, for that reason.
1. We do not think the first point well taken. The authorities are quite uniform, that where one railroad company uses the track of another company for the purpose of transporting passengers or piuperty, the company transporting the persons or property is liable for any damages which may be sustained, either by the passengers or by the owners of the property so transported, caused by any defects in the road of the other company so used, or by the negligence of the servants or employees of such other company occurring during such transportation. Redfield, in his work on the law of railways, says; “ The rule of law in regard to passenger-carriers who run over other
We are also of the opinion that the same rule should apply as between the railroad company and its employees; and we do not understand the learned counsel as contending that a different rule should apply, as between the railroad company and its employees, and the railroad company and passengers and freighters. In the case at bar, there would seem to be every reason for holding that the same rule should apply. The com pany, when the accident happened, was running its trains over a short line of road, which terminated at the main track of its road, which was never used as a railroad for any purpose except as the trains of the defendant ran over it, and for all practical pnrposes was of no use as a railroad except as used by the defendant. There is no evidence that the plaintiff had any knowledge that the road did not belong to the defend
2. The exception to the refusal of the learned circuit judge to give the instruction asked, and to his remarks accompanying such refusal, we think must be held to be well taken; especially as his general charge was entirely silent upon the point sought to be raised, and which we think the defendant, upon the evidence in the case, had the right to insist should be submitted to the jury. We have very serious doubts whether the defendant had the right to demand of the court an instruction that, if the negligence of a coemployee contributed to the injury, the plaintiff could not recover; but we are very clear that he had the right to demand an instruction that if they found from the evidence that the accident happened by reason of the negligence of a coemployee, then the plaintiff could not recover. As the instruction asked was in the alternative, if the learned judge had simply denied it, without comment, we should have hesitated to reverse the judgment for that cause; but as the learned judge, as a matter of law, decided that there was no evidence of any negligence on the part of any persons in charge of or running the train at the time, which could
There is evidence that the conductor was advised, before he went to work on this road, that it was not in a very safe condition, and that he was cautioned to run slowly over the same. The evidence also shows that when the accident happened, he was running the train at a speed which the conductor himself considered unsafe, taking into consideration the condition of the track, and the fact that the train was backing instead of going forward; and it tends also to show that the accident happened by reason of the lateral pressure against the rails, occasioned by the backing of the train at a speed which was not safe. Upon this evidence, we think it was for the jury, and not for the court, to say whether there was negligence on the part of the conductor in the running of the train, and whether such negligence caused the accident which resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The case of Durgin v. Munson, 9 Allen, 396, decided by the supreme court of Massachusetts, was similar in principle to the case at bar, and that court held that the question as to whether the negligence of the coemployee caused the injury should have been submitted to the jury.
In that ease, the plaintiff, an employee of the company, had been injured by an engine running off a turn-table, when such employee was engaged in turning the same. His claim to recover against the company -was based upon an alleged insufficiency of the brake on the engine, to keep the same in place whilst it was being turned upon the table. The court held that
Applying the principle of that case to the case at bar, there was certainly some evidence in the case to go to the jury
We have examined, with some care, the question as to whether mere contributory negligence on the part of a coem-ployee or servant of the defendant would be a good defense for the master in an action by an employee or servant for an injury received on account of the alleged negligence of the master. We have been able to find but one case in which the question has been plainly before the court, the case of Paulmier, Adm’r, v. The Erie R. R. Co., 5 Vroom, 151. The court held in that case, “ that where the track of the company over a trestle-work was not capable of supporting an engine, and the engineer in charge had orders not to put his engine thereon, which orders he disobeyed, and the intestate of the plaintiff, who was a fireman on said engine, and who was unaware of said orders or of the danger, was thereby killed, the said trestle-work giving way, the plaintiff was entitled to
This case may appear to be in conflict with the opinion cited in 9 Allen, supra, but it is not so in fact. Chief Justice Beasley, who delivered the opinion, announces the same principle which was announced in the case in Allen. He says: “The principal ground on which a new trial is asked in this casé is, that it was clearly shown by the evidence that the accident by which the intestate lost his life was occasioned, not by the negligence of the defendants themselves, but by that of their employees. They said that their roadbed extending over the water was properly constructed i/n view of the purpose for which it was designed, and that it was misapplied to another purpose by their servants coni/ra/ry to their orders. If these were the facts of the case, the position would be well taken.” The learned chief justice afterward gives his reasons for holding that the rule above claimed by the defendant was not applicable to the facts of the case, and that the defendants were guilty of negligence, although they had directed their engineers to stop their locomotives at the end of the trestle-work, and not run them onto it. He says: “Stripped of all verbal disguises, the arrangement is this, that by their arrangements they required their employees almost hourly to run their engines to the brink of danger, and that their orders were to stop there. The road-bed over the water was supported by wood-work which the defendants admit was dangerous to a locomotive, and what they required 'was that the locomotive should be stopped on the fast land.
After giving the question such consideration as we have been able to give, we are inclined to hold, as was held in the case of Paulmier v. The Erie R. R. Co., supra, that where the negligence of the railroad company directly contributes to the injury of an employee, the company must be held liable, though it also appears that the negligence of a coemployee contributed to such injury, and that the rule is universal, that contributory negligence, to defeat an action, must be the negligence of the plaintiff or of some other person for whose acts he is responsible.
3. Upon the question of damages, we are unable to say from the evidence and verdict whether they are excessive or not, as the amount of damages which should be given depends very much upon the nature of the injuries received. If they are in fact permanent in their nature, and materially interfere with the natural and ordinary use of the plaintiff’s arm, we would not feel justified in holding that they were excessive; whereas, if the injuries were temporary in their nature, and resulted in no permanent disablement of the plaintiff in any respect, we might be constrained to hold the damages were excessive. We do not, however, wish to be understood as giving any opinion upon that subject.
For the error of the court in taking away from the jury the question as to whether the negligence of the conductor in charge of the train caused the accident and the injury to the plaintiff, the judgment must be reversed.
By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.