Lisa Sternberger appeals from a summary judgment dismissing her claim against the City of Williston for her personal injury when she fell on its snow-storage lot. We affirm.
On March 26, 1995, Sternberger was injured while running in the middle of the night through an unimproved lot owned by the City and used for a snow-storage site. Stemberger described what happened in her answer to an interrogatory:
At aрproximately 1:00 a.m. on March 26, 1995, my friend Karlen Pope and I were driving in the area of 2nd Street and University Avenue when the driver of my vehicle, Karlen Pope, got out [of] the vehicle, took the keys with him and proceeded across the lot in question. I pursued him to try to gain possession of my keys so I could drive myself home. As I was crossing the lot in questiоn, on what I thought was hard packed gravel, I fell through, what was in fact hard packed snow and ice, and severely injured my right knee. After my fall, Karlen Pope threw the keys to mе and I crawled and limped back to my van and drove home.
Stemberger sued the City, alleging it had negligently maintained the lot by failing to furnish safe access on it that resulted in her injury.
The City moved for summary judgment on the ground, as a matter of law, it owed no duty to Sternberger. With its motion, the City submitted part of Sternberger’s answers to its interrogatories and the affidavits of а City Commissioner and the Public Works Director. Both swore that they were not aware of any prior complaints about the lot or of any accidents on the lot. They аlso stated that the City had evaluated various possible snow-storage sites and that they did not consider this one to be dangerous. The Public Works Director, said: “There is good access all around the lot and it is not reasonable to believe that people would cross it at times when the snow is melting, as the lot is not surfaced and it is full of mud аnd gravel.”
Sternberger did not submit any evidence of negligence by the City in her opposition to the summary judgment motion. The trial court granted summary judgment because “reasonаble minds could not disagree that under the situation described in this case, the City did not maintain an unreasonably dangerous or hazardous condition for a person (pedestrian) exercising ordinary care.”
In its order, the trial court said that the lot was surrounded by a well-maintained roadway and partially surrounded by a walkway. On appeal, Stеrnberger asserts the fact of an adjacent sidewalk is disputed and material, so summary judgment was improper. She argues the trial court wrongly concluded that the City owеd no specific duty to her to “guard against unreasonably dangerous conditions.” She contends that the existence of an adjacent sidewalk may determine whether the City properly exercised this duty. We disagree.
Summary judgment is appropriate when either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, if no dispute exists about the mаterial facts or inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving disputed facts would not alter the result.
Olson v. City of Garrison,
*290 [T]he party opposing summary judgment cannot leave to the court the chore of divining what facts are relevant and material to the claim for relief, but must draw the court’s attention to relevant evidence in the record by setting out the page and line in depositions or оther documents containing testimony or evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.
(footnote omitted). NDRCivP 56(e) describes the evidentiary methods of opрosing summary judgment, primarily with affidavits or other admissible evidence. As
Kristian-son,
Stemberger did not present any evidence about sidewalks to the trial court. 1 She alsо failed to offer any evidence that the City’s maintenance of the lot was unreasonably hazardous. On appeal, she does not identify any admissible evidence in this record to support her argument, but depends on her complaint. This is not enough response to raise an issue of material fact.
Anyway, the presence оr absence of a sidewalk around the lot is not material. Stemberger argues this fact is material because it may determine whether the City properly exercised its duty to protect against hazardous conditions on the lot. However, even without a sidewalk anywhere, we agree with the trial court that there is no evidence аt all to indicate the City maintained an unreasonably hazardous condition on the lot for a person exercising ordinary care.
To be negligent, a person must owe a duty to protect another from injury.
Hotter,
Landowners owe a general duty to lawful entrants to maintain their property in a reasonably safe condition under the circumstances.
2
Holier,
The circumstances of a visitor’s entry upon аnother’s premises will continue to have a direct relationship to the question of landowner liability. Foreseeability of a visitor’s entry determines in part the likelihood of injury to him, and the extent of the interest which must be sacrificed to avoid the risk of injury.
Here, Stemberger was running at night in an unfamiliar area. The accident occurred in the wintertime when large piles of snow and ice are common in North Dakota. The piles were open and obvious, and they cannot be viewed as pitfalls, traps оr snares that would make conditions dangerous for a person exercising ordinary care. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965) (a landowner is not liable for “conditiоn on the land whose danger is known or obvious”). Here, the City’s Commissioner and its Public Works Director both swore that they were not aware of any prior complaints about thе lot or of other injuries. We conclude there is no *291 evidence that Sternberger’s entry on the lot and her injury were foreseeable by the City.
Stemberger also argues that the trial court could not determine, as a matter of law, that she was not exercising due care. This argument ignores the nature of the analysis often employed in а summary judgment against an injured claimant absent evidence of unreasonable conduct by the defendant.
See Morrison v. Grand Forks Hous. Auth.,
We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the City. As explained in footnote 1, we deny costs to the City on this appeal because of its indifference to the appellate rules.
Notes
. As evidence of sidewalks and adequate lighting, the City relies on а map and interrogatories that were not submitted with its summary judgment motion. In violation of Rule 30(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the City included this material in its supplemental appendix. As a sanction for this indifference, we deny costs on this appeal to the City.
. We are unable to tell from this record whether Stembеrger was a lawful entrant or a trespasser on the City’s lot. Although this court has eliminated the distinction between invitees and licensees, it has maintained the separatе category of trespassers.
O’Leary v. Coenen,