246 Conn. 170 | Conn. | 1998
Opinion
The issues in this appeal are whether a motion to open a judgment and set aside the verdict following the rejection of a court-ordered additur is an appealable final judgment, and whether pursuant to General Statutes § 52-2281),
The following facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, Joan Poll Stem, brought these negligence actions against the defendants, Warren D. Walters, and his employer, Allied Van Lines, Inc., for injuries she had sustained arising out of a collision between her automobile and a tractor trailer operated by Walters and owned by Allied Van Lines, Inc.
The plaintiff then filed a motion rejecting the additur, and thereafter filed a motion to correct the trial court’s decision. Relying on § 52-228b, which provides that “the parties” must be given an opportunity to reject the additur, the plaintiff requested that the court’s decision be corrected to indicate “that the plaintiff, as well as the defendants], [have] the opportunity to accept or reject the [c]ourt’s additur.” The plaintiff then moved the trial court to open and set aside the judgment, and to order a new trial on all issues. The trial court granted the plaintiffs motions and ordered a new trial on all issues. On appeal,
I
We first address the defendants’ claim that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Specifically, the defendants argue that § 52-263
“ ‘The right of appeal exists only by virtue of statutory authority.’ ” In re Judicial Inquiry No. 85-01, 221 Conn. 625, 633, 605 A.2d 545 (1992), citing State v. Audet, 170 Conn. 337, 342, 365 A.2d 1082 (1976). Generally, “appellate courts in this state do not have jurisdiction to entertain appeals not taken from final judgments. See General Statutes § 52-263; State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). The lack of a final judgment is a jurisdictional defect that mandates dismissal.” Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, 241 Conn. 24, 34, 694 A.2d 1246 (1997). A judgment is considered final “if the rights of the parties are concluded so that further proceedings cannot affect them . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodson v. State, 228 Conn. 106, 112, 635 A.2d 285 (1993), on appeal after remand, 232 Conn. 175, 653 A.2d 177 (1995), quoting Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 176, 413 A.2d 819, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S. Ct. 20, 62 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1979).
Although the plaintiff is correct that the present appeal does not constitute a final judgment under the traditional definition upon which she relies, this does not conclude our analysis. Section 52-263 explicitly grants an aggrieved party the right to “appeal. . . from the decision of the court granting a motion to set aside a verdict . . . .” The plain language of the statute expressly provides for the appeal of an order to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. See Robbins v.
II
We next address whether the trial court properly granted the plaintiffs motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial after she had rejected the additur. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is limited to challenging the order of additur exclusively on appeal. They construe § 52-228b to provide only defendants with the option to reject a court-ordered additur, and argue that §§ 52-216a and 52-228a, when read in conjunction with § 52-228b, compel the rejection of a contrary construction.
We begin our analysis by examining the plain language of § 52-228b. Section 52-228b provides in relevant part that “[n]o . . . verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the damages are inadequate until the parties have first been given an opportunity to accept an addition to the verdict of such amount as the court deems reasonable.” (Emphasis added.) We previously examined the meaning of § 52-228b in Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 217-18, 682 A.2d 106 (1996),
Our prior application of the statute supports this construction. In Fazio v. Brown, 209 Conn. 450, 454, 551 A.2d 1227 (1988), the plaintiff rejected the trial court’s order of additur, and moved to set aside the verdict and receive a new trial limited to the issue of damages. The trial court granted the motion and ordered a new trial solely on the issue of damages. Id. The defendant raised two issues on appeal,
The defendants also argue that an inteipretation of § 52-228b that permits the plaintiff to reject an additur conflicts with §§ 52-228a and 52~216a.
In examining statutes that potentially conflict, we have adhered to the principle that “[r]ather than adopt [a] reading of these statutory . . . provisions to create a genuine conflict that would result in a nullification of one by the other, as a reviewing court we should seek to harmonize the legislation so as to avoid conflict. . . . ‘Where, as here, more than one [provision] is involved, we presume that the legislature intended them to be read together to create a harmonious body of law . . . and we construe the [provisions], if possible, to avoid conflict between them.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 388, 698 A.2d 859 (1997); see Shortt v. New Milford Police Dept., 212 Conn. 294, 301, 562 A.2d 7 (1989) (“[i]n ascertaining [legislative] intent, we deem the legislature to have intended to harmonize its enactment with existing common law and statutory requirements”).
The defendants claim that construing § 52-228b to permit a plaintiff to reject an additur, move to set aside the verdict and have a new trial ordered would conflict with § 52-228a. Section 52-228a provides in relevant part that “[i]n any jury case where the court orders . . . an increase in the amount of the judgment, the party aggrieved by the order of . . . additur may appeal as in any civil action. ...”
We begin by examining the legislative history of § § 52-228a and 52-228b. Section 52-228b was enacted first, in 1965. Public Acts 1965, No. 532. Section 52-228a was amended to grant the right to appeal from an additur
The fact that a party may appeal, as § 52-228a provides, does not compel the conclusion that the legislature intended such an appeal to be the only recourse available to the plaintiff. To the contrary, we find support for the notion that the legislature sought to provide an aggrieved party with the option either to appeal the additur, or to reject the additur and move to have the verdict set aside and a new trial ordered. A plain reading of § 52-228a unquestionably grants a defendant the right to appeal the additur, and § 52-228b provides the defendant with the right to reject the additur. We are not persuaded that the legislature intended only the defendant to have the right to choose either option. Having reconciled § 52-228a with our interpretation of § 52-228b, we conclude that these statutes are not inconsistent with one another.
A determination of the legislative intent underlying § 52-216a begins our analysis. When first enacted by Public Acts 1976, No. 76-197, the statute referred only to remittiturs. The language concerning additurs was added by Public Acts 1982, No. 82-406, § 3. Public Act 82-406 was enacted to solve the perceived problem that “[r]ight now in Connecticut, whether a verdict is set aside by the court or whether a remittitur is added, or whether there’s an additur is in the discretion of the court. . . . [This amendment] would take the discretion out, and [the judge] would have to find as a matter of law that the verdict was out of balance one way or the other.” 25 H.R. Proc., Pt. 19, 1982 Sess., p. 6178, remarks of Representative Alfred Onorato. It is not clear from the legislative history why this language, requiring that a verdict be deemed inadequate as a matter of law
In contrast to § 52-216a, § 52-228b does not address the conditions precedent that require the trial court to order that a verdict be set aside. Rather, it discusses what a court must do before it may consider setting aside the verdict. Section 52-228b provides in relevant part that “[n]o . . . verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the damages are inadequate until the parties have first been given an opportunity to accept an addition to the verdict of such amount as the court deems reasonable.” (Emphasis added.) The purpose of § 52-228b is to ensure that if a trial court determines that an award is inadequate as a matter of law, before setting aside the verdict and ordering a new trial, that court must first offer an additur to “the parties,” i.e.,
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 52-228b provides: “Setting aside of verdict in action claiming money damages. No verdict in any civil action involving a claim for money damages may be set aside except on written motion by a party to the action, stating the reasons relied upon in its support, filed and heard after notice to the adverse party according to the rules of the court. No such verdict may be set aside solely on the ground that the damages are excessive unless the prevailing party has been given an opportunity to have the amount of the judgment decreased by so much thereof as the court deems excessive. No such verdict may be set aside solely on the ground
Although § 52-228b provides “an opportunity to accept an addition to the verdict,” we infer that this language equally confers an opportunity to reject an addition to the verdict.
The actions against the two defendants originally were brought separately, and then were consolidated. Hereafter, we refer to Walters and Allied Van lines, Inc., collectively as the defendants.
Because the jury found that the plaintiff was 50 percent contributorily negligent, the plaintiffs verdict was for $15,542.04.
The trial court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to $10,000 in noneconomic damages; therefore, because the jury found the plaintiff to be 50 percent contributorily negligent, she received an actual additur of $5000.
The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, now Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 65-1, and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).
General Statutes § 52-263 provides in relevant part: “Appeals from Superior Court. Exceptions. Upon the trial of all matters of fact in any cause or action in the Superior Court, whether to the court or jury, or before any judge thereof when the jurisdiction of any action or proceeding is vested in him, if either party is aggrieved by the decision of the court or judge
The defendants also cite as authority case law from other jurisdictions, whereby plaintiffs do not. have the right to reject a court-ordered additur. They concede, however, that the st atutory provisions underlying those cases are not identical to those in our statutes. In this instance, moreover, we find the purpose and meaning of § 52-228b to be clearly ascertainable through traditional methods of statutory interpretation.
The plaintiff also claims that the defendants’ interpretation of § 52-228b would violate her state constitutional right to a trial by jury. Because we conclude that § 52-228b permits the plaintiff to reject the additur, we need not reach her constitutional argument.
Santopietro concerned the scope of appellate review of claims made pursuant to a § 52-228b motion to set aside the verdict. Although this is not the issue in the present case, our general analysis of the purpose of § 52-228b in Santopietro is instructive here.
The first issue, which involved an abuse of discretion claim regarding the granting of the plaintiffs motion to set aside the verdict, is not relevant to the present discussion.
General Statutes § 52-228a provides: “Appeal from order of remittitur or additur. In any jury case where the court orders a decrease in the amount of the judgment or an increase in the amount of the judgment, the party aggrieved by the order of remittitur or additur may appeal as in any civil action. The appeal shall be on the issue of damages only, and judgment shall enter upon the verdict of liability and damages after the issue of damages is decided.”
General Statutes § 52-216a provides: “Reading of agreements or releases to jury prohibited. Adjustments for excessive and inadequate verdicts permitted. An agreement with any tortfeasor not to bring legal action or a release of a tortfeasor in any cause of action shall not be read to a jury or in any other way introduced in evidence by either party at any time during the trial of the cause of action against any other joint tortfeasors, nor shall any other agreement not to sue or release of claim among any plaintiffs or defendants in the action be read or in any other way introduced to a jury. If the court at the conclusion of the trial concludes that the verdict is excessive as a matter of law, it shall order a remittitur and, upon failure of the party so ordered to remit the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial. If the court concludes that the verdict is inadequate as a matter of law, it shall order an additur, and upon failure of the party so ordered to add the amount ordered by the court, it shall set aside the verdict and order a new trial. This section shall not prohibit the introduction of such agreement or release in a trial to the court.”
Public Acts 1972, No. 108, § 10, provides in relevant part: “Section 52-228a of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof: In any jury case where the court orders a remittitur OR AN ADDITUR, the party aggrieved by the order of said remittitur OR ADDITUR may appeal as in any civil action. . . .”
The defendants argue that when substantive and procedural statutes conflict, the substantive statute, which they identify as § 52-228a, would
We previously have reviewed the language of § 52-216a and determined the overall legislative intent underlying the statute. “[T]he evil intended to be avoided by [the statute’s] passage was the jury’s knowledge of the existence of any release or claim or agreement not to sue because such knowledge might tend to be prejudicial to aparty to the action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Donner v. Kearse, 234 Conn. 660, 676, 662 A.2d 1269 (1995). Our discussion of Public Act 82-406 in relation to § 52-228b should not be read to alter that inteipretation.