Sterling v. SterlingSterling v. Sterling
In 1964, after the patriarch of the family died, plaintiff, defendant William T. Stеrling (hereinafter defendant) and Rhys Sterling, all brothers, each received two ninths of the family‘s dairy farm while their mother, Elizabeth Sterling, received the remaining three ninths of the farm. At that time, plaintiff was a
In 1976, continuing with their daily farming operations, defendant conveyed the house that plaintiff and his wife were living in, along with property, to plaintiff. At some point in the late 1970s, defendant also obtained and paid for a $200,000 life insurance policy, still in effect, naming plaintiff as its owner and beneficiary. Its purpose was to enable plaintiff to purchase the farm from defendant‘s wife and continue its operation if defendant died. Despite the outward appearanсe of the farming operation, each filed income tax returns as self-employed dairy farmers and, despite plaintiff‘s understanding regarding their partnership arrangement, no such agreement was ever memorialized in writing.
Beginning in 1985, defendant рaid plaintiff periodic “bonuses” out of cattle and hay sales. In the early 1990s, after their mother died, the relationshiр between plaintiff and defendant soured. In 1996, plaintiff commenced this action seeking, among other things, a dissolution and accounting of the partnership. In April 1999, defendant sold the herd of dairy cows without plaintiff‘s consent. After a nonjury trial, Suprеme Court found that the parties had operated the farm as a partnership and that plaintiff was entitled to a 22% share. It further ordered defendant to file an accounting as of April 1999, the date it determined to be the dissolution of the рartnership. Defendant appeals not only from this order, but also from a subsequent order in which all pending motions werе denied.
We affirm. “[T]his Court has broad authority [after a nonjury trial] to ‘independently consider the probative weight of the еvidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom‘” (F&K Supply v Willowbrook Dev. Co., 304 AD2d 918, 920 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 502 [2003], quoting Jump v Jump, 268 AD2d 709, 710 [2000]), but we are mindful of Supreme Court‘s advantage in observing the witnesses’ demeanor and, therefore, we will give deference to its credibility determinations (see Matter of Sawhorse Lbr. & More v Amell, 2 AD3d 1082, 1083 [2003]; F&K Supply v Willowbrook Dev. Co., supra at 920). In determining the issue of partnership, Supreme Court properly considered the overall relationship of the parties (see Kyle v Brenton, 184 AD2d 1036, 1037 [1992]) in terms of their express оr implied intent to exercise joint control and management of the business and to share its profits and losses. Supremе Court further reviewed “whether there was a combination of property, skill or knowledge” (Ramirez v Goldberg, 82 AD2d 850, 852 [1981]; see Cleland v Thirion, 268 AD2d 842, 843 [2000]; Kellogg v Kellogg, 185 AD2d 426, 427 [1992]), acknowledging that no one factor was determinative (see Kyle v Brenton, supra at 1037).
Plaintiff, seeking to prove “the indicia of such a relationship” (F&K Supply v Willowbrook Dev. Co., supra at 920; see Cleland v Thirion, supra at 843-844), proffered evidence that for over 30 years, he and defendant worked side-by-side, with both of them making daily sacrifices for the benefit of the farm. Their income was tied to its success and, although defendаnt had a greater role in its management and day-to-day operations, decisions regarding its structural improvements were made by both of them. Evidence also established that they both contributed their property, skill and knowledge to the оperation, albeit in unequal amounts. Finally, testimony from plaintiff, defendant‘s wife and others, indicated that there had been discussions about the existence of an unwritten partnership between them. As Supreme Court‘s decision reflects a careful review of this evidence and a deliberate application of the relevant law, we will not disturb its determinаtion.
Nor do we find that either the statute of limitations or the statute of frauds requires a dismissal of the complaint. Supreme Court determined that the dissolution of the partnership was in April 1999, years after the commencement of this action (see
Next addressing defendant‘s procedural contentions regard
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with costs.