Hеlen Sterling (hereinafter, “Appellant”) appeals from the trial court’s judgment dismissing her claims of defamation in favor of Rust Communications, Inc., et al (hereinafter, “Rust”), and Thomas M. Mеyer and Thomas M. Meyer, Realtors (hereinafter and collectively, “Meyer”). Appellant claims the trial court erred in dismissing her petition because the facts pleaded in her petition and exhibits incorporated therein stated grounds for relief. Appellant alleges several articles published in the Southeast MissouRian newspaper constitute a publication of defamatory statements because they identify Appellant, were false, were published with the requisite degree of fault, and damaged Aр
The alleged defamation of Appellant arises out of four newspaper articles published in the November 1998 editions of the Southeast MissoueiaN daily newspaper. These articles focused on an entity called Community Sweat Equity Housing (hereinafter, “CSEH”) whose primary purposе was to rehabilitate housing units. Appellant resided in a home owned by CSEH, and was a paid employee of Golden Age Day Care, another tenant of CSEH.
Appellant filed this dеfamation action claiming Rust and Meyer were responsible for the publication of the articles. Rust and Meyer responded, filing motions to dismiss asserting the complained оf statements were not defamatory as a matter of law. The trial court, without specifying a reason, entered its judgment dismissing Appellant’s case with prejudice. Appellant appeals.
When reviewing the trial court’s judgment dismissing a petition, this Court determines if the facts pleaded and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom state any ground for relief.
Wheelehan v. Dueker,
In Missouri, the elements of defamation are: (1) publication, (2) of a defamatory statemеnt, (3) which identifies the plaintiff, (4) that is false, (5) that is published with a requisite degree of fault and (6) damages the plaintiff’s reputation.
Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College,
The determination of whether a statement is defamatory in charaсter only arises when the statement is an assertion or implication of fact.
Ribaudo v. Bauer,
If the statements are capable of a defamatory meaning, the court must also inquire if one or more privileges would shelter the defendant from legal action. These privileges offered by the First Amendment to thе United States Constitution include the absolute privilege accorded statements of opinion, which even if made maliciously or insincerely, do not give rise to a libel cause of action.
Pape,
In Nazeri, the Missouri Supreme Court set forth the test to be used in determining whеther, as a matter of law, an allegedly defamatory statement is reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning. The Nazeri test consists of two standards, which “while ... not absolutely consistent ... should be read together.” Nazeri at 311. The first standard requires that the alleged defamatory words “be stripped of any pleaded innuendo ... and construed in their most innocent sense.” Id. The second standard requires that the words “must be considered in context, giving them their plain and ordinarily understood meaning.” Id. That is, the words “are to be taken in the sensе which is most obvious and natural and according to the ideas they are calculated to convey to those to whom they are addressed.” Id.
Appellant’s only point on appeal alleges several articles published in the Southeast MissoüRIAN newspaper constituted a publication of defamatory statements which identify her. Apрellant claims the statements were false and published with the requisite degree of fault which damaged Appellant’s reputation. The alleged defamatory statements Appellant identifies from the Southeast Missourian are:
On November 20,1998:
‘Some of the tenants did not make any rent payments, which crippled the overall program. In this business, you run across some deadbeats.’
Thomas M. Meyer
Meyer, who worked frequently with rental property said last week that slow payments are a normal expectation of landlords, even saying that some tеnants are professional delinquents.
He confirmed that [Appellant,] who lives at the property at 227 S. Pacific was slow on payments, but that payments were always evеntually received. He calls her action [consistent with other tenants].
But at the end of September, 1997, Meyer, who was still managing the property for CSEH, sent a letter to [Appellant] reminding her that she was late in her rent payments. He told her in the letter that when her rent came due on the first of October, she would owe just under $1,000, about three month’s rent.
Appellant extracted the following phrases from the November 21, 1998, article:
Community Sweat Equity Housing Corp and Golden Age Day Care Center was run by the same people
Common bonds and the personnel running both programs are intertwined also as depicted below:
Community Sweat Equity Housing Corporation
Golden Age Day Care Center
[Appellant] renting home owned by Community Sweat Equity Corporation
Picture-Appellant-Programmer
Appellant extracted the following phrases from the November 22, 1998, article:
It was almost like a scam.
It looked real screwy.
Virtually nothing was going on
On November 23, 1998, article identified Appellant as a tenant.
Also included in the November 21, 1998 article was a picture of Appellant with the title of programmer.
Next, a careful reading of the words in the context of the November articles as a whole also fails to satisfy the second part of the Nazeri test. We find the words “considered in context, giving them their plain and ordinarily understood meaning.” would most obviously and naturally be interpreted as opinions which, even if false, have not been published with the requisite degree of fault required for a prima facie defamation action pursuant to Nazeri.
The statement confirming that Appellant was slow on payments, but that payments were always eventually received, is a fact supported by Appellant’s petition. Falsity is an element of a prima facie defamation claim. Furthermore, the statement calls Appellant’s actions “consistent with other tenants.” When “considеred in context, and given their plain and ordinarily understood meaning,” these words clearly are either true, or opinions which although embarrassing, are not defamatory. The сomplained of statements, therefore, do not satisfy the Nazeri test.
The trial court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s petition because the complained of statements in this cause are not defamatory as a matter of law. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.