*1 and condemned absolutely prohibited punishment Con- and the of our Commonwealth the Constitution America? the United States stitution of Appellant. Philadelphia, Sterling *2 1954. Before C. Argued April 21, J., Stern, and Ar- Musmanno Stearns, Bell, Jones, Chidsey, JJ. nold, L. with him Freedman, City Solicitor,
Abraham L. D. Solo and Assistant Murray Schwartz, Richard L. City Abraham Wernick, Deputy City Solicitors, City J. First Shestack, Deputy and Jerome Solicitor, Solicitor, appellants. him S. Clarke Mason, Sydney Stern,
William for appellees.
Opinion Horace Mr. Chief Justice Stern, June 1954: appeal: in this involved questions
There are two Philadelphia Does ordinance (1) li- mercantile a so-called imposing December 9, 1952, the bar members coverage cense include tax, If so, profession? (2) of their engaged practice interference unconstitutional ordinance branch judicial government? with the “AN ORDI- entitled, The ordinance question a mercantile imposing To provide NANCE revenue businesses, certain license tax on persons engaging occupations, manufacturing, professions, including in the commercial activities vocations, trades, *3 as “Business” is defined ...” City of Philadelphia; or gain for exercising “the on or meaning carrying of Philadelphia any trade, of City within profit manufac- ... or of profession, any vocation, business, or financial activity, commercial or service turing, that “. . . every person ... .” It provided is business, in any in to engage or continue engage desiring a . . ... in each license . year, procure business shall, of of in places license for each his business mercantile and from the of In- Department Licenses City, of upon issue the same spections payment which shall of place for each fee three dollars business (3) after rates ordinance, establishing City.” paid by dealers, tax to be wholesale of the annual retail, both at and and who sell wholesale dealers each dollar of (3) fixes three mills on manufacturers, as transacted the annual volume business gross other persons engaged “all busi- paid by rate to a- failure or refusal to- mercantile procure ness.” For under the ordinance there provided required license fine and of case de- penalty imprisonment of- of the fine. in the payment fault injunction against sought complaint Plaintiff’s an enforcing against at- and its officials torneys provisions at law the license tax injunction granted the ordinance. The court below appeals from its decree. defendant cov- intend to include in its 1. Did the ordinance practice erage engaged in the of the bar members profession? in the definitions are in the title1 and There words compel an affirmative section the ordinance question. the tax The title answer to that states including, imposed inter on “certain businesses” but occupations professions, vocations. Then, alia, carrying on of as the Section “business” is defined “any profession, . . . or business.” . service . . vocation, plain, intention of that the therefore, It would seem notwithstanding impose the ordinance the tax, pro- designation license tax,” as a “mercantile occupations as on mer- as well and vocations fessions, given strong em- intention cantile establishments, carry- phasis by as is defined the fact that “business” profit gain ing exercising “service on or familiar canon of construction It or business.” indeed of contracts, wills, ordinances, statutes and every presumably instruments, and other written provision intended for therein is sentence word, *4 given accordingly purpose, effect. must be and some argued “mercantile license that a so-called It ap designation, merely can be such because tax,” engaged in or only trade plied business, those given to a tax frequently the name held that have we such, and, 1 must part ordinance or of a statute The title Phila construing Stores Co. v. the enactment: in be considered 664, 667, there 487, 488, cases 482, and delphia, A. 2d 103 376 Pa. cited.
542 determining nature. its real in far from conclusive rather of the law or ordinance,
It
is the substance
legisla
given
designation
it
or
than
name
regard: Flynn
controlling
v.
body,
in that
that is
tive
&
A.
Armour
58;
51
2d 54,
356 Pa.
Horst,
20, 27, 29,
Pittsburgh,
407;
A. 2d 405,
v.
69
543 2 services his man “sells” broader a sense, professional man aas business just for a consideration financial are at his activities although sells his merchandise, cer lawyer doctor, in the case of the tended, motivations and altruistic tain measure of idealistic place. the market to pertain which do not necessarily con the ordinance Plaintiff that what suggests in those engaged professional in to templated regard in not to tax should apply, activities was that to re merely but come derived services rendered, to the if incidental ceipts transactions, any, from sales not to other words, of their practice professions, —in activi their non-professional to professional to points In ties. of that support proposition plaintiff 130 184, v. 284 Pa. Lutz, such as Commonwealth cases Com 200; A. 317 Pa. 176 A. 410; 190, Biser’s Appeal, 182 Com 542; v. 320 A. monwealth Pa. Dinnien, 257, 333 Pa. Heat & Power Co., monwealth v. Pennsylvania 337 Pa. Miller, 3 A. 2d Commonwealth 412; 246, held 11 A. in the tax was 2d all of which involved and sup sales merchandise —fixtures apply caskets medicines plies by a by pharmacist, plumber, an oil burners heat by and shrouds undertaker, optome and and power company, eyeglasses to the skilled professional trist —but apply seryices In all rendered connection with those sales. under stat the tax levied those cases, however, only utes vendors expressly imposed of, and and merchandise, not, or dealers wares in, goods, upon pro also those the present case, engaged vocations or serv occupations rendering fessions, there upon by ice. cases thus plaintiff are, relied all in not at fore, point. phrase connection comes to mind the there attributed many lawyers’ offices, prominently Lincoln framed lawyer’s are his stock in trade.”
“A time advice *6 that the ordinance We of clearly opinion are, then, en- intended include those here in question lawyers therefore professions gaged —in —and coverage. Is the to the second question:
2. This us brings so unconstitutional construed, when ordinance, independence judicial the upon infringement branch of government? are upon question
Two that propositions bearing One the of privilege practicing self-evident. from the duties of exemption law carries with it no the all others sharing with citizenship, including of state and expense government, national, municipal; federal income lawyers personal prop- state pay taxes, taxes erty real estate and net taxes, municipal profits the same as all other The other persons. proposition is that are the courts and it is sole- lawyers officers of ly they courts derive the authority of practice their branch profession; legislative whether state or can neither municipal, government, nor nor or grant prescribe revoke such authority, any manner interfere with functions and activi- nor the conduct regulate of their ties, practice. If, en- therefore, present any ordinance involved croachment it would upon judiciary represent attempt vain part author- municipal ities exercise a which do not power they possess; 231 Pa. (Hoopes 80 A. Bradshaw, 1098, 1099.). The question, is whether the tas therefore, it does constitute such encroach- imposes ment or interference with the upon, judiciary thereby the constitutional violating power separation among branches of government. the three deciding be question we must careful to be misled merely inept Thus the terminology. ordinance requires JS3.0Q. of a for payment, fee of a “mercantile procuring literally, “license” would the word license.” Taken permission, mer granting since a and, connote the doing privilege busin on the cantile license tax is obtaining might appear offhand ess,3 prerequisite for condition license is made a lawyer right taxpayer con this case —to —in profession. practice But tinue in the of his business nothing too for truth, from the could further definitely have and indeed we clear discussion, charge “license in fact a is not that the held, $3.00 procedural charge, registration mere fee” but a —a *7 identity rea those who, the device to establish subject occupations, the to the tax, son of their are expense being merely the clerical to cover $3.00 registration license certificate: and issuance Pittsburgh, 69 Pa. 109, 112, 113, Armour & Co. v. 363 Philadelphia, v. A. 2d National Biscuit Co. 405, 407; (footnote 4), A. 182, 188, Pa. 98 2d 374 618 604, 616, attorney scarcely an at law 189. It need be said that requires to than from courts, no other license, practice profession; merchants for his indeed also, legal right to conduct their matter, have by governmental operations without license business special only authority in the of certain busi save case subject their are to which, nature, nesses because example, liquor. police power, the sale of as, point important controlling But the and indeed right lawyer’s engage or continue here is that in, practice profession engage not con his in, so-called, upon procuring or license his ditioned 3 Harrisburg Light Co., & Power Commonwealth v. 284 Pa. 412, 413; Blauner’s, Philadelphia, 175, 178, v. Inc. A. 130 330 Pa. McKinley-Gregg 346, 347, 892; 342, 889, Commonwealth v. 198 A. Co., Drug 546, 544, 919, 920; Automobile Federal 345 Pa. A. 2d Pittsburgh, 454, 849, 850; Co. v. National 358 Pa. 57 A. 2d 604, 612, 613, Philadelphia, Biscuit Co. 374 Pa. 98 A. 2d 186. is it in nor imposed by ordinance, the tax paying if lie fails thereby; or manner any regulated affected upon imposed of the duties any out carry or refuses or- that which applies only penalty him therein the entry namely, tax measures, to all other dinarily fine his against property, and execution of judgment fraudu- false or for making possibly imprisonment in filing default return or wilful lent statements on a meas- a revenue ordinance is purely one. In short, any exercise or seek to not interfere with, does ure; and obligations authority rights power over, pur- of the court or as an officer the lawyer in those practice; his professional generally suance other taxes from all differs respects nowise fellow in common with lawyers pay now prac- What is the And it well asked, citizens. may on income a revenue tax difference between tical revenue tax and a admittedly valid, receipts, gross re- income or gross that same measured a privilege ceipts? cite the supererogation
It
be a work
would
jurisdictions which,
in other
numerous
cases
that while,
in their
hold
unanimity,
if
break
little
*8
and
their admission to
bar,
practice
members
as
of
essen-
after admission are
conduct
their professional
depart-
by
judiciary
be regulated
matters to
tially
on
members and
as
citizens,
the government,
ment of
state and
their
hand,
nation,
city,
rights,
the other
of
well
their
duty
pay
as
as
immunities,
and
privileges
like those
expenses
government
their share of
the laws and
by
are controlled
citizen,
other
of any
which
are a
body
they
of the political
ordinances
protection.4.
which
receive
The
they
from
and
part
from
they
exempt
municipal
are
contention
li:
cense,
occupation
privilege,
and
writers
as
alike,
denied
courts
text
sistently
by
annotation
shown
the authorities
collated
by
municipal
license, privilege,
entitled “Validity
1228 et
tax
in 16 A.L.R. 2d
occupation
attorneys”
18 L.R.A.
5 Am. Jur.
seq.
pp. 268, 269;
See also
409;
Municipal
ed.)
§12;
Corporations,
(3rd
McQuillin,
In the United States
9, p.
volume
Su-
293, §26.130.
v.
early
Royall
Court
as the case
preme
Virginia,
tion is a mode just, it matters but little name what reasonable and ” it is called.’ impose right municipality this to Since the challenged ground lawyers is on the tax on officers an interference with their activities as invalid analogous charge to of the is somewhat courts, long against right government of the federal made origi tax to of state officials. salaries view nally prevailed tax an that such unconstitutional gov upon independence of state encroachment per capacity Avithits to ernment an interference ex rel. New York form But in Graves v. its functions. Supreme S. U. United States 466, 306 O’Keefe, taking practical problem, more view Court, argued holding.5 It the earlier decisions so reversed power municipality tax that if be conceded the conducting privilege on the members of bar might professional great so a tax activities, imposed impossible, for to make it if difficult, as apart practice. fact from the them continue But, applicable argument equally that a Avouldbe similar impositions, to all other tax famous cliché of Chief Maryland, Wheat. McCulloch v. Justice Marshall 4 power power to tax that “the involves the 316, 431, questioned destroy,” dis Mr. Justice in his Holmes Mississippi senting opinion ex Oil v. Panhandle Co. practically rel. U. has been 223, S. Knox, legal being pronounce unrealistic abandoned ment. attack on the
Plaintiff makes ordinance some constitutionally ground title defective. 5 Among Day, the eases reversed was Collector Wall. so competent Congress which had held was not judicial salary tax of a officer of a state. *10 National Biscuit we said however, the Co. case, merit serious discussion.
that such criticisms did not party each Decree reversed and bill dismissed; bear its own costs. by Dissenting Opinion Mr. Musmanno: Justice Supreme Court of the United
Justice Clark dissenting from decision that Court, States, “Today’s by the observed: decision the law twists * Opinion goes Majority tail.” The in the at bar case by the law the tail and ties it into further; twists a knot. regarded
Prom time immemorial the has law been justice. Majority today as the handmaiden of commodity, makes it a an article of merchandise, something sold the over merchants—known counter lawyers. as
Using obviously manifestly an ordinance en- purpose raising money acted for the on what is so clearly designated City as “certain businesses,” Philadelphia, through its Revenue Commissioner and Inspections, the Commissioner of Licenses and at- tempts by threatening penalties, to license and, harass legal profession. And this instead Court, of thwart- ing unblushing places imprima- circumvention, tur on the bold maneuver. dissenting Opinion
This of mine is not intended apology legal profession. as a defense of or for the It champion certainly requires needs no the services apologist. of no If Government of Philadel- phia, powers, the exercise of its undoubted con- justified attorneys-at-law, categories, cludes that pay shall legally a certain tax on their incomes and * Newspaper Board, Pub. Assn. v. Labor 345 U. S. 113. un- will tax lawyer
says Philadelphia pay so, every obliga- he meets other honorable hesitantly, stall, him market through tion. But at to strike and the auctioneer’s block is counter grocer’s fair dealing the candor and keeping with agencies has expect legal lawyer right elected people. a municipal government duly *11 I am branch of legislative And satisfied License intended the Mercantile never government law- apply of December Tax Ordinance to reach yers. stretching legislation The of on a undoubtedly legal profession accomplished department city gov- windlass the executive ernment. ex City’s Opinion, affirming
The Majority of scope declares that department’s action, ecutive be legal encompasses profession the Ordinance including as “the carrying it defines business cause or within gain profit City or exercising voca trade, business, profession, Philadelphia any commercial or fi manufacturing, ... or of tion, .” But business. the word service or activity, nancial is not given natural, unhampered, here profession many other centrifugal expansion. It, together busi circle of compressed rigid within is activities, concept professional Obviously, therefore, ness. ac type professional intended activity here as, integral part of business, which forms tivity by auctioneers, conducted the business for instance, are referred loosely of whom all pharmacists, brokers, of the Ordinance The drafters “professionals.” as knew unquestionably that, 9, 1952, of December profession Dictionary it, defines Unabridged Webster’s me- commercial* occupation, purely “the is: if * throughout, Italics mine.
5'51 or to which one de- chanical, agricultural, like, votes which one to have calling professes oneself; either acquired by way some used special knowledge others of instructing, guiding serving advising them in some and the drafters also knew art”; business buying intends “mercantile transactions; industrial establishment selling; commercial or enterprise.”
The matter of the Ordinance of December subject business in mercantile clearly world. 9, 1952, The measure is entitled: “An to provide Ordinance revenue a mercantile tax by imposing license on per- sons in certain manu- engaging including businesses, facturing, professions, vocations, occupations, trades, commercial Philadelphia.” activities Section of the Ordinance a mercantile li- imposes cense "Section 3 exacts mercantile tax. fee; license piece touchstone of this entire is the legislation word mercantile. What the definition of mercantile? *12 Let us turn to the dictionaries. The new five volumed defines Dictionary Webster’s International (1954) or the mercantile: to or “Of, pertaining merchants, business of or befitting characteristic merchants; of, do or trade.” merchant; having engaged with, Dictionary Oxford (in world-renowned defines mercantile as: “Of or be- elephantine volumes) concerned to merchants or longing trade; of or merchandise; pertaining of trade exchange or commercial.” commerce; Diction-
Funk College & New Standard Wagnalls of merchants. “1. to or characteristic ary: Pertaining com- principles; 2. or on business acting Conducted mercial.” or pertaining “Of Dictionary:
New Century engaged commercial; commerce; merchants or trade or house); in trade or commerce a mercantile (as or to the polit. pertaining system.” of mercantile eeon., “Mercantile That Dictionary: Bouvier’s Law Law. defines and enforces rights, branch law which of mercantile trans- and liabilities out arising duties, Merchant Derived Law actions and relations.” usages of commercial body defined as “The general Blackstone matters to commerce. calls relative custom merchants.” Justice speaking through this Court, Linn, Century is defined as By “Mercantile follows:
said: or or Dictionary: pertaining merchants, Of to do with by traffic carried on merchants; having character- trade or commerce; commercial; trading; Dic- of merchants; istic the business Standard mer- or characteristic tionary: pertaining to, Of, and merchan- business of chants, buying selling com- business principles; conducted or on dise; acting mercial.” unanimity meaning this absolute
With does Majority today the word how mercantile, which defies interpretation dictionaries, justify which run memory archives court decisions this effect answers contrary? not to the The Court has been dictionary a new saying question by edited published City One compiled: Conceding City Philadelphia. Council under Chart- powers Council has considerable this con- Court has acknowledging er, vast that even it does not seem to me powers, stitutional con- of Council and Court can authority combined jurisdiction a lexicographical fer Council upon *13 it to alter The English language. authorize will right that has the says City even Majority I doubt dictionary.” statement, its own “create no can true, dictionary be assuming even make of a nor trans- any dictionary horse a can cow, form a into a lawyer manufacturer, butcher, grocer, or merchant. And it is not Council City evident ever intended such a startling metamorphosis.
Section Article III Pennsylvania Consti- tution declares that: except “No bill, general appro- priation shall be more than passed bills, containing one which shall subject, clearly expressed title.” en- obvious intention of this is to provision
able all citizens to be on kept legislation informed af- fecting particular and wel- activities, pursuits, fare. The maxim that everyone supposed to know the law is a statement of because it fantasy towering in- purports knows all say everyone law, all court cluding ordinances and statutes, decisions, the limitless expanse regulations of rules and promul- gated under such statutes and or- decisions, decrees, dinances. for- leaves of the trees of the Counting ests the North American continent be a would simple task comparison reading digesting what is contained in all the of all the multitud- pages inous books of the law. It because the founders of our Commonwealth were aware of the cel- vertiginous erity with which laws are enacted that they declared, through the organic law of the that each State, law, comes off the lines of the assembly legislative executive must carry a and a designation machine, name so that to be those affected will once thereby at be warned of its applicability to them. And it reason that the Constitution decreed that each law must but one carry and but one title. subject, the case Lancaster (No. Annexation Case 1), 374 Pa. we said: “In order to enable persons, corpo- businesses and rations, governmental sub- authorities, divisions affected by particular to be kept statute, *14 our expected them, informed on what is currently that statutes wisely provided constitutional fathers must mention shoemakers do with having to shoemakers . to know wanting in the . shoemakers Thus, title. . would trade, pass about laws new appertaining regu- in to port title referred over statute which lations.” 1952, of December of the Ordinance
The title lawyers. mention the suggestion does not remotest tax on imposes the ordinance say Nor does It certain says professions. certain businesses watching lawyer The including professions. businesses, think, never lawyers could for legislation applying nature, a particularly suspicious unless he were of the to include business was intended mercantile “busi- The words “mercantile” profession. law en- to those the severely profession nesses” limit word the of mercantile having aspect in a profession gaged activity. 212 Pa. Kebort, legislation Com. “An Act to provide
there entitled: involved was question of food . . against the adulteration “food” of the word meaning that case was whether em- include drink. If the logic ample enough been in the case at bar had Majority ployed by in the Kebort there question posed case, exercised be- had to be answered the affirmative would have embrace logically cause can more drink (especial- food mer- chocolate) than soup, bouillons, cocoa, ly milk, lawyers. But this Court business can include cantile food not include drink: “The first ques- did said us is that section can be sustained tion whether before requirement under constitutional drink, expressed act shall be subject clearly legislature to define the terms right title. The at- beyond question meaning so it uses mandatory upon taches is the construc- courts meaning given tion the statute. But where such subject describing to the words and is act, not that which to them in the common attaches under- standing, requires the constitution that the title shall *15 express special meaning such with at least sufficient put inquiry pro- clearness to readers on as to the full visions.” plainly
“As to drink, this act fails to re- meet this quirement. . . . food The words and drink in common usage understanding complementary and are and as- denoting prime sociate terms, the two necessities of they synonymous they, life, are so far from that import plain and fundamental as uni- distinction, language versal as and as old as the human race. No tongue primitive is so that it lacks different words to express indicate them and different words to the sen- hunger sations want as and thirst.” them, liquor appellants having “. . . No as the dealer, are, eye regulations a wakeful to the strict of his business suppose the other would statutes, he af- be indicating fected a new act with a title food as its only subject. suppose Nor is it reasonable to his representative legislature in the so intended. The act clearly is ap- unconstitutional far so as it assumes to ply to drink.”
It will be noted here that the Court said that where legislation give meaning intends to a word a other than that which attaches to it “in common un- derstanding,” express special the title shall “such meaning put with at least sufficient clearness to read- inquiry provisions.” ers on as to the full in the Thus, Ordinance at the word bar, profession in the title only accepted referring pro- could as to the legal specifically profession. if it fession said legal “it familiar Opinion says The Majority as ordinances, and of statutes canon of construction instru- other written of contracts, wills, indeed pro- sentence or every that presumably word, ments, ac- for some is intended purpose, therein vision state- effect.” given Accepting must be cordingly does do what Majority ment as legal tender, If in the title? every “mercantile” word the word purpose is) some course (as intended to serve mercantile in its inter- Majority ignore does the why the Ordinance? The Majority Opinion pretation the inten- plain, therefore, “It would seem says: notwith- impose tion of the ordinance was tax, as a ‘'mercantile designation license standing tax’, vocations as well occupations on professions, . . .” establishments mercantile Notwithstanding dangerously destructive word *16 Aet in an or Ordinance. I do not to use interpreting fount from this Court derives authority know what what say notwithstanding legisla- a power body has it means else. A said, tive really something in court decisions could notwithstandings few wreck criminal code. a whole civil Pennsylvania as indi- already Constitution, subject one can be in only states carried cated, title an The Philadelphia Act. Home Eule is even more re- April 17, 1951) Charter (approved in 2-201 that: strictive. It Section “. . . provides Every not . . . shall contain more than ordinance one subject shall be in clearly adequately expressed its it title.” what Adequately means, course, says. City not Council of that may change meaning word, if it desired do so. Adequacy particularly even a proclaiming non qua purpose sine a bill when the bill makes fundamental change the person- of a or substance ality given type legislation. His-
557 torically, always tax a tax on mercantile has been (Beaver goods, the sale of and merchandise. wares Cooperative County Appeal, Association’s 118 Pa. Su perior 305.) Harrisburg In Ct. & Com. v. L. P. Co., 284 Pa. “a 175, we defined a mercantile tax license as vending tax for merchandise.” This definition has definitely history Duquesne become in our decisions. Pittsburgh, Superior Club 170 Pa. Ct. Com 426; HcKinley-Gregg monwealth v. Automobile Co., Pa. 544.
Although history the stream of is an erratic one, may we far know that so the law is it concerned, Mississippi suddenly change like not, River, unsuspecting property course and inundate and civil rights previous warning without some or notification lawyers Philadelphia If affected owners. are by City to be classified ordinance as vendors of mer- the ordinance chandise, which makes them must so, clearly adequately. they advise them And cer- are tainly adequately they when notified are indiscrim- inately amorphous thrown into classification of businesses. City appellant its brief before this Court, the
emphasizes quoting the word business when the Ordi- quoting nance. Thus, from the Section Title, and Section it italicizes the word business wherever appears. But while it bears down hard on this word cautiously tiptoes by Ordinance, the word piece mercantile. But mercantile de resistance *17 legislation. ignore of this entire To mercantile in the forget Ordinance is to in the Dane Hamlet. enough subject
It not is to hint at the matter in piece legislation. whisper the title of a of A mere of intimation falls far short of the Constitutional and requirement clarity adequacy Charter of in the permit title. To the Ordinance of to December, 1952, 5'58 de- affirm which procedure is to lawyers to
apply openly of statutes open the American principle fies leg- the Council City It suggest arrived at. would much but meaning one stealth, saying thing, islated by the Fathers City ascribe to more it said. It would than is not war- lack of frankness which “cleverness” and legis- It the suggest the record. would ranted by but ambush. openly City legislated lature of the depart the executive of The rationalization the within to bring legal profession ment seeking ad the of of title the Ordinance, the compass is a profession, not mention the legal does mittedly ‘business’ is It in effect: “The word forced one. says, the to include profession; the is said business title; certainly Therefore, law is a profession. practise practi is a and all business, law practise This must obtain a mercantile license.” tioners lawof lead to one persuasively along is calculated argument before one can be made until, track reasoning our territory. forbidden In 1872 he led into aware, the title of which passed State Legislature Act, Passenger ad Railway lay the Union “to authorized Under railway.” tracks color this ditional proceeded to tracks railway company lay title, into which it had no this right territory go, “To lay additional transgression: Court halted from, railway is a different thing tracks on an existing not be itself into new railway extending territory used. The authorized difference purpose fore difference in so consequences so palpable, mind cannot hesitate a moment in the con grave, which authorizes the former language clusion mean the latter. cannot to sanction To confound only the door to open and to enable fraud, these two in the use steal away men, expert phrases, this it was a purpose rights people; *18 of this a reader Then, clearly, to amendment prevent. to the purpose led conclude title alone would be rail single-track was to enable supplement of the lay to merely as this way company, company was, line of railway. tracks its along down additional into new line not that of extension of language already.” to it but of that which had addition places, 81* Pa. Passenger Railway Company’s Union Appeal, 94. 91, in the case was involved principle
The same had do with 281 Pa. which to Moltrup, Guppy re- entitled “An Act Act the Uniform Sales holding the This goods.” Court, to sale lating not come the sale of stock did within corporate that “the numerous stock title of declared Act, capital selling brokers and others stock buying “to in ‘An would not find Commonwealth,” expect this to relating provision regu- Act the sale goods’, the sale such stock.” (capital) lating Union Passenger Ry. Co. Quoting case, this Court reaffirmed case Guppy supra, could be the short to proposition reply if the title enough it is City’s apparent position sufficiently Act or hints provoke Ordinance study the reader into a detailed legislation: to a un- in the title as “Confiding purpose applicable is led from an reader, to the he objectionable away body of the bill. such a case examination expressed not the title. Indeed, subject clearly It all. have color- expressed may is not at something at the this is it, merely hinting subject, able . can said to Nothing ambiguous . . expressing a decisive argument this is answer be clear, title sufficient An in- inquiry. lead into a dubious or uncertain is not thing quiry require- the constitutional Its purpose provision.] [of subject expressed.” be clearly xnent is that should *19 Chief of Court de Justice this Paxson “the clared that of the law one of profession * in the has caused highest and noblest world.” What first egregious confusion which for the time now, of history high transforms that courts, a noble into mercantile business? There is profession
not a
of the bar or
bench that
judge
member
a
has not heard from student days distinguished jurists,
celebrated statesmen and
authors declare
great
legal
should
enter into
that one
never
profession
to make
I
not
primarily
money.
(But
law
do
recall
hearing
say
ever
one
that was not the
primary
into
purpose
business.)
entering
lower
court properly interpreted
the Ordi-
.
phrase
nance when
said
“certain
. . pro-
in the
fessions”
Ordinance means those
of
aspects
pro-
that are mercantile in
fessional activity
nature, “and,
very
of that
support
sound observation,
called
forth
distinguished Opinion
a
written
present
Chief Justice
1935 when he was President
Judge
of
Pleas
Court
Common
in Philadelphia County,
his
receiving
decision
unanimous
affirmance of
this
(Biser’s
Court.
Pa.
Appeal, 317
In that case
190.)
who sold
pharmacist
bottled drugs which he had
compounded
himself
argued
Sales
Emergency
Act
upon
levied
“sales
tangible personal
did
apply
to his
property”
product because the
practise
pharmacy
a “profession” rather
than
a “business.” The President
Judge rejected this argu-
ment: “Those words are popular
rather
than ‘legal’
A
terms.
minister’s
a brief
sermon,
prepared by a physical
examination
lawyer,
of a patient by a
is not the
physician,
subject of a
but a
sale,
bottle of
*
Joseph
Splane,
Petition
P.
medicine is. well legislature why the is no reason fession/ compounded by not tax the sale of medicines should pharmacist, no distinction and the act makes products, excepts pharmaceutical them nor favor of ” ‘tangible property.’ general personal from the class of Judge (now Using of President the words Stern lawyer what it that a sells Chief Justice Stern), It him a mercantile business man? which makes it is not brief. admitted that his 3 of the which carries the head- Ordinance,
Section “Imposition ing Hate nine contains Tax,” Eight different classifications of tax. of these classi- employ language specifically applicable fications *20 vending selling the business of wholesale —either lawyer or retail. What does a sell—either wholesale “(e) ninth All or retail? The classification reads: engaged persons other in at the three business rate of (3) gross mills on each dollar of the annual volume of business transacted.” precedes paragraph
It this obvious what “e”) applies (e) (paragraph persons that it to those strictly selling businesses are not the whose of mer- yet indissolubly chandise but are so associated with selling they of business must be included in activity, give the ambit of mercantile as, an illus- auctioneering repre- the business of which tration, both sents vendor vendee. strictly aspect mercantile of the Ordinance, non-applicability lawyers,
and thus could not be apparent made more is in Section 2 specifies: Beginning year “Section 2. Licenses. in annually every person desiring thereafter, engage engage any in or continue to business shall, day January the first or before each license prior day year, any to the first of business in such year, procure a mercantile for each license license places Depart- City, his business in the from the Inspections ment of Licenses and which shall issue the upon payment (3) of a same fee of three dollars City.” place in the each of business many places lawyer How of business does a have? comparison lawyers (very few in number A few to the city practising) may have a office and an office practically suburban is so rare as to be town, lawyer city. in the non-existent for a to have two offices only applies City (And this Ordinance to the —one City.) any lawyer legislator, At no drafter rate, Philadelphia, ordinances for the would, accuracy language, degree concern for the lawyer’s place refer to a office as a mercantile of busi- ness! apparently part
In an determined search on lawyer Majority it is vends, to find what that a may regarded that his mercantile, so “business” Majority says lawyer “sells his services just for a financial as a business man consideration, attempted sells his merchandise.” substantiation of Majority makes reference statement apocryphal motto attributed to Abraham Lincoln that lawyer’s “A time is his stock trade.” questionable
It whether Lincoln ever made this *21 questioned but it cannot be that Lincoln of- remark,* * study writings produce A of Lincoln’s accredited fails this aphorism. many There are Lin- maxims and mottos attributed to spurious, hearsay coln which fall into classifications of and ob- quoted by Majority scure. one classified an axiom supposed to be Lincoln’s because sounds it like “diction.” Lincoln’s Its source not been has ascertained. The Lincoln National Life Foundation, origin sup- which an effort makes to trace the posed sayings, reports (reported Lincoln this one as read- ing: lawyer’s trade”) ap- “A and time advice are his in stock parently plaque produced by came to life in a the Allen Smith indigent gave gratuitously in clients ten his time injustice crying There out for redress. whom he saw lawyer reputable that has not is not at the bar days time at his and of his his career devoted hours appellate in cham- courts in trial courts and in books, bring pioning re- him no financial a cause which could richly compensate him turn but would which upheld highest having ideals of satisfaction upon way legal profession secu- in no based which are lar and materialistic returns. paid lawyers paid, must be and sometimes
That proper, very only natural services, well for money say they for their because receive but to comparing, like makes them merchants, services this chestnut “a horse of Abraham Lincoln, words with a chestnut horse.” say lawyers paid for their serv
To that because are they place mar scales in the those services on the ices place heading merchandise ket under the vendible only ideals of reflection is not an unwarranted happens That be bad law as well. Bar, grand man Justice Oliver law, Wendell good things about that: “One said Holmes** directly. pursue money that it When law is does your you you get goods price own sell you think in the affair. When are about interests what ways you you try to win a case think about your client.” interests why I am Another reason convinced lawyers in the Or- intended to include Council never deception. not advocate dinance is that Council would engaged Company Indianapolis, perhaps firm a mercantile lawyers’ producing (Bulletin, Lincoln these mottos offices. 11, 1949.) July National Life Foundation No. ** Legal Papers, Holmes; Harcourt, Howe, Brace & Collected P. 153.
564 sub-
Section that all indicated, provides persons 2, post to the mercantile tax must ject conspicuously such For a to lawyer display mercantile license. a the that falsely license would be to declare world he mercantile The fact activity. was a engaging report- that feature of the Ordinance has posting significance now been not alter the repealed does edly first reveals its inclusion because it place that time of the passage measure, at Council, market terms of thinking stores, warehouses, not offices. At the stalls, lawyer’s mills —and factories, City oral for the before this counsel argument Court, presented copy 35) an Ordinance photostatic (Bill De- which states that Section of the Ordinance of cember has been amended “removing for the of licenses.” But Section requirement posting 9 of the it still carries intact, Ordinance remains notice! how- penalty failing post Assuming, of the feature been ever, repeal posting has duly is still to ob- effectuated, taxpayer required tain the license and he must have it on hand dis- play every official and who demands city inspector if to examine it. It the long may run, inspection may runs find more riot, lawyer practical to have the license framed and con- conspicuously in his thus spicuously hung avoiding the neces- office, it from sity having to remove his files for examina- whimsy inspector tion each time the of an of- city ficial dictates of it. The inspection of the displaying smother may unjust suspicion license also serve to lawyer paid has mercantile.tax. mer- arguing obtaining City, matter of merely cantile license states registration, in its brief: “This is a mere charge, however, regis- $3 tration to inform the designed identity fee, of those liable for the the tax.” payment *23 argument very convincing This to me. The identity lawyers Philadelphia of the can be ascer- simple glance tained with the maximum of ease Lawyer’s Directory. only at If identification is why necessary sought, is it collect from each $8 lawyer? City, my judgment,
Nor does advance the logic argument says registra- of its when lawyers compared, tion of under the Ordinance can be legal point registration gam- from a to the view, upheld Kahriger, blers in United States v. 345 U. S. Supreme language 22. The uses the of the Court registra- by italicizing in that case “The sentence: provision simpler tion makes the tax to collect.” But lawyers the matter of collection from cannot be made any simpler already duly they than it is are since telephone tabulated, addresses and numbers, telephone legal directory. book and study A of the relevant a re-evaluation decisions, history portraying ever-increasing encroach- bureaucracy rights ment of on the freedoms creeping a sense of diminu- individual, distress over a respect great professions tion in for the which have pinnacle taken civilization to the of intellectual and cultural a realization that the Ordinance achievements, glorious of December is another blow at the 9, 1952, independence which once characterized the Bar of this great city, all lead me to conclusion the inevitable Majority upheld by that the Ordinance as of this accomplish possi- will far harm than the Court more ble benefits it will collect from license fees. Majority paradox.
The decision of the is a It can- gainsaid primary objective not be that the busi- gain. By making legal ness concern is financial profession objective primary must al- “business,” presumed history legal be to be financial. The so every profession contrary. quite law- to the fact, yer judge preceptor student to a law becomes who applying required an- to take bar examinations practising following questions: do “In law, swer the you (the preceptee’s) conduct would believe his right regulated to be he believes a desire to do what Notably, gain? primarily, for financial rather than, give or does he disinterestedness he evidence of does money?” to be fond of seem lawyers practising preceptors If the all now questions Philadelphia had these at the answered Bar, *24 Majority’s making conformity decision profession legal cloud a of doubt would “business”, every lawyer’s oc- office as to whether the settle over justice champion cupant man or a business oppressive money.” Against such “fond of . objec- melancholy vigorous I must situation declare accordingly I tion and
Dissent.
Baldridge Appellant. v. Matthews,