49 Ga. App. 826 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1934
Headnotes 1, 3, and 4 do not require elaboration.
A lease of premises for a year, commencing October 15, 1929, and ending October 15, 1930, at a monthly rental of $150 per month, in which “the lessor gives to the lessee an option as follows: that within six months from date, they will renew this
In Walker v. Wadley, 124 Ga. 275 (52 S. E. 904), a contract of rental of a farm specified the term to be for one year, and further provided that the tenant “shall have the option of renting the said plantation fox the further term of four years after the completion of the first term,” at a specified yearly rental. It was held in that case that “The extended term of four years was not a new demise, but only an extension of the term of lease from one to five years according to its express provisions.” In Hamby v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 127 Ga. 792 (56 S. E. 1033), the court, construing a similar provision in a lease contract which had the words “extend” and “renew” therein, said: “While the words renew and extend do not always mean the same thing, still, in interpreting a stipulation of the character above referred to, the context must be considered, and the intent of the parties must be arrived at, and this may, under certain circumstances, require that these words shall be given a similar meaning.” The lease contract in that case provided that “The term of this lease is two years from and including April 1, 1904, and the privilege is hereby granted by the parties of the first part and expressly reserved unto the parties of the second part of renewing and extending this contract for a period of three years, from, after and including the 1st day of April, 1906.” In Parker v. Gortatowsky, 127 Ga. 560 (56 S. E. 846), “Where an owner of an opera-house rented it to certain lessees for a term of one year, with a provision in the lease that at the termination of the year they should have the option of leasing it for a term of two years at a named price; and where, at the close of the year, they wrote to the owner, 'We will continue the theater;’ to which he replied acknowledging receipt of this letter and stating, 'I understand this to mean that you will continue the rent of opera-house as per terms of contract;’ and thereafter the lessees continued in possession and use of the opera-house, without objection or further
In Candler v. Smyth, 168 Ga. 276 (147 S. E. 552), wherein the contract provided that “This contract . . shall continue in effect for a terra of two years from the date hereof. Sixty days before the expiration of this contract” the second'parties “shall be given the refusal of the privilege of operating for an additional five-year period. Such additional extension of time shall be upon such terms and conditions as may be deemed justified by the showing of operations during the period of this agreement,” the Supreme Court, in holding that the stipulation contemplated a new contract at the expiration of the two years and was a renewal, and that the execution of a new lease was indispensable, said that the words in the stipulation, that “Such additional extension of time shall be upon such terms and conditions as may be deemed justified by the showing of operations during the period of this agreement,” were not a statement of the price, terms, or conditions of the contract of extension, and that it would remain for the parties to agree upon the terms and conditions of the contract for the additional five-year period, and that therefore it was “clear that a new agreement was contemplated.” In the case at bar the option agreement contained in the lease specifically provided that the lessee had the option, within a designated time, to renew the lease for an additional period of years at a stated higher rental. It did not remain for the parties to agree upon any terms or conditions of the contract for the additional four years, these being plainly stated in the option agreement.
The present case is distinguishable from Walker v. Brooks-Simmons Co., 44 Ga. App. 470 (161 S. E. 659). In the evidence in that case there was nothing going to show that the parties to the original agreement treated it as a lease for ten years, or that the plaintiff in that case so treated it after acquiring title to the property, other than that the lessor was to receive the rent for a short period after the original term expired, and there was nothing in the evidence to indicate any express agreement between the parties, in parol or otherwise, for the renewal of the lease. See Candler v. Smyth, supra. In the instant case the lessee prepared the contract, and, before the expiration of the designated time in the option agreement, the plaintiff went to the store of the defendant and was in
Judgment affirmed.