Pursuant to powers contained in security deeds, Home & Farm Life Insurance Company (“applicant”), as successor in interest to Appalachian Heritage Communities, Inc., foreclosed on four separate lots securing resрondent Jeanette Stepp’s debt to Appalachian Heritage Communities. After publication of notice, the four lots were sold on the courthouse steps, with applicant being the sole bidder in each case. Thereafter, applicant sought confirmation in the Superior Court of Gordon County. Respondent opposed confirmation, and the issue of true market value was tried to the superior court. After a hearing, the superior court determined that notice was proper; that the sales were conducted under power of sale; that the true market value of each lot was $6,800; and that this true market value was less than the amount of the indebtedness secured by each lot. The debt rangеd from $24,912.80 to $26,978.20. Respondent appeals from the *258 final orders confirming applicant’s foreclosure on her four lots. The four separate appeals are hereby сonsolidated for appellate disposition in this single opinion. Held:
1. Respondent first contends the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the confirmation proceedings under OCGA § 44-14-161 (a) becаuse no report of the non-judicial sales was tendered into evidence.
OCGA § 44-14-161 (a) provides: “When any real estate is sold on foreclosure, . . . under powers contained in seсurity deeds, . . . and at the sale the real estate does not bring the amount of the debt secured by the deed, ... no action may be taken to obtain a deficiency judgment unless the pеrson instituting the foreclosure proceedings
shall,
within 30 days after the sale,
report the sale to the judge of the superior court
of the county in which the land is located for confirmation and approval. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Nothing in this language imposes an evidentiary or procedural requirement that any such report to the superior court be formally tendered into evidence as an exhibit. In each of the cases sub judice, the initiаl pleadings were captioned “APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF FORECLOSURE SALE UNDER POWER,” and each recites: “This Application is a report of a sale under power of real property located in Gordon County, Georgia, which sale was made pursuant to that certain Deed to Secure Debt With Power of Sale (the ‘Security Deed’) dated September 28, 1990, recorded at Deed Book 337, Foliо 352, Gordon County, Georgia Records. This Application is also a petition for an order of confirmation and approval of said sale.” The applications further recite the date of non-judicial sale and the amounts received. “Clearly, when the application for confirmation was presented to the judge of the superior court to obtain a rule nisi, reciting the fact of the sale, the price obtained, and all pertinent factors concerning the sale, this was a
report of the sale to the judge of the superior court,
and the terms of the statute were fully comрlied with.” (Emphasis in original.)
Dukes v. Ralston Purina Co.,
2. Over,respondent’s objections as to authentication and hearsay, the superior court admitted into evidence plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, the affidavit of the publisher of the Calhoun Times, indicating that the notice of applicant’s impending sale under power was published on August 11, 18, 25, and September 1, 1993. This evidentiary ruling is enumerated as error.
John S. Hetzel, one of the attorneys for applicant, testified that he conducted the foreclosures and affirmed that in preparation, he “cause[d] those foreclosures to be advеrtised during the month preceding the foreclosure,” in the legal organ of Gordon County. Mr. Het
*259
zel identified the publisher’s affidavits of publication and affirmed that the “ads [ran] four times during the month preceding foreclosure.” Consequently, respondent’s contention that the publisher’s affidavits were erroneously admitted without a proper foundation is without merit. As to respondent’s additional contention that the publisher’s affidavit is inadmissible hearsay, it is our view that the affidavits are competent proof of the facts recited therein, namely the contents of the advertisement and the dates of publication. The publisher’s sworn statement is aided by the presumption of regularity. “ ‘The law presumes that every [citizen], in [both] private and official character, does [one’s] duty until the contrary is shown.’
Nicholson v. Spencer,
3. With respect to Case Nоs. A96A1410 and A96A1412, respondent contends the superior court erred in failing to dismiss the confirmation proceeding, arguing there was no evidence of the foreclosure notice “mandated by OCGA § 44-14-162.2.”
“Code Ann. § 67-1503 [now OCGA § 44-14-161] is a debtor’s relief Act to subject a land foreclosure sale under a power to the scrutiny of the court. Its purpose is to pass upon the notice, advertisement and regularity of the sale and to re-insure that the property was sold for a fair value.”
Wall v. Fed. Land Bank &c.,
4. In her fourth enumeration, respondent enumerates the general grounds, contending the superior court erred in failing to dismiss the confirmation proceedings because the foreclosure sale was not conducted in good faith.
The law imposes upon the holder of a mortgage or security deed with power of sale the duty “‘“to advertise and sell the property according to the terms of the instrument, and [to ensure] that the sale be conducted in good faith.” ’
Scott v. Paisley,
In support of her contention that foreclosure in the four cases sub judice was conducted in bad faith, respondent points to the circumstance that thе developer (applicant’s predecessor in interest), Appalachian Heritage Communities, was in bankruptcy when the commercial real estate apprаiser, Henry J. Wise, was first retained to appraise respondent’s lots. Henry J. Wise affirmed that “once the developer goes into bankruptcy, there is a chilling effect on the valuеs of [the] lots.” But Henry J. Wise did not attribute any chilling effect on the value of the lots to collusion, fraud, or conspiracy. Rather, in his opinion, lots in respondent’s particular subdivision declined in value after the developer’s bankruptcy because “there were many fewer transactions. There was no longer an organized sales force, an organized markеting process, and the transactions were what [Henry J. Wise] call[ed] the normal or natural rate of transaction that is through the secondary brokerage community.”
“Inadequacy оf price paid upon the sale of property under power will not of itself and standing alone be sufficient reason for setting aside the sale. It is only when the price realized is grossly inadequate and the sale is accompanied by either fraud, mistake, misapprehension, surprise or other circumstances which might authorize a finding that such circumstances contributed to bringing about the inadequacy of price that such a sale may be set aside by a court of equity. [Cits.]”
Giordano v. Stubbs,
Judgments affirmed.