Statement of the Case
[1] Gerald W. Stephenson appeals his conviction for battery, as a Class B misdemeanor, following a bench trial. Stephenson raises three issues on appeal, namely:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.
2. Whether the' trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
3. Whether his 180-day sentence for Class B misdemeanor battery is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Jessica Jordan and Stephenson were married for three years before divorcing, but they subsequently maintained a relationship. Jordan lived in Greenwood, Indiana and Stephenson lived in Canton, Ohio. Sometime in mid-October 2014, Jordan and Stephenson agreed that Stephenson and his two dogs could stay at Jordan’s residence in Greenwood because Stephenson had a job interview that required him to fly out of the Indianapolis airport, and Jordan would be watching his dogs while he was gone.
[4] On October 18, Jordan and Stephenson went to the Taxman Bar and Restaurant in Bargersville to have a few beers and watch a football game. At around half-time, they left the Taxman and returned to Jordan’s home. Once back at Jordan’s home, Jordan began to prepare dinner while Stephenson watched the football game in the living room. At some point while cooking dinner, Jordan told Stephenson she suspected that he had taken some horse-riding spurs from her closet and given them to an eighteen-yеar-old girl who Jordan knew from Facebook and who, she believed, “had a thing for [Stephenson].” Tr. at 4, 7,-9. Stephenson and Jordan began to argue, and Stephenson then grabbed- Jordan. Jordan attempted to push on Stephenson’s face tо get him out of her way, and this caused abrasions to Stephenson’s face. Stephenson then pushed Jordan and, as she fell, she hit a coffee table. As Jordan attempted to get away from Stephenson, he.grabbed at her and scratched her face. Jordan then-went to the door of her apartment, opened it, and yelled out into the hallway.
[5] While Stephenson and Jordan had been arguing, Jasmine Forrester, Jordan’s next door neighbor, heard a loud female voicе from inside Jordan’s apartment and in the hallway saying, “I can’t breathe,” “I’m going to call my dad,” and “Stop it[,] you’re hurting me.” Id. at 17-19. Forres-ter called the police. Approximately five minutes later, Greenwood Police Officer Michele Richardsоn' arrived at Jordan’s apartment. Before knocking on Jordan’s apartment door, Officer Richardson heard a female screaming from inside Jordan’s apartment. When the officer knocked on the door, the screaming stopped. Two to three minutes later, Stephenson opened the apartment door. Officer Richardson observed some abrasions on Stephenson’s face. After obtaining Stephenson’s permission to enter the apartment, Officer Richardson found Jordan in the bedroom, crying, upset, and having difficulty breathing. The officer observed red marks on the right side of Jordan’s face. Aftejr speaking with Forrester, Jordan, and Stephenson, Officer Richardson arrested Stephenson for domestic bаttery.
[6] The State charged Stephenson with domestic battery, as a .Class A misdemean- or. After, a bench trial, the trial court found Stephenson guilty of the lesser included offense of battery,-as .a Class B misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the triаl court noted that Stephenson had served little or no jail time for his past two domestic violence-related convictions and that Stephenson exhibited no remorse. The trial court found no factors in mitigation. The court sentencеd Stephenson to the maximum sentence of 180 days to be served in the Johnson County Jail. This appeal ensued.
Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence
[7] Stephenson asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. In reviewing a sufficienсy of the evidence claim, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. See, e.g., Jackson v. State,
[8] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35 — 42—2—1(b), to prove that Stephenson committed battery, as a Class B misdemeanor, the State was required to show that he knowingly or intentionally touched Jordan “in а rude, insolent, or angry manner.” The evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling showed that, while arguing with Jordan, Stephenson grabbed and scratched Jordan and pushed her, causing her to fall onto a coffee table. The testimony of Jоrdan, Officer Richardson, and Jordan’s neighbor, Forrester, provided sufficient evidence of those actions, and those actions constitute battery under the statute.
[9] However, Stephenson insists that the evidence is insufficient because he рrovided testimony that it was Jordan who had instigated the violence and battered him. He points to photographs taken of his face after the incident, showing horizontal scratch marks. He contends that the fact that the scratches are horizontal proves that Jordan scratched him while he was laying down on the sofa watching football, not while he was attacking her. However, Stephenson is simply asking this court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The trial court clearly did not find Stephenson’s version of events credible, and we will not second-guess the court’s credibility assessment. Jackson,
[10] Stephenson also maintains that Jordan’s testimony that she scratched Stephenson’s face as she was trying to push him away from her was incredibly dubious because the scratch marks were horizontal, not vertical. Under the incredible dubiosity rule, a court will impinge upon the factfinder’s responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses only when confronted with inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible du-biosity. Whatley v. State,
[11] Stephenson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by-sentencing him to the maximum sentence for battery, as a Class B misdemeanor, namely, 180 days fully executed. Ind.Code § 35-50-3-3. Specifically, he asserts that-the trial court erred by failing to find that mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. However, the sentencing statute for Class B misdemeanors dоes not provide a presumptive or advisory sentence, but rather a maximum allowable sentence. Id.; Creekmore v. State,
it is clear that abuse of discretion review of a sentence, which conсerns a .trial court’s duty to issue a sentencing statement along with its findings of aggrava-tors and mitigators, has no place in reviewing a misdemeanor • sentence. See Cuyler v. State,798 N.E.2d 243 , 246 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. deniedsee also Anglemyer v. State,868 N.E.2d 482 , 490 (Ind.2007) (stating that post: Blakely revisions to sentencing statutes included sentencing statement requirement “whenever imposing sentence for a felony offense”).
Morris v. State,
Issue Three: Appropriateness of Sentence
[12] Stephenson also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution “authorize[ ] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State,
[13] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State,
[15] Stephеnson also maintains that the sentence is inappropriate in light of his character. He points to evidence that he is a fifty-two-year-old, well-educated professional. He also points to his Mend Dunbar’s testimony that Stephenson is a good person who has helped him when Dunbar was prevented from doing activities due to his physical disability and that Stephenson “has treated Dunbar’s son well and has been a good influence for him.”
Conclusion
[16] The State has provided sufficient evidence to support Stephenson’s conviction; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him to the maximum sentence; and Steрhenson has failed to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his crime and his character.
[17] Affirmed.
Notes
. Stephenson also points to other evidence that relates not to his good character, but to Jordan’s alleged bad character, such as her past criminal history. This other evidence is not relevant to our analysis of Stephenson’s character under Rule 7(B), .