170 So. 767 | Ala. | 1936
This suit was for a divorce, alimony pendente lite, permanent alimony, and attorneys' fees, which were allowed by the court pursuant to the report of the register.
The trial was on the evidence taken ore tenus before the judge rendering the decree, and the usual presumption obtains. Hodge et al. v. Joy et al.,
The averments that respondent committed acts of violence on appellee's person, attended with danger to her life or health, or from his conduct there was reasonable apprehension of such violence, state a cause of action within the statutes. General Acts 1933, Ex.Sess. p. 142; Code, § 7409; Harris v. Harris,
The defenses were that respondent used no unusual or unnecessary force, and the alleged adultery of the wife, from which conduct he was returning her to his home. Code, § 7413. The rule that has long prevailed in this jurisdiction as to the proof of adultery was aptly stated by Judge Stone in Mosser v. Mosser,
"A respectable author, Shelford on Marriage and Divorce, p. 405, has well said, 'Adultery, being an act of darkness and of great secrecy, can hardly be proved by any direct means;' and 'that presumptive evidence alone is sufficient proof.' The same author says, quoting from Lord Stowell, 'It is a fundamental rule of evidence upon this subject, that it is not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery.' — Ib. 'The only general rule that can be laid down on the subject is, that the circumstances must be such as would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion.' — Shelf. on Marriage and Divorce, p. 406. In one case, it was held, that 'adultery may be inferred from the general co-habitation of the parties, without proof of particular facts, although the parties have separate beds.' — Loveden v. Loveden, 2 Hagg.Cons.R. 4. The court, says Lord Stowell, 'will judge of facts as other men of discernment, exercising a sound and sober judgment on circumstances that are duly proved before them.' — See, also, Poynter on Marriage and Divorce, 188-9. In our own court, the subject has been under discussion. In Richardson v. Richardson, 4 Port. 467, 30 Am.Dec. 538, Justice Henry Goldthwaite announced the rule that 'the fact is inferred from circumstances, that lead to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion.' The question came again before the court in Collins v. State,
This rule was approved and followed in Jeter v. Jeter,
It was declared in Stabile v. Stabile,
However this may be, the trial court has determined the issues of fact in favor of the appellee, after seeing and hearing the witnesses — the evidence being given ore tenus.
The testimony has been carefully examined, and, within the rules that obtain, held sufficient to sustain the decree of divorce, alimony, and allowances to the wife for her attorneys. Harris v. Harris; Sharp v. Sharp, supra; Ortman v. Ortman,
The decree of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
ANDERSON, C. J., and BROWN and KNIGHT, JJ., concur.