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Stephens v. State
28 S.W.3d 260
Ark.
2000
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*1 cautiously when whether to deciding recognize This Court treads meet new the law adjust society’s changing a tort. While must needs, balance that boundless claims adjustment against we must are averse to crowded We judicial system. especially already tort that would lead to creating duplicative litigation, better relitigation inefficient of issues handled within encouraging core We cause of action. thus decline context tort. . . evidence as an . recognize spoliation independent [The] to the of evidence properly problem spoliation traditional response as an not cause wrong evidentiary the alleged concept, separate frames action. added). 951-52 (emphasis Trevino Ortega, unwise to first- Because we find unnecessary recognize Arkansas, as an tort in we of evidence spoliation independent party affirm decision of court. E. STEPHENS v. STATE of Arkansas

Mack CR S.W.3d 260 98-1073 Court of Arkansas delivered September Opinion *3 Bowden, Firm, for BowdenLaw David O. by: appellant. Gen., Gen., Newman, for Brad Ass’tAtt’y Mark Att’y by: Pryor, appellee. Mack was convicted of Justice. Tom Glaze, a controlled substance (methamphetamine)

possession he intent deliver and was possession drug paraphernalia; $10,000. and fined On sentenced twenty-three years prison denied his motion he court argues improperly appeal, evidence from his and car after his arrest. seized person Lance the Van Burén On Freeman of July Deputy was with the owners of the Sheriff’s County visiting Department store, he he Foothills in Airead. As was inside saw a Grocery lot, tan to enter the but the car then Oldsmobile parking begin for a second and sped away. recognized paused knew Rudder to be (whom passenger, Terry policeman he did A minute involved but not know the driver. or so drugs), later, store, the car returned to the and the driver was alone. Because this struck Freeman as he asked the suspicious, was; store owner if he knew who the driver the owner responded that it Mack Stephens.' *4 Freeman then called the Sheriff’s and asked the Office

Deputy name file) name Mack in QNF dispatcher (query Stephens the Arkansas Crime Information The (ACIC). search Computer came back that there was a warrant out for a Mack showing out of Faulkner on a hot check County Stephens charge. license, went outside and asked for his driver’s deputy Stephens which showed the name Mack Freeman told Stephens. Stephens him, that there was a warrant out for and he under placed Stephens arrest.

Freeman then turn had out his as of a Stephens pockets, part search incident arrest. set out a red Stephens zipper pouch that contained a number of small of white a vial baggies powder, with white a vial and device with white powder, glass measuring blades, straws, two two a a small razor three powder, pipe, spoon, screens, $2,229.35 and Crown in filtering Royal bag containing cash. A the car turned search of also a list up Dial-a-Page beeper, names, and a list of numbers. telephone

After with with intent to deliver being charged possession and possession methamphetamine drug paraphernalia, Stephens moved to the evidence found this search. He during contended that his arrest was but trial dis- “pretextual,” judge and ruled that Freeman had reason believe Mack agreed Stephens had a warrant out for his arrest it was later learned that (although son, the warrant was for whose name was also Mack Stephens’s motive, and that there was no evidence of Stephens), any improper faith, bad or on the officer’s in pretext part approaching asking for identification or in under arrest based on the placing Stephens warrant.

A found and he now jury Stephens guilty drug charges, two appeals, 1) his arrest was not based raising following points: cause, reasonable or but was instead upon suspicion probable pre- Rudder, mised on the fact that he had been seen with a person known to have a of involvement with history 2) drugs; court erred in the list of names and numbers allowing telephone seized from his car to be entered into evidence. findWe no merit to either of these contentions and affirm. first asserts that could not Freeman artic

ulate a reasonable or cause to him to suspicion probable permit files, such, access the ACIC and as the information from the ACIC search should have been deemed obtained and therefore illegally However, this was not his below. suppressed. to the trial court that the evidence argued should have been sup There, because the arrest was he contended that pressed pretextual. the QNF because of a only requested suspicion However, based on association Rudder. he never or below the officer acted suggested argued improperly about and on the arrest warrant.1 learning We acting long held that issues must be trial court order to presented 1 In his first makes mention that the was stale warrant or reply, Stephens perhaps *5 convincing argument outside the statute of limitation. still no However, offers concerning or citation of the warrant’s and we have said on numerous authority invalidity, arguments convincing occasions that we not do consider unless by authority, unsupported is further v. State, without research that are well taken. See McGhee 334 Ark. apparent they 543, 975 S.W.2d 834 156 State, 283, them for v. Ark. 66 989 S.W.2d

preserve appeal. Rogers State, 402, Stricklandv. (1999) 331 Ark. (citing S.W.2d 769 will (1998)). We not address an that was not made to the State, trial court as a motion Rhoadesv. part suppress. Ark. 45, 49-50, 888 S.W.2d 654 (1994). addition, that the fruits of the Stephens argues search were

inadmissible because Freeman had no information except Stephens’s association with Rudder as a basis for the arrest. He relies on State, 138, Stewartv. 964 S.W.2d 793 v. (1998), State McFadden, 16, for the (1997), proposition that an officer must have more than a bare something suspicion criminal before However, activity an individual. approaching both Stewart and McFaddeninvolved warrantlessstops. Stephens’s argu ment the fact ignores that Freeman did not him approach until after Freeman learned of the arrest warrant. This case is controlled our essentially rules of criminal by — procedure Ark. specifically, R. Crim. P. 4.2 4.3. Under 4.2, Ark. R. Crim. P. law any enforcement officer arrest a may to a person pursuant warrant in in the state. Rule county 4.3 that the officer provides need not have the warrant in his possession arrest, at the time of the but if the it, officer does not have officer must inform the accused of the fact that the warrant has been issued. with both of complied these rules. Again, the fact that emphasizes Freeman’s were suspicions based association”; however, “guilt by even if Deputy Freeman suspected involvement when he drugs called in the QNF, “otherwise valid does not become stop unreasonable because the merely officer has intuitive suspicions of the car are occupants in some sort of engaged criminal State, 201, 210, activity.” Mings 884 S.W.2d 596 (1994) Cummins, Untied States v. (citing 920 F.2d 498 Cir. (8th 1990)). We have held that is a matter of the pretext arresting intent, officer’s which must be determined the circumstances of by the arrest. 210, 318 Ark. at Mings, 884 S.W.2d at 602 (citing Ray 894, Ark. 897, denied, 803 S.W.2d cert. 501 U.S. An (1991)). ulterior motive does not in itself render an arrest pretextual when there is a valid overt reason to make the arrest. Id. Hines v. (citing 68 (1986)). is that the arrest for the reasoning overt violation would have

157 event; taken is no thus there reason to the any Fourth place bring Here, and the doctrine Amendment into Id. exclusionary play. had an arrest warrant “Mack naming and because he had under R. Ark. Crim. P. Stephens,” authority 2.2.2 to and arrest said cannot be that the approach Stephens,3 arrest was pretextual.

For second on that his the list point of appeal, Stephens argues names and numbers seized to his arrest were not telephone pursuant him in He to contends that this his provided discovery. prejudiced on his defense was that he the ability (which put possessed large amount of for and not personal with methamphetamine possession the intent to distribute the it) because names on the list were “not enforcement,” unknown to law and the was that the list implication was a “customer list.” that court should urges Stephens his sustained or his mistrial motion for when objection granted the State introduced these lists.

The list was removed from question Stephens’s possession and introduced without at the on the motion objection hearing trial, which held five months before the trial. At suppress, admitted, seized, list was the other with items again along without did not objection. Stephens’s to the introduction of attorney object the list in until the any way to ask Free- began prosecutor man if he knew on the names fist. any Although Stephens states in brief his that he made a motion for mistrial “for instruction,” neither the nor the that abstract reflects such transcript a motion was made. law

The is clear that either objections introduc any tion of evidence or to must be made discovery violations purported at the first Hinkston opportunity.

S.W.3d first in this case was at the opportunity another at arose trial when the suppression hearing; opportunity introduced the fist the other items seized. prosecution along 2 This rule law enforcement officer provides “[a] may any person request investigation furnish or otherwise information in the ... of crime.” cooperate did of challenged not attack the even if he had warrant, but validity “executing it, the United Court has indicated that a law officer States enforcement an arrest is investigate warrant the Constitution to [not] required by independently every innocence, claim whether the claim such is based mistaken or a defense as lack identity (1979) intent.” Baker v. U.S. McCollan, 145-56 requisite however, did not to the evidence until Deputy Stephens, object Freeman’s on redirect examination. testimony event, had list at known of the least for months He least five had hearing. following suppression *7 motion, a asked for evidence in he does documentary discovery not claim he was denied to the list. The cannot that access State be evidence, held the for failure to responsible investigate nor was entitled on as a to alone substitute rely discovery State, for v. See 334 Ark. thorough investigation. Rychtarik addition, 976 S.W.2d 374 the State not (1998). was to obligated tell what was planning having Deputy State, to with to the names on the list. Munson v. testify respect See 51, 41, State, 331 Ark. (1998); 391 Sanders v. 328, 878 S.W.2d 391 State has no (1994) (“the dis obligation cover to defense counsel the of the substance anticipated testimony State’s We therefore conclude by witnesses”). that Stephens’s argu ment on this is meridéss. point brief, raises a novel in his

Finally, Stephens reply argument that this court has standard review in urging applied improper cases motions to For he involving this cites suppress.4 proposition, States, Ornelas v. United 517 690 held that U.S. which “as a (1996), matter determinations of reasonable general probable suspicion Ornelas, cause be reviewed should de novo on 517 U.S. at appeal.” 699. The Court further stated “a court should take reviewing care both to review of historical fact for clear error findings and to due to inferences give weight drawn from those facts by resident and local law enforcement officers.” Id. judges

Our court has reviewed trial denials of historically courts’ motions to erroneous” standard. Our most suppress using “clearly recent of this standard came pronouncement down this June, past Gilbert v. where we (2000), standard the as expressed follows:

When this court a trial on a reviews court’s motion to ruling we review the evidence in the the suppress, most favorableto light State and make an determination upon based independent of the totality circumstances. Bangs the basis of this This appeal perceived was conflict between originally filed in the Ornelas Court of and our Appeals, standard of review. but was certified to us on Further,

S.W.2d 738 this court will only reverse trial court’s on a motion if the ruling ruling clearly erroneous. Id.

Gilbert, 341 Ark. at 605.

However, while an inter Stephens’s argument brings up we decline to legal address it this time for a esting question, First, number reasons. is not raised. Ste timely brief; result, did not broach until his as a phens subject reply State was no this given opportunity respond argument. we are not convinced that entirely our standard

Secondly, of review is at with the odds one enunciated by Court. This court first formulated its standard of review in search-and- Osborn, seizure cases in State S.W.2d (1978):

We never stated our standard for appellate review *8 trial court action or to granting denying motions evidence suppress obtained means of a warrantless by search. the substan Although tial evidence rule has been followed this court in by nearly every instance of review of fact finding circuit by judge, even evidence, questions to of there pertaining admissibility has been at State, least one since our in outstanding exception decision Harris v. 314, 293, 941, 244 Ark. 425 S.W.2d cert. den. 393 U.S. S.Ct. 308, 21 L.Ed.2d 278. We then decided that we would make determination the independent of voluntariness of as a confession evidence, basis for its admission into respectful considera giving tion to the of the findings judge trial on the critical issue. This State, review was standard crystalized into a articulated Degler 388, See, 517 S.W.2d followed thereafter. e.g., State, 849, Smith v. 537 S.W.2d 158. We also extended at it to least one other situation to admissibil pertaining State, ity evidence. See Hammers 432. to Pursuant we make an Degler, determination independent circumstances,

based totality the will upon but not set aside trial judge’s finding voluntariness unless it is the clearly against of the evidence. In this preponderance we have approach, given weight considerable the of the trial in the resolu- findings judge tion of conflicts. Harris v. evidentiary We must defer to supra. of the trial superior judge position pass upon credibility of witnesses. Whitmore v.

Osborn, Ark. 566 S.W.2d at 140.

Without additional and citation of authority, we are unable to our standard inis conflict with that set say out in Ornelas. The Court directed courts to examine reviewing the factual of trial courts for clear error” and findings “only give “due to inferences drawn from weight those facts resident by standard, Osborn, our set as forth judges”; us to do the requires same. we us, note that in

Finally, the record before reviewing the outcome would be the same under the Ornelas standard or the short, one our court has who heard adopted. judge motion to made an Stephens’s factual appropriate finding that there was no involved in arrest. pretext Based on Stephens’s reached the finding, correct conclusion judge legal deny words, motion to In other Stephens’s whether we suppress. applied our based “independent determination on the of the cir totality cumstances” and erroneous” standard “clearly of review or novo, examined the record de a clear error review of historical giving Ornelas, facts as described in we conclude that the trial court made ' decision. right Freeman arrested Simply put, Deputy warrant, based on an arrest and he then conducted a lawful search incident to arrest. We hold the trial court’s ruling allow evidence from the search of gained and his car was correct. reasons,

For the we affirm foregoing convictions. *9 Smith, Brown and concur. JJ., Brown,

Robert L. I Justice, with the concurring. agree but write majority opinion on one expand The point. majority cites opinion correctly Mings 201, 884 S.W.2d 596 (1994), for the following proposition:

An ulterior motive does not in itself render an arrest pretextual when there is a valid overt reason to make the arrest. Id. (citing Hines v. 68 (1986)). The is that the arrest for reasoning the overt violation would have taken event; thus there is reason to no Fourth place bring and the Amendment doctrine-into Id. exclusionary play. however, and forward that an opinion, goes Mings emphasizes reasonable-officer standard is objective, applied determining whether the arrest is valid relies on R. LaFave’s distin Wayne LaFave, treatise as See 1 R. Search guished authority. Wayne 1.4, Thus, Seizure failure meet (Supp. 1994). § and reasonableness standard set out in objective can under Mings mine an arrest. We validity recently upheld reasonableness Sullivan, standard for arrests in State v. pretextual 318-A, S.W.3d denied (2000), 16 S.W.3d 551 reh’g Smith, J., joins.

David Carroll GOODWIN STATE of Arkansas CR 99-11 Court of Arkansas delivered

Opinion September

Case Details

Case Name: Stephens v. State
Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date Published: Sep 28, 2000
Citation: 28 S.W.3d 260
Docket Number: CR 98-1073
Court Abbreviation: Ark.
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