Following a bench trial, appellant Robert Wayne Stephens was convicted of one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) — less safe driver (OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1)). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence, contending that his conviction was based upon circumstantial evidence which failed to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of his guilt. For the reasons set forth below, we find appellant’s claim of error to be without merit and affirm.
On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Green v. State,
So viewed, the jury was authorized to conclude that at approximately 7:46 p.m., November 17, 2002, an East Ellijay patrolman received an all-points police radio dispatch directing him to be on the lookout for a possible drunk driver in a grey Lexus sport utility vehicle, bearing Georgia license plate no. 17UY6. The patrolman spotted the vehicle “sitting half in [a] parking place and half in the driveway” of a Waffle King restaurant. The vehicle was running; its headlights were on; and appellant was sitting behind the steering wheel, “laid up against the window passed out.” The patrolman observed what he believed to be fresh vomitus on the driver’s side window. He knocked on the door and “hollered” at appellant to wake him up.
Appellant subsequently failed field sobriety tests administered to him on the scene by the patrolman and tested positive on an *635 alco-sensor for the presence of alcohol. 1 Appellant was placed under arrest, read his implied consent warning under OCGA § 40-5-67.1, and asked if he would submit to State-administered chemical testing. Appellant refused.
At trial, appellant testified that he became tired after taking a prescribed medication for anxiety and drove into the parking lot of the Waffle King where he then consumed six to ten ounces of wine and fell into a deep sleep. He denied drinking while driving or vomiting in his vehicle. He also testified that he “thought” he had parked in a parking slot.
“ ‘It is well settled that the driving of an automobile while intoxicated may be shown by circumstantial evidence. [Cit.]’ ”
Phillips v. State,
Appellant was found passed out behind the steering wheel of a haphazardly parked vehicle with the engine running and the lights on. Appellant, who had apparently vomited, admitted driving after taking an anti-anxiety medication, failed field sobriety tests and refused to submit to State-administered chemical testing. “Although the officer did not see the car moving, he observed circumstances from which a jury could infer that appellant was in actual physical control of the car when it was moved to the location where the officer found it, and that appellant was intoxicated while moving it there.”
Johnson v. State,
supra at 501, 502 (1); see also
Phillips v. State,
supra;
Stearnes v. State,
supra. Additionally, “the refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test. . . create [d] an inference that the test would reveal the presence of a prohibited substance and bears directly on the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence.
[Fairbanks v. State,
Appellant nevertheless contends that his testimony provided an alternative hypothesis or explanation of the evidence. However, “the reasonableness of that hypothesis [was] for the trier of fact to determine.”
Perkins v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
“Alco-sensor testing is in the nature of a field sobriety test. Alco-sensor results are not used to establish blood alcohol content. Rather, the alco-sensor is used as an initial screening device to aid the police officer in determining probable cause to arrest a motorist suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Schoolfield v. State,