79 N.Y. 183 | NY | 1879
There is no dispute as to the material facts. On and prior to the 18th of December, 1871, one Gill was a member of the board of education of the city of Brooklyn, and, as attorney for said board, received $3,600.84, the money of the board, which he wrongfully converted and appropriated to his own use. Soon after the date mentioned, he procured from the plaintiff on a mortgage forged by him on the property of a third person $4,129.34 in a check of the plaintiff which on the 21st of December, 1871, he deposited in a bank, to his credit, and on the same day drew his own check on the bank in which the deposit was made, to the order of the board of education for the amount of the money fraudulently appropriated by him and delivered the same to the board, and the board thereupon credited the check to Gill in discharge of his debt. The check was paid in due course, and the money received thereon was used by the board in its business. The plaintiff, about two months thereafter, ascertained that the mortgage received from Gill was a forgery, and then demanded from the defendant the money received from Gill. The defendant had no notice, when it *186 received the check from Gill, of the fraud by which he obtained the money of the plaintiff, nor had it any information as to the source from which the money to his credit in the bank was derived. The first information which the defendant had of the facts in respect thereto was at the time of the demand made by the plaintiff, before referred to.
The question is presented whether, under these circumstances, the plaintiff can maintain an action to recover the money received by the defendant from Gill and applied in payment of the debt owing by him to the defendant. We are of opinion that the action will not lie. The money having been obtained by Gill from the plaintiff by fraud and felony the former acquired no title thereto and the plaintiff could recover it from Gill if found in his possession, or he could follow it into the hands of any person who received it from Gill without consideration or with notice of the fraud by which he obtained it. The money when deposited by Gill in the bank, was still the money of the plaintiff. The bank was a mere depository and while it so remained, the plaintiff could have compelled the bank to restore the money to him as the rightful owner. (Tradesmans' Bk. v.Merritt, 1 Paige, 302; Mechanics' Bk. v. Levy, 3 id., 606;Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De Gex, M. G., 372.) But the bank, having paid it out on the check of Gill without notice of any defect in his title, was thereafter protected against any claim of the plaintiff therefor. The plaintiff, however, passing by the bank to whose possession the money first came from Gill, claims to recover of the defendant on the ground that the defendant, having received it from Gill in payment of an antecedent debt, cannot be permitted to retain it as against the plaintiff. No authority has been cited which sustains this position. The rule has been settled by a long line of cases, that money obtained by fraud or felony cannot be followed by the true owner into the hands of one who has received it bona fide and for a valuable consideration in due course of business. This, said Lord HOLT in 1 Salk., 126, is "by reason of the course of trade which creates a property in the *187
assignee or bearer" — and in Miller v. Race (4 Burr., 452), Lord MANSFIELD said: "The true reason is upon account of the currency of it; it cannot be recovered after it has passed into currency." No suspicion is cast upon the bona fides of the defendant. It received the money in the ordinary course of business, and for a good and valid consideration. The defendant had no connection with the fraud of Gill. He did not act or assume to act as the defendant's agent in the transaction with the plaintiff. The money was not obtained through or by means of his relation to the defendant. The position and rights of the parties are precisely the same as if Gill had not been a member of the board when the payment was made, or as if the debt which he paid had not originated in any violation of trust. It is said that the case is to be governed by the doctrine established in this State that an antecedent debt is not such a consideration as will cut off the equities of third parties in respect of negotiable securities obtained by fraud. But no case has been referred to where this doctrine has been applied to money received in good faith in payment of a debt. It is absolutely necessary for practical business transactions that the payee of money in due course of business shall not be put upon inquiry at his peril as to the title of the payor. Money has no ear-mark. The purchaser of a chattel or a chose in action may, by inquiry, in most cases, ascertain the right of the person from whom he takes the title. But it is generally impracticable to trace the source from which the possessor of money has derived it. It would introduce great confusion into commercial dealings if the creditor who receives money in payment of a debt is subject to the risk of accounting therefor to a third person who may be able to show that the debtor obtained it from him by felony or fraud. The law wisely, from considerations of public policy and convenience, and to give security and certainty to business transactions, adjudges that the possession of money vests the title in the holder as to third persons dealing with him and receiving it in due course of business and in good *188
faith upon a valid consideration. If the consideration is good as between the parties, it is good as to all the world. "Money," said Lord MANSFIELD, in Miller v. Race, before cited; "shall never be followed into the hands of a person who bona fide took it in the course of currency and in the way of his business." The question involved in this case was considered by JOHNSON, J., inJusth v. Bank of Commonwealth (
All concur.
Judgment reversed. *189