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Stephen P. Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company
344 F.3d 381
3rd Cir.
2003
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*1 argument third obligation the' to as- Government’s judge trial ‘has “the that, in equally unavailing. of situation deter- It contends totality the the be- sess accepted re- the District in ap- whether the defendant cause Court erred not mining ” (quoting justice at 806 United plying Id. the obstruction of enhance- sponsibility.’ McDowell, 2 ment, 293 n. in granting acceptance States v. erred the Cir.1989)). There, is, we determined responsibility adjustment. of That totality in assessing the the District Court looking totality at the of the situation re- granting accep- an of the situation erred garding acceptance responsi- Williams’s reduction because responsibility tance of bility, the asks Government us to consider had to trial on some of gone the defendant alleged jus- Williams’s efforts to obstruct for sentenc- grouped the counts that were argument tice. This the fails because Dis- could The District Court ing purposes. specifically trict Court found there was no credit based granted acceptance have justice, obstruction of and the Government some counts because guilty pleas on the appealed finding. has not We will not before consider- grouped the counts were now allow the Government to revisit that credit, eliminating thus ation of such disguised “totality issue in a of the circum- acceptance availability of the reduction argument. stances” (“Were the District responsibility. Id. sum, that, we find because Williams a credit for ... grant able to Court pled guilty robbery charge, to the bank then we charges separately, ... three reduction in acceptance his sentence for However, the would see no error. Guide- responsibility regard with to that count multiple for this lines do not allow and, thus, improper, was not defer to we grouped be be- counts of conviction must the District Court. adjustment accep- be made for fore an can % sfc sfs # That situation is responsibility.”). tance of Accordingly, we will affirm Williams’s present here. conviction and not disturb sentence Next, argues the Government meted out the District Court. disregarded Application District Court Sentencing § Note 3E1.1

Guidelines, that a reduction which states be for a defendant who granted should not trial, factual elements proceeds to denies guilt, only guilt admits after a con- Stephen P. LASSER Sentencing Manu- viction. U.S. Guidelines However, § cmt. n.2. the District al 3E1.1 v. adjusted the offense level as to LIFE RELIANCE STANDARD one, only put count Gov- Williams COMPANY, INSURANCE on count proof ernment to its burden of Appellant. Cohen, where the counts

two. As noted No. 02-4123. granted grouped may are not and credit them there is no error when separately, Appeals, United States Court the reduction as grants the District Court Third Circuit. did not chal-

to a count that defendant Argued April (“Were the District lenge. 171 F.3d at 806 18, 2003. Sept. Filed ... grant a credit for Court able to then we charges separately, three ... error.”). Therefore, Applica-

would see no inapplicable. tion Note was

Background

I. Stephen orthopedic Lasser is an sur- employed by Townsquare

geon who was (“Townsquare”), Associates Orthopedic *3 He sued to practice group. four-doctor disability alleges he Reli- obtain benefits Company Insurance ance Standard Life (“Reliance”) disability under the owes him purchased policy Townsquare insurance (the “Policy”). Policy The from Reliance when, disability benefits pays disease, or a claimant “is injury, illness material duties capable of performing [only] on regular occupation of his/her mate- [only] basis or some of the part-time rial duties on a full-time basis.” artery coronary Dr. Lasser suffers from 1986, 46, age at he underwent disease. later bypass surgery. As be- coronary cor- surgery was not apparent, came Rawle & (Argued), Bachrach Joshua Although Dr. Lasser rectly performed.1 PA, Henderson, Appel- for Philadelphia, for the next experience symptoms did not lant. surgery, following decade Nusbaum, Stein, (Argued), Stein Lewis (collo- infarction myocardial he suffered Kron, P.A., Goldstein, Succa- Bronstein & attack”). Aid- “heart Dr. Robert quially, a sunna, NJ, Appellee. for rich, treating physician, pre- Lasser’s change regimen a treatment scribed SCIRICA,* Judge, Before: Chief exercise, Aid- diet, therapy. Dr. drug GARTH, Judges. AMBRO and Circuit to reduce his advised Lasser rich also level, stress. including work-related stress COURT OF THE OPINION Dr. Las- September Accordingly, AMBRO, Judge. Circuit sched- on a reduced to work ser returned by load patient ule. He decreased Life Insurance Com- Reliance Standard 50%, night at longer no “on-call” he was Court incor- that the District pany argues weekends, did not and he its de- on arbitrary capricious rectly held 26, December surgery. On emergency Lasser was not Stephen termination ap- 1996, Dr. approved the terms of his within disabled disability benefits long-term plication conclude policy. We insurance Policy. affirm. under therefore did not err and [*] The Honorable ser’s high dure. Whereas Chief cant Rather than failure rate success surgeon Judge rate, performing an conducted May artery grafts have a (cid:127)— Anthony J. Scirica became vein according to Lasser’s 2003. grafts have a a vein artery graft, Las- graft relatively signifi- proce- phy- fifteen rather than sicians, diagonal artery. supplying (as it should have years. between branches, only blood being Moreover, 50% connected been), and 60% anterior Lasser’s vein one of was sewn to another after which was descending to two ten to artery graft, However, pe- bility in December after a capricious and that Dr. — riodic review of Lasser’s condition entitled to benefits. Rebanee primarily response appeals. to a medical Burke, by evaluation issued William II. Jurisdiction

whom Reliance hired to evaluate Las- —ser Reliance terminated Lasser’s bene- policy insurance issue is covered fits on the ground that was not disabled Employee Retirement Income Se- Policy. as defined in- Dr. Lasser curity (“ERISA”), Act of 1974 29 U.S.C. voked Reliance’s appeal administrative § seq. et Dr. Lasser sued recover procedures, prompted Reliance to benefits Policy, under and ERISA *4 — opinions obtain two additional medical preempts state-law claims in this context. — from Karel Drs. Raska and Field John 1132(a). Thus, § Id. the District Court as well as to commission a labor market jurisdiction had pursuant to 28 U.S.C. survey to determine the material duties of § jurisdiction 1331. We exercise appebate general occupation. Lasser’s Based § under 28 U.S.C. 1291. on opinions these medical and the sur- —vey as well as the fact that Dr. Lasser III. Standard Review returned to work at a full-time schedule The standard-of-review inquiry is more (including on-call and emergency surgery involved in this case than in most. The — duties) April 1999 Reliance concluded Supreme Court has mandated that courts that Dr. Lasser was not disabled review the arbitrary capricious under and performing the material duties of his occu- standard claim denials if ERISA cases pation and affirmed its earlier denial of plan “the gives benefit the administrator benefits. fiduciary or discretionary authority to de-

Dr. Lasser then filed a in the complaint ehgibihty termine for benefits or to con- 8, February District Court. In a 2001 strue terms of the plan.” Firestone opinion, it denied parties’ both Bruch, cross-mo- Tire 101, & Rubber v.Co. 489 U.S. summary judgment 115, tions for (1989). stated S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 80 that it hearing would hold a to determine “Under the arbitrary capricious stan- the proper dard, standard of review.2 Lasser v. an administrator’s only decision wib Co., Reliance Standard Ins. 130 be reason, overturned if it is without un- Life (D.N.J.2001). F.Supp.2d After supported by substantial or evidence erro- that holding hearing and deciding that a neous as a matter of law [and] court is moderately heightened arbitrary and ca- not free to substitute its own for judgment pricious standard of review appropri- that of the in determining defendants ehgi- ate, the Court reviewed the bihty record before for plan benefits.” Pinto v. Reliance review, Rebanee. On the basis of its Standard held Cir.2000) (internal Reliance’s determination of nondisa- quotation marks 2. The Court's stated denying basis for sum- extent which the administrator's decision mary judgment was that "a could court find was tainted his self interest.” at 626- Id. party for considering either when the admin- dissenting 27. colleague Our suggests that istrator's resolution of questions these factual Court erred considering extra- heightened under arbitrary standard of resolving record evidence in We merits. review,” capricious parties and that "the disagree. The recognized District Court have advanced to the sup- Court some factual its was limited review to the record before the port positions for each of their under- claims administrator. Id. at 630. lying merits of the claim as well as on the omitted). Discussion parties agree IV. Here both authority. Reliance such grants Policy Regular Occupation A. explicit terms of Dr. Lasser’s Under However, entity that if the same alia, disabled, Policy, he is inter if as a claimant is disabled whether a determines injury, or he is result of illness disease benefits, that disability for pay must also performing “of the material capable find him incentive to has a financial entity regular occupation duties of on a his/her Thus, have noted we her not disabled. basis or some of the material part-time that, plan insurer of an ERISA when the basis.” To determine duties on a full-time administrator, there is a claims also acts as correctly whether Reliance decided conflict of interest or inherent structural qualify did not “heightened” mandates a benefits, we first determine what is his of review. Id. capricious standard Policy as the leaves “regular occupation,” “sliding employed In Pinto we argues term undefined. Reliance of scru in which the level approach scale” broad, ge- indeed “regular occupation” is fiduciary’s decision is “a tiny to the applied *5 In Dr. Lasser initially denying neric. ben- (quoting 392 point.” a Id. at range, not 1997, in efits December Reliance said Co., 631, F.2d 974 v. ARCO Chem. Wildbur job a “regular occupation your is not with Cir.1992)). (6th penetrat It is “more 638 job in a specific employer, your it is not suspicion partiali greater is the ing the environment, your is it work nor particular suspi the smaller that ty, penetrating less occupational field. speciality particular Id. at 392-93. cion is.” benefits, for evaluating your eligibility your inability must evaluate we hearing on the held The Court it is your regular occupation as own interest to of Reliance’s conflict of extent any typical setting in a work for performed Be of review. determine the standard general economy.” in the employer con found no evidence of cause inherent structural flict other than the that, meaning if the recognize We conflict, correct standard of it held that the Reli “regular occupation” ambiguous, is height “at the mild end of review was is entitled to deference ance’s definition scale,” and arbitrary capricious and ened arbitrary capri applicable under the degree of defer afforded a “moderate thus v. E.I. of review. Skretvedt cious standard Nei Co., Reliance’s determinations. ence” to DuPont de Nemours & Cir.2001) (insurer’s ap this conclusion on party disputes interpretation ther However, argues that the is en peal. ambiguous provision an insurance contrary to the standard unless it is misapplied District Court titled to deference However, we allegedly plain language). reasonable deferring plan’s to Reliance’s occupation” is not “regular believe usions.3 concl capri- decision under the Court for tor's dissent criticizes the District 3. The we do not making findings of fact on the basis of review. But de novo cious standard of to, Kearney decision v. the Ninth Circuit's reference that the District Court’s believe Co., (9th Cir. of, 175 F.3d 1084 Standard Kearney consti- implicit endorsement 1999), our Court has never and notes that error, to facts for its reference tuted reversible Kearney agree adopted approach. We before explicitly “limited to that evidence was Kearney the law in is not with dissent F.Supp.2d at administrator.” the claims factfinding that de novo our Circuit and reviewing improper administra- claims Policy ambiguous. pro- case, The states that it er district court Dawes v. First inability “per- tects the insured from Unum Insurance 851 F.Supp. form regular the material duties (S.D.N.Y.1994), his/her which defined occupation.” purpose Both the of disabili- “regular occupation” “a position ty insurance the modifier “his/her” same general character as the insured’s before “regular occupation” make clear previous job, requiring similar skills and that “regular occupation” is the usual work training, and involving comparable duties.” actually that the insured is performing im- Id. at 122. Notably, Dawes was decided mediately disability. before the onset of before Dr. applied for written, Applying the text as Dr. Lasser’s benefits. regular occupation as an orthopedic ' surgeon responsible for emergency sur- plain meaning “regular oc gery and on-call in a relatively small cupation” is one of which both parties were practice group and within a reasonable aware when the Policy began on June travel distance from home in New Jer- 1993. There is no reason to believe that sey. Dr. Lasser was aware Reliance’s differ Even assuming “regular occupa ent definition until it denied him benefits tion” is susceptible multiple interpreta in December 1997. Because Reliance has tions ambiguous, and therefore Reliance’s shown no intent “opt out” of this plainly definition of the term nonetheless must be (indeed, understood term oppor had the reasonable before deference is conferred. tunity to do so each June when Policy Skretvedt, See at 177 (noting renewal), up came it is unreasonable *6 courts defer to a claims administrator’s for it to argue it has post done so hoc. interpretation if it is arbitrary or capri Even if we fall back interpretation to the cious). Yet Reliance’s definition is differ of “regular occupation” imparted by ent from that in the caselaw pertaining Kinstler, Dawes and too undermines to it both policies containing generic Reliance’s understanding. Com “regular occupation” modifier. See pare also Amalgamated Gaines v. The Ins. O’Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Ins. Life Fund, (3d Cir.1985) 753 F.2d 290 n. 5. Co., (Table), 188 F.3d 502 1999 WL 617891 (deferring plan to a administrator’s con (4th Cir.1999) curiam) (unpublished per struction of an ERISA-governed insurance (on review, and capricious hold policy when there was no caselaw inter ing that claimant could not mate preting provision issue); Epright at v. rial duties of his regular occupation and Envtl. Res. Mgt, Inc. Health & Welfare defining “regular occupation” with refer Plan, (3d Cir.1996) (hold specific ence to performed duties for his ing plan when, construction unreasonable employer). among deficiencies, other the administra Even were a court not to limit itself pointed tor statutory no provision to exclusively to duties, the claimant’s extant interpret the term and when its definition person’s “regular occupation” none- seemed self-serving). requires theless consideration “some context, In it is nature of the unreasonable for [at institution which the Reliance to “regular was define employed.” occupation” claimant] Kinstler v. dif- ferently plain First Reliance from its meaning or Standard even the Cir.1999). Moreover, somewhat more understanding relaxed Kinstler adopted the reasoning of an earli- Dawes and without explicitly Kinstler in- duties, all but fell performing was when he in the Poli- different definition eluding that $4,000 $6,000 per month to between cy.4 terminated immediately before Reg- howev- During period, this latter Duties of Lasser’s benefits. Material B. forty Occupation er, working less than Dr. Lasser was ular week, patient his as he reduced per hours that Dr. Las- determined Having oper- longer and no was load one-third Policy occupation under regular ser’s seeing patients after ating in the afternoon' in a surgeon orthopedic that of an was assuming Even he was morning. in the Jersey, New group in practice four-person instead twenty per hours week working for Reliance unreasonable it was and that (an by record assumption supported forty Policy’s plain argue post hoc evidence), he would assuming otherwise, turn to what we language $12,000 $8,000 per month have made regular course of did in the Dr. Lasser (i.e forty per hours week had worked during office patients saw occupation. He earn- twenty-hour-per-week double his hours, surgeries, scheduled performed that, by performing ings), it out stands call, emergency performed night took duties, Dr. emergency surgery on-call or longer handled he no surgeries. When by over earnings have declined Lasser’s were surgeries, emergency night call and earnings decline 50%. This substantial an The District they material? materiality of else can the lays out as little yes. F.Supp.2d swered occupation. regular to his activities those supported conclusion The Court’s orthope- of an Looking occupation at the pre-disability Lasser’s comparing reference generieally without surgeon dic earnings post-disability earnings with duties, Reliance particular Dr. Lasser’s Townsq- The schedule. from reduced survey to a labor market re- commissioned agreement requires uare shareholders’ emergency performing salary determine whether of a doctor’s by one-third duction are material being on-call surgery and call. longer night takes no when he or she surgeon.5 was, orthopedic for an Moreover, salary on av- *7 asked: $26,000 survey month per erage, approximately arguing Dr. Lasser’s below, Ironically, that interpre- in post generic ex 4. As noted reference with the be evaluated with even at odds duties should of is tation Reliance DOT, responses Reli- ac- majority survey solicited Reliance surgeon in the title - ortho- surgery ance. than knowledged rather that - "occupational field" in pedics broader is the Dictionary of Reliance also consulted the "regular occu- conducts his which ("DOT”) analy- its aid Occupational Titles However, survey to relying pation.” in contains no points that the DOT It out sis. disabled, must Reliance find Dr. Lasser orthopedic surgeon, listing for an separate "occupational field” that his concluded have related title appears as an undefined orthopedic sur- orthopedics than rather is Therefore, ap- heading. "surgeon” under - i.e., occupation” is “regular gery his that does surgeon, which plying the definition an conduct it is reasonable one in which duties, emergency to on-call and not refer reports, which only write practice or office are immate- argues that these duties suggested as survey respondents some agree with the District rial. We inconsistency in options. Reliance’s available issue about critical the DOT’s silence disability deci- thus, its ultimate position renders to the unhelpful makes DOT suspect. based on even more is sion conclusion extent Reliance’s surgeon, that conclu- the DOT’s definition sion is unreasonable. your experience in general, rea- on-call material orthopedic are duties of an Orthopedic Surgeon sonable that an can surgeon. Eight out of responses fourteen practice in if this field one: suggest practice without these duties perform duties, [1.] Cannot “on-call” impossible do would be or would in result an calls, night carry pager[;] or occupation fundamentally different orthopedic surgery. Cannot perform emergency respondent [2.] One sur (even if wrote gery practice one can do that the non-emergency, Reliance proposed [;] surgery) elective very would be unusual and would essen- tially non-operative practice. you If Anoth- responded [3.] have YES to ei ther, er jobs stated that you only “[t]he can I estimate know your experi of that would fulfill appx. prevalence your ence the jobs such restrictions would orthopedic surgeon an be someone who general restricted [sic] themselves economy reports. where one would writing Work-comp, not need to or med- perform legal.” “on-call” A respondent third emergency noted that “[i]n duties? surgery your example, you are describing physi- cian who is not orthopaedic an surgeon, Reliance’s vendor sent surveys, might but be considered orthopaedist. an which it received fourteen responses, An surgeon orthopaedic should be able to nine of which were returned in time to be fulfill all duties.” Five other respondents considered. Five of those nine respondents flat-out that what said Reliance proposed opined that an orthopedic surgeon could impossible. “practice in this field” without performing on-call or emergency surgery duties. On context, In this both Dr. partic- the basis of the survey, and on the absence ular case survey and the for orthopedic any showing affirmative from Dr. Las- surgeons general lead to the conclusion ser that performing emergency surgery and emergency on-call surgery duties and being on-call are material duties of an were material regular to his occupation. orthopedic surgeon generally, Reliance immaterial, concluded that these duties are Ability C. of Dr. Lasser to Perform the thereby precluding Dr. Lasser from dis- Regular Material Duties of His Oc- ability benefits within Policy’s terms. cupation While Reliance survey selected respons- 1. Merits argue es to that on-call and emergency We duties next surgery were not determine whether material for Dr. Dr. Las- (like Lasser, Court) ser’s we medical precludes condition con- him from clude safely that Reliance’s survey performing actually favors material *8 Dr. argument regular Lasser’s occupation. that these He argues that he are material even on generic safely a basis.6 emergency surgery When all responses fourteen or perform are consid- on-call duties. To fulfill our ered and when respondents’ appellate comments review function under the arbi are along viewed with the trary standard, answers to the and capricious we examine yes/no questions, survey indicates that the entire record to determine whether performing emergency surgery and being Reliance’s determination is supported by given 6. And that inevitably doctors will survey have would have been even more favorable scheduling flexibility less they when work in to Lasser had it taken into account the rele- larger practice smaller rather than groups, it practice vant of Townsquare. context at only seems reasonable to that the conclude signifi- Pinto, suggest that do classifications evidence. substantial ability to Dr. Lasser’s limitations-on cant surgeon.8 orthopedic as an work for dis- motivation primary Reliance’s in Decem- benefits Dr. Lasser’s continuing however, Lasser, that Reli- contends Dr. is- report been have appears ber sub- unsupported is conclusion ance’s Dr. He examined Burke. by Dr. that, sued notes after He evidence. stantial in test to a treadmill Lasser, subjected him his bene- of discontinuation appealing Dr. that concluded November physicians other fits, two engaged Reliance any cardio- demonstrate “does Lasser re- him, of whom issued both to evaluate earlier During an disability.”7 first, vascular position. supporting ports Dr. Steven performed test treadmill Raska, that Dr. Lasser concluded Dr. — 1997, Dr. “achieved Lasser April Roth i.e., situations stressful avoid “should maxi- age-predicted of 90% than greater medical night [and] call require those only experienced rate]” [heart mum reduced stress “[a] emergencies,” A nucle- minutes.” fatigue [after] “mild schedule abso- environment work Christou, not- Dr. Christos cardiologist, ar patient’s maintain this necessary to lutely Dr. Lasser’s of imaging planar ed that “[s]tress Raska reasoned Dr. health.” cardiovascular during conducted heart recog- is a tolerance regardless exercise “very small and revealed testing for recurrent risk factor independent nized heart de- insignificant” clinically probably that] ... [and artery disease coronary fect. ... which dem- multiple studies are there in the level causes flux that stress Dr. onstrate

Furthermore, *9 (the standard Bruce Protocol Stage IV of the no but with ("Patients disease with cardiac conducted), typically tests are by stress Ordinary ac- physical activity. limitation only on was that Lasser pointed out Raska anginal pain, Dr. dyspnea, no tivity causes undue thirty-six three minutes .for the treadmill Therapeutic . palpitation.”) fatigue or patient seconds, for duration an insufficient ("Patients disease whose with cardiac AClass Dr. noted that Stage IV. He also restricted.”). to reach activity not be need physical receiving report, however, After this result, Re- aAs in a letter to Rebanee dated liance realized that Dr. had a Raska con- 3, 1998, June Dr. expressed Aldrich flict of practiced interest: he in the same Rebanee that he believed Dr. Lasser is physician group aas doctor from whom disabled and incapable of “resuming ab of Dr. Lasser previously sought an evalua- the customary and responsibilities tion, (whose Dr. Lubow evaluation is dis- of an orthopedic surgeon on a full-time below). response, cussed Reliance en- basis[,] ator least that he could not do so gaged Dr. Field as evaluating another without exposing himself to a high degree physician. While Dr. Field noted that of risk.” Dr. Aldrich’s reasoning underly- “[t]here is little definitive that evidence ing this that, conclusion was though even job emotional stress is causally related “by all objective criteria Dr. Lasser to the development or acceleration of coro- doing very well at point time,” nary disease,” artery he did acknowledge work-related might stress induce a deteri- physical “both and emotional stress oration in Dr. Lasser’s condition. More- are identified triggers myocardial acute over, according to Dr. Aldrich’s reasoning, infarction [heart attack].” He concluded a favorable classification under the New that Dr. Lasser could work forty-hour York Heart guidelines Association is of week, but capable “is not of resuming all bmited use in Dr. situation, Lasser’s as customary duties and responsibili- system ties of classification an orthopedic surgeon.” addresses a car- In partic- ular, patient’s Dr. Field diac opined that ability Lasser to perform should certain restrict his on-call or emergency surgery physical tasks regard without to stress. duties, given their stressful nature. Lowell, who performed a cardiac Dr. Lasser also relies on the evaluation Lasser, catheterization on Dr. opined also of his treating cardiologist, Aldrich, as that Lasser was agreed disabled. He with well those of Barry Drs. Lowell and Law- Burke Lasser’s “functional stress Lubow, rence opined who all that he is test at present excellent,” time is but First, disabled. argues cautioned that “the stress of profession evaluation issued Dr. Aldrich suggests will contribute poorer control of blood incapable he is of working in regu- pressure lipid therapies” and that “a lar occupation. When Rebanee asked Dr. less stressful environment would contrib- Aldrich to complete a form detailing Dr. ute graft to his longevity.” Dr. Loweb Lasser’s “current restrictions and hmita- concluded that “the tions,” severity of Dr. Las- he responded that Lasser should ser’s heart condition, “hmit while exposure readily physical and emotional measured stress.” He testing methods, noted also that traditional is a “[s]tress just well-documented renders him risk factor patient disabled as the the development of whose coronary artery dis- would not questioned itself, ease but context, within that presents to the with more overt precipitation of a myocardial infarction.” symptoms.”10 Burke’s examination of Lasser’s records was arrive at a reasoned evaluation of his condi- “sloppy” because it described a heart tion. cathet- erization occurring in October when in 10. He too criticized report Dr. Burke’s for its

fact performed July 1996. To Dr. failure "significant to mention the anatomic Raska this error suggested that Dr. Burke was problems with Dr. coronary anato- insufficiently familiar with Lasser's case to my.” *10 working in his occu- Lubow, physician regular who ex- the harm that a Finally, Dr. — might as pation precipitate the of Las- the dissent request Dr. Lasser at amined — counsel, require high.12 similar would raises the bar too a conclusion reached ser’s Aldrich, Raska, disability claimants will have the and Lowell. Most not that of Drs. to (financial their that, disposal on the recurrence means at or other- opined “[b]ased He wise) kind disease to obtain this of evidence. arteriosclerotic heart significant of Therefore, plus prima a claimant a an acute infarction once makes manifest[ed] showing disability physi- angioplasty through for and stent- of urgent the need facie (as Dr. Lasser here reports hiatus he had no cians’ has done year after a ten when ing pa- through physicians’ stating grant reports decision to symptoms, the condition) disability was cer- stress will exacerbate heart partial tient permangnt ques- if call correct, of his and the insurer wishes to into particularly view tainly (as those reports tion the scientific basis of anatomy.” here), has to do then attempted Reliance — Thus, evaluating physicians all will lie with insurer the burden Burke, whose exception with the of objection. of its It has support basis — agreed report the others discredited met that here. not burden precludes that Dr. Lasser’s heart condition duties safely performing him from on-call Alleged Resumption D. Relevance of surgery. Reliance’s con emergency Emergen- Lasser’s On-Call contrary is clusion to the thus cy Surgery Duties that Reli capricious. To the extent nondisability ance’s determination that, if emer argues Reliance even expect ... “it was unreasonable are mate surgery and on-call duties gency simply accept opinion ... rial, these resumption Dr. Lasser’s exacerbate Dr. Lasser’s stress would [that settles he disabled whether range any proba condition] without First, disagree. performing them. We that Dr. Lasser was bility proof or actual disputes he has harm,” increased we believe its determi performing these duties with resumed faulty. nation was 1996, this issue frequency same as before not do question involves factual we Regarding Burden Clarification Moreover, assum appeal. on even resolve Proof them, has alleged the facts as Reliance ing — as as Dr. well physicians re Dr. Lasser’s

We conclude with clarification Field, has disability opinion Rebanee proof whose garding burden — much have advised weight dis proving placed the burden of cases. While Thus, Lasser, these duties. to he should ability ultimately lies with Dr. that, medical evidence detailing him there is substantial statistics require provide Raska, Lowell, Aldrich, probability depends on ent 11. Like Drs. thoroughness of Dr. also While Lasser's criticized future risk’s occurrence. review, improper man- well as the quantified Burke’s precisely have not doctors conducted Lasser’s stress case, ner in which he reports suggest that in his their risk test. high. does of course stress the risk is While necessarily incapacitate an individual that the risk that stress 12. The dissent states (note, Cheney), example, President Vice injury will cause future is insufficient opined that doctors have Lasser’s case his However, disability. present constitute incapacitating. stress is pres- effects creates a whether risk of future *11 392

if Dr. performing on-call and District Court’s judgment in favor of Dr. duties, emergency surgery he is doing so Lasser. Indeed, his detriment. Dr. Lasser has argued that, to the extent that he has GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. activities,

resumed these he did so out of obliged — I am majori- dissent from the economic necessity because Reliance ty’s judgment in favor of Dr. Lasser. discontinued his A benefits. claimant’s re turn to work is not dispositive of his or her (1) The District Court failed adhere disability when economic necessity compels to our established standards of review and him or her to return to work. Hawkins v. precedents. our See Lasser v. Reliance First Corp. Long-Term Union Disability Co., Standard Ins. 616, 130 E.Supp.2d Life Plan, 914, (7th (“A 326 Cir.2003) F.3d 918 (D.N.J.2001) (“Lasser 630 I”) (“th[is] desperate person might force himself to Court anticipates adopting procedure work despite an illness that everyone set forth in Kearney Co., [v. Standard Ins. agreed totally was disabling.”); Levinson (9th 1999) (en banc) Circuit ] v. Reliance Co., Standard Ins. Life and making plenary findings fact pursu (11th 1321, Cir.2001) (a 1326 n. 6 ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure claimant’s status aas full-time employee even though no new evidence may be re should not constitute reliable evidence that ceived case.”)1 on that branch of the By he is able to the material duties of so doing, the District Court erred giv occupation on a basis); full-time Stark only service, ing lip but no required true v. Weinberger, (7th 497 F.2d 1092 Cir. deference, to the Administrator Walsh’s 1974) (even if a claimant work, returns to determinations even after it had held that her doing so does not mean she is not the Administrator was neither conflicted disabled). This principle is especially per nor biased. See Pinto v. Reliance Stan here, suasive where Dr. Lasser’s disability Co., dard Ins. 214 F.3d 377 Cir. Life was observable and did not make it 2000). physically impossible for him to perform (2) This ais job summary judgment for a limited period. case. pation” was that in which he was actually abled: an orthopedic surgeon in a four- engaged immediately before becoming dis- We hold that Dr. [******] “regular occu- trial on the merits a la Kearney. See infra The District Court did decide summary judgment, cannot note 3. In just Court, that. when called upon to case, District the hold person practice group in Jersey. (3) New We Court, at its truncated also hold that on-call and emergency April sur- 2001 hearing, while purporting gery duties are material to Dr. Lasser’s resolve Administrator’s status as practice and that he is disabled from per- to whether he was (it conflicted or biased forming those duties. We agree with the held neither), that he was proceed District Court that Reliance's conclusion to ignore our prescribed standard of re- the contrary was unsupported by substan- view which requires deference and then tial evidence and therefore proceed to substitute its own judgment on and capricious. We accordingly affirm the the merits.

1. The District opinions Court filed two in this filed Lasser v. Reliance Standard 8, 2001, case. On February I, it filed Lasser F.Supp.2d (D.N.J.2001) ("Lasser 130 F.Supp.2d 13, 2001, II"). and on June *12 Pinto’s, of sliding scale arbi- (referring to re- by Reliance written (4) policy The review).2 capricious and benefits, trary Dr. Las- that for quires performing the from disabled had be ser a then Court conducted District The occupation. regular of his material where it 2001 April trial on bench materiality rested proving of burden relevant to testimony only heard Walsh’s materiality No evidence Dr. Lasser. our standard heightened of how the issue record. the appears sliding on Pinto’s be should of review nor testify, did Lasser did scale. Dis- by the was shown (5) No deference reiterate-the I other witness. any Walsh’s, the Administra- Mr. Court trict to address hearing was the purpose of (a) materiality that: tor’s, determinations or biased was whether Walsh conflicted (b) demonstrated; Dr. Lasser re- was employee. Reliance’s was he because his full- to, performing, was and turned a determining duty the had Walsh (c) and “emergency” “on- occupation; time as well as benefits eligibility for claimant’s as ma- established were not services call” the funds out of benefits those of paying only services the terial; these were yet, If reaps profits. its which Reliance perform; and not to told was Dr. Lasser biased, Pinto the deference under then disabilities future (d) stress nor neither would be his determination accorded be dis- 'present Dr. Lasser’s establish could “calib- deferential, court must and the less ability. to the intensity of review [the] the rare] by (6) taken The actions Pinto, 214 F.3d conflict.” intensity of the Reliance, as by upon relied evidence the Pinto, biased, then under If not at 393. Walsh, made the determinations well as employed to be of deference the standard Administrator, determined be the absolutely “deferential, but not be would under our capricious nor to be event, But, in def- either Id. deferential.” precedents. standards accorded. had to erence deter- Thereafter, Court the District I. de- a “moderate would give that it mined determina- to Walsh’s of deference” gree par- after both to us comes appeal This or of bias evidence no it found tions It summary judgment. for ties had moved II, Lasser by Walsh. exhibited conflict judgment case summary remained has at 623. F.Supp.2d only look could Court the District record. Court administrative developed stage, the the At hearing inquiries and end its required pertinent outlining briefly begin I rec- existing administrative review February In its history. procedural But, District Court no more. ord-and denied the District opinion, further, proceeded that. It do did not summary judg- cross-motions parties’ context summary judgment despite hold that it would It then stated ment. own find- case, made its and it instant Walsh, Admin- if hearing to determine at 642. Id. merits. of fact on ings a conflict suffered istrator, was biased (cid:127) courts district precedents, our Reliance. Under employee was an “merits-trials” so-called 625-26, cannot conduct I, F.Supp.2d arbitrary and heightened form compa- that, rants an insurance "when Pinto held Pinto, 214 review." benefits, capricious standard administers ny both funds at 378. that war- acting a conflict under generally when determining appropriate pation. conflict- The relevant part of the policy of-interest review I standard.3 As have provides: stated, the District Court should have lim- “Totally Disabled” and “Total Disability” ited its findings to a determination of what mean ... that as a result of an Injury or the appropriate standard review would *13 Sickness, during the Elimination Period be, and then should have continued on to and thereafter an Insured per- resolve the summary judgment question form the material duties of regu- his/her pursuant to that standard. occupation.... lar Accordingly, I would have returned this App. added). at 139 (emphasis Critical to case to the District Court with the di- analysis, this is that the burden prove rection that it all expunge its merits find- materiality is on Dr. Lasser because the ings and discussion and then proceed burden of proving coverage is always on prescribed its function of ruling, the II, claimant. See Lasser on the administrative only, record wheth- F.Supp.2d Pinto, at 639 (citing 214 F.3d at er Walsh’s denial of benefits was arbitrary 8). Lasser, n. however, submitted capricious. evidence, no proofs, affidavits, no no no witnesses, and no depositions on the issue

II. of materiality. Indeed, the record as to Although the issue District this is barren.4 purported Court to subscribe to the correct standard of Despite the silence of the regard- record review, a fair reading of the District ing materiality, the District Court never- opinions Court’s not; indicates that it did theless held that Dr. Lasser had made out it merely gave lipservice to the deference his burden of proof on materiality. To do to be accorded the Administrator’s de- só, the District Court relied principally on terminations. diminution Dr. Lasser’s income

Pursuant plain language of Reli- he when discontinued emergency and on- ance’s policy, whether Dr. Lasser is “total- call duties. Id. at 639-40. The majority, ly disabled” hinges on whether too, he can finds this diminution income to be perform the “material” duties of his Yet, occu- controlling. must remembered 3. The District relied aon Ninth Circuit The District Court yes." answered Maj. op. which, en divided banc contrary case to Third But, out, at 387. pointed I have it was not jurisprudence, required Circuit deferential, novo, de the function of the District Court to make Kearney, review. See 175 F.3d finding. a such Nor is it the function this 1084. Kearney, lawyer with a heart uphold Court to finding such a ap- when it played condition who several sets of tennis pears in summary judgment context. weekend, every up car-raced per to 120 miles hour and had opinions Rather, medical that he could majority should have examined work, return to contested the cessation record, of his have, Ias for evidence of material- disability policy payments. at Id. 1086. The ity night as to calls emergencies. Had District Court accorded de novo review and so, majority learned, done it would have ruled in favor of the company. insurance Id. did, Ias that no such evidence exists-and it is at 1086-87. A fractured en banc court re- that evidence that the Reliance policy re- versed, approving de novo finding review but quires. disputed material fact. Id. 1093. Moreover, proof the burden of as to materi- ality rests majority The with Dr. Lasser and the opinion majority seeks answer its question, as, opinion's own purported posed which it has respecting "When clarification he [Dr. longer night Lasser] no proof handled burden call change does and emergency surgeries, they were prescription. material? maj. See op. at 391. vocational of such Moreover, the use (from Sep- of time during period disability benefits eligibility 1997) studies that Dr. to December tember Circuit. accepted practice is an disabled,” was at- he “totally Revere See, v. Paul e.g., Russell and tasks functions his office to all tending Cir.2002) (labor (elective) scheduled performing he was jobs within identified study which market time, was collect- he the same At surgery. not re- did occupation claimant’s Reliance. from disability benefits ing total conten- travel, plaintiffs contravened quire relied Court also disabled he remained tion cardiologists, reports medical various travel, hours and extended not work could Dr. Las- stated that merely they although required). position his current *14 and “emergency” perform not ser should unrebutted stands evidence of this All functions those that work-not “on-call” appropriate the Again, Dr. Lasser. of ortho- occupation to his “material” were or not Reli- whether review of is standard Id. surgeon. pedic in deter- capricious arbitrary and was ance his meet to Dr. hand, that Lasser presented mining

Reliance, the other on failed that Dr. is: materiality, that materiality. Reli- burden of the issue on evidence of material perform the not could general Lasser duties of the to looked ance Nowhere occupation. regular Dictionary of of his duties in the defined as surgeon “emer- that evidence is there (“DOT”) in record from the Titles Occupational only work tasks-the “on-call” and gency” of Labor. Department States United not could told he was Dr. Lasser which are work “on-call” “Emergency” and/or ev- Lasser’s to material perform-are Dr. Las- duties. in material included not sym- I am Although day occupation. ery the con- no evidence presented has ser and med- financial to Dr. pathetic trary. members I sure the am difficulties-as ical recognized Furthermore, is the DOT sympathy too-such are majority See, industry. in the vocational authority “emer- as evidence substitute Reliance Standard v. Gallagher e.g., material work are “on-call” and gency” (4th Cir. 272-73 surgeon. orthopedic anof occupation the reasonable (DOT objectively 2002) an is troubling Furthermore, it I find of duties material determining the tool for study, nor no vocational presented description job “general occupation; an field, or the experts from evidence any involve must DOT, applicable, to be of his the members evidence even necessarily ev but comparable con- himself, support own office added). (emphasis duty.”) ery in fact mate- were these tasks tention no evi- has been there no gave particular, In rial. District Similarly, the partners three whether use as to in its dence Reliance whatsoever deference to the respond and would handle study pro- This could survey. a labor market duties, emergency on-call practice’s that “on-call” evidence direct vided lead could circumstances although such restrictions duties-the “emergency” Dr. Lasser. income a diminution proscribed- physicians Dr. Lasser’s which record the no also evidence was There provided Dr. Lasser not material. were sched- could Dr. Lasser nor, I earli- as stated studies vocational no all other as well surgery, elective uled contradicted which evidence er, any other tasks. procedures office materiality. evidence Reliance’s III. so, In doing the opinion majority ignores the claim evaluation framework estab- majority, sense, I has fallen into the lished very language of the pattern same analysis employed by the policy First, that it quotes: District claimant’s Court. Instead of addressing and condition Next, is evaluated. assessing basis, claim- the rationale and the ant’s regular occupation evidence is evaluated and led to the Administrator’s the material duties benefits, determination thereof denying are defined. and then Finally, giving appropriate claimant’s condition to that is com- deference deter- pared mination, against majority material duties discusses the deter- evi- as if mined to be subjected required dence it his regular to de occu- novo pation. review so, after It appears trial. Lasser, doing draws its Court, own conclusions and now substitutes this Court its would own end judgment the inquiry just as to after who and what first step. is to be believed.

Instead of looking to the evidence IV. none)-or materiality-(there the evi- Another example of the District Court’s dence whether “emergency” and “on- *15 failure to defer to Walsh’s determinations procedures call” material-(the are evi- revolves around Dr. Lasser’s continuing to is dence uncontradicted that they are work while receiving disability payments not)-the majority opinion reviews the Dis- $6,000 of about month, as well as Dr. trict Court record as if it arose from a Lasser’s return to work after his benefits non-jury fact-finding That, trial. I sug- were discontinued. gest, was the error the District fell Court Reliance argues that Dr. into Lasser and it is cannot compounded by the majority be totally disabled because in panel. this December 1997 he returned to “full-time” unrestrict- I also find the majority’s preoccupa work, ed including “emergency” and “on- tion with the definition of “regular occupa duties, call” without consequence to his tion” misses the Here, mark. we are con health. See at 263. App. Reliance further cerned only with the 'policy’s definition of contends that it was reasonable because “total disability” which concentrates on none of the doctors stated that he would material aspects of Dr. practice. be incapable of performing a full-time The majority relies on the Second Circuit’s schedule and Drs. Burke and Field specifi- decision in v. Kinstler First Reliance Stan cally evaluated Dr. as being Lasser capa- Co., dard Ins. (2d 181 F.3d 243 Cir. Life ble of full-time work. 1999),even though that is distinguish case able inasmuch the standard of review The District concluded, and the there, here, unlike was de novo. The ma majority agrees, here jority further strains to justify the term Lasser risked heart attacks due to future “regular occupation” by relying on a the stress on-call and emergency from Fourth Circuit unpublished opinion, O’Bry duties-which on this record cannot be him v. Reliance Co., Standard Ins. characterized as material-his continuing Life to 188 (Table), F.3d 502 (4th 1999 WL 617891 work after the termination of his insurance Cir.1999) (unpublished curiam). per See benefits nevertheless is evidence his maj. op. at 386. A Fourth Circuit unpub “total disability.” particular, the Dis- lished opinion under no circumstances can trict Court focused on the fact that he be considered precedential by this health, Court. his against risked express the rec-

397 Group Ins. Program v. Orvosh e.g., returning doctors, by of his ommendations 123, 129 Employees, necessity. Salaried of economic out those to Ins. v. AIG 627, Cir.2000); Hightshue 5,n. at 626 II, F.Supp.2d (a Cir.1998) (7th 1144, 1148-49 F.3d policy’s satisfying But, without reasonable, af- must be decision, if ma- plan’s tasks inability condition an presents claimant if the even agree firmed cannot I occupation, terial ful- Here, has position). in his office working opposite Lasser, who was procedures all established “to- with complied surgery, ly elective performing replete record Administrator’s and the tally disabled.” the Administra- supporting evidence with this has addressed Circuit Eighth tor’s decision. to to necessity relating economic issue of to Dr. similar context in a tal v. Prudential In Galman Lasser’s. V. (8th Cir. America, F.3d Co. of Court’s Moreover, District claim that a held

2001), Eighth Circuit of “stress” issue reliance majority’s disability when total assert ant analyses. their not do credit does of wheth work, regardless returned has of “economic out work he returned er from the evidence I consider again, Once of benefits denial an initial after necessity” lens through record administrative adminis results awaiting the while stan- deferential Under of deference. 771- Galman, appeal. trative Court, dard, is clear suf attorney who trial awas 72. Galman erred. majority, then disease, artery heart coronary fered *16 of none that alia, prior First, undisputed two it is of, inter history awith claim disability disability supported his who based doctors He attacks. heart medical of degree any aggravating of with the risk on stated claim, part, ever in Dr. Lasser to risk the stress increased to certainty due condition his heart Re- denied, employment. Galman full-time returning was to the claim After work. against asserting that insure not full time does policy to work liance’s fu- returned A disability. work return to present him disability-only “forced the denial ture The 771. determines at who expert Id. reasons.” or other financial doctor Id. based for benefits. claim is disabled rejected patient his court that should of stress effects possible future so that risk quantify have Lasser implies that majority if it determine can maker decision ERISA week, and forty-hour to work unable was Thus, an disability. present constitutes mis- majority But disabled. thus was may graft venous opinion insurer An jurisprudence. our apprehends not does years five another survive not merely be- capricious arbitrary and not of Reliance’s the condition satisfy opinions medical on other relies it cause requires policy policy-a it is coverage; denial in a that result material perform unable be Lasser “clearly if decision such To time. at this occupation his duties the rec- the evidence supported blind may go I, judge, as a illustrate: com- has failed the administrator ord or now, that blind if I am years-but five by the required procedures ply with me render deemed Roche, possibility v. Abnathya plan.” Hoffmann-La disabled. also, presently Cir.1993); see 40, Inc., 2 F.3d I think we recognize all stress, lar fitness as “excellent,” his cardiac condi- it may while affect cardiac patients, does tion as stable and further stated pa- not necessarily incapacitate them, pre- or tients with a New York Heart Association vent them from successfully to, returning Functional Class I level typically “an have and performing, jobs, i.e., stressful Vice overall low risk of cardiovascular morbidi- President Dick See, Cheney. e.g., Coker v. ty mortality.” App. at 229. Metropolitan Co., Ins. Life (8th Cir.2002) 798-99 (plan not arbi- VI. trary and capricious in denying benefits, I believe that the District even where the should claimant’s doctor declared have determined, on him disabled established ad- based on the exacerbating record, ministrative stress); factor of whether the Adminis- Gooden v. Provident trator & his abused Accident discretion was arbi- 335 n. 8 (5th trary Cir.2001) capricious (dismissing determining at claimant’s com- plaint least the following that his matters: insurance company failed to account for his doctor’s concern of the (a) Did Dr. Lasser meet his burden of stress associated job). with his establishing the material tasks and aspects

Based on the record, administrative practice? was not arbitrary and capricious for Reli (b) Are emergency surgeries and on-call ance to determine that Dr. Lasser was not parts material of Dr. Lasser’s func- “disabled” based on any risk of relapse tions anas orthopedic surgeon? Indeed, stress. stress tests subse (c) Could and did Dr. Lasser quent to his heart attack in July 1996 did elective (scheduled, not emergency) not reveal sur- any chest pain or EKG abnor gery as procedures material malities during occupa- cardiac testing, only a tion? “very small myocardial infarction” which was “very small and probably clinically (d) Could Reliance’s policy as drawn insignificant.” App. at 208. Three car take into account future disabilities that diologists rated Dr. Lasser aat Functional Dr. may suffer or was it limited to *17 Class I level for physical capacity on the only the current or present disability

New York Heart Association Functional which Dr. Lasser may or may not have? System, Classification which level desig It is these matters with which the Dis- nates “[pjatients with cardiac disease but trict Court had to concern itself in deter- with no limitation of physical activity.” mining whether the Administrator’s denial II, 146 F.Supp.2d at 626. Dr. Ald of benefits was arbitrary and capricious. rich’s 25, March 1998 report states: “I do By failing so, to do I believe the District not disagree [with Dr. Burke] all Court erred. objective criteria Dr. Lasser is doing very well at point this in time” and also One reports last word on subject. this I am that Dr. Lasser “does not currently troubled have the District Court’s reliance any symptoms, his examination is negative on the Ninth Circuit’s de novo standard in with respect to the system, cardiovascular Kearney. supra See note 3. While Kear- and his stress test April 1997, ney may advocates, have its and I cannot well as the stress test performed by help but note that the Ninth Circuit en Burke good showed exercise capacity....” banc court was severely divided, we have App. at 222. Dr. Raska’s August 5, yet 1998 to depart from established review stan- report confirmed Dr. Lasser’s cardiovascu- dards in ERISA and summary judgment mind, District Court’s my To cases. NUMBER ACCOUNT OF CONTENTS favor in standards these both abrogation of Tas 03001288, Name Held warning bell review, rings Kearney of a National at Union Located neem Jalal ignored. Branch, Deira-Du Rashidiya Bank, its conducted Court Had Emirates; Contents bai, Arab United is, should, that suggested Ias hearing Held Number of Account resolution only to the confining itself Located Jalal of Tasneem Name in the biased, conflicted Walsh whether Sharjah Zurich Bank AG at Habib then resorted Court the District had Emirates; Con Branch, Arab United reso- summary judgment traditional to the Number of Account tents below, I the record only on based lution Jalal Tasneem Name of in the Held this But this issue. not have raised would Zurich, AG Bank at Habib Located out, Ias played case way this is not Emi Branch, Arab Sharjah United review permit the If we noted. have rates; Jalal Tasneem signal case, it will I fear in this place took v. they the future courts district of America STATES UNITED merits cases, to hold free, similar are sum- from the to deviate thus hearings and Jalal, Appellant. Tasneem standards. Pinto judgment mary 02-1839. No. Dis sum, I would reverse Thus, in of Appeals, Court States United Las- of Dr. in favor judgment Court’s

trict Circuit. Third the District remand ser 12, 2002. Dec. Argued on the sum under case consider properly 25, 2003. Sept. Filed def standard, giving Pinto judgment mary theAs determinations. Walsh’s erence noted, a court recently just

Supreme Court standard; correct actually apply must mere citation lipservice mere See suffice. will not of review standard — U.S. -, -, Vincent, v. Price (2003) L.Ed.2d S.Ct. recited Circuit the Sixth (holding 28 U.S.C. review under standard correct it when apply 2254(d)(1) did not then but § *18 jeopardy question double it reviewed issue.) dissent. Thus, respectfully I notes which the circulation catecholamines Aldrich, considered Dr. physician, Lasser’s precipitant to be a have been shown Associa- York Heart to be New Lasser and sudden infarction (“Patients myocardial acute II with Class Functional tion Lasser’s opinion, Dr. Raska’s death.” limitation slight with disease cardiac stress reduc- graft made vein unsuccessful comfortable They are activity. physical as increased important, especially tion symp- experience but exertion with mild earlier fail- bring about even could stress grades strenuous the more toms with context, he In this graft. ure Class Therapeutic activity.”) and ordinary disability benefits Lasser’s Dr. opined whose (“Patients disease cardiac with C revoked been not have should mod- activity be should ordinary physical the material duties safely perform “cannot more strenu- and whose restricted erately — surgeon.”9 discontinued.”) orthopedic anof should ous efforts in Functional Lasser was said that Raska prognosis Burke described 7. Dr. Therapeutic C. Class I and regi- stabilizing Class "plaque awith "excellent” slight prevent "ace inhibitors men” and 9.Moreover, sharply critical Raska with exer- response associated hypertensive evaluation, of Reliance’s the basis Burke's cise." While benefits. to terminate decision initial underwent according Dr. Burke Dr. Burke con- points out that also 8. Reliance he exercised test in stress I treadmill Class be in Functional Lasser to sidered

Case Details

Case Name: Stephen P. Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Sep 18, 2003
Citation: 344 F.3d 381
Docket Number: 02-4123
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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