Stephen H. Loy v. Robert A. ClammeStephen H. Loy v. Robert A. Clamme
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- Before:
- Bauer
Stephen Loy appeals an order of the district court dismissing his civil rights case in its entirety. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
I.
Stephen Loy was arrested and charged with murder on September 11, 1979. Following his arrest, Loy was held in pre-trial detention at the Jay County Jail in Portland, Indiana. While Loy was being held there a fellow inmate was murdered and Loy was subsequently charged with and convicted of battery against the murdered inmate. On December 15, 1979, Loy was transferred to the Indiana State Reformatory pending his trial on the murder charge. Loy was returned to the Jay County Jail on September 18,1980, in order to stand trial for murder. Eleven days later, Loy was convicted of murder and removed to an Indiana prison.
On May 13, 1983, approximately two and one-half years after Loy was last held in the Jay County Jail, he filed a
pro se
complaint in the district court alleging various violations of his constitutional rights. Loy amended his complaint to allege violations under
II.
“It is well settled that the re-’ quirement of a timely notice of appeal is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional,’ ” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 62, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (citing Bowder v. Director, Illinois Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 560, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978)), and so, if Loy’s notice of appeal was filed out of time as appellees claim, we are without jurisdiction over this appeal. Judge Lee signed the order on May 7,1985, and the order is stamped filed on that date. The docket sheet indicates, however, that the order was entered on the docket on May 8, 1985. Because Loy filed his notice of appeal on June 7, 1985, thirty days from the order’s entry on the docket, his notice of appeal was timely. See Stelpflug v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 790 F.2d 47 (7th Cir.1986).
Appellees next suggest that we affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing Loy’s
In
Anton,
we held that, “in Illinois, a plaintiff whose
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. ... Second, it has been stressed that “we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” ... Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[wjhere a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.”
(Citations omitted). As in
Anton,
we must first “determine whether
Wilson
effectively overruled clear precedent in this circuit upon which litigants may have relied when they filed a
A month before Loy filed his motion to proceed
in forma pauperis
and six months before he filed his complaint, we held that, in
The second Chevron factor requires us to determine the effect the retroactive application of Wilson would have on the interests furthered by Wilson. Those interests are: “(1) safeguarding the rights of federal civil litigants; (2) achieving uniformity and certainty; and (3) minimizing unnecessary collateral litigation.” Anton, 787 F.2d at 1144 (citations omitted). We reaffirm our reasoning in Anton in finding that “the interests of establishing uniformity and reducing litigation are not hampered by nonretroactive litigation and the interest of safeguarding the rights of federal civil rights litigants is retarded by retroactive application.” Id. at 1145. Thus the second Chevron factor has also been satisfied in this case.
Finally, we must weigh the “inequity imposed by retroactive application,”
Chevron,
404 U.S. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355. Here as in
Anton,
the retroactive application of
Wilson
would produce inequitable results. Loy filed suit approximately two and one-half years after his alleged injuries occurred, well within the five-year limitation period applicable at that time. The Supreme Court decided
Wilson
approximately two years after Loy filed suit. During those two years, the parties expended a considerable amount of time and resources in this case. Thus retroactive application of
Wilson
“would not serve justice and would impose a hardship on those plaintiffs who had actually pursued their
Accordingly, we find, as in
Anton,
an Indiana “plaintiff whose
We therefore reverse the order of the district court with respect to Loy’s
III.
The district court also dismissed Loy’s claims under
*409 Affirmed in part and Reversed and Remanded in part.