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Stephen A. Mobley v. Frederick Head, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison
306 F.3d 1096
11th Cir.
2002
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 6 MOBLEY,

Stephen Petitioner- A.

Appellant,

v. Warden, HEAD, Georgia Frederick P.C., Steel, Firm, Brian Law The Steel Diagnostic and Classification Atlanta, GA, Petitioner-Appellant. Prison, Respondent-Appellee. Burton, Attaway State of Geor- Allison No. 02-14224. Atlanta, GA, Dept., Respon- Law gia Appeals, States Court United dent-Appellee. Circuit.

Eleventh

Sept. TJOFLAT, BARKETT and

Before WILSON, Judges. Circuit BARKETT, Judge: Circuit Having determined that the Su forthcoming in Ab Court’s preme —Bell, -, dur’Raham v. (grant 152 L.Ed.2d 620 every ing certiorari consider whether a prohibited motion constitutes petition as a “second or successive” habeas law), matter of determine our resolu will raises in this issues hereby stay Mobley’s execution appeal, we until a decision that case or pending the Supreme further order this Court or fully the dissent describes Court. Because procedural background the factual only explain our write disagreement. dissent, we that the

Unlike the Turpin, read fairly district court (11th Cir.1996), to have es- bright-line restric- tablished for “second or tions all petitions apply to successive” peti- motions filed (“We at 661 tioners. See hold that the successive restric- tions contained in amendments 60(b) proceedings, to Rule *2 1097 explained previously, even those seek to under proceedings where that standard review, became final be judgement amend a that amendments.”); fore the effective date A discretionary that decision within falls Medina, 1556, n re 109 F.3d I permitted bounds, is but based on false (11th Cir.1997) (“We held in Felker premises, raises question on review that and successive second as to whether the trial court would have to restrictions amended come to the same conclusion using prop- 60(b) motions.”). That is the same premises. er That it could have does unequivocal rule that the Court not satisfy inquiry as to it whether granted has certiorari Ab- would have reached the same result. dur’Raham, and we the outcome The affirmance of a deci- discretionary that ease will determine outcome here. sion that is based on improper an view believes, apparently The dissent not of the merely facts the law reflects Medina, withstanding Felker and that the appellate court’s exercise discre- Mobley’s subject motion not rightfully belongs that to the trial 2244(b)’s Assuming restrictions. ar- court. proper The role of appellate re- guendo on that that dissent correct permits view pro- remand further score, precedent we believe that our ceedings discretionary when squarely affirming precludes us has premises. been made on false clearly alleged district has Mobley court. Co., Collins Seaboard C.R. that regarding the State’s actions Fuller’s Cir.1982). Therefore, if testimony created infirmities in federal his right the dissent were that the district hearing, just pro not the state Felker, court misread then under Collins 60(b) motion, ceedings. Mobley In his remand; required we would recently claims that discovered evidence by substituting would not be free to affirm prior that demonstrates the district court’s district court’s discretion our con- resolution of his claim was tainted jecture it would have reached the (regarding because it was based facts it guided by same result had been a proper testimony) prior the State course, view of law. Of we believe the knew or should have known were false. correctly interpreted district court “ex argues these recognizing but circumstances,” traordinary granted has certiorari on the same issue court should have exercised its discretion Abdur’Rahman, we it appropriate find grant under Rule him relief from stay pending issue a decision in judgment denying request ha- case. beas relief.1 Appellant Stephen Mobley’s Stay A. Mobley’s The court denied Execution is GRANTED. perceived motion to be because what Felker’s This re absolute rule. TJOFLAT, Judge, dissenting: Circuit views a denial of a motion for abuse Singletary, of discretion. See Booker v. Before the court three last-minute (11th Cir.1996). Anthony petitions As we filed inmate Steven disagree reopen We lan- with the dissent that the would also have discretion to evidence”) 60(b)(2) guage Mobley's ("newly is restricted to Rule motion discovered 60(b)(6) ("any justifying has limited other reason ground. operation judgment”). to that enumerated The district from the Mobley’s death sen- the administration to death was sentenced Mobley, who Collins, em Pizza a Domino’s tence. killing John of a robbery during

ployee, armed February store Pizza Domino’s *3 I. to for Permission (1) “Application an 1991: Ha- of for Writ Petition File a Successive on what premised Mobley’s petitions (2) Cer “Application for an Corpus;” beas phase of his sentencing at the transpired of an [from order Appealability of tificate County, of Hall Superior in the trial for the District States the United sentencing phase, the Georgia. During his Georgia denying District Northern had that he evidence Mobley introduced for Re Stay of Execution Motion any exchange in plead guilty to offered Fed. Pursuant Judgment from lief penalty.1 than death other punishment Stay of and Motion ] R.Civ.P. Judge rebuttal, called prosecution In Execution;” “Motion Recall superior Though was Fuller. Andrew 13980[, Mobley v. in Case Mandate 00— trial, Mobley’s time of judge at the Cir.2001)].” (11th Head, F.3d 1312 267 attorney at the had been Fuller panel The believes made the and had prosecution onset of Ab in forthcoming decision Court’s against penalty death to seek the decisión — -, Bell, 122 v. dur’Rahman Mobley.2 (2002) will 152 L.Ed.2d Mobley the issues affect the resolution to seek that he decided Fuller testified the Court’s filings, because raises these what knew [he] “once penalty the death will determine in Abdur’Rahman decision actual to the regard with occurred” had 60(b) motion Mobley’s Rule whether Among crime. circumstances that Federal reviewed should be that it was were Fuller considered factors or, instead,, should Procedure Rule of Civil Mob- robbery,” that armed planned “a well succes- a “second or to be be considered immediately for the ley pistol [his] “used corpus, for writ sive” taking accomplishing purpose' previ- our with supposedly accordance Collins, seeing after money,” and that Turpin, 101 v. Felker ous face, to a back been marched Mobley’s had Cir.1996). Consequently, kneel, in the room, and then shot forced to consideration postpone chosen panel has he was Fuller said that the head. back of execu- stay his Mobley’s filings —and that Mob- by the troubled fact particularly decides AbdurRah- the Court tion—until shooting about the “wasn’t léy concerned from dissent I must Respectfully, man. put his bag grabbed as he so much I believe that this decision he exited money before and, getaway hand, at the case inapplicable building.” thus, postpone for us to is no need there actually The first Mobley tried twice. only was 2. was Mobley’s plea offer one failed At the commence- in a ended mistrial. trial mitigating that he pieces three Mobley's trial —at which of the second ment sentencing phase his tri- at the introduced ' (cid:127) imposed— ultimately was sentence father, plead who Mobley al. also called jeopardy, but his Mobley plead tried to double witness, son, expert and an mercy for Georgia rejected claim suffered who testified State, Ga. Court. See may personality disorder which antisocial (Ga.1993). testimony was S.E.2d 150 ages. as he mellow sentencing phase of during tire Mobley’s second trial. Fuller also added that he had mother, consulted the victim’s apparently contacted family, they Collins “supported” Mobley’s father to him tell that she had his decision to seek the death penalty. He decided to oppose Mobley’s execution. On however, emphasized, they “never put July Mobley filed an “Extraordinary anything that [he] would even associate Motion for New Trial as to Sentence” in pressure [him],” him, with telling “It is Superior Court of Hall County, Geor- decision, your our put you.” trust in gia. His motion asserted if his death fact, family’s feelings only factored as sentence were vacated and he were afford- “a small percentage” decision to trial, ed sentencing Mrs. Collins instead, seek the death penalty; per- “95 testify that her family only ac- *4 cent of the decision made based on [was] quiesced to Fuller’s decision to seek the [he saw] that describefd] and death penalty because Fuller had not told define[d] the defendant for [him].” them that a sentence life of without parole was an option available

Despite initial case. On his impressions, Fuller 19, July the superior court denied asserted Mob- nonetheless tried to re- ley’s motion. The main court found that “open minded ... because of the evidence Mobley simple decision,” present wished to gravity of the at a when Mob- new sentencing ley’s hearing counsel would approached him about a admissi- plea ble, but that even if Fuller, offer. According to testimony other were factors decision, to a jury, reinforced his “it though. [could] not Specifical- reason- ly, ably be Fuller concluded Mobley joked opposition recounted how had family victim’s getting job about a to the at Domino’s death penalty ... “because probably produce he knew vacancy,” there was a a gotten had different ver- dict.” Mobley a back, applied Domino’s tattoo on his had the Georgia Su- raped preme cellmate, his for a and had prison discretionary told a deputy, appeal of motion, way him, as a denial of his threatening but his application that he was was “looking denied. more and more like Domino’s delivery Pizza boy every day.” These 2, August On Mobley shifted his efforts led events Fuller to “that [he] had to the system federal court and filed a

made the right decision” seeking the Stay “Motion for of Execution and for death penalty, as he saw Mobley “noth- Relief Judgment from Pursuant Fed. ing but pure unadulterated meanness.” 60(b)” R.Civ.P. with the United Dis- States noted, As Mobley was sentenced to trict Court for the Northern District of death. On appeal, direct Georgia Su- Georgia. The district court denied this preme Court affirmed capital his convic- 3, August finding that Mobley tion and death sentence. Mobley See v. had not met the conditions 28 U.S.C. State, (Ga.1995). 265 Ga. S.E.2d 2244(b), which, said, were applicable Mobley sought then relief Turpin, Felker v. 101 F.3d 657 state and federal petitions court. His Cir.1996), to Rule motions filed with ultimately were denied. Mobley See regard to habeas corpus petitions. Conse- Head, (11th Cir.2001); 267 F.3d 1312 Tur- quently, Mobley turned to us for relief pin v. Mobley, 269 Ga. 502 S.E.2d 458 filing an “Application for Ap- Certificate of (Ga.1998). pealability” from order, the district court’s July

On 2002—less than a month an “Application for Permission to File before the date on was Successive Petition for Writ of Habeas Collins, scheduled to be executed—Nina Corpus,” and a “Motion Recall Man- under- guilty applicant found Mobley’s 00-13980.” No. in Case date lying offense. No. in Case the Mandate to Recall “Motion him re- direct to grant us asks 00-13980” revoking our

lief, specifically nei- has met application, In his denial the district affirmance His claim criteria. these two ther of contrast, in petition. his habeas unconstitutionally sentence his death Appeala- for Certificate “Application knowingly pre- the state imposed Permission “Application bility” during sen- testimony false Fuller’s sented of Ha- for Writ Petition File Successive tencing is not to allow Mobley wants us Corpus,” beas Likewise, Mobley has law. to seek him dis- not have that he could shown neither letting it reconsider namely by his claim— underlying the facts covered his claim that light misrepresentations namely, testimo- through his jury misled Fuller due dili- the exercise -through Collins— Mob- supported family Collins’ ny that jury had the proven nor gence, essentially *5 filings execution; both ley’s misrepresen- alleged Fuller’s about known two result, through albeit the same seek family, it would to the Collins’ tation mechanisms. procedural separate Therefore, him to death. have sentenced of showing of either facie a prima

without under Mobley’s application grounds, these II. 2244(b)(2)fails. § claims, Mobley for one vehicle As pursuant application an

has filed III. 2244(b)(3)(A), as amended § U.S.C. A. Effective the Antiterrorism § of (“AEDPA”), Act of Penalty Death “Application filing an In addition the district authorizing an order seeking Petition a Successive to File Permission or successive” a “second consider court Mobley filed Habeas Corpus,” of for Writ Such corpus. of habeas for writ petition Appeala- for Certificate “Application if: granted bemay authorization denial of court’s from the bility” aforementioned, As motion. his Rule claim that the (A) applicant shows in his Certifi- same relief Mobley seeks law, constitutional a new on relies review Appealability cate of —district on collateral to cases retroactive made alleged light of his sentence Court, by the application in his misrepresentations —-as unavailable; or previously corpus habeas or successive” for a “second (B)(i) predicate factual however, difference, There is petition. discovered been not have claim could and a “second a Rule between due through the exercise previously petition. habeas or successive” diligence; and each is in the harm lies The distinction or succes- A “second to cure. claim, designed if (ii) underlying facts corpus petition, discussed evi- sive” light viewed proven specific two above, to address is meant whole, be sufficient would as a dence by prisoners: claims of constitutional types convincing evi- by clear and establish rule of a new (1) “rel[y] on error, claims that constitutional but for dence rely (2) law,” claims have factfinder no reasonable on a rule of constitutional law and are any other reason justifying relief on evidence that “could not have operation of the judgment. previously through discovered the ex- 60(b). Fed.R.Civ.P. When a habeas cor- ercise of due diligence” and would estab- pus petitioner under, moves petitioner’s lish the factual innocence. 28 example, 60(b)(3), he is impugning 2244(b)(3)(A). U.S.C. Neither these integrity of the district court’s judg- types challenges claims the district ment rejecting ground denial of relief under 28 that the State obtained the judgment Instead, U.S.C. alleges each fraud. Asserting this claim is quite differ- the contextual pro- circumstances of the ent from contending, as the petitioner ceeding changed so much that the would ain successive peti- petitioner’s conviction or sentence now tion, that his conviction or sentence was runs afoul of the Constitution. “in obtained violation of the Constitution contrast,

In laws a motion treaties for relief United States.” 2254(a). Rule 60 of the Federal U.S.C. of Civil Rules Pro- cedure integrity contests the pro- sum, a “second or successive” habeas ceeding that resulted the district court’s corpus petition, like all peti judgment. Rule states: tions, is meant to remedy constitutional

(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; (albeit Excusable violations ones which arise out of Neglect; Newly Evidence; Discovered facts discovered or laws evolved after an Fraud, Etc. On motion and such initial habeas corpus proceeding), while a *6 just, terms as are 60(b) the may court relieve Rule motion is designed to pro cure party a or a party’s legal representative cedural violations in an proceed earlier order, from a final judgment, or pro- ing here, a habeas corpus proceeding— — ceeding (1) for the following reasons: that questions raise about that proceed mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or ex- ing’s integrity. This distinction identifies (2) cusable neglect; newly discovered these types two of filings matter how —no evidence which diligence due styled. could either words, is In other if peti a not have been tioner, discovered time to already who has been denied feder move for a trial 59(b); under Rule al corpus habeas relief files a motion that (3) (whether fraud heretofore presents denom- new constitutional claims to the extrinsic), inated intrinsic or misrepre- district this motion should be consid sentation, or other misconduct of an ad- ered a “second or successive” habeas cor (4) party; verse void; the judgment is pus petition petitioner if the calls it —even (5) judgment the satisfied, 60(b) has been re- a Likewise, Rule motion3. if the leased, or discharged, or a prior judg- petitioner sought a “second or successive” upon ment which it is based has been habeas petition to questions raise vacated, reversed or otherwise or it is no about integrity a prior habeas cor longer equitable that the judgment pus proceeding perhaps suggesting that — should have prospective application; the prior proceeding was rife with fraud— Utilizing approach especially impor- following (6) any reasons: ... other reason dealing tant when with justifying motions made under operation relief from the of the Federal Rule of Civil judgment.”). Procedure See A district court that uses this 60(b)(6) ("On Fed.R.Civ.P. motion and provision "catch-all” to allow a habeas cor- just, such terms as may are pus petitioner court a relieve to obtain review of newa con- party legal representative or a party's will, view, from a my stitutional claim eviscerate order, judgment, final proceeding provisions of AEDPA.

1102 case, only dealt with which filing facts review should court then 60(b) amend to 60(b) of Rule use mo Rule standards under con- other allege habeas of 28 the strictures not under- and tions by the Any decision violations. stitutional 2244(b)(2).4 U.S.C. 60(b) motions Rule regarding panel Felker way in no inconsistent approach This claims allege do not that 101 Turpin, v. in Felker holding our with Second, dicta. mere be considered must Cir.1996). In that F.3d suggests Felker wording. of mo- last-minute filed a inmate row a universal adopt intend did not panel (3), 60(b)(1), (2), Rule 60(b) motions filed Rule rule about through he discovered though even petitioners; 'corpus habeas Georgia Open under the brought lawsuit “that successive said the panel § 50-18-70 Ann. Act, Ga Code Records amendments contained restrictions (1994). review our In -76 60(b) proceed- 2244(b) §to motion, spe- we of Felker’s denial conclu- seemingly id., it based this ings,” the claims “[a]ll cifically noted that “Rule notion on the statement sive Maryland, Brady v. raises Felker re- to circumvent be used cannot 10 L.Ed.2d 83, 83 S.Ct. petitions,” habeas on successive straints at 662. (1963), claims.” later Therefore, open left Felker Id. to use trying words, Felker was other a Rule where the scenario asserting consti- aas vehicle corpus petitioner by a filed con- claims tutional to circumvent meant is not Not petition. in a veyed particular 2244(b), seeks instead but Felk- “because held that surprisingly, Rule of Civil that Federal to be was due proceeding er’s provides. specifically Procedure successive second treated failed cases application, Moreover, Circuit the Eleventh authorizing the order for an in line ... falls move presumably cites that application, to consider Singletary, with — Scott *7 by do required he was Thigpen, 875 (11th Cir.1994); Lindsey as v. denial 2244(b)(3)(A), district the Cir.1989); v. (11th § Booker and F.2d Id. at proper.” Cir.1987)— entirely (11th was his motion Dugger, 825 all concept 661. support no provide as 28 60(b) viewed should motions Rule instant In the 2244(b) Scott Both petitions. § U.S.C. pan- this colleagues on my presumably habe- where with situations Lindsey dealt They differently, however. read Felker el constitution asserted petitioners as proposi- for the Felker stands motions, 60(b)(6) so in Rule al violations in the restrictions peti where cases inapplicable they peti- 2244(b) or successive” for “second 60(b) in Rule misuse use do not filed tioners motions to all tions (“The Scott, at 1550 38 F.3d way. See A close petitioners. by habeas 60(b)(6) motion Scott’s gravamen at presents text of Felker study of the mandate is to recall the and his motion why this inter- reasons separate two least Dugger, v. in Scott that our earlier First, it belies inaccurate. pretation motion, petitioner more a a Rule of review standard Obviously, because the 4. guise the former likely to file habeas successive” "second versa. than vice latter stringent than that more petition is so much (11th Cir.1989), 891 F.2d 800 affirming the lawyer regarding claims of ineffective as court’s denial of his sistance of represented fraud counsel— writ of corpus, ‘erroneously found upon the district court in violation of Rule no merit to [his] claim that [Florida’s] 60(b). Booker, See 825 F.2d at 282. Ac “heinous, atrocious cruel” aggravating cordingly, the panel, in denying the mo applied circumstance was in an overbroad tion, focused on the fact that Booker could vague manner when penalty phase show that any such fraud occurred and jury did not adequate receive guidance did not consider whether the motion met ”) (al- regarding narrowing construction.’ standards of 28 U.S.C. 2254.5 See teration in original); Lindsey, 875 F.2d at Hence, id. at 283-85. Eleventh Circuit 1511 (considering a motion under Rule jurisprudence, Felker, from Booker to has 60(b)(6) claims, based on two proposition established the that a Rule “first, that the trial court’s consideration of 60(b) motion filed a habeas corpus peti heinous, ‘especially Alabama’s atrocious tioner be considered to be a “sec statutory cruel’ aggravating fix- factor ond or successive” petition if—and only ing his eighth sentence violated the motion asserts a claim that more if—the amendment interpreted by as properly should be raised in a habeas cor Court in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. pus petition, i.e., a constitutional violation.6 108 S.Ct. 100 L.Ed.2d 372 This corresponds with second, [and] that the trial court’s consid- Court’s recent grant of certiorari Ab eration of statutory aggravating factors —Bell, dur’Rahman -, v. not found by jury violated the sixth (2002). 152 L.Ed.2d 620 amendment interpreted by Ninth AbdurRahman, Circuit, the Sixth Ricketts, Circuit in in an Adamson unpublished order,7 (in rejected Cir.1988) banc)....”). habeas cor Book- er, pus contrast, petitioner’s motion, did address a situation somewhat it did not hand; similar to satisfy the one at criteria listed in 28 2244(b)(2) row inmate perjured contended U.S.C. for a “second or suc testimony during a previous pro- cessive” corpus petition. In doing ceeding so, inmate’s former the Sixth explicitly Circuit relied on a —albeit quotes following prisoner statement from "[t]he Felker ... identically Booker: “We also requirements note that the respects situated in all material with Medi- corpus, of federal habeas including the abuse Id. at na.” 1561. Like Medina tried applied writ standard to successive to use Rule to raise a new constitutional writs, *8 9(b), 2254, claim, Rule may prop- specifically that incompetent he was to erly superimposed be independent on this ac- be executed. The case at is hand different 60(b)].” Booker, [filed under Rule because, here, from both Felker and Medina Felker, quoted at F.2d 284 n. prisoner 60(b) trying the is not to use Rule to at passing 661. This comment was a footnote assert a constitutional claim. dicta, in Booker clearly and is as it had no role in how the case was decided. 7.As indicated in Abdur'Rahman's brief in support certiorari, petition of his a for writ of note, 6. my colleagues As in a later In re judgments two the of the Sixth Circuit for Medina, (11th Cir.1997), 109 F.3d 1556 sought which he review are in a “embodied stated that “[w]e held in single Felker that the sec- unpublished incorporating Order pri- a petition ond and successive unpublished restrictions of or order.” Moreover the district 2244(b) 60(b) amended to Rule mo- judgments court orders that those address are tions.” Id. at Therefore, 1561. Medina adds little in- unpublished. also the facts of the sight to holding the of as it based its case were derived from Abdur’Rahman's brief simply reliance on Felker on the fact that itself. denial of its reconsider court to district Scroggy, 99 decision, McQueen v. of a light habeas held his Cir.1996), had which procedural Court Supreme Tennessee 60(b) practical the is motion Rule “a retr applied be supposed that was rule habeas a successive equivalent Therefore, Abdur’Rahman oactively.8 at 1335. Id. petition.” 60(b), incorrectly, as Rule using was the Su McQueen, in which facts of The a “second equivalent practical the review, certiorari declined Court preme but, habeas successive” 1257, 117 Parker, McQueen v. “prior the relief because to seek properly, (1997), were L.Ed.2d 185 district which upon [the judgment Abdur’Rahman, those different been reversed ha[d] decision] [wa]s McQueen, petitioner the however. Fed.R.Civ.P. vacated.” otherwise “broad to raise motion used in Ab- certiorari By granting violations,” constitutional allegations has inti durRahman, Supreme Court initial included “never were today I suggest the rule mated —that McQueen es was Because Id. petition.” consid only be motion or successive” a “second seeking sentially cor habeas or successive” a “second ered circuit the Sixth corpus petition, habeas to assert seeks if the former pus petition 60(b) mo McQueen’s Rule to review chose is the and thus violations id. writ. See abuse tion for the latter. equivalent” “practical a Rule (“[0]nce it is determined note, I add that As a final of a suc practical equivalent is the law, with case consistent just is not the issue petition, cessive the fair comports with it also cause and but has McQueen met whether If, justice. burden.”). contrast, administration equitable in Ab- By prejudice show inmate could row example, try was not dur’Rahman, petitioner fraud indeed committed State assert constitu ing to use during court Instead, he wanted violations. tional to have deemed brief, in order be Appeals nal see su- According Abdur’Rahman's re- state remedies con- all available refused to exhausted pra court note Rather, when many of claims specting claim of error. sider the merits writ of petition for presented in his presented to the claim has because, presented although Court, he had Appeals of Criminal Ap- to the Tennessee claims these denied, litigant shall has been and relief in an present them peals, failed to he had available all to have exhausted deemed to the discretionary review application for On for that claim. available state remedies The district Supreme Court. Tennessee by the capital cases automatic had "failed Adbur’Rahman concluded that Code pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court claims, [he] and "because these exhaust” 39-13-206, Annotated, a claim in state remedy ... available no ha[d] Appeals shall be of Criminal to the Court procedurally defaulted.” [we]re claims these such even when exhausted considered pending court’s denial die district While Supreme Court renewed in claim not however, appeal, the Tennessee review. on automatic *9 39, provided: which promulgated Rule moved Sup.Ct. R. 39. Abdur’Rahman Tenn. convictions appeals from In all criminal 60(b) from the for relief Rule under af- post-conviction relief matters asserting corpus, of habeas court's denial litigant shall not July ter Rule Supreme Court Tennessee rehearing to file required petition for claims, and, exhausted he had indeed appeal permission application for therefore, should district court following Supreme Court Tennessee their merits. Crimi- the Court of decision of an adverse corpus proceeding, it would be a miscar- successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2). justice if riage eye § we turned a blind judicial process. such abuse of the Never- court, The district in denying Mobley’s theless, this is the result that would occur 60(b) motion, interpreted Felker as 60(b) if corpus petitioners’ establishing a bright-line rule that “the always were

motions “second considered successive restrictions contained in or successive” corpus petitions. 2244(b) § the amendments to apply to all, After a claim prosecutorial fraud 60(b) proceedings.” rely does not on “a new rule of constitu- at 661. it Consequently, found that Mob- may tional by law” clear “establish 60(b) ley’s motion was by bound the same convincing evidence ... that no rea- restrictions as successive habeas sonable factfinder would have found the 2244(b). petitions under 28 U.S.C. Since applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” Mobley had not our sought permission to It is a claim that file such a petition under 28 U.S.C. recognized. must be nonetheless 2244(b)(3)(A), the district court rea-

soned, his motion under Rule must therefore fail. B.

Mobley now argues that Felker has been Mobley’s case point dis illustrates abrogated thus, the district court’s —and cussed above. that believes faulty —because district court should have him re granted granted certiorari AbdurRah- lief from its denial of his “[wjhether man as every Rule .to State, petition, according to Motion prohibited constitutes a ‘second or him, committed a fraud upon the district successive’ habeas petition as a matter of through purportedly false My colleagues, law.” reading the holding testimony. Clearly, he is suggesting, of Felker the same 60(b)(3),9 accordance with Rule stayed Mobley’s execution because they district court should him relieve from its were if unsure that holding would still be judgment in the habeas corpus proceeding valid after the Court decides AbdurRah- (whether due to “fraud heretofore denom I man. As discussed sec- extrinsic), inated intrinsic or misrepresen tion, however, I do not tation by or misconduct” the State. He is stands for the proposition that every Rule not presenting a claim upon a Motion filed a habeas peti- rule of constitutional law or constitution tioner constitutes “second successive” al claim based on he could and, thus, habeas corpus petition, I do not not have discovered through exercise believe that the grant Court’s effect, therefore, of due diligence. certiorari AbdurRahman threatens the wholly claim is different from one for a validity of holding in Felker. Never- does not indicate viously under which sub- petition, considered the habeas section of Rule he seeks relief. The did so based facts and assertions language Mobley’s actual motion makes (or respondent was aware clear, however, Mobley asserting fraud aware) materially were false. upon the district court seeking and therefore judgment The resulting denying Court’s 60(b)(3): relief under Rule thereby tainted mis- fraudulent grounds The Mobley's for Mr. motion relate representations respondent. directly integrity to the of this Court's deci- *10 added). (emphasis sionmaking process. pre- this When Court 1106 ha- court’s the district during never raised Mobley’s motion that theless, I believe therefore, and, no corpus proceeding, require- beas meet the not

fails, it does because al from Fuller’s derived 60(b). could have fraud ments of Hence, of them.10 misrepresentation leged Mobley’s light, possible in the best Read fails.11 motion Mobley’s may have the State that imply allegations supe- Georgia upon the fraud committed IV. allegedly by proffering court ñor resort, filed a Mobley has final As a sentenc- Mobley’s during testimony false in No. Mandate Case Recall the “Motion 60(b) relief obtain Rule In order ing. Thompson, 523 In Calderon 00-13980.” of his rejection the district L.Ed.2d 140 728 however, Mobley petition, acknowledged (1998), committed fraud was that show needs to recognized appeal “the courts that See, e.g., Rodri- couri. the district to recall their power an inherent to have (2d Mitchell, guez v. that “it mandates,” emphasized is but it Cir.2001) (“[A] motion to vacate resort, in reserve to be held last one of may be based on action] [habeas a federal contingencies.” grave, unforeseen against inadvertence, ex- mistake, surprise, ‘(1) In 549-50, Cal- at 1498. at 118 S.Ct. Id. ..., ‘(3) misrep- fraud neglect’ cusable moreover, that a deron, found the Court an ad- resentation, misconduct or other recall the mandate who seeks petitioner 60(b). These party.’ Fed.R.Civ.P. verse of a habeas from the denial inadvertence, mistake, are to references of AEDPA: by the strictures bound etc., of the fraud, in the course surprise, motion to prisoner’s In a liti- in the proceedings, federal the basis mandate on recall the which the against of the conviction gation can underlying be of the directed.”) merits prof- cannot Mobley ap- or successive a second regarded as regard because the this any fer 2244(b). §of purposes plication wishes was family’s the Collins issue of Georgia Superi- nary for New Trial Mobley Motion corpus petition, did 10. Therefore, had he raised July Court on under oath Judge Fuller lied ] “contendf corpus petition to the in his habeas rejected this claim that the reasons testified when he required have the court guilty were the cir- plead Mobley's offer to state court. the claim in first to exhaust crime, him Mobley's boastful cumstances 2254(b)(l)(A)("An application U.S.C. crime, See 28 Mobley's conduct about the attitude behalf of a a writ of habeas incarcerated, Mobley and the fact while judgment of custody pursuant person in 'pure me- unadulterated consumed with granted unless not be court shall a State Judge Fuller had ... ... because anness' (A) applicant has exhausted appears that — he was stipulation], when [a into entered courts of the available the remedies case, which attorney prosecuting State.''). plea was of a the offer the reason stated without possibility rejected was or the sentence, pa- be 11. Even if circuit possibly could all motions adopted a rule that The district re- future.” roled successive” habeas testimony “second treated whether Fuller's to consider fused law, Mobley’s should still corpus petitions, motion process Mobley due denied II, supra, I Part As discussed the claim be denied. Georgia had found courts the criteria of Mobley’s not meet motion does when Mob- procedurally defaulted Therefore, Mobley’s review. Simi- U.S.C. it on direct ley to raise failed regardless of how we first that he larly, concedes fails— Supreme Court de- or how testimony read Fellcer about regarding Fuller's his claim cides Abdur’Rahman. his Extraordi- wishes in family's Collins *11 Otherwise, petitioners Instead, (1) ings. could evade the deny his “Ap- against bar relitigation of claims pre- plication for Certificate of Appealability prior application, sented [from order of the United States Dis- 2244(b)(1), § against or the bar litigation trict Court for the Northern District of prior appli- claims in a Georgia denying his Motion Stay cation, § If grants the court Execution and for Relief Judgment motion, such a subject its action Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. ] Mo- irrespective AEDPA of whether the mo- (2) Execution,” for Stay deny his (in tion is based on old claims case “Application for Permission to File a Suc- 2244(b)(1) would apply) or new ones cessive Petition for Writ of Habeas Cor- (in 2244(b)(2) which case apply). (3) pus,” deny his “Motion to Recall the Id. at 118 S.Ct. at 1500. As discussed 00-13980,” Mandate Case lift the II, supra, Mobley’s Part claims do not stay Mobley’s execution. 2244(b). requirements meet Therefore, his motion to recall the man-

date of our affirmance of the district denial of his

must fail.

V. summary, panel post- should not

pone the resolution Mobley’s fil- three

Case Details

Case Name: Stephen A. Mobley v. Frederick Head, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Sep 18, 2002
Citation: 306 F.3d 1096
Docket Number: 02-14224
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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