Stephanie Kim SMITH, Appellant, v. Kole Ryan MCADAMS, Respondent.
WD 77449
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
Opinion filed: February 17, 2015
419 S.W.3d 418
Jesi Nan DeMeire, for Appellant.
Respondent Acting Pro Se.
Before Division Two: Anthony Rex Gabbert, Presiding, Judge, Joseph M. Ellis, Judge and Karen King Mitchell, Judge
Joseph M. Ellis, Judge
Appellant Stephanie Kim Smith appeals from a judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Ray County denying her petition for an adult order of protection against Respondent Kole Ryan McAdams.1 Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in determining that Respondent was not a “household member” within the
On October 8, 2013, Appellant filed her Adult Abuse/Stalking Petition for Order of Protection against Respondent. Respondent is Appellant‘s daughter‘s ex-boyfriend and the father of Appellant‘s grandson. In her petition, Appellant alleged the following incident occurred: Appellant was driving on a county highway when Respondent began following her in his vehicle. Eventually, Respondent aggressively drove past Appellant and cut her off, which caused Appellant to veer off the road. When Appellant turned into a residential driveway, Respondent blocked her in with his vehicle and demanded that she speak with him. When Appellant informed Respondent that she had called the police, Respondent drove away from the residence. Appellant further alleged that Respondent‘s actions evidenced that he knowingly and intelligently stalked, harassed, and followed her from place to place, attempted to cause her physical harm, and placed her in apprehension of immediate physical harm.
On November 20, 2013, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Appellant‘s petition. Appellant testified that Respondent had resided in her home for approximately two years.3 Two other witnesses also testified that Respondent had lived with Appellant in Appellant‘s home. Additionally, Appellant introduced evidence that Respondent had listed Appellant‘s address as his residence on records pertaining to Respondent‘s purchase of a vehicle. However, on cross-examination, Appellant‘s daughter testified that Respondent last lived with Appellant approximately six years ago.
At the hearing‘s conclusion, the circuit court denied Appellant‘s request for a full order of protection and, at the request of Appellant, memorialized its findings in a written judgment. In the judgment, the circuit court found that “Respondent engaged in unwanted conduct which caused alarm to [Appellant]” and that Appellant “felt fear of danger of physical harm, and that such alarm was reasonable based upon the conduct of the Respondent.” The circuit court further concluded that there was “undisputed evidence” that Appellant and Respondent “resided at the same residential address for two years.” Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded that Appellant and Respondent were not “family” or “household members” as defined in
Appellant now appeals from the circuit court‘s denial of her petition for an order of protection. Our review of a trial
In her sole point, Appellant contends that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in denying her petition in that the circuit court misinterpreted sections
The circuit court determined that, although Appellant and Respondent resided at the same residential address for two years, Appellant and Respondent were not “household members” for purposes of
Section
Here, Appellant contends that she is entitled to relief under
spouses, former spouses, any person related by blood or marriage, persons who are presently residing together or have resided together in the past, any person who is or has been in a continuing social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim, and anyone who has a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have resided together at any time[.]
(Emphasis added). Thus, under the statute‘s plain language, a household member includes persons with whom the petitioner is presently residing or has resided in the past. Therefore, despite the circuit court‘s focus on the nature of Appellant and Respondent‘s relationship and the passage of time since their cohabitation, Appellant needed to establish only that she had re-sided
To that end, the circuit court expressly found that Appellant and Respondent had “resided at the same residential address for two years.” This Court‘s interpretation of the term “reside” and the record before us on appeal support the circuit court‘s finding that the parties had resided together in the past.
While the statute provides no definition as to the term “reside“, this Court has interpreted the term, in the context of
To settle oneself or a thing in a place, to be stationed, to remain or stay, to dwell permanently or continuously, to have a settled abode for a time, to have one‘s residence or domicile; specifically, to be in residence, to have an abiding place, to be present as an element, to inhere as a quality, to be vested as a right.
State v. Cloyd, 238 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Mo. App.W.D.2007) (quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 1308 (6th ed. 1990)). In doing so, we explained that “[b]y any reasonable and ordinary definition, the term ‘reside’ includes both physical presence and intent to remain at that place for a significant period of time.” Id. at 187.
Appellant testified that Respondent resided in her home for approximately two years. Testimony from two other witnesses at the hearing further indicated that Respondent had lived or resided with Appellant in her home. Appellant also introduced into evidence records from Respondent‘s purchase of a vehicle in which he listed Appellant‘s address as his residency. Thus, there was sufficient evidence in the record from which the circuit court could conclude that Respondent was physically present in Appellant‘s home and remained there for a significant period of time.
Therefore, by establishing that she and Respondent resided together in the past, Appellant proved that Respondent is a former household member within the context of the Adult Abuse Act. Thus, it follows that the circuit court erred in denying Appellant‘s petition for an order of protection on grounds that Appellant and Respondent‘s relationship was insufficient to meet the definition of household members set forth in
All concur.
Joseph M. Ellis, Judge