Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.
Bossard Associates, Inc. and the estate of Dennis K. Bossard (collectively “Bossard” or “appellants”) appeal from the judgment of the District Court in favor of plaintiff Steno-graph, L.L.C., on claims that Bossard infringed Stenograph’s copyright for computer software and misappropriated its trade secrets. Appellants’ primary contention before this court is that Stenograph failed to present evidence- of “copying” sufficient to support an infringement action undеr the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.). Because appellants correctly concede that copying can be proven through evidence that the software was installed on a computer and then used for its principal purposes, we affirm the District Court.
I. Background
Stenograph, a Delaware corporation with its principal offices in Illinois,' provides goods and services to the court reporting industry. Stenograph sells several different versions of Computer-Aided Transcription software, which enables court reporters tó convert their stenographic notes into English text. In order to protect against the unauthorized use of such software, which is copyrighted, the company has developed “software protect devices” or “keys.” When a court reporter uses Premier Power software—the type of transcription software at issue in this appeal—to convert stenographic notes into text, the reporter must put a computer disk containing the notes into a computer that has both the software and a key plugged into the parallel port of the computer. Premier Power will not work on a computer unless a key simultaneously is plugged into the computer.
Stenograph requires that its customers enter' into license agreements for both the Transcription software and the keys. The company’s standard licensing agreement re *98 stricts the use of the licensed materials to a single computer. The license forbids the customer from transferring the Transcription software, the key, or the accompanying documentation to any third party, without the prior written consent of Stenograph. See Exhibit (“Ex.”) 5, at 19-20.
Stenograph filed its initial complaint on January 20, 1995, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and its First Amended Complaint on May 22, 1995, against, as pertinent to this appeal, Bossard Associates and Dennis K. Bossard (collectively “defendants”). See Ex. 1. Bossard Associates is a court reporting and litigation support service located in Washington, D.C. Before his death in August 1997, Mr. Bossard owned all of the stock of Bossard Associates and served as the company’s president and treasurer. Stenograph sought compensatory and punitive damages and an injunction for copyright infringement and state law claims of trade secret misappropriation and conversion. These claims arose from allegations that, from April 1992 through November 1994, Mr. Bossard illicitly purchased Stenograph’s Premier Power software and eleven keys from one of Steno-graph’s sales representatives, John Baker, with checks made payable to Baker personally, at a substantial discount from Steno-graph’s normal retail price,
A jury trial commenced on November 20, 1996. Stenograph presented evidence that Mr. Bossard obtained the keys and software from Baker during the alleged time periods. See Trial Tr. (11/21/96) at Appendix (“App.”) 164-66, 200; id. (11/22/96) at App. 228-36. Stenograph also presented evidence that defendants used the software and one or more of the keys obtained from Baker, gave four keys to independent contractors for them to use (at least partly for Bossard-related jobs), and resold two other keys, all notwithstanding Mr. Bossard’s knowledge that Steno-graph required users of its software to enter into licensing agreements. See id. (11/22/96) at App. 222-26; id. (11/25/96) at App. 440-46. Baker testified that Stenograph fired him on November 4,-1994, after he admitted that he sold Premier Power software and keys to Mr. Bossard for his own personal benefit. See id. (11/21/96) at App. 164-66; Ex. 6, at 1. Stenograph did not seek damages for any time after 1995, because in 1996 Christopher Bossard, the son of Mr. Bossard, obtained a Premier Power key from another court reporter and paid Stenograph for a license transfer. See id. (11/22/96) at 227-28; Br. of Appellee at 16.
At trial, Mr. Bossard defended largely on the theory that he did not know either that the products obtained from Baker belonged to Stenograph, or that Baker lacked authority to make the sales in question. Baker had had a fifteen year sales relationship with defendants, during which time Baker legitimately sold other Stenograph goods to Bossard Associates. See Trial Tr. (11/21/96) at App. 163, 173-74; Br. of Appellee at 11. With respect to the eleven keys, Mr. Bossard testified that Baker told him that Baker was merely serving as a “broker” for third parties who wished to get rid of the products. See Trial Tr. (11/21/96) at App. 212. It is undisputed, however, that after Baker was fired in November 1994, Stenograph asked defendants to either pay for or return the Premier Power keys, thereby putting defendants on explicit notice of the illicit nature of the transactions involving the keys. See Trial Tr. (11/21/96) at App. 112; Br. of Appellee at 14.
The District Court denied Bossard’s motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the conclusion of Stenograph’s ease and renewed at the end of trial. See id. (11/22/96) at App. 282; id. (11/26/96) at App. 539-40. On December 2, 1996, the jury returned a verdict for Stenograph on all counts. The jury awarded damages in the amount of $1,500,000 for copyright infringement; compensatory damages of $710,000 and punitive damages of $750,000 for trade secret misаppropriation; and compensatory damages of $44,000 and punitive damages of $178,000 for conversion. See Stenograph Corp. v. Bossard Assbcs., Civ. No. 95-0141(NHJ) (D.D.C. filed Feb. 12, 1997) (“Order”), reprinted at Ex. 3. The District Court subsequently denied defendants’ motion for a new trial or, alternatively, to amend the judgment and to stay the enforcement of the judgment. See id. The Court also entered a separate judg *99 ment as a matter of law in favor of Steno-graph on other claims alleged in the lawsuit. See id. The District Court then entered a judgment on the jury verdict and awarded Stenograph monetary .relief in the total amount of $3,198,016.17 against Mr. Bossard and Bossard Associates. See Ex. 4.
This appeal followed. Because of Mr. Bossard’s death, the estate of Mr. Bossard and Bossard Associates are now the appellants in this proceeding.
II. Discussion
A Copyright Infringement
Most of Bossard’s numerous challenges to the District Court’s judgment are plainly meritless and thus do not warrant treatment in this opinion. We do, however, address appellants’ contention that the District Court erred in presenting Stenograph’s copyright infringement claim to the jury, on the ground that Stenograph fаiled to present sufficient evidence of impermissible “copying” of Premier Power software by Bossard. In reviewing the denial of a judgment as a matter of law, “the standard we apply is the same as that applied by a district court considering the motion in the first instance. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we must ask ourselves whether any reasonable jury could find in its favor.”
Harbor Ins. Co. v. Schnabel Foundation Co.,
A plaintiff seeking to establish copyright infringement must prove “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
Case law supports the general proposition that unoriginal portions of a software program can be copied without resulting in copyright infringement.
See Lotus Develop. Corp. v. Borland Int'l
Appellants’ argument on copying— particularly their attention to the issue of whether protected elements of Premier Power were сopied to random access memory—is a nonstarter. Appellants conceded at oral argument, and this court agrees, that if someone loads validly copyrighted software onto his or her own computer without the owner’s permission, and then uses the software for the principal purposes for which it was designed, there can be no real doubt that the protected elements of the software have been copied and the copyright infringed. In other words, thе only real question in this case is whether the jury had sufficient evidence to find that Bossard installed and used Stenograph’s software for its principal purposes.
As an analytical matter, there are two different ways to describe the impermissible “copying” that occurred in this case. First, it can be concluded, quite simply, that copying occurred when appellants installed and used the software for the principal purposes for which it was intended. Alternatively, following a line of аnalysis adopted by a number of courts, it can be concluded that appellants copied the software when it was booted up for use for its principal purposes, and thereby loaded into RAM. These two theories may be two ways of saying the same thing; but in either of them, the jury’s verdict against appellants was fully justified.
1. Installation
The language of the Copyright Act, case law, and common sense support the proposition that the installation of software onto a computer rеsults in “copying” within the meaning of the Copyright Act.
See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies” as “material objects .. in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device”); 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.08[A][1], at 8-113 (1997) (“Nimmer”) (the Act’s language “makes clear that the input of a work into a computer results in the making of a copy”);
cf. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,
The question in the instant case, then, is how installation could be proven. Here, Mr. Bossard admitted outright at trial that Premier Power was installed on his company’s computer network. See Trial Tr. (11/22/96) at App. 232-33. During Mr. Bossard’s testimony, after a series оf exchanges between Stenograph’s counsel and Mr. Bossard on the issue of how Bossard originally obtained the software and keys, Stenograph’s counsel elicited the following testimony:
Q You have your Premier Power software installed on the network. Correct?
A I’ll agree to that, okay?
Id. According to appellants, Mr. Bossard’s statement only established that Premier Power was installed on the company’s network as of the time of trial—i.e., November 1996. Thus, they argue, Mr. Bossard’s statement does not constitute persuasive evidence of infringement, because earlier in 1996 Christopher Bossard had obtained a license for the software. See Reply Br. at 7-8.
Appellants’ self-serving reading of the record is not enough to overcome the jury ver *101 diet in this case. First, Mr. Bossard never claimed that his company’s installation of Premier Power occurred only after a license for its use had been obtained. Second, and more important, Mr. Bossard essentially conceded all of the points in issue when he testified that Bossard had possessed and used Premier Power software since 1993.
Bossard does not dispute that a court reporter who seeks to use the software first must insert a disk containing stenographic notes “into a computer on which the Premier Power resides.” Br. of Appellee at 7 (emphasis added); also see Trial Tr. (11/22/96) at App. 322. This is hardly surprising, because it is consistent with the way in which software is typically used. See 2 Nimmer, § 8.08[B][1], at 8-118 (“[Installing programs from floppy disks onto the hard drive (instead of booting them from the floppy drive every time they are desired) has become almost universal____”). Indeed, even if it were possible to use Premier Power without prior installation onto a сomputer, Bossard makes absolutely no suggestion that it did so in this case. Furthermore, Bossard makes no claim that it used only computers located in other offices, on which Premier Power already was installed pursuant to a license from Stenograph. In these circumstances, where installation of the software is a prerequisite to its use, Stenograph could show that Bossard installed and therefore copied the software by demonstrating that Bossard used the software and keys fоr their principal purposes during the relevant time periods.
There is substantial evidence in the record showing that Bossard used Premier Power for the principal purposes for which it was designed—i.e., to convert stenographic notes into English text and produce transcripts for sale. First, Mr. Bossard testified that his company initially obtained Premier Power in 1993, when Bossard also obtained its first software protect key from Baker. See Trial Tr. (11/22/96) at App. 234-35. In addition, Stenograph elicited testimony from Mr. Bossard that numbered keys were kept in Bossard’s offices. See id. at 229. On those occasions when Bossard would purchase a key from Baker, the key would “ultimately go to [Bossard’s] computer room” if Baker did not first take it there himself. Id. (11/25/96) at 381-82. At one point in his testimony Mr. Bossard admitted that software had been used from “whenever [the company] got the first Premier Power key from John Baker.” Id. (11/22/96) at 234. 1 Mr. Bossard separately admitted that a Bossard Associate employee used the software and a key in the company’s cоmputer room to process files and cause transcripts to be printed for sale to customers. See id. (11/25/96) at 445-46. From these statements, the jury easily could conclude that Bossard—through both its regular employees and independent contractors—used the software in tandem with the keys prior to 1996.
In sum, the evidence supports the finding that Bossard impermissibly copied Premier Power by installing and using the software for its principal purposes during the time in question.
2. Loading Into RAM
It is also evident that copying of Premier Power occurred through thé loading of the software into the random access memories of Bossard’s computers while the software was in use. Courts that have addressed the issue agree that the loading of software from some permanent storage medium, such as a floppy disk or a computer’s hard drive, to the computer’s random access memory (“RAM”) when the software is “booted up” causes a copy to be made.
See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,
We do not read appellants’ arguments to seriously challenge the holding in MAI Systems and other cases that a RAM reproduction constitutes a copy, although this holding has drawn some criticism. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 29, 40 (1994) (protesting result in which all acts of reading or viewing a digitalized work with the use of computer involves “actionable reproduction”); see generally, Ginsburg, 95 Colum. L.Rev. at 1476 n.39 (citing сritics). Rather, appellants complain that Stenograph failed to prove that the protected elements of Premier Power were reproduced into RAM in the first instance. But this argument is specious, because, at oral argument, appellants conceded that the protected elements of Premier Power were copied if in fact the software was used for the principal purposes for which it was designed. As described above, there was ample еvidence from which the jury could conclude that Bossard used Premier Power to convert stenographic notes into English text and produce transcripts for sale, without a license from Stenograph. Equally important, appellants do not argue that they had any reason to use Premier Power other than for the software’s principal purposes. Thus, evidence of Bossard’s use of Premier Power served as sufficient evidence that protected elements were copied, insofar these elements were reproduced into RAM. On the current record, it is simply irrelevant that Stenograph never presented an expert witness who could testify that specific parts of Premier Power were reproduced into RAM when the software was used by Bossard.
Contrary to appellants’ contentions, this conclusion is not in tension with
Fonar Corp. v. Domenick,
Our holding in this case does not address a situation in which it might be claimed that no
*103
copying occurred through prior installation.
See, e.g., Fonar,
B. Damages
The total damages awarded by the District Court to Stenograph reflected, in part, the jury’s awards of $1,500,000 for copyright infringement and “$710,000 for actual losses and unjust enrichment” on the claim of trade secret misappropriation. Order, at 1. Appellants’ arguments attacking these and other aspects of the total damages award are without merit.
The amount of $1,500,000 presumably represents Bossard Associates’ total revenues ($1,700,000) for the time period under dispute (December 1994 through December 1995), minus an estimation of expenses related to the use of Premier Power software (approximately $200,000). Bossard’s- challenge to the $1,500,000 figure is meritless because, after Stenograph introduced the statement containing Bossard Associates’ gross revenues for the relevant time period,
see
Ex. 5, at 25-27; Trial Tr. (11/22/96) at App. 236-37, the burden shifted to Bossard under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) to “prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors оther than the copyrighted work.”
Id.
Because appellants clearly failed to carry their burden under § 504(b), we have no reason to disturb the copyright infringement award of $1,500,000.
See
§ 504(b), Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary on Actual Damages and Profits;
cf. Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
We are perplexed, however, as to how the jury reached the amount of $710,000 “for actual losses and unjust enrichment” on the trade secret misappropriation claim. The trial judge instructed the jury that “unjust enrichment” was based upon “Defendants’ profits from the misappropriation.” Trial Tr. (11/27/96) at App. 613. The trial judge further stated that such profits should be determined through a burden-shifting process largely identical to the one it had set forth for the copyright infringement claim.
Id.
To the extent Stenograph was awarded damages based on Bossard Associates’ 1995 profits for
both
the misappropriation of .trade secrets claim- and the copyright claim, it would appear that Stenograph obtained a questionable double remedy.
See Softel v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Communications,
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Notes
. Later in his testimony, when confronted with plaintiffs’ exhibits demonstrating that Bossard obtained its first key from Baker in 1993, Mr. Bossard appeared to backtrack from his earlier statement that the company had been using Premier Power software from that time. According to Mr. Bossard’s later statement, Bossard Associates only "possibly” had been using the software since 1993, because the first key obtained from Baker "could be the key that blew up on us.” Trial Tr. (11/22/96) at 235. Of course, it would have been reasonable for the jury, in determining Mr. Bossard’s credibility as a witness, to resolve contradictions in his testimony against him.