Stenhouse v. StateStenhouse v. State
Appellant Tishaun Demetri Stenhouse appeals from his conviction for capital murder and his sentence to life imprisonment without parole plus fifteen years’ imprisonment for committing a felony with a firearm. He asserts three points on appeal. We find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction.
On July 7, 2003, at sometime after midnight, members of the Little Rock Police Department found Braylon Gray shot to death in the front yard of a residence at 3115 Fulton Street in Little Rock. Testimony at trial reveals that prior to his death, Gray and several others, including Stenhouse, had gathered at the Fulton Street home. Several of the people, including Gray, had gathered there to smoke sherm. 1 At some point during the evening, gunshots were fired inside the house, and everyone exited the house into the front yard. Testimony at trial revealed that two different people fired gunshots inside the house. There was testimony that a man named Angelo first pulled a gun on Gray, held it to his neck, and then shot it into the ceiling. After that, there was testimony that Stenhouse fired one shot inside the house while everyone was leaving. Several of those present testified that Gray was the last to leave the house. Testimony then diverges as to what happened next and as to how Gray was acting before he was shot. The end result was that Stenhouse shot and killed Gray in the front yard of the house with several witnesses present. He was charged with capital murder and with committing a felony with a firearm.
At the conclusion of the trial, Stenhouse was convicted of both charges and sentenced accordingly.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We first consider Stenhouse’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence point due to double-jeopardy considerations. See Edwards v. State,
This court has repeatedly stated its standard of review for sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims:
The standard of review in cases challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is well established. We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Parker v. State, 355 Ark. 639 ,144 S.W.3d 270 (2004); Reed v. State,353 Ark. 22 ,109 S.W.3d 665 (2003). This court has repeatedly held that in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Stone v. State,348 Ark. 661 ,74 S.W.3d 591 (2002). We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Parker,355 Ark. 639 ,144 S.W.3d 270 .
Davis v. State,
Our capital-murder statute reads in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits capital murder if:
(4) With the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of another person, he or she causes the death of any person[.]
the manner in which the weapon was used; the nature, extent and location of the wounds; and the accused’s conduct. See id.
In the case at hand, Tiffany Williams testified that Gray walked out of the house and toward the street, and that Stenhouse walked towards Gray. She testified that Gray had no gun; nor had she heard him make any threats. She added that after the shooting, Stenhouse got in his car and drove away. Brandon Landers testified that he saw Stenhouse shoot seven or eight times and that before Stenhouse shot Gray, Stenhouse told him that if he said another word, he would kill him. Landers also testified that Gray did not have a gun and was not violent that night. Finally, Dr. Charles Paul Kokes, an associate medical examiner for the State, testified that the cause of Gray’s death was multiple gunshot wounds. He also testified that one of Gray’s wounds gave indications that he was shot while lying down. We conclude that these facts sufficiently demonstrate premeditation and deliberation.
With respect to Stenhouse’s claim of self defense, several witnesses, as already noted, testified that Gray was not conducting himself in a weird or strange fashion, but like the others smoking sherm, he was slow-moving. They testified that he was not violent or unpredictable and was not aggressive. There was also testimony by Brandon Landers that Gray walked toward Stenhouse and said, “Man, why you do that?” and that Stenhouse warned him not to say any more or he would kill him. We have held that a jury is not obliged to believe an appellant’s claim that he shot someone in self defense. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State,
II. Batson Challenges
Stenhouse next claims that the circuit court erred in denying his three Batson challenges made pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky,
In Anderson v. State,
... In MacKintrush v. State,334 Ark. 390 ,978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), this court set forth the three-step procedure for challenges under Batson v. Kentucky,476 U.S. 79 (1986). We summarized the MacKintrush procedure in Hinkston v. State,340 Ark. 530 ,10 S.W.3d 906 (2000):
... First, the strike’s opponent must present facts to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination; that is, the opponent must present a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Second, once the strike’s opponent has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to present a race-neutral explanation for the strike. If a race-neutral explanation is given, the inquiry proceeds to the third step, wherein the trial court must decide whether the strike’s opponent has proven purposeful discrimination. Here, the strike’s opponent must persuade the trial court that the expressed motive of the striking party is not genuine but, rather, is the product of discriminatory intent.
340 Ark. at 538-39 ,10 S.W.3d at 911-12 (internal citations omitted). This court will reverse a circuit court’s ruling on a Batson challenge only when its findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. See id. We further accord some measure of deference to the circuit court, because it is in a superior position to make determinations of juror credibility. See id.
a. Jurors Jackson and York
After the peremptory challenges made by the State regarding jurors Jackson and York, Stenhouse made a Batson objection. At that time, counsel for Stenhouse argued that of the twelve jurors in that particular group, one-fourth were African-American and two of the three were struck by the State. Counsel further argued that of the remaining nine white jurors, only one of those was struck. Counsel then stated that in his opinion, none of the answers given by the two African-American jurors gave rise to a strike for any reason other than race, and he pointed out that his defendant was African-American.
The prosecutor responded that the victim too was African-American and asserted that Stenhouse had failed to make a prima facie case for racial discrimination. She further stated that there was one African-American in the box whom the State had left seated and that the State had chosen to strike a proposed alternate, presumably white, as opposed to an African-American who was seated as a potential alternate.
Stenhouse now claims that the circuit court erred as a matter of law by not engaging in the third step of the Batson analysis, regarding the need for a sensitive inquiry. This court examined a similar scenario in Anderson v. State, supra, and made no mention of error. In that case, Anderson raised a Batson challenge after the State struck an African-American juror. This court noted that although the circuit court did not believe that Anderson made a prima facie case, the circuit court nonetheless directed the State to offer its race-neutral reason for the strike. This court then examined the State’s reason and found the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s Batson challenge. No additional evidence or argument was presented by defense counsel in support of the Batson challenge in Anderson v. State, supra. The circuit court denied the Batson objection based on the evidence presented.
The same holds true in the case before us. As this court said in Anderson v. State, supra, the State’s race-neutral explanation must be more than a mere denial of racial discrimination, but need not be persuasive or even plausible, and, indeed, may even be silly or superstitious. See also Purkett v. Elem,
b. Juror Smith
Following the State’s strike of Ms. Smith, defense counsel mounted another Batson challenge. After reciting the strikes of jurors Jackson and York, counsel asserted that while he did attend church with Ms. Smith, the church has a membership in excess of 6,500. In addition, counsel stated that while Ms. Smith knew her pastor who was to be a defense witness, that witness was not slated to testify until the sentencing phase. Counsel pointed to the fact that Ms. Smith stated that she would not feel the need to explain herself either to defense counsel or Bishop Arnold and argued that two other white jurors who knew State witnesses were not struck by the State. Stenhouse’s counsel claimed that all of this showed a pattern of striking African-Americans from the jury.
The prosecutor responded that the defense had not made a prima facie case. She argued that of twelve jurors, she had struck six — three Caucasian and three African-Americans, and that as to the alternate panel, she had struck a Caucasian
Following defense counsel’s response that the sole reason for disqualification was the fact that Ms. Smith was African-American, the circuit court upheld the strike. Prior to doing so, defense counsel offered no additional proof to support an assertion of purposeful discrimination. Accordingly, we hold there was no abuse of discretion by the circuit court in denying the Batson challenge.
III. Continuance
Stenhouse argues that his motion for continuance filed before the circuit court and his argument at the hearing on the motion set out all the information required for granting a continuance and clearly shows that his defense was prejudiced by his inability to have a key witness available to testify. He contends that the missing witness would have testified to the victim’s behavior, including his disassociation from reality, his aggressiveness, and his unpredictable behavior. He asserts that this testimony would have been germane to his defense and an answer to the anticipated testimony from the State’s witness regarding Gray’s conduct while under the influence of sherm and PCP.
This court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for continuance under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., Smith v. State,
Our criminal rules provide that a court shall grant a continuance “only upon a showing of good cause and only for so long as necessary, taking into account not only the request or consent of the prosecuting attorney or defense counsel, but also the public interest in prompt disposition of the case.”
(a) A motion to postpone a trial on account of the absence of evidence shall, if required by the opposite party, be made only upon affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained and that due diligence has been used to obtain it. If the motion is for an absent witness, the affidavit must show what facts the affiant believes the witness will prove and not merely show the effect of the facts in evidence, that the affiant himself believes them to be true and that the witness is not absent by the consent, connivance, or procurement of the party asking the postponement.
This court in its case law has also identified several factors for the circuit court’s consideration in deciding a continuance motion: (1) the diligence of the movant; (2) the probable effect of the testimony at trial; (3) the likelihood of procuring the attendance of the witness in the event of a postponement; and (4) the filing of an affidavit, stating not only what facts the witness would prove but also that the appellant believes them to be true. See, e.g., Travis v. State,
The circuit court then asked whether Ms. Alexander’s statement, which was given to police officers, could be used by the defense expert in forming his expert opinion. Defense counsel agreed that it could. The circuit court denied the motion and set the trial to begin the next day.
This court has held that a circuit court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for continuance when the motion is not in substantial compliance with
That being said, the circuit court, nonetheless, properly denied Stenhouse’s motion for a continuance for a different reason. Not only did Stenhouse not file the affidavit as required by the statute, he has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the denial of his motion. We conclude as we do because similar testimony to that anticipated from Angela Alexander was introduced at trial through Tiffany Williams, a prosecution witness:
Prosecutor: Did you ever see Braylon crawl or walk to this spot over here?
Ms. Williams: He was — he was laying on the ground. He tried to get up. I was like, “No.” I was like, “Braylon, lay down.” I was like, “Be still.,” like that right there. I was like, “Be still.” He was like — I was like, “Braylon, be still. You’re shot.” And I was like — I’m like, “Help. Somebody help.”
And he was like — I’m like, “Be still.” He was like, “Ain’t nothing wrong with me.” I’m like, “Braylon, be still. Please be still,” you know what I’m saying. I’m crying. I’m like, “Please be still.”
And he was like, “Ain’t nothing wrong with me.” I’m like, “Oh, please be still.” And I’m like — he just laid there, and I’m like, “Oh, somebody please help. Somebody please help.” And it was — ooh.
The record in this case has been reviewed for error pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 4-3 (h). While not raised by either party, our review reveals that the circuit court sentenced Stenhouse to life imprisonment plus fifteen years. However, his judgment and commitment order reflects a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, plus fifteen years. It is the entered judgment and commitment order that controls. See Johninson v. State,
Affirmed.
Notes
Kim Light, a professor of pharmacology at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences in the College of Pharmacy and a witness for the defense, testified that sherm is “a street term for tobacco, marijuana, or sometimes a parsley or oregano cigarette that has been dipped in either [a] liquid form of phencyclidine [PCP] or otherwise adulterated with phencyclidine with a powder form of the drug.”