350 F.3d 578 | 6th Cir. | 2003
This case arises out of an incident that occurred on Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; and SILER and GIBBONS,
Circuit Judges. February 19, 1994. We have reviewed this case on a previous appeal. The relevant facts are described at length in Stemler _________________ v. Florence , 126 F.3d 856 (1997). Briefly, Black was killed in a car accident shortly after police officers allegedly
COUNSEL
removed her from Stemler’s car and placed her in the truck of her boyfriend, Steve Kritis. Both Black and Kritis had been
ARGUED: Eric C. Deters, ERIC C. DETERS & drinking heavily, and after an altercation between them at a ASSOCIATES, Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky, for Plaintiffs. Jeffrey bar, Black left with Stemler in Stemler’s car. Kritis then C. Mando, ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & began to chase the women on the streets of Florence before DUSING, Covington, Kentucky, for Defendants. both the car and the truck were stopped by the police after a ON BRIEF: Eric C. Deters, ERIC C. DETERS & concerned citizen alerted them to the situation. Stemler was ASSOCIATES, Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky, for Plaintiffs. Jeffrey arrested for driving under the influence. Witnesses say that C. Mando, ADAMS, STEPNER, WOLTERMANN & all the police officers present repeated Kritis’s assertion that DUSING, Covington, Kentucky, Hugh O. Skees, ROUSE, Stemler was a lesbian to each other and to others present. No SKEES, WILSON & DILLON, Florence, Kentucky, David police officer ever checked Kritis for intoxication or asked Whalin, LANDRUM & SHOUSE, Louisville, Kentucky, for him to leave his truck. Black was either escorted or carried Defendants. from Stemler’s car to the passenger seat of Kritis’s truck. Kritis then drove away and turned onto the northbound lanes
_________________ of I-75. According to Kritis, Black, who had passed out, woke up and began to hit Kritis. He began to hit back and
OPINION
lost control of the truck. The truck swerved and collided with _________________ the guardrail. Black was partially ejected from the passenger- side window. Her arm was completely severed from her body
BOGGS, Chief Judge. Appellant/cross-appellee William and her head was split into two parts by some part of the Chipman, administrator of the estate of Conni Black, and guardrail. intervenor-appellant/cross-appellee Randy Black appeal the Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 5 6 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al. I. The Claims motions for summary judgment of Florence and Boone County. Chipman v. City of Florence , 858 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. A. Chipman’s claim Ky. 1994), reconsideration denied on amended complaint , 866 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Ky. 1994).
On March 7, 1994, William Chipman, the administrator of the estate of Conni Black, filed a wrongful death action in the On appeal, we upheld the district court’s order granting Boone County Circuit Court against Florence police officers summary judgment to the municipal defendants, Florence and Dusing, Dolan, and Wince; Boone County police officers Rob Boone County. Stemler , 126 F.3d at 866. However, we Reuthe and Chris Alsip; the City of Florence; and Ron reversed the district court’s dismissal of Chipman’s claims Kenner, the Boone County Sheriff. The Boone County against the individual officers. We held that Chipman had Circuit Court entered summary judgment on behalf of the pled facts sufficient to maintain her substantive due process defendants on Chipman’s wrongful death claim. Chipman v. claim against the individual officers. Id. at 870. The only City of Florence , No. 94-CI-00202 slip op. at 4 (Boone Co.,
state court decision prior to our decision was the Boone Ky., Cir. Ct. Apr. 2, 1996). The Kentucky Court of Appeals County Circuit Court decision awarding judgment to the reversed the Circuit Court. Chipman v. City of Florence , No. defendant officers, holding that Black was not in custody 1996-CA-001287-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1998). The when the pickup struck the guardrail and that none of the state Kentucky Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals actors were the direct cause of her death on the highway. We and reinstated the summary judgment ordered by the Boone stated in Stemler that “[w]hile these findings are entitled to County Circuit Court. City of Florence v. Chipman , 38 S.W. preclusive effect, they are irrelevant to the merits of her 3d 387 (Ky. 2001). substantive due process claim.” Id. at 870 n.12. The case
was remanded to the district court for further proceedings Chipman also filed a complaint in federal court against the consistent with the opinion. same defendants on March 31, 1994. [1] The complaint alleged that the defendants were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
Shortly after the opinion issued, Randy Black was granted Black’s wrongful death because they had displayed deliberate permission to intervene on behalf of Conni Black’s minor indifference by forcing her into Kritis’s car. [2] child, Shianne Black, to bring a claim of loss of parental consortium. At about the same time, the federal district court
Chipman’s federal claims were dismissed by the district held the case in abeyance pending a decision by the Kentucky court in 1994. The district court granted the individual Supreme Court on appeal of the Boone County Circuit court’s officers’ motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil order entering summary judgment in favor of defendants and Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim, on the ground the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversal of that order, which of qualified immunity. The district court also granted the was issued February 22, 2001. Chipman later reached a settlement with the Boone County officers. In June 2001, the district court granted the officers’ motion for summary judgment on Chipman’s substantive due process claim, and [1] W e treated the complaint against Kenner as a suit directly against
Shianne Black’s claim for loss of parental consortium. The Bo one County. Stemler , 126 F.3d at 864 n.8. district court found that the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court barred their claims under the doctrine of issue [2] This claim will be referred to as “the substantive due process claim.”
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 7 8 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205 of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al. preclusion. The issue that the district court found could not imprisonment. It also found that her abuse of process claim be relitigated was whether Black was in “custody” when she was barred based on the probable cause finding, that the got into Kritis’s car because, according to the district court, officers had no improper motive in arresting her, and that a the Kentucky Supreme Court had held that Black was never state prosecutor independently had made the prosecutorial in custody. decisions in her criminal case. As for her claims of negligent
or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found B. Stemler’s Claims that under Kentucky law, there is no viable cause of action for these torts when she had raised essentially identical claims Susan Stemler filed a federal complaint, pursuant to under traditional torts as discussed above. Finally, the court 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against officers Wince, Dolan, Dusing, and determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact the City of Florence. The complaint alleged claims of with respect to her assault and battery claim against Wince, excessive force, wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and but not against Dusing and Dolan. Stemler later voluntarily violation of equal protection on the bases of sex and sexual dismissed this claim. The Kentucky Court of Appeals orientation. The district court granted the officers’ Rule affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Stemler did not 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss on the ground of qualified pursue an appeal. immunity. The district court then consolidated her case with Chipman’s and awarded summary judgment to Florence. The Upon appeal of the district court decision to this court, we federal district court then entered an order granting Stemler’s affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City motion for voluntary dismissal of her excessive force claim of Florence. Stemler , 126 F.3d at 866. We also affirmed the against Wince. This voluntary dismissal was entered dismissal of her false arrest and malicious prosecution claims pursuant to an agreement between the parties to dismiss the because the Boone County Circuit Court’s finding that there claim so that an appeal could proceed in this court. The
had been probable cause to arrest and prosecute Stemler agreement allowed her to bring her claim again should she be precluded relitigating that issue in this court. Id. at 871-72. successful upon appeal. We noted that although Stemler seemed to be asserting a
claim that Wince had falsified evidence against her, and that As Chipman did, Stemler had also brought similar claims the state court’s finding of probable cause would not preclude in Kentucky state court. She raised state-law claims of her from prosecuting this claim, she had failed to properly malicious prosecution, false arrest, abuse of process, assault plead it. Id. at 872. We stated that she would be free to file and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent or intentional a new complaint against Wince raising that claim. Ibid. infliction of emotional distress. Stemler v. Florence , No. 94- Finally, we reversed the dismissal of Stemler’s equal CI-00459. The Boone County Circuit Court held that she was protection claim of selective prosecution against the officers, precluded from prosecuting all of her claims, except for holding that the allegations in her complaint were sufficient assault and battery. See Stemler v. City of Florence , 126 F.3d to state a claim. Id. at 874. 856, 871 (6th Cir. 1997). There was ample evidence constituting probable cause for her arrest. This barred her After our opinion in Stemler was issued, Stemler amended false arrest and malicious prosecution claim. As the her complaint to allege that Wince fabricated the blood defendants were police officers, the court found that there was no distinction between her claims of false arrest and false Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 9 10 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al. sample evidence used in her DUI trials. [3] As it did in Univ. and Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Tenn. , 126 F.3d 849, 851 (6th Chipman’s case, the district court held Stemler’s case in Cir. 1997); Kane v. Magna Mixer Co. , 71 F.3d 555, 560 (6th abeyance pending final judgments in the state court Cir. 1995), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 1848 (1996). When proceedings. In June 2001, the district court denied the deciding whether to afford preclusive effect to a state court officers’ motion for summary judgment on Stemler’s claims judgment, the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, of denial of equal protection based on selective prosecution, requires the federal court to give the prior adjudication the and Wince’s motion for summary judgment on her claims of same preclusive effect it would have under the law of the state falsification of evidence, and excessive force. The district whose court issued the judgment. See Migra v. Warren City court noted that none of these claims actually had been Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Heyliger , 126 litigated in state court. It stated that while it might agree with F.3d at 851-52. the defendants that Stemler could and should have brought
Under Kentucky law, “[c]laim preclusion bars a party from these claims in state court, our opinion in Stemler had implied re-litigating a previously adjudicated cause of action and that claim preclusion did not apply. The court further stated entirely bars a new lawsuit on the same cause of action.” that our holding in Stemler stated that she could proceed with Yeoman v. Kentucky Health Policy Bd ., 983 S.W.2d 459, 465 these claims, and that the “law of the case” would be violated (Ky. 1998). “Issue preclusion bars the parties from if it did not permit her to do so.
relitigating any issue actually litigated and finally decided in II. Chipman’s substantive due process claim an earlier action.” Ibid. Chipman argues that our resolution of the custody issue in A. Issue Preclusion his favor in Stemler should have had preclusive effect on the In order for issue preclusion to apply in Kentucky, (1) the Kentucky state courts. He argues that our opinion’s holdings
issue in the second case must be the same as the issue in the constituted the “law of the case” and the district court erred in first case, (2) the issue must have been actually litigated, applying the doctrine of issue preclusion based on the state (3) the issue must have been actually decided, and (4) the court proceedings. The officers argue that the district court decision on the issue in the prior action must have been was correct in deciding that issue preclusion barred the necessary to the court’s judgment. Ibid. The district court relitigation of the issue of custody. Alternatively, they argue found that all four factors were met when the Kentucky that Chipman’s substantive due process claim is barred from Supreme Court resolved Chipman’s state claims. further litigation under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, or under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
In order for Chipman to prevail in the Kentucky state courts, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that he had to We review de novo a district court’s decision with regard show “the existence of a duty and unless a special relationship to issue preclusion or claim preclusion. Heyliger v. State was present, there is no duty owing from any of the police officers . . . .” Chipman , 38 S.W. 3d at 392. The court went on, stating that “[i]n order for the special relationship to exist, [3] Stemler was twice tried in Boone County District Court on the DUI two conditions are required: 1) the victim must have been in
charge. The first trial ended in a hung jury. She was acquitted at the end state custody or otherwise restrained by the state at the time of her se cond trial. Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 11 12 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al. the injury producing act occurred, and 2) the violence or other court made an explicit statement that there was insufficient offensive conduct must have been committed by a state evidence to support a finding that Black was in custody. actor.” Ibid. The court held that “[t]here is no evidence from
However, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s statement that she which it can be ascertained that Black was in state custody or was never in custody was not necessary to its judgment. The otherwise restrained by the police at the time the pickup truck Boone County Circuit Court held that there was no genuine struck the guardrail with the fatal result. In addition, there is issue of material fact regarding whether Black was in custody no evidence to support a claim that the conduct which caused at the time the pickup struck the guardrail – the point at which the pickup truck to leave the roadway and strike the guardrail the injury-producing act occurred. Specifically, it stated she was the result of the actions of the police officers.” Ibid.
was not in custody at this point. This was the only holding The Kentucky Supreme Court also stated that Black was necessary for the affirmance of the Boone County Circuit never in custody. Id. at 393. This is precisely the issue that Court’s judgment. As we noted in discussing this lower court is relevant in a § 1983 action. In order to prevail on the decision in Stemler , the holdings of the state court on this § 1983 claim, Chipman needs to show that the defendant issue are entitled to preclusive effect. Nonetheless, this officers “violated substantive due process by placing [Black] precise issue is irrelevant to the substantive due process at risk of harm from a third party . . . .” Stemler , 126 F.3d at claim. 867. The court must first determine whether “the plaintiff and As the Kentucky Court of Appeals (now the Kentucky the state actors had a sufficiently direct relationship such that Supreme Court) stated in Sedley v. City of West Buechel , 461 the defendants owed [Black] a duty not to subject her to S.W.2d 556, 558 (Ky. 1971): danger,” and then “the court must also conclude that the officers were sufficiently culpable to be liable under a
The general rule is that a judgment in a former action substantive due process theory.” Ibid. As to the first part, the operates as an estoppel only as to matters which were relevant inquiry is whether Black was in custody at the time necessarily involved and determined in the former action, the officers allegedly forced her into Kritis’s truck. and is not conclusive as to matters which were immaterial or unessential to the determination of the First, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that there was no prior action or which were not necessary to uphold the evidence in the record to support a finding that Black was judgment. ever in custody, the same issue that is necessary to Chipman’s federal claim. Second, the custody issue was actually
(Emphasis added). litigated in the state courts: in the Boone County Circuit Court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Kentucky
As the Kentucky Supreme Court correctly stated, our Supreme Court. The Kentucky Supreme Court found that statements in Stemler regarding whether Black was in custody there was no evidence to support a finding that Black was were dicta, as the only issue before us at that point was the ever in custody in the context of deciding the appeal of a sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. Similarly, the summary judgment motion. A summary judgment order is a statements of the Kentucky Supreme Court regarding whether decision on the merits. Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United Black was ever in custody are dicta, as they are not necessary States , 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). Third, the issue was actually decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 13 14 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al. to the state courts’ disposition of the case. The actual holding B. Claim Preclusion of the Kentucky Supreme Court reads:
The defendant officers also argue that claim preclusion In order for a claim to be actionable in negligence, there should bar Chipman’s claim against them. Claim preclusion must be the existence of a duty and unless a special bars further litigation under Kentucky law when: (1) there is relationship was present, there is no duty owing from any identity of the parties; (2) there is identity of the causes of of the police officers to Black to protect her from crime action; and (3) the action has been resolved on the merits. or accident. In order for the special relationship to exist, Yeoman , 983 S.W.2d at 465. Yeoman also stated that “[f]or two conditions are required: 1) the victim must have been claim preclusion to apply, the subject matter of the in state custody or otherwise restrained by the state at the subsequent suit must be identical.” Ibid. time the injury producing act occurred , and 2) the In Barnes v. McDowell , 848 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1988), we violence or other offensive conduct must have been
stated that “Kentucky courts do not apply the doctrine of committed by a state actor. Neither of these factors can claim preclusion in a subsequent suit involving facts already be found from the undisputed material facts in this case. at issue in another action when the causes of action in the two There is no evidence from which it can be ascertained proceedings are not the same.” Id. at 730. A district court, that Black was in state custody or otherwise restrained by interpreting Kentucky law, stated: the police at the time the pickup truck struck the guardrail with the fatal result . In addition, there is no
[W]here the second action between the same parties is evidence to support a claim that the conduct which upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the caused the pickup truck to leave the roadway and strike prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those the guardrail was the result of the actions of the police matters in issue or points controverted, upon the officers. determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to
City of Florence v. Chipman , 38 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Ky. 2001) apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one (emphasis added and citations omitted). cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a The Kentucky Supreme Court would have reached the same different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as result if it had found that Black was in custody at the time she to the point or question actually litigated and determined entered Kritis’s truck, so long as it found she was not in in the original action, not what might have been thus custody at the time the truck hit the guardrail. litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the
judgment conclusive in another action. The district court erred in finding that issue preclusion barred Chipman’s substantive due process claim. Presbyterian Child Welfare Agency of Buckhorn v. Nelson County Bd. of Adjustment , 185 F. Supp. 2d 716, 720 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (quoting Louisville v. Louisville Professional Firefighters Ass’n , 813 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Ky. 1991)).
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 15 16 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205 of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al. While there is identity of the parties, and the action was the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues resolved on the merits, Chipman’s claim is not barred, as it is before it. Where federal relief can only be predicated not the same claim as in state court. His claim in the state upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is courts was for wrongful death, which is a negligence claim. difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in This is not the same cause of action as the one he brought in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the the federal court, a claim of violation of Black’s substantive state-court judgment. due process rights. It is indeed true that this claim could have Id. at 391 (quoting Catz v. Chalker , 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th been brought in state courts. However, under the Kentucky Cir. 1998)). In Peterson Novelties , we held that the Rooker- law of claim preclusion, this does not matter, as there is no Feldman doctrine was inapplicable to claims that the state identity of the causes of action. Yeoman , 983 S.W.2d at 465.
court did not address or rule upon even though the federal Chipman’s federal claim is not barred by claim preclusion. claims arose out of the same nucleus of facts. Id. at 391-93. C. Rooker-Feldman Therefore, the question is whether this court could hold that the officers violated Black’s constitutional rights without The defendant officers also argue that the federal district implicitly holding that the state court wrongly decided the court lacked jurisdiction to consider Chipman’s claim under issues before it. Id. at 393. the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. They argue that Chipman’s federal suit is an attempt to appeal a state court decision to the This court discussed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its federal courts. frequent conflation with claim and issue preclusion in
Hutcherson v. Lauderdale County , 326 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. The doctrine gets its name from two Supreme Court cases. 2003). This court stated that Seventh Circuit case law Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 provided a useful way to determine which doctrine to apply: (1923), held that the power to hear appeals from state court judgments is exclusively held by the United States Supreme In order to determine the applicability of the Rooker- Court. The Supreme Court held in District of Columbia Feldman doctrine, the fundamental and appropriate Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the (1983), that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment hear challenges to certain state-court decisions. The Rooker- itself or is distinct from that judgment. If the injury Feldman doctrine states that “lower federal courts lack alleged resulted from the state court judgment itself, subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of Rooker-Feldman directs that the lower federal courts lack state court proceedings or to adjudicate claims ‘inextricably jurisdiction. If the injury alleged is distinct from that intertwined’ with issues decided in state court proceedings.” judgment, i.e., the party maintains an injury apart from Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. Berkley , 305 F.3d 386, 390 (6th the loss in state court and not "inextricably intertwined" Cir. 2002). In defining “inextricably intertwined,” we have with the state judgment, . . . res judicata may apply, but adopted the reasoning that: Rooker - Feldman does not . . . .
[t]he federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the Id. at 755 (quoting Garry v. Geils , 82 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (7th state-court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to Cir. 1996)).
Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 17 18 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205 of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al. As Chipman is not directly challenging the state court’s circuit court that Stemler cannot establish that they acted with judgments in federal court, the doctrines of claim and issue an improper motive.” Stemler v. City of Florence , No. 1996- preclusion are more properly applied to this case. However, CA-001318-MR at 23. The court made this statement in the in any case, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. context of discussing the propriety of summary judgment The Kentucky Supreme Court’s discussion of whether Black regarding Stemler’s abuse of process claim. One of the was ever in custody was dicta, and therefore any finding by essential elements of that tort is an ulterior purpose. Bonnie the federal court that Black was in custody at some point Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson , 598 S.W. 2d 765, 766 (Ky. Ct. during the encounter would not implicitly hold that the state App. 1980). It was one of several findings of fact that court improperly decided the issues before it . The issue of supported the granting of summary judgment in favor of the Black’s custody before the truck hit the guardrail was not an defendants. issue that was salient before the Kentucky court.
Stemler argues that our statement in our opinion in Stemler The district court does have jurisdiction to hear Chipman’s that “the record evidence supports a finding” that the officers substantive due process claim. chose to arrest her because they believed her to be a lesbian should have had preclusive effect on the Kentucky state III. Stemler’s Claims courts. However, this statement was dicta. We reversed the district court’s dismissal of her claim on a 12(b)(6) motion. A. Equal Protection Claim Thus the only question before our court was whether her complaint adequately stated an equal protection claim. A
The defendants argue that Stemler’s equal protection claim dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6) “is proper only if it appears is barred by claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and the beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court, although support of its claims that would entitle it to relief.” inclined to rule that her claim was barred by claim preclusion, Kostrzewa v. City of Troy , 247 F.3d 633, 638 (6th Cir. 2001). instead decided that this court’s decision in Stemler precluded That judgment does not preclude a later summary judgment the application of any of those doctrines. We first note that motion, arguing that the plaintiff in fact could not show such the district court was not required to abstain from analyzing evidence. In state court, the claim was being considered for Stemler’s claims under the claim preclusion doctrine because summary judgment purposes. A summary judgment order is of our previous opinion. Our opinion was issued while a decision on the merits. Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. , 922 F.2d Stemler’s appeal was pending with the Kentucky Court of at 325. Thus the issue was actually litigated in the state Appeals. We stated that at that point , claim preclusion did courts. And, as the state court made an explicit finding that not yet apply to her claims before the federal courts. We the officers had no improper motive, the issue was actually nowhere said that claim preclusion would never apply. decided. The defendant officers argue that the Kentucky Court of In order to maintain a claim of selective prosecution (the Appeals decision conclusively decided the question of basis of Stemler’s equal protection claim), the plaintiff must whether they had acted with improper motive in arresting her. prove that a state actor initiated the prosecution with a The Court of Appeals stated that “[a]lthough the officers may discriminatory purpose. This is the same issue as the ulterior have been crude during Stemler’s arrest, we agree with the purpose issue in Stemler’s state claim of abuse of process. Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 19 20 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205 of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al. And finally, the issue was necessary to the resolution of the her state law claims bars her from reviving her assault and state claim. Thus, the state court’s finding that the officers battery claims. did not have an improper motive in arresting Stemler has
First, a voluntary dismissal of a claim is not a judgment on preclusive effect on relitigating that issue in the federal the merits. Ky. R. Civ. P. 41.01. While Stemler’s assault and courts.
battery claim was dismissed with prejudice against Dolan and Because Stemler’s equal protection claim is barred by issue Dusing, the state court did not grant summary judgment to preclusion, the district court should have granted summary Wince, and issue preclusion does not apply to her claim judgment to the officers on that claim. against Wince. Second, the agreement itself does not bar her
from bringing her federal claim. As she was not successful B. Excessive Force on appeal in the state courts, the agreement would seem to bar her from bringing her assault and battery claim again in state Stemler’s federal claim of excessive force and her state courts. However, the agreement addressed her federal and claim of assault and battery against Wince were voluntarily state claims separately. The agreement did not say that if she dismissed so that she could appeal unfavorable lower court was unsuccessful in the state courts that she was barred from decisions on other claims. Wince first argues that Stemler has bringing her federal excessive force claim again. The never taken any action to revive her federal claim. However, agreement that bars her from bringing her state assault and Stemler’s Second Amended Complaint was accepted by the battery claim is not a judgment for the purposes of issue district court on January 13, 1998. Her Second Amended preclusion, as Wince seems to argue. Complaint incorporated by reference her initial complaint and her First Amended complaint, which included the excessive Wince next argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred force claim. Furthermore, Wince does not explain why he did the district court from considering Stemler’s claims since any not make this argument when he moved the district court for
decision favorable to her would have been an impermissible summary judgment on this claim, and why the district court review of issues decided adversely to her in the Kentucky denied his summary judgment motion without ever state court. He also argues that the claim preclusion doctrine addressing this issue. bars her from relitigating this claim in the federal courts as well. We will discuss the application of these doctrines Wince next argues that the voluntary dismissal agreement below in conjunction with Stemler’s other outstanding claim. bars Stemler from reviving her excessive force claim because it bars her from reviving her assault and battery claim. The agreement stated that if her appeal to the state appellate court on her other state claims was unsuccessful, then her assault and battery claim could not be revived, and vice versa. It similarly stated that if her appeal to the federal appellate court was unsuccessful, then her excessive force claim could not be revived, and vice versa. He argues that because both claims rely on the same facts and elements of proof, the dismissal of Nos. 01-5956/6205 Stemler, et al. v. City 21 22 Stemler, et al. v. City Nos. 01-5956/6205
of Florence, et al. of Florence, et al. C. The application of claim preclusion and the Rooker- courts confined themselves to the issues of probable cause Feldman doctrines to Stemler’s Fabrication of and the motive for Stemler’s arrest. The district court could Evidence and Excessive Force Claims rule in Stemler’s favor without even implicitly holding that
the Kentucky courts wrongly decided the issues before them. Wince argues that Stemler’s excessive force and fabrication The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to these claims, of evidence claims should be barred by claim preclusion and and the district court has jurisdiction to hear them. the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Wince also argues that claim preclusion would bar Stemler The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as previously noted, states from bringing these claims in federal court, because as she that “lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to could have brought them in state court. However, as engage in appellate review of state court proceedings or to discussed above, the Kentucky law of claim preclusion only adjudicate claims ‘inextricably intertwined’ with issues bars bringing the same cause of action twice. Stemler’s claims decided in state court proceedings.” Peterson Novelties , 305
for falsification of evidence and excessive force could have F.3d at 390. The question for this court is whether a federal been brought in state court and were not. However, under court can rule in Stemler’s favor on her federal claims without Kentucky law, as she did not bring identical causes of action implicitly holding that the state courts wrongly decided the in state court, she is not barred from bringing them in federal issues before them. Id. at 393. court. Yeoman , 983 S.W. 2d at 465 . The district court did not
err when it decided that claim preclusion did not apply to The state courts adjudicated several of Stemler’s claims. these claims. As noted above, Stemler’s claims of malicious prosecution and false arrest and imprisonment were dismissed on IV. Conclusion summary judgment because the state court held that there was no genuine issue that probable cause existed for her DUI In No. 01-5956, we REVERSE the grant of summary arrest. Her claims of intentional or negligent infliction of judgment to the defendants on Chipman’s substantive due emotional distress and outrage were dismissed on summary process claim. In No. 01-6205, we REVERSE the denial of judgment because Kentucky law holds that if a claimant raises summary judgment with regard to Stemler’s equal protection claims under traditional torts that allow recovery for claim. We AFFIRM the denial of summary judgment with emotional distress, the claimant cannot raise claims of regard to Stemler’s excessive force and falsification of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress or evidence claim. Both cases are REMANDED to the district outrage. The Boone County Circuit Court found that there court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. was a genuine issue of material fact as to her assault and battery claim against Wince.
Except for the decision refusing to dismiss her assault and battery claim against Wince, the Kentucky state courts never considered or ruled on any elements of the claims of fabrication of evidence or excessive force, nor did they address any facts or issues regarding these claims. The state
