748 A.2d 667 | Pa. | 2000
OPINION
The issue presented is whether, following issuance of an award in a compulsory judicial arbitration proceeding, the thirty-day period within which a notice of appeal may be filed commences when entry is made on the docket concerning such issu-
Appellee, Stellar Construction, Inc. (“Stellar”), initiated an action for breach of contract against Appellants, Ronald Sborz and Pat Sborz, individually and trading as Keystone Meats (collectively, “Keystone”), arising from a construction dispute over payment for demolition and reconstruction efforts expended by Stellar connected with a collapsed Keystone building. The matter proceeded to compulsory judicial arbitration pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1301-1361. On August 7, 1997, a board of arbitrators issued an award in favor of Stellar and against Keystone in the amount of $55,782.62, plus interest and costs, and the clerk of courts made a contemporaneous entry on the docket reflecting such issuance.
Presently, Keystone maintains its argument that the period allowed for appeal does not commence until an entry is made upon the docket confirming that the required notice has been provided to the parties. In significant part, Keystone relies upon Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 108(b), which establishes such a rule with respect to appeals lodged in the appellate courts, contending that this rule is also directly applicable to appeals to the common pleas courts, as it applies by its terms to any matter subject to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Stellar emphasizes the jurisdictional nature of the time limits established for the filing of a notice of appeal; argues that the express scope of the Rules of Appellate Procedure is limited to the governance of appeals lodged in the appellate courts; and notes the absence of a corollary to Rule 108(b) within the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which expressly govern review by the common pleas courts of awards in matters subject to compulsory judicial arbitration.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1308 establishes the procedure for appeal of an award in a matter of compulsory judicial arbitration, providing that such an appeal shall be taken by, inter alia, filing a notice of appeal with the prothonotary of the court in which the action is pending
Thus, in predominate contexts in which explicit definition has been given to the time of entry for an order for the purpose of determining the commencement of the period allowed for appeal, both the General Assembly and this Court have evinced an intent to condition such entry upon compliance of the court, agency or tribunal with its obligation to provide notice to the parties. Stellar offers no policy applicable to compulsory judicial arbitration which would require a different definition, nor do we discern any such policy upon independent consideration. Indeed, the obligations of the prothonotary to provide notice immediately and make a corresponding entry upon the docket are juxtaposed with its duty to make record entry of an arbitration award within Rule of Civil Procedure 1307.
In furtherance of clarity, certainty and ease of determination, see Frazier, 557 Pa. at 621-22, 735 A.2d at 115, we hold that the date of entry of an order for purposes of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1308 shall mean the day on which the prothonotary fulfills its duty to make the required notation on the docket reflecting that notice of entry of the arbitration award has been provided as required by Rule 1307(a)(3).
. In the Court of Common Pleas for Lehigh County, the functions of the prothonotary are performed by a clerk of courts pursuant to local home rule charter.
. The pertinent docket entry follows the August 7th notation concerning issuance of the award and reads "AWARD NOTICE EXIT 8/11/97.”
. In its memorandum opinion, the Superior Court also considered an issue concerning the timing of the entry of the molded judgment, deeming such entry premature as the common pleas court entered the judgment prior to the entry of its order quashing Keystone's appeal. Thus, the Superior Court held that the judgment itself was void and must be stricken. The Superior Court's decision in this regard has not been questioned in this appeal. We note, however, that, although the Superior Court’s order struck the judgment, the present appeal contains a live controversy, since the Superior Court's order did not undermine the underlying arbitration award, on which a proper judgment may ultimately be entered once the matter has ripened.
. The thirty-day time period derives, in the first instance, from Section 5571(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571, which provides, as a general rule, that appeals from tribunals or governmental units to a court must be commenced within thirty days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. See generally Pa.R.C.P. No. 1308, Explanatory Note. Pursuant to Section 7361 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7361, an award of arbitrators expressly constitutes an order of a tribunal for purposes of Section 5571.
. The Court’s authority to promulgate such rule derives from its general rulemaking powers, and, more specifically, from Section 5571(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(a), which vests this Court with the particular authority to prescribe general rules governing the time for filing of appeals to the Pennsylvania appellate courts. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 108, Note. Given this derivation, although Rule 108, by its terms, might be deemed to apply to any matter subject to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, it is preferable to limit its direct reach, in accordance with the express scope of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the governance of practice in the appellate courts. See Pa.R.A.P. 103.
. The thirty-day time period established by the General Assembly applies generally to appeals from both tribunals (which, as previously noted, includes panels administering compulsory judicial arbitration) and government units to the courts. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(b). For reasons that are unclear, however, in specifying in Section 5572 that the date of the entry of an order is the date of its service, the Legislature referred only to orders of governmental units.
. As a practical matter, this date should ordinarily correspond to the date on which the award is physically entered of record upon