OPINION
Stella Townsend (“Townsend”) and her attorneys appeal from the district court’s denial of her request for reimbursement of her' attorney fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), in: this social security benefits action. Bеcause we conclude that equitable tolling is applicable to the EAJA,
I. BACKGROUND
On November 19, 1999, Townsend filed an аpplication for supplemental security income on the grounds that she was disabled as a result of “borderline intellectual functioning, vision problems, epicondylitis in her right arm and elbow, anxiety and depression, decreаsed grip strength in her right hand, and pain in her back, neck, and right arm and shoulder.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 8 (Mem. Op. and Order at 1). Townsend’s application as well as her motion for reconsideration were denied. Townsend then requested and was granted a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On November 8, 2000, a hearing was held, and the ALJ later affirmed the denial of Townsend’s application.
Townsend then filed a complaint in federal district court asserting that the denial of her application was erroneous and was not supported by substantial evidence. Once before the district court, Townsend filed a motion for summary judgment which the district court granted on the grounds that “the Commissioner’s decision [was] not fully supported by substantial evidence.” J.A. at 15 (Mem. Op. & Order at 7). The district court then entered a judgment on August 7, 2002, reversing the ALJ’s decision and remanding the case for further consideration of her mental impairment pursuant to sentenсe four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). J.A. at 16 (J. at 1).
On October 9, 2002, the Commissioner filed a motion for- relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Commissioner alleged that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination and thаt the district court had committed legal error in its interpretation of the relevant listing of impairments. The motion did not specify which of the six statutory grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b) entitled the Commissioner to relief from judgment. On December 18, 2002, the district court denied the Commissioner’s motion. Despite the Commissioner’s failure to reference explicitly a specific provision of Rule 60(b) entitling the Commissioner to relief, the district court concluded that the Commissioner was asserting that relief ought to be granted based on a legal error by the district judge. The district court therefore construed the motion as invoking Rule 60(b)(1), which entitles a movant to relief from judgment based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). After determining that the motion should properly be labeled as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, the court denied the motion as untimely because it had not been filed, as required by decisions interpreting Rule 60(b)(1) motions claiming legal error, before the time for taking an appeal had expired.
See Pierce v. United Mine Workers,
On February 20, 2003, Townsend petitioned the district court to obtain payment of her attorney fees and costs from the government pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(a). The district court denied Townsend’s request as untimely. The district court acknowledged that “that the plaintiffs attorneys should be compensated for their valuable legal service,” but the court concluded that the EAJA time
II. ANALYSIS
Townsend and her attorneys assert that the district court erred in denying her reimbursement of her attorney fees and costs under the EAJA. Normally, we review a district court’s decision to award or deny attorney fees pursuant to the EAJA for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Ranger Elec. Communications, Inc.,
The EAJA provides that prevailing parties in certain federal court proceedings may recover attorney fees and costs frоm the government, In order .to qualify for such reimbursement, however, the EAJA requires that “[a] party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court” its .application for reimbursement. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B);
Scarborough v. Principi,
The district court determined that Townsend’s fee application was untimely by using the following calculations: The district court determined that its August 7, 2002' judgment became final for EAJA purposes when that judgment was no longer appealable by the Commissioner. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) establishes that, in a civil case to which a federal officer is a party, the time for appeal ends sixty days after entry of judgment. The district court’s August 7, 2002 judgment therefore became unappealable, and hеnce final within the meaning of the EAJA, on October 7, 2002. Thus, for Townsend’s ‘ fee application to have been timely, the application ought'to have been filed by November 6, 2002, thirty days after the district court’s August 7, 2002 judgment became final and unаppealable. Because Townsend’s fee application was not filed until February 20, 2003, which was over three months after the thirty-day deadline had expired, the district court concluded that Townsend’s fee applicаtion was untimely.
We do not disagree with the district court’s calculations or its selection of the August 7, 2002 judgment as the critical judgment for the purpose of calculating the time limitation. That judgment became final on October 7, 2002, and the thirty-day clock began to run at that time. Instead, we disagree with the district court’s determination that it lacked the power to apply equitable tolling under the EAJA because the time limitation wds jurisdictional. Admittedly, our past precedent characterized the EAJA’s time limitation for fee applications as jurisdictional.
See Ranger,
Having clarified the posture of the EAJA’s time limitation for fee applications, the Court in
Scarborough
concluded that the relation-back doctrine did apply to fee applications under the EAJA and that a delayed amendment to a fee application adding an allegation that the government’s position was not substantially justified would relate back to a timely filed fee application. In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to the longstanding principle that “limitation principles should generally apply to the Government in the same way that they apply to private parties.”
Scarborough,
These same factors counsel that equitable tolling is appropriatе under the EAJA. “Time requirements' in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to equitable tolling.”
Irwin,
Additionally, we do not believe that applying equitable tolling in certain limited circumstances will prejudice the govern
In sum, we conclude that basеd on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Scarborough,
the EAJA time limitation for fee applications is subject to equitable tolling. It is understandable that the district court reached a different legal conclusion, however, as the district court did not have the benefit of
Scarborough
at the time of its ruling. We thus conclude that it is appropriate for the district court to consider whether in light of
Scarborough
and our decision in this case, equitable tolling is warranted under the facts of this case. Once the distriсt court has ruled on this question, if either party so chooses, we may review the district court’s application of the equitable-tolling doctrine for an abuse of discretion.
Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn.,
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment that equitable tolling does not apply under the EAJA and REMAND the case for determination as to whether equitable tolling of the EAJA time limitation is warranted in this case.
Notes
. This thirty-day deadline applies to fee applications brought under either 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) or 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
See United States v. Ranger Elec. Communications, Inc.,