*1 97 July July Argued 13, 1977 Decided July Rehearing denied appellant. Haldi, for Glenville Fine, Cadenhead, for S. Nall, Lowell Miller & appellees.
54219. GUAY v. NIENABER. Judge. Webb, appeals judgment against him Defendant from a for complaint contending due, rent containеd in However, attacks should been his answer have sustained. ruling matters, no as to these was invoked nothing there for this court to review. Judgment Deen, Marshall, J., J., P. affirmed.
concur. July July Submitted Decided July Rehearing denied 1977.
Schreeder, Flint, Sheldon, & M. Wheeler Michael appellant. pro Nienaber,
Fred C. se.
53525. STEINER et al. v. MELVIN. Judge. Smith, Mr. appellants, brought Steiner, and Mrs. wrongful against following death action Melvin a traffic appellants’ accident in which injured. fatally son was appeal judgment This from the entered on the verdict apрellee’s in favor contends that irrelevant evidence portions was admitted and that various of the erroneous. We find no error and affirm. County accident occurred in Fulton on a segment notorious of Powers Road. Traffic cross-
ing a spanning one-lane, 500 foot each lights controlled River is
Chattahoochee from one to allow traffic programmed are end which other, direction, alternately. to cross and then the by motorcycle eastbound traveling decedent admitted over ob- Testimony the bridge. approached light, at the traffic stopped showed that he jection *2 red, green it turned and entered he ran it before was but 50 miles hour. Other accelerating per to about bridge, the side and that he reached the other showed evidence colliding with feet further before two hundred travelеd left, from the turning which was appellee’s vehicle lane, motorcycle’s path. into the west-bound disobeyed had 1. The evidence that the decedent impact 750 feet from the was on the light red it relevаnt was very This evidence was admissible. accident, to the and connected time and distance closely decedent was on whether directly therefore bore own at the time and exercising ordinary safety care his event, rel- But in where the any of the accident. place and evidence is doubtful it should be admitted evancy of jury. Lovejoy v. to the determination of the weight its left 784). (95 Tidwell, 212 Ga. 751 SE2d charged provisiоns judge properly 2. The trial 68-1612) (Ga. 556, 569; pp. L. Code Ann. 34 § § § (c)) (Ga. 556,577; Ann. 68-1626 of the pp. 48 L. Code § since each Although repealed, 1952 Traffic Act. Highway time of the trial. section was effect at the 68-1612) (Code (a) Ann. prohibited Section 45 § As the of an official traffic control device. disobedience admissible evidence of the violation of the traffic was above), charge provision 1 of this Division to the evidence. adjusted (с))
(b) (Code Section 48 Ann. 68-1626 § speed at a reduced when driver of a vehicle to drive and when traveling winding roadway, on a narrow or respect hazards exist with to other traffic or special Thus, statutory highway reаson of conditions. it was shown also to the evidence as provision adjusted im- which the decedent traveled over narrow and mediately preceding very the accident was decking wooden as shown appearance old in and with very by photographs.
99 regard judge sections, With to each of these properly jury instructed the that if it found violation statutory provisions by plaintiffs decedent, of these it must then consider determine whether the violation proximate was the of the cause collision. refusing charge
3. The court did not err to the doctrine last clear chance. the trial of the case On аppellee any op there was no had portunity to take evasive action after became aware impending of the collision. "The last clear chance doctrine simply application has no unless the defendant knew of plaintiffs perilous opportunity situation had proper injuring take evasive action avoid him. It does apply not know’ or 'should 'should have known’ (6) Mangum, App. 100, situatiоn.” (207 106 Conner Ga. 604). Wallace, SE2d See L. R. also Seaboard C. Co. v. 542). App. 490, There is no error failing principle applicable not evidence adduced trial of the Mc case. (4) (179 Larty Corp., v. Emhart *3 appellants 4. The in contend the court erred following language: charge you "I that one using rightfully roadway who is himself or street has a right superior to the use thereof is that of one who violating regulations, traffic in of absence knowledge, person required anticipate such is not unexpectedly will other user violate the law or rule danger.” of the road and create a situation of There was no giving error in which is а correct statement of (Russell (2)(91 24)) Corley, 121, 122 law v. applied presented by and could be to the evidence either party. appellants
5. The
contend that the trial
has a
court
upon
responsibility
request
jury
to instruct
with
respect
parties.
general
the contentions
rule
judge clearly
fairly gives
is that if applicable
formally
involved,
law
to the issues
his failure
pleadings
to state the contentions as shown
not
will
McKinney,
cause for new
be
trial.
R.
Central
Co.v.
of Ga.
(1)(45
430);
Lines,
appellants in an ar- have resulted and would charge. gumentative merit in this is no com- There plaint. Judgment Bell, J., Deen, J, Quillian, P. C. affirmed. Banke, JJ., J., Webb,Marshall, concur.
P. Shulman McMurray, J., dissents. July
Argued February 1977 Decided July Rehearing denied Hawkins, Hawkins, Q. Paul M. William Freeman & appellants. Bird, for Corry, Webb, Williams,
Dennis, Thomas Carlock & appelleе. Copeland, Carlock, K. Wade S. Judge, dissenting. McMurray, plaintiffs’ wrongful arose when
This death action riding motorcycle his east on decedent was killed while Ferry County and collided with an Powers automobile driven Roаd Fulton hundred feet defendant. Several the collision Powers Road west of the scene of by way one- the Chattahoochee River crosses bridge by lane Access to the is controlled only lights at eаch end of the which allow traffic at time. The one direction to be traffic one bridge, at the west end of the which controls bridge by motorists, more access to the eastbound Testimony than 750 feet from the scene of the collision. objection plaintiffs’ was allowed evidence over *4 light stopped decedent was the traffic at west end but green. ran approximately it to it turned He then accelеrated before per 50 miles hour the and passed sight from the of the witnesses. before defendant, who had been The collision occurred when driving Ferry attempted Road, turn left west on Powers a parking restаurant lot private leading into a drive of 200 feet from the east end the approximately in that lower court did not err majority The hold the se, per on allowing negligence is, plaintiffs’ that that decedent hаd the traffic disobeyed side 750 feet signal opposite on of a from of at an in- point impact Powers Road with a private leading tersection drive restaurant lot. It noted that this is located parking ap- drive proximately 200 feet from the east end of the bridge, this lost sight motorcyclist, witness of but she later saw where collision occurred.
I agree signal cannot the violation of the traffic or a as should hаve been allowed in evidence to negligence per se as a result thereof was authorized.
In whether the violation of a statute is determining per negligence specific se as individual it is necessary (1) to examine purpose of the statute and decide the injured person whether falls of within class (2) persons was statute intended to protect; complained whether harm was of the harm the statutе Baker, was intended to guard against. Rhodes v. (2b) 157, (Ga. Ann. 1953, Sess.,
Code 68-1612 L. Nov. pp. § 569, in effect at the time of the collision in the case sub judice, although L. repealed 633, 645, by pp. 1, 1974, 68A-201)) effective July new Code Ann. § prohibits the disobеdience of the instructions official traffic-control device unless otherwise by directed a police officer. purpose The of this statute is to expedite flow traffic and avoid collisions by сontrolling the flow of traffic within the regulated area by traffic signal. protected by individuals are statute those motorists and pedestrians traveling within the area where the flow of traffic is controlled signal. There was no evidence that the defendant in this case was within the area controlled the traffic signal, nor there any evidence that he entering leaving or such an area. (c) (Ga. purpose of Code Ann. 68-1626 L. § Sess.,
Nov. pp. 556,577, amended, at effect the time of collision the case judice, repealed sub Ga. L. *5 68A-8)) prevent
pp. 1582,1588 new CodeAnn. Ch. is to upon roadways special by collisions requiring where hazards exist roadwаys their
the motorists on those to reduce speed necessary provide safety much as is for the so protected by The individuals this statute are the all users. upon roadway endangered such a who motоrists would be higher probability of collision if their fellow speed. are not to reduce The motorists statute also immediately adjacent their protects pedestrians using and others the area roadways might be who endangered by roadway collisions or loss of control of a vehicle thereon. There is no roadway that the
at or near the site of the accident was winding special or that other hаzard existed. There ap- was considerable evidence that proximately away. 200 feet occur collision did not on the
Defendant in this case does not fall within the class of protection pеrsons for the of whom these statutes opinion my enacted. Therefore in the trial court erred in language jury. of these statutes to the allowing The court also erred into evidence over objectiоn testimony plaintiff the irrelevant had run a light shortly red lights purpose time before the of the collision. The traffic
were installed on each end of the for the expediting avoiding the flow of traffic and controlling collisions the flow of traffic the area within bridge regulated by signals. running the traffic of the red as no occurring was irrelevant and inadmissible inasmuch proximate causal connection with the collision away
more than 750 feet was shown Co., evidence. See such cases as Tiller v. Ga. App. 68 Ga. Power (22 623); Fielding Driggers, SE2d (1)(190 601); Corp. Oil v.Stanfield, Gulf 436, I therefore dissent.