Stegman v. NickelsStegman v. Nickels
{¶ 2} Appellants, Donald and Phyllis Nickels, owned a residence which they began renting to appellees, Thomas and Donna Stegman, in 1994. The lease provided that appellants would pay for insurance as to the house itself, but аppellees could either purchase renter's insurance or self-insure to cover loss or damage to their personal property in the event of damage or destruction of the home. The Stegmans did not purchase renter's insurance.
{¶ 3} On March 30, 2001, a firе destroyed the rental property, including all of the Stegmans' personal property. When the fire started, Mike Brewster, who had been hired by appellants to upgrade certain electrical components, was working on an electrical panel in the basement. He saw smoke seeping down through the floor boards and quickly exited the house, which was then completely destroyed by the fire.
{¶ 4} Appellants' insurer, Ohio Mutual Insurance Group ("OMIG"), assigned an adjuster, Aleta Roberts, to handle the Nickels' insurance claim. On April 3, the Nickels received a $50,050 claim payment, and ultimately received a total payment of $78,790. The Stegmans were then notified that they had thirty days to retrieve property or arrange for inspection of the property. Ohio Mutual also hired an outside expert to evaluate and create a report as to his opinion on the fire and its possible causes.
{¶ 5} The Stegmans did not arrange for a separate inspection of the residence or request that appellants delay demolition. They did, however, speak with and answer questions posed by the expert investigator hired by OMIG. The house was demolished over a period of four days, beginning on May 11, 2001. The Stegmans later sued appellants for damages, alleging that appellants had been negligent in the maintenance of the rental property. During discovery, the Stegmans sent interrogatories to appellants requesting "any and all documents which reference or pertain to inspection or investigative reports performed on the subject property after the fire." Apрellants responded: "Objection. Testifying experts have not been identified as yet on [sic] such request violates Civil Rule 26(B)(4)."
{¶ 6} The Stegmans then filed a motion to compel the production of all reports regarding any investigation of the causes of the fire. Appellants opposed the motion, asserting that certain documents, including a letter to potential defendants and the report created by the outside expert, were protected as attorney work product created in anticipation of litigation, undеr
{¶ 7} "The trial court abused its discretion in its August 26, 2005 Judgment Entry by requiring Defendants/Appellants to produce to the Plaintiffs any expert reports and the identity of the person making the report or inspection as these materials arе privileged pursuant to the work product doctrine codified in Ohio Civil Rule 26."
{¶ 8}
{¶ 9} "It is the policy of these rules (1) to preserve the right of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of such cases and (2) to prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage of his adversary's industry оr efforts."
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} "(a) Subject to the provisions of subdivision (B)(4)(b) of this rule and Rule 35(B), a party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation оf litigation or preparation for trial only upon a showing that the party seekingdiscovery is unable without undue hardship to obtain facts andopinions on the same subject by other means or upon a showing ofother exceptional circumstances indicating that denial ofdiscovery would cause manifest injustice.
{¶ 12} "(b) As an alternative or in addition to obtaining discovery under subdivision (B)(4)(a) of this rule, a party by means of interrоgatories may require any other party (i) to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, and (ii) to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify. Thereafter, any party may discover from the expert or the other party facts known or opinions held by the expert which are relevant to the stated subject matter. Discovery of the expert's opinions and the grounds therefore is restricted to those previously given to the other pаrty or those to be given on direct examination at trial."
{¶ 13} In other words,
{¶ 14} Once discovery is requested, the party claiming that documents or statements are work product, has the burden of showing that the materials should not be discoverable. Peyko v.Frederick (1986),
{¶ 15} Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which belongs to the cliеnt, "[t]he work-product doctrine * * * belongs to the attorney and assures him that his private files shall remain free from intrusions of opposing counsel in the absence of special circumstances. The work-product doctrine generally protects a broader range of materials than does the attorney-client privilege because the work-product doctrine protects all materials prepared in anticipation of trial." Frank W. Schaefer,Inc. v. C. Garfield Mitchell Agency, Inc. (1992),
{¶ 16} Generally, trial courts arе given broad discretion in the management of discovery. State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman
(1973),
{¶ 17} Nonetheless, if requested discovery is arguably either opinion work product or ordinary fact work product, the trial court should conduct an evidentiary hearing and an in camera inspection to determine which portions of a file are privileged. See Peyko, supra, at 167. See, also, Miller v. Bassett, 8th Dist. No. 86938,
{¶ 18} In this case, appellees contend that their cooperation with the expert hired by OMIG entitles them to a copy of the report generated by that expert. They also claim undue hardship because the house has been demolished, now preventing them from gathering their own information. What appellees do not acknowledge is that they themselves created the alleged hardship. Despite being notified that the house was to be demolished, they did not seek to have their own inspection of the property. Although the Stegmans may have assumed that they would be compensated in some way, nothing in the record indicates that OMIG or appellants ever told them they would receive a сopy of the expert's report or that they would be covered by the OMIG policy. The information about the cause of the fire only became important to the Stegmans when they later filed suit.
{¶ 19} The facts of this case illustrate the exact purpose behind
{¶ 20} Before any experts were designated as trial witnesses, appellees requested all expert reports, regardless of whether they had been generated for claims purposes or for litigation. Appellees may discover any unprivileged report generated in the ordinary course of business for the purpose of investigation and рayment of insurance claims. The trial court failed, however, to conduct a hearing or in camera inspection to make the determinations as to whether the documents submitted under seal are privileged work product in anticipation of litigation or merely investigative business reports related to the processing of appellants' insurance claim. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court improperly granted appellees' motion for disclosure of appellants' expert's repоrt.
{¶ 21} Accordingly, appellants' sole assignment of error is well-taken.
{¶ 22} The judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and remanded for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to inspect the documents submitted under seal to make determinations which are consistent with this decision. Appellees are ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Singer, P.J., Skow, J., Parish, J. Concur.