142 Wis. 49 | Wis. | 1910
The questions as to the defendant’s liability which arise if it be assumed that the evidence permitted the inferences that the chauffeur’s negligence was the proximate cause of decedent’s injuries, and that she was free from contributory negligence, are these: First, Is an automo
Upon the first inquiry we discover nothing in the construction, operation, and use of the automobile requiring that it be placed in the category with the locomotive, ferocious animals,, dynamite, and other dangerous contrivances and agencies. When properly handled and used, automobiles are as readily and effectually regulated and controlled as other vehicles in common use, and when so used they are reasonably free from dangers. The dangers incident to their use as motor vehicles are commonly the result of the negligent and reckless conduct of those in charge of and operating them, and do not inhere in the construction and use of the vehicles. It is well known that they are being devoted to and used for the purposes of traffic and as conveyances for the pleasure and convenience of all classes of persons and without menace to the safety of those using them or to others upon the same highway when they are operated with reasonable care. The defendant cannot therefore be held liable upon the ground that the automobile is a dangerous contrivance. This view has been adopted by the courts in the following cases: Slater v. Advance T. Co. 97 Minn. 305, 107 N. W. 133; McIntyre v. Orner, 166 Ind. 57, 76 N. E. 750; Lewis v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 50, 59 S. E. 338; Jones v. Hoge, 47 Wash. 663, 92 Pac. 433; Cunningham v. Castle, 127 App. Div. 580, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1057.
Whether tire chauffeur, at the time of the accident, was acting within the scope of his employment involves an inquiry into the contract of his employment and the relation of his acts at the time of the accident to the service he actually performed pursuant to his employment. The facts are that under his contract of service with John McNcmghton, the owner of the automobile and the defendant in this case, he was to care for and operate the machine at the request and direction of.the defendant or any member of his family; that he
It is obvious from the conditions of the contract of employment that it did not embrace the use of the automobile by the chauffeur for going to his meals; and the question, therefore, is: Do the facts warrant the inference that this use of it by the chauffeur was, under the circumstances of the case, “a permissive privilege granted to [him], of which he availed himself, to facilitate his labor and service, and . . . equally connected with it and the relation of master and servant?” Ewald v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 70 Wis. 420, 428, 36 N. W. 15. It is strenuously urged that the evidence on this subject permits of such an inference. This contention is made on the grcrands that the chauffeur used this machine to further his master’s interests; that he thereby reduced the time for getting his meals and thus was able to devote more time to the service of the defendant; that the defendant gave him the control of the machine for the day without restriction, thereby enabling him to use it for this purpose; and that these and all the other conditions of his employment and service malee the use of the machine on these occasions one
“Eor all acts done by a servant in obedience to the express orders or direction of the master, or in the execution of the master’s business, within the scope of his employment, and for acts in any sense warranted by the express or implied authority conferred upon him, considering the nature of the services required, the instruction given, and the circumstances-under which the act is done, the master is responsible.” Ritchie v. Waller, 63 Conn. 155, 160, 28 Atl. 30.
While the rule of such liability may readily be comprehended, its application to the varying facts in cases of this class is often attended with difficulty. The ultimate inquiry
Upon these considerations it must be held that the facts in evidence do not permit of the inference that the chauffeur at the time of the accident was acting in the execution of the defendant’s business, or that the defendant granted him the privilege of using the machine on this occasion to facilitate his labor and service; and that the acts of the chauffeur were not connected with his service and were not performed within the course of his employment.
This conclusion disposes of the ease, and no other question need be considered.
By the Cowrt. — Judgment affirmed.