STEEVE LOUISSAINT v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILDREN
No. CV-20-382
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION IV
October 28, 2020
2020 Ark. App. 494
N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 26JV-18-385]; HONORABLE LYNN WILLIAMS, JUDGE; AFFIRMED
Appellant Steeve Louissaint appeals from the March 2020 order of the Garland County Circuit Court terminating his parental rights to his three children, who were all under the age of seven: daughter JL, daughter SL, and son SL1.1 On appeal, aрpellant argues that the circuit court (1) clearly erred in finding that the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) proved any statutory ground for termination because DHS failed to provide meaningful reunification services to him, аnd (2) clearly erred in finding that it was in the children‘s best interest to terminate his parental right because DHS failed to prove that there was potential harm to the children if they were placed in appellant‘s custody. We disagree with his arguments and affirm.
Termination of parental rights is a two-step process requiring a determination that the parent is unfit and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Houseman v. Ark. Dep‘t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 227, 491 S.W.3d 153. The first step requires proof of one or more statutory grounds for termination; the second step, the best-interest analysis, includes consideration of the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted and of the potential harm caused by returning custody of the child to the parent. Id. Statutory grounds and a best-interest finding must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is the degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established. Id. We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Id. The apрellate inquiry is whether the circuit court‘s finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviеwing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. A juvenile‘s need for permanency and stability may override a parent‘s request for additional time to improve the рarent‘s circumstances. Contreras v. Ark. Dep‘t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 604, 474 S.W.3d 510.
In 2011, DHS made a “true” finding against appellant for having subjected two older children, RL and XL, to physical abuse. In July 2018, DHS opened a protective-services case concerning the three younger сhildren in the present case due to the mother‘s drug use. The children were taken into emergency custody of DHS in December 2018. The children were living with their mother in Hot Springs. The home was environmentally unsafe (eight or more poorly сared for dogs and cats in the home; animal feces throughoutthe home; rotten food in the sink and on the kitchen counter; utilities had been turned off; the children were inappropriately clothed, dirty, and malodorous). Although аppellant and the mother were married, they did not live together or have a relationship. Appellant was living in Hollywood, Florida. After the children‘s removal, the circuit court appointed an attorney to represent appellant.
At a January 2019 adjudication hearing, the children were found to be dependent-neglected; appellant‘s attorney appeared, but appellant did not. The circuit court made no findings cоncerning appellant because he had not yet appeared before the court nor presented any evidence of his fitness. Appellant was ordered to view
At a November 2019 permanency-planning hearing, appellant‘s attorney appeared, but appellant did not. The circuit court found that appellant had not complied with the case plan, he had not demonstrated progress, and he had only participated in phone visitаtion. The circuit court again made a “reasonable efforts” finding. The goal was changed to termination of parental rights. DHS filed a petition to terminate parental rights alleging multiple statutory grounds against appellant, including having subjected the juveniles to aggravated circumstances in that there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in successful reunification. See
The termination hearing was conducted in March 2020. Appellant‘s attorney appeared. Appellant appeared by telephone. Thе case worker testified that although she had had contact with appellant beginning in January 2019 and told him about the need for him to have stable housing and income, appellant never made progress and had lived for a whilе in a homeless shelter. She said that appellant had participated in some telephone visitation, but he had not had any contact with his children since late January 2020.
Appellant testified that he had lived in a homelеss shelter from August 2019 through December 2019, but since the end of December 2019, he had lived in Pembroke Park, Florida, with his aunt and two cousins at his aunt‘s leased apartment; he slept on the couch. He admittedly had not notified DHS of this new address until a fеw days before the termination hearing. He said he had been working for the previous six months and had just bought a bunk bed and a television for his children to use at his aunt‘s apartment. He saidhe could not afford to travel to Arkansas and keеp up with his other expenses. Appellant wanted a little extra time to work toward gaining custody, and he asked at the termination hearing that the court order a home study.
In the termination-of-parental-rights order entered fifteen months after the children had come into DHS custody, the circuit court found that appellant would not or could not appropriately care for his children, that he lacked effort toward, or interest, gaining custody, and that these facts presented potential harm to the children if they were placed in his custody. Among the statutory grounds that the circuit court found DHS had proved against appellant was that appellant subjected his children to “aggravated circumstances” in that there was little likelihood that continued
Appellant first argues that DHS provided him no services except telephone visitation, so therе could be no finding that DHS had made reasonable or meaningful efforts toward the children being placed with their father. We hold that appellant has failed to demonstrate that the circuit court committed reversible error.
In the Juvenile Code, “aggravated circumstances” is defined to exist in certain circumstances that include when “a determination has been or is made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in succеssful reunification[.]”
Appellant also argues that the circuit court committed reversible error by finding that termination of appellant‘s parental rights was in his children‘s best interest because thеre was insufficient evidence of potential harm to the children if they were placed with him. We disagree. Potential harm is merely a factor to be considered; it is not an element of the cause of action and nеed not be established by clear and convincing evidence. Phillips v. Ark. Dep‘t of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 169, 596 S.W.3d 91. The circuit court is notrequired to find that actual harm will result or to affirmatively identify a potential harm. Id. Moreover, evidence on this factor must be viewed in a forward-looking manner and considered in broad terms. Id. A parent‘s past behavior is often a good indicator of future behavior and may be viewed as a predictor of likely potential harm. Id. In deciding whether it is in the children‘s best intеrest to terminate parental rights, the Juvenile Code requires that the circuit court consider recent improvements, but the circuit court also relies on the record of the parent‘s compliance in the entire dеpendency-neglect
Appellant was represented by counsel for fifteen months and had been informed by DHS what he would need to do to gain custody of his children; DHS provided him with telephone visitation, which appellant ceased exercising; appellant never came to Arkansas see his children during the case and had never met his son in person; and appellant failed to provide stable, suitable, and sufficient income and housing to properly care for his children. After de novo review of this record, we hold that this evidence supports the circuit court‘s finding that termination of appellant‘s parental rights was in the children‘s best interest.
Affirmed.
GRUBER, C.J., and ABRAMSON, J., agree.
Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
Ellen K. Howard, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Kimberly Boling Bibb, attorney ad litem for minor children.