*1 right to implicit of her fundamental agreement. This waiver arbitration enforce the then, provi- under the cited by jury, a trial founded on a belief argument appears to be law, her sions of this state’s fundamental just result attain might avoidable. this The assertion of through arbitration. contrary belief, directly to this sought en- clause to be arbitration acknowledgment of arbitration Court’s against Mary Long appears to be forced jus- to substantial process as an avenue governed by laws of the of New State support this Appellee fails tice.7 also recites York. contract she argument logical as to supposed belief infirmity in clause. and she claims no provide an ade- would not why arbitration argue here her arbitra- Nor does she complaints.8 Fur- remedy for her quate agreement is as viola- tion unenforceable ther, in arbitration is sub- public policy principle an award made es- tive of some by governs param- poused by review the courts assure the law that ject to promise.2 of of to as- eters her contractual impartiality the arbitrators proceedings the arbitration were sure that Mary I cannot conclude that Because Appellee’s argument fairly conducted.9 governed Long’s agreement is arbitration policy not allow public should by I concur in the provisions is rely on the arbitration lant to opinion. court’s unpersuasive. denying ap- court The order the trial compel arbitration is
pellant’s motion to is REMANDED The cause
REVERSED. entry court of an order
to the trial
compelling in accordance with arbitration 803(A).
15 O.S. STEENBERGEN, Appellant, C.J., HARGRAVE, DOOLIN, V.C.J., Bobbie Lou SIMMS, SUMMERS, OPALA and v. JJ., concur. AND FEDERAL FIRST SAVINGS CHICKASHA, J., KAUGER, et part, OF LOAN al., Appellees. part. dissents No. 63166. WILSON, JJ., HODGES Supreme Court Oklahoma. OPALA, Justice, concurring. 8, Dec. 1987. Constitution, Art. 23 Under Oklahoma’s 8,1 express implied contractual waiv- Rehearing Denied 1988. March appear right to be ers of a constitutional unenforceable. Long’s agreement Mary arbitration in suit were to be construed as an contract, "Any express provision or im- Supra, 2.
7. note any person, plied, Appellee’s she was assertion that induced sought Constitution to be benefits of agreement by into the securities account enter waived, [Emphasis be null and void.” shall issue. Paint fraud is itself arbitrable Prima added.] Mfg. Corp., Corp. & U.S. v. Flood Conklin S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1270 Keller, Okl., 2. See Benham [1983]. (A)(2) and §§ 15 O.S.1981 Const., provide: 1. The terms of Art. 23 *2 Taylor,
Michael A. Bloodworth & Associ- ates, City, appellant. for Cordell, Jr.,
F. Chickasha, Thomas for appellees.
SUMMERS, Justice. Plaintiff/appellant Steenbergen Bobbie had two accounts with the defendant/ap- pellee and Loan of passbook Chickasha. The first was a sav- ings opened account $500.00 (her names of Steenbergen daugh- Renee ter) Steenbergen. or Bobbie The second was a certificate of $7500.00 Steenbergen the names of Bobbie or Velma Hooker. funds were the inheritance of Steenbergen Bobbie only hers was the authorized on both accounts. 27,1980 On October Bobbie went to First Federal and announced that she wished to given close out both accounts. She was representing the bal- $8844.27 accounts, presumed ance in both which she to be a cashier’s check. That check was to the order of Renee Steen- bergen Steenbergen. put or Bobbie reality the check in In her lockbox. instrument was not a cashier’s but rather a check drawn on an account First Topeka, lending Federal had at a Kansas institution.
In November 1981 First Federal issued a
stop payment order on the 13 month old
check. The
month it issued a
amount, again
second check
the same
Bobbie,
payable to
called
Renee or
pick
up.
Renee to come in and
daughter obliged and cashed it for her own
benefit. None of the events described in
paragraph
were known to Bobbie until
of or
property in denial
inconsistent with
deposited
January
rights
White v.
then
therein.
Webber/Walk
purchase
Only
new
CD.
(Okl.1979)
It is
her check man
payment on
learn that
did she
a conversion
necessary to constitute
check had
stopped, that a second
had been
pos
into
come
the defendant’s
property
issued,
it had
delivered
and that
been
been
wrongfully. Federal National
session
taking her
at the time was
Lindsey,
Bank
Shawnee
in a
divorce battle.
side
bitter
father’s
*3
(1935).
necessary
is it
Nor
against Renee and
lawsuit
In Bobbie’s
apply
proper
alleged converter
the
parties filed motions
all
use,
ty to
own
U.S. Zinc Co. v. Col
discovery was
summary judgment once
(1927),
burn,
124 Okl.
P.
be
First
sustained
completed. The trial court
v. Gudgel,
Stack
in bad faith.
appeals.
motion and Bobbie
Federal’s
(1916).
P.
reverse.
We
her action for conver
maintain
To
held,
we,
The
as do
that
trial court
must establish that First Fed
sion Bobbie
issuing
in
the
justified
First Federal was
wrongfully
with
eral
interfered
her funds
its
12A
stop payment order on
stale check.
check, depriving
represented by the
as
her
enti
4-403. A “customer” so
O.S.1981 §
of the use of such funds. See Davidson v.
carry
stop payment includes a bank
tled to
Bank,
(Okl.1976).
First State
12A
another bank.
ing an account with
parties agree
are
there
no material
4-104(1)(e).
O.S.1981 §
controversy.
in
facts
paying
that in
the
The trial court held
compel
The
uncontested facts
to one of the
proceeds of the two accounts
opposite
to reach a result
that reached
us
Fed-
on
first check First
payees named
the
by the trial court:
liability. It is
incur no additional
eral could
signatory
was the sole
on
disagree.
here that we
each account.
defensively
Although
by First
signatory
not raised
one
2. As
she was the
who
question
note a threshold
Federal we
in
to close out the
appeared
suit
to be first addressed. Bobbie’s
needs
accounts.
Deposits
in
such as
conversion.
sounds
proceeds
first
all
3. The
banking
in
and loan
institu
hers
to
was delivered
her.
relation
tions establish debtor-creditor
Loan reissued
4. When
Guaranty Bank Okeene v.
ships. State
payee,
in the other
check it called
(1924).
manner,
conversion. Ow
does constitute
in a con-
the loan officer to have been
Trust
ens v. Andrews Bank and
divorce with Bobbie.
tested
par
to material fact the court shall the bank to either payee’s render of the including the judgment party for the word or between so entitled as a the names. payable An instrument to 13(e), the order of matter of law. Rule Rules for the two or more payable in the alter District Courts of Oklahoma. native, one of them and fact-specific Our conclusion is that in this negotiated, discharged or enforced situation the above acts of the defendant by any of possession them who has of it. mishandling amounted to such a 3-116(a). Appellant knew check to which Bobbie was entitled as to or should have known that she was in constitute a interference with her possession of a bank not a certified property. judgment She is thus entitled to check, and that the check as matter of law. The either of the payee’s. An instru trial court is reversed and the cause re- ment is converted any person manded judg- with instructions to enter whom it is payment delivered for refuses $8844.27, plus ment the sum of interest on demand either or return it. 12A *4 provided by plaintiff favor of the O.S.1981, 3-419(1)(b). In this case the § against the defendant First Federal presented payee a named Savings and Loan Association of Chicka- appellee paid the face value on demand. sha. appellee powers acted within the granted statute and therefore their HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and acts did not constitute an unlawful or LAVENDER, WILSON, ALMA wrongful conversion appellants prope SUMMERS, JJ., KAUGER and concur. rty.1 OPALA, J., judgment. Appellant argues further DOOLIN, C.J., SIMMS, J., lee breeched the contract that was created card for the appellee’s accounts at the bank. HODGES, J., participating. they could be held liable had SIMMS, Justice, dissenting: any released funds from these accounts to person. However, ap- unauthorized I respectfully dissent. To maintain an pellant relieved the bank from obli- action for appellant conversion the gation under this contract when she volun- prove an unlawful or act of do- tarily closed these accounts. At the time minion over the property of another. she closed the long- accounts a contract no Davidson v. First State Bank and Trust er existed and the terms of the check be- Yale, Okl., Co. controlling. came A check is a draft drawn on a bank and I would affirm of the trial on demand. court. 3-104(2)(b). The check ap issued to the pellant’s daughter carried an I am unconditional authorized to state that Chief Jus- joins or tice expressed order to DOOLIN sum certain in views money and herein. promise. no other 12A O.S. 3-104(1)(b). money This sum of paid
must be payee payees or
on the appellant face of the check. The
was aware that the check had both hers daughters
and her name on it. She was 6, O.S.1981, provides: not, 1. Title persons “When a such shall be a minor or deposit has been made or shall not; hereafter be living whether the other be or and the made in bank in the names of two or more receipt acquittance paid persons, payable of them or shall be valid and sufficient release and dis survivor, any of deposit, them or the such charge any payment to the bank for so made ..." thereof, thereon, any part or interest paid to either of said whether one of