*1 January 10, Argued Appeals judgment and submitted decision of the Court of and reversed; of the circuit court case remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings May 9, 1996

STEELMAN-DUFF, INC.,

a corporation, Respondent Review, on

v. STATE OF OREGON, and acting by through its DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION/ OREGON STATE HIGHWAY DIVISION,

Defendant, J.C. COMPTON CONTRACTOR, INC.,

an Oregon corporation, Petitioner on Review.

(CC S42501) 92C12356; A80684; CA SC

915 P2d 958 *2 P.C., Portland, Paul R. & Meyer, Meyer Meyer, argued on the cause and filed for review. petition petitioner Portland, A. & Larkin, Gray, Thomas Stewart Sokol him on the the cause on review. With argued respondent brief John Stewart. Spencer Garza, Randles,

Keith M. A. and Eric A. Guy Grasberger, Rives, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus of Stoel curiae of the Associated General Oregon-Columbia Chapter America, Contractors of Inc.

GRABER, J. J., Fadeley filed a which

Durham, concurring opinion JJ., joined. and Unis

GRABER, J. interpretation This case involves that, of held in ORS Court Appeals provision Contractor, Inc. (Comp J.C. Compton under ORS fees in this action. Steel- not entitled to ton), 545, 135 Or Inc. v. Dept. Transportation, App man-Duff, (1995). follow, the reasons that we P2d 752 For reverse. 279.067 provides:

“(1) any Any bidder affected or trade associ- acting on behalf of a mem- ation of construction contractors protect ber of the association to interests common to may construction contractor members commence a suit in county circuit court for the in are located the which principal public contracting agency, offices of the for the with, purpose requiring compliance prevention of vio- of, 279.063, lations ORS 279.011 to or to determine of ORS applicability 279.011 to 279.063 to matters or deci- agency. sions of the

“(2) may The court equitable order such relief as it con- appropriate siders in the circumstances. In addition to or in any relief, equitable may lieu of the court award an any aggrieved damages bidder suffered the bidder as a result of violations of ORS 279.011 to 279.063 for the preparing submitting reasonable cost of A deci- bid. contracting agency sion of shall not be voided if equitable other relief is available.

“(3) If the public agency defending is successful in its against potential actions claims of violation or violation of 279.063, ORS 279.011 to then the court award to the any aggrieved public agency damages suffered as a result of the suit. “(4) payment The court order reasonable attor-

ney appeal and costs on trial and successful *4 added.) under (Emphasis suit this section.” 279.063, statute, ORS 279.011 to referred to in the foregoing con- relate to for bids and bidders in the requirements public tracting process.

Steelman-Duff was an affected bidder that 279.067(1). brought this action under ORS Steelman-Duff Oregon Department claimed Transportation (ODOT) requirements pub- had failed to follow certain of the contracting improperly rejected lic law and had its bid on a project being nonresponsive. construction Assum- ing responsive, that its bid was Steelman-Duff was the lowest project. Compton bidder on that Because was the next lowest bidder, and ODOT had announced its intention to award the Compton, contract Steelman-Duff named J.C. Company, as well as ODOT, as a defendant.1 The relief sought was

“a determination that [Steelman-Duff] is the lowest respon- responsive sible bidder and is entitled to award of the sub- ject procurement, appropriate injunctive with relief so requiring, together with determination in [Steel- favor of against recovery [ODOT] and [Steelman- man-Duffl Duff’s] attorney’s fees and costs incurred herein.” Compton then filed answer, defenses, affirmative counterclaims, and cross-claims. In the first counterclaim Compton alleged and cross-claim, it was the lowest responsible, responsive bidder and that ODOT remained obligated through to follow on its announced intention to Compton. award the contract to The relief that sought “[t]he was that court should honor the decision of [ODOT] Project Compton to award the contract for and [ODOT] Compton.” should direct to award the contract to sought attorney also fees and costs from Steelman- pursuant Duff to ORS Compton sought

In its second counterclaim, dam- ages delay by filing from Steelman-Duff for caused of the Compton Company It was later discovered that J.C. were not entity, although they companies. the same Compton Company, were related J.C. Compton, defendant, although Compton entity not had been named aas was the subject project. that had submitted the second-lowest bid on the Steelman-Duff dis Compton Company A(1), missed J.C. pro from the action under ORCP 54 which part: vides (a) plaintiff by “[A]n action be dismissed without order of court

filing serving a notice of dismissal with the court and such notice on the defendant.” substituting Compton “[plursuant The trial court entered an order as a defendant attorneys agreement parties.” for the

225 costs fees and attorney sought also court action. 20.105(1),2 and ORCP 17.3 279.067(4), to ORS pursuant for the request reiterated counterclaim, Compton third In its costs. fees and attorney the affirmative filed a reply

Steelman-Duff Steelman- things, other Among counterclaims. and defenses be awarded fees should attorney Duff denied Compton. determined The trial court tried.

The case then was ODOT relief, because not entitled to that Steelman-Duff the time of At as nonresponsive. its bid rejected had properly The contract. subject not awarded yet had trial, ODOT 67 B4 on Steel- under ORCP a judgment trial court entered costs to both awarded judgment claims. The man-Duffs for counterclaim that Compton’s and provided defendants 2 20.105(1) (1993) part: provided in * * * * * * action, any proceeding in a circuit court suit or other “In civil attorney discretion, appropriate in the may, its award reasonable court circumstances * ** asserted, party against if that is party a claim is whom by party asserting paid proceeding to be prevailing in the and a claim * * disobeyed willfully by a *, upon finding that the a the court solely faith, wantonly oppressive reasons.” or for acted in bad order or court 21.105(1) 1995, 618, § ch 2. legislature in 1995. Or Laws amended ORS The 140(1) 618, 1995, ch apply § Or Laws do not to this case. See amendments Those pro- apply and to “actions to ORS (providing that the amendments 9,1995). September ceedings commenced on or after” that are 3 part: provides in ORCP 17 by party represented an Every paper of a pleading, motion and other “A. attorney who is an active attorney signed of record be at least one shall Oregon State Bar.” member of the motion, paper lawyer pleading, a provides that a who files further ORCP 17 sanctions, including attorney circumstances, subject fees. be, under certain 1995, 618, Oregon § ch 4. 17 in 1995. Or Laws amended ORCP 140(2), 618, amendments to ORCP chapter that the section Laws before, actions, after the effective date on or “apply whether commenced to all analysis today, pertinent however. to our of ORCP 17 is not The text this act.” to ORCP 17 deciding those amendments read whether Nothing should be as herein retroactively. apply part: provides in 67 B ORCP action, presented in an whether than one claim for relief more “When claim, multiple par- counterclaim, cross-claim, or when claim, or third a entry judgment as to one involved, of a final direct the the court ties are only upon express parties determi- an all of the claims or fewer than more but express for delay upon direction just and is no reason for that there nation entry judgment.” proceeding. fees would later be resolved in a That judgment appealed. was not subject

Thereafter, ODOT awarded the contract to Compton. voluntarily dismissed its first counter- leaving claim only counterclaim, and cross-claim and its second request its for costs. petition filed a then fees. The ground petition

trial court denied the on the party” “was not successful in a suit supplemental judgment deny- under ORS 279.067. The court entered a

ing Compton’s request supplemental for fees. aIn second *6 judgment, Compton’s the trial court denied statement of ground untimely. costs on the that was Compton appealed supplemental judgments, both Appeals and the Court affirmed Steelman-Duff, both. 135 App Appeals Or 550. at The Court of held trial that the court properly Compton’s request attorney fees, denied for because Compton only legal controversy [that “was not a to the 279.067(4)] contemplates ORS between an affected public contracting agency.” App a bidder and 135 at Or 549. respect Appeals costs, With to the Court of held that the trial properly request, Compton’s court denied that because cost untimely. bill was Id. at 549-50.

Compton sought only respect sup- review with to the plemental judgment request attorney that denied fees, its and this court review. allowed

Attorney statutory fees are in a recoverable action provides. when, and to the extent that, the statute so Investors, Cash v. Co., 88, 91, Flow Inc. Union Oil 318 Or 862 (1993). Compton P2d 501 The statute that asserts 270.067(4). attorney basis for its claim for fees is ORS presented interpret requires issue in this case thus us to ORS 270.067(4) to determine whether the intended to attorney litigant Comp authorize award of in position. v. Industries, ton’s See PGE Bureau Labor and (1993) (explaining 317 P2d 610-12, Or method statutory analysis). 279.067(4) provides

ORS that a order court “toa fees and costs successful in a suit added.) argues Compton (Emphasis this section.” under it is “a successful party’ is used in ORS as that term was, 279.067(4). Compton fact, a that it reasons brought by that, because Steel- Steelman-Duff the action Compton was and because that action man-Duff lost “successful.” thereafter, was the contract awarded Accordingly, it is entitled to concludes, fees. “suc- was not counters

Steelman-Duff “brought respect under” to the action with cessful” required in order to be enti- 279.067, as “brought Any the stat- under” of fees. action tled to an award dispute between limited to the Steelman-Duff, is ute, reasons aggrieved Steelman-Duff —and case, this bidder—in respect contracting agency case, this ODOT—with —in Applying aggrieved that definition bidder’s bid. to the dispute statutorily us, the facts before Steelman- defined directly argues and, not involved Duff have “successful.” could not been thus, arguments of both cases, is true in close As often Certainly, plausible. the text of ORS sides are begin leg- Compton’sargument. support with, To lends the defi- article, “a,” rather than the indefinite islature used parties obtain “the,” when it stated which article, nite addition, In the word under ORS arguably thereby “party’ permitting statute, at least defined in the is not *7 party proceeding any entity a that became attorney eligible brought fees, for the statute to be under original party could have been an that was or or not whether bringing plaintiff the action party Plaintiff, or defendant. And, as a defendant. statute, named the under adjec- finally, at least when that “successful,” ordinary the sense. Because of its common and used in tive is accepted litigation, Compton’s and it bid was the of outcome project. profit to from the was able parts of the text and con- hand, other On the other 279.067(4) reading. support Steelman-Duffs text of ORS may be awarded that fees statute That * * * brought only under this in a suit to “a successful added.) section,” brought By referring (Emphasis “a suit to 279.067(4) under this section” (emphasis added), ORS limits an of award to the form of specific action that the remainder of the section authorizes someone bring. 279.067(1) ORS delineates the that as a may, matter of an action ORS right, bring under “[a]ny bidder 279.067 — affected” or adversely “any trade association of construction a of contractors on behalf of member the acting association”— whom the against action be brought public —“the contracting Thus, the statute agency.” may be read plausibly an award of authorizing only to a party spe- identified cifically elsewhere the text: either to an bidder a aggrieved trade association the hand, on one or to the contracting governmental on the other. agency * * * Additionally, by the term using in a “successful suit under this added), section” instead (emphasis 279.067(4) the more common term “prevailing,” ORS could be read limit the award of attorney fees to a achieves success as defined in the remainder of the section. 279.067(1) allows affected adversely bidder trade association to sue a public for the agency, purpose requir- the ing comply with the agency public law or of contracting the from preventing agency the violating public contracting law. Under ORS the example, public agency is the The statute be defending party. thus read to suggest that, because of the nature the claim, only the adversely affected or the be agency bidder can “successful” in the action the statute That if a contemplates. is, court holds that the agency has violated or potentially law, violated is successful. If a court plaintiff holds that the public has not violated or agency potentially law, violated the is successful. Under agency rationale, and with respect to the kind of controversy 279.067, contemplated by or the be a agency will “successful” plaintiff party. course,

Of the latter of the text and context reading of ORS would defeat Compton’s argument. Comp- ton is not one of the identified in two-sided action parties under ORS 279.067. not a “bidder action, affected” as that term is used in ORS agency’s 279.067, because did not that ODOT acted allege *8 the con- to award improperly its intention it announced when fully supported Compton that deci- Compton. Indeed, tract to “public Similarly, Compton con- a by is neither ODOT. sion tracting agency” of construction “trade association nor a acting the association” a member of on behalf of contractors Compton does not 279.067; used in ORS terms are as those contend otherwise. argues Compton should that 279.067

Instead, only contemplate here, action a two-sided to not be read added) “necessary party” (emphasis Compton was a because under ORS Steelman-Duff to the action Compton meaning 29 A.5 of ORCP within “necessary party,” a sub it had a because that it was asserts If of the action. in the outcome interest financial stantial Compton prevailed, not receive would Steelman-Duff a that, because was therefore concludes contract. “necessary party,” “a loss makes Steelman-Duffs party’ ORS 279.067. in the action under successful “necessary not a that was We conclude present disa- party’ gree We action under in the Compton’s argument premise for three rea- with action under no claim in the made First, Steelman-Duff sons. Compton’s respecting conduct. Steelman-Duff ORS 279.067 awarding prevent to sought the contract ODOT from allegedly erred in its con- had else, because ODOT someone nonresponsive. was low bid that Steelman-Duffs clusion part Compton wrongdoing alleged on the no Steelman-Duff Compton. sought relief from no affirmative why Compton not a neces- was reason The second had sary is that ODOT action to the ORS 279.067 Compton had no trial. the time of contract at awarded no right protect. existing contractual part: A ORCP 29 joined process as a in the subject shall be person to service of “A who is (1) among complete cannot be accorded person’s relief in that absence action if (2) relating to the sub- already person an interest parties, claims those person’s disposition in that absence ject is so situated that the action and (a) ability protect person’s impair impede practical matter as a interest!.]” why Compton necessary The third reason not a to the action relates to the first two. lacked controversy brought by direct interest in the outcome *9 Steelman-Duff. did have an in interest the indirect litigation of effects the outcome of the between Steelman- Compton’s Duff and However, ODOT. in interest the indirect litigation of effects the outcome of the is not the same as an controversy Wright interest in the ments, See v. itself. Hazen Invest- (1982) (holding Or Inc., 259, 261-64, 648 P2d 360 that a lessor and a were sublessor “interested” but not “nec- essary” parties litigation plaintiff in between the a and sub- lessee). party “necessary” party controversy, For a to be a to a party subject have an in must interest the matter of the litigation, merely and not an indirect financial interest in the litigation. “necessary only party party” of the A outcome a subject litigation if the court cannot resolve the matter of the (“ party’s presence. [although without the See id. at 263 both sublessor] subject [lessor and had an ‘interest’ in the matter controversy, any way part the of such ‘interest’ was of not in controversy necessary party”). the so as to render either a In brought by Steelman-Duff, this action the issue was whether statutory provided the ODOT had violated scheme in ORS rejected 279.011 to 279.067 when it Steelman-Duffs bid. The subject litigation only the matter of thus was whether ODOT processing bid; had followed the law in Steelman-Duffs Compton’s presence required disposition was not for the of that issue. summary, necessary party

In was not a 279.067(1), though party the action under ORS it even was a litigation. inquiry, the That however, does not end our necessary party, because, even if was not a party proceeding to the had “a” been under the availability to the of statute.6 We therefore turn issue of by fees, under ORS named necessary party. plaintiff who was not a summary, foregoing As be seen from the text controversy context do not of ORS resolve this case in of either in favor Steelman-Duff. The case, procedural posture In the we are not on to this called decide whether Compton appropriately litigation; given was made a to the that is a here. plausible. It is not reading given remains that statute each analysis whether first-level clear from our nonnecessary party any apply to meant for that subsection ORS 279.067 or initiated under in an action involved provision applies to the the fee whether, instead, and the under ORS 279.067 initiated an action proposed application agency contracting that defends its Accordingly, public contracting application we law. history surrounding passage legislative turn to the PGE, 317 Or at 611-12. 279.067. as Senate Bill 1983, was enacted in ORS 279.067 (1983) § 279.067 690, ch 27. ORS Laws 190. Or provided: affected commence a suit

“Any bidder county in are located the circuit court for the which board or the offices of the local contract review principal local pliance com- agency, purpose requiring for the government *10 of, 279.011 to with, prevention or of violations ORS agency. of the board or The 279.061 to matters or decisions court appro- relief it considers may equitable order such A of the local contract in the circumstances. decision priate review voided if other shall not be government agency board or the local relief is available. The court equitable attorney reasonable and costs to suc- payment order of fees (Empha- under this section.” in a suit cessful added.)7 sis by proposed the Executive Bill 190 was Senate Department to the Senate Committee on and was referred Tape Recording, Senate and Elections. Local Government Elections, 190, SB Government and Committee on Local (statement Gary Tape A at 16 of 9, 1983, 30, Side March Esgate, Administrator). purpose of the bill The Committee present in Laws legislature to its form 1990. Or amended ORS 279.067 The Sess). in 1990 1990, 6, (Spec made those amendments When the § ch (3) 279.067(1); provisions, three additional modified ORS added it: 279.067(4); subsection, and (5); attorney provision own fees to its & moved the attorney legisla provision. The phrase appeal” to that fees “on trial and added the provision. wording Accord change operative not the ture did history surrounding passage legislative history the of SB ingly, pertinent is the the pertinent. 190, 1983; history surrounding is not See the 1990 amendments in the (“views (1984) WPPSS, 550, 561, legislators have 296 Or 679 P2d 1316 DeFazio v. enactment, weight light no in inter existing a new but it is of of law shed on by predecessors”). preting their a law enacted in was, part, to replace system then-extant of ensuring that public agencies complied with the law concerning Id. at 23-27. of contracts. awarding bill, as first did not proposed, contain the provi- that sion later became ORS At a public hearing 190, on Stan from the SB of Long, Department Justice, testi- fied in favor of the bill: you

“The bill that requires is before a local oversight func- not, adequate tion. Whether that is whether you or not choice for point needed that is a I you make. out to * * * you if are concerned about compliance lots there’s ways to that. of alternative that’s achieve There’s of lots alternatives. The

presented you Senate in Bill 190 is a board things. local to review those There are other alterna- you explore you’re tives that can if interested in them. One ways the most to require compliance with state of mandated effective is to programs provide exam- fees for in law ple successfully suits that challenge local officials’ compliance. some get executing You self by enforcement association outcome. people actually bar the and who are interested And, can you personal I tell experience, from things one of that gets local officials’ attention is they prospect pay they the Senate if Tape Recording, lose.” Committee Local Elections, on Government and SB (statement 9,1983, Tape 30, March Side A at 165-82 Justice) added). Long, Department (emphasis Stan Senator Gardner about questioned Long the possi- to the bill. Id. at bility adding provision The following 295-303. exchange occurred between Senator Gardner Long: “[Long:] you’re compliance If worried about with state * * *

statutes, way this bill that problem addresses tois say oversight there will be a local to take care of that. I was *11 merely you pointing out to that that anwas alternative that you, selected present was and there are other alterna- staffed tives weren’t and one them is private enforcement. * * * as,

“[Sen. Or a combination. if Gardner:] Such remedy, exhausted this then can you’ve you go to circuit court, try and to enforce those you standards there. And if * * * win, you attorney fees get and costs. Now that gives road, at the you you’ve [sic] arbitration end of the but got to front got in there. You’ve getting hazards to initial some bidder, presume. I You, disappointed of it. the costs * ** are recoverable be these I assume it would fees jurisdiction? right? Is that the local against That’s an alternative. “[Long:] they be recoverable Who else would Gardner:] “[Sen. from? * * * pre- traditional I would have in mind a

“[Long:] approach. kind of vailing party would be jurisdiction And the local Gardner:] “[Sen. * * *

the defendant and not a legged, that a two And I would make “[Long: * * * so that provision legged one * * * way Gardner:] Either “[Sen.

“[Long:] government You bet. Give the local its fees if if up proceed That will sober some of the incentives to wins. you’re right. you didn’t think Well, bill, go Gardner:] if we do the route of

“[Sen. something we want to on there to make put be other incentives for adherence to the sure that there’s some added). Id. at 303-40 (emphasis statute?” exchange surprisingly, foregoing shows, not that Senator The Long provision and envisioned an Gardner aggrieved govern- would allow fees to either the bidder or entity awarding But it also shows that mental the contract.8 person thought held a view con- of, neither even much less cerning, possibility that a third would find itself proceeding. in such a enmeshed exchange, committee discussed other After that meeting, spoke aspects At that no other witness of the bill. topic adding provision, and the favor by any the committee. further member of not discussed meeting on Local a later of the Senate Committee At to SB 190 Elections, various amendments Government Tape Recording, proposed. on Local Senate Committee were provision associ original no trade version of the statute contained bring action. ation to such an *12 Tape Elections, 30, 1983, 190, 46, Government Side B at 35. At the March SB request of the committee, Penhollow, Bill representative Oregon Counties, Association of Tape explained Recording, the amendments. Senate Com mittee on Local Government and Elections, 190, SB March (state Tape Tape 30, 1983, 47, 122, Side A at BSide at 404 Penhollow). Tape Recording, ment of Bill See also Senate on Local Government and Elections, 190, Committee SB (statement Tape 30, 1983, 47, March Side A at 119 of Sen. Heard) (“[t]he committee will recall that the chair asked Bill questions to chair a subcommittee to deal with some ofthe on bill”). this Penhollow stated: 12, 13 14, “Finally, question attorney fees, on lines & the in, this committee was which interested that: ‘The may order the payment attorney court of reasonable fees on appeal trial or on to a successful in a suit attorney under this section.’ So that fees would go both ways.” Senate Tape Recording, Committee on Local Gov Elections, 190, 30, 1983, 46, ernment and SB March Tape BSide at 397-404. quoted adopted by

The sentence was verbatim the committee operative phrase Tape and became the at issue in this case. Recording, Senate Committee on Local Government and Tape Elections, 47, SB Side B at 58. The bill then was passed by the House, without further discussion of the attor- ney provision. fees legislative history surrounding passage

The the 297.067(4) attorney provision fees now contained in ORS clearly legislators establishes that the and witnesses who provision litigation only discussed the tional, foresaw cast in tradi- attorney terms and intended that two-sided fees be ways.” provision originally available “both envisioned fees Senator would have awarded fees Gardner aggrieved successfully challenged to an bidder who public contracting agency’s compliance with the con- tracting Long suggested provision that the fee law. become a two-way agreed. street, and Gardner Penhollow then drafted provision suggestion. to accommodate

Unfortunately, history foregoing nothing adds knowledge legislature intended, our of what the would have party’s presence possibility had the of a third in the action called thought its attention. It seems clear us that been no one possibility, even about that much less made a con- policy respect text, scious choice with to it. Our review of the legislative history context, and of ORS thus does not reveal whether intended to make the statutory provided provision available to non-necessary party “[a]ny a affected,” acting that is not bidder

“any trade of association construction contractors protect on behalf of a of the member association interests common to members,” construction contractor or public contracting agency” “the as those terms are used in 297.067(1). ORS scrutiny neither first

Because of the two levels of seek, the answer that we we are left to utilize vari- statutory ous maxims of construction to the resolve issue in (discussing methodology). PGE, this case. See 317 Or 612 at statutory analysis help. Even this of level is of little None of resolving dispute, leaving the usual maxims aids us in the us with no but recourse to use the maxim this that court has developed just such situations: When all else fails, this attempt court will to decide the case in accordance with what legislature it believes the would have done, had considered question. (referring specifically the at PGE, See 617 Or citing Security to that maxim and Luebke, State Bank v. (1987), Or 418, 423, 737 P2d 586 as illustrative of its application). here,

Even the issue is much in doubt. Rationales ways easily posed. can both be conclude, however,

We that the most likely would have intended be fees to awarded in identify any this situation. We so conclude because we cannot legislature, having reason that the once determined to use availability encourage of the as a fees “stick” to compliance requirements public bidding ensure with the of deny attorney categorically any law, the party would wish to long proceedings, to such as had a so that stake in process, outcome, the contributed to “successful,” the and was ordinarily term is understood. We that the hold attor- 297.067(4) ney provision permits in an award of any party brought pursuant proceeding fees to is 297.067, whether not that one of kinds to ORS contrary specifically in The enumerated that statute.9 conclu- Appeals of and of the circuit court sions of Court were incorrect. Appeals judg-

The of the and the decision Court The court are reversed. case is remanded ment of circuit proceedings. circuit court for further to the concurring. DURHAM, J., agree majority’s petitioner I with the conclusion that brought in a section,” “successful suit under this is a my meaning However, view, of ORS within requires exposition ambiguity plausible in the no statute legislative history maxims resort to court-created its legislature’s probable to divine the intention. construction majority concludes is ambiguous respects. phrase “a in two The first is the suit brought disagree. No under this section.” I reasonable doubt that this action is a suit under ORS 279.067. exists Neither the Appeals parties suggests nor Court of major- meaning phrase disputed or unclear. The the ity’s *14 ambiguity phrase that is effort discover unpersuasive. according ambiguity, to the

The second source of majority, prevailing, is term However, “successful.” any defini- was a “successful” under familiar majority apparently agrees with that of that term. The tion conclusion, eventually, holds, because “ ordinarily 323 Or as that term is understood.” at ‘successful’ 235-36. key context, their make the terms,

The statute’s interpretive legislature’s Therefore, clear. our task intention history legislative complete an examination of is without legislative secondary sources of intent. Under our other 9 fees, require do we does not an award of nor hold We note the statute required “may” case. ORS the court that one is in this and, so, if what Those are issues for award fees is to decide award is “reasonable.” court on the circuit remand. methodology, proceed “we no further.” See Forbes, McIntire v. (1996) (so holding); 426, 429, 322 Or 909 P2d 846 PGE v. Industries, Bureau Labor and Or 611, 859 P2d (1993) (if legisla text statute’s and context make the inquiry unnecessary”). clear, ture’s intent “further inquiry I would terminate our with an examination legislature’s of the best evidence of the intention: the stat- ute’s words.

Fadeley join concurring and Unis, JJ., in this opinion.