75 Md. 477 | Md. | 1892
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a claim of $5,000 filed in the Orphans’ Court by the appellee against his father’s estate. As first pre
First. We fully agree that a promise of this kind ought to be established by the clearest and most satisfactory proof. At the same time, however, no one, it seems to us, can read the testimony in the record without being satisfied beyond question that the promise was made by the father, and that the property was purchased by the son on the faith of the promise.
Mr. Gary, the trustee, by whom the property was advertised for sale, says that Mr. Steele, the father, came to
Mr. Grassaway Watkins, abrother-in-law and neighbor of Mr. Steele, the father, says the latter sent for him to talk over the purchase of the property by his son, and said he thought it would be the very property for Nicholas, as he understood the business thoroughly — that he was anxious to get his son away from Wetheredville, where he then lived; and further said he knew his son was not able to buy it, but he was willing to helja him to pay for it. Afterwards Nicholas came down to see his father ábout the purchase of the property, and the latter told him to buy the property if he could get it right, and that he would give him $5,000 to start the mill and buy the property. After the sale, the father told the witness that he was going to give his son $5,000 to help
Such testimony as this, — and it is before us uncontradicted,- — proves beyond all question that the pi’omise was made by the father, and that the son, relying upon this promise, purchased the property. The father ivas a person of large means, and Nicholas was his only son. The property was a woolen mill, and he had implicit confidence in his son’s ability to manage and conduct the business, and it was but natural that he should be willing and anxious to assist him in its purchase.
And this brings us to the question, whether the purchase of the property upon the faith of the promise on the part of the father, is a sufficient consideration to make it a valid contract. And in regard to this question, there cannot be, it seems to us, any difficulty. Without going through the long list of cases in which the question as to the sufficiency of consideration has been considered, it is sufficient to say, it is well settled that if one incurs a legal liability, as by jmtering into a contract with a third person, the liability thereby incurred is a sufficient consideration to support a promise by the person at whose request it was incurred. Thus, for instance, where a person contracts in his own name to purchase property upon the promise by another, to provide the money to pay for it, ‘the consideration is sufficient to support the contract. Leake on Contracts, 628; Chitty on Contracts, p. 64.
The case comes, we think, directly within the principle laid down in Skidmore vs. Bradford, Law Rep., 8
The purchase of the property in this case by the appellee upon the faith of the promise made by his father to give him $5,000 to assist him in the payment of the purchase money, is therefore a sufficient consideration to support the contract, and the order must be affirmed.
Order affirmed.