32 Minn. 14 | Minn. | 1884
This action was originally brought in the municipal court of the city of St. Paul, under the statute relating to forcible entries and unlawful detainers. Upon a former appeal the judgment of that court was reversed for want of jurisdiction to determine the question of title involved. The action was properly commenced, and the complaint gave the municipal court jurisdiction to entertain the case in the first instance. It could not, however, try the issues raised upon the equitable matters affirmatively pleaded in the an
The findings of the court do not sustain the allegations of the answer, that the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee was continued or renewed by any agreement between these parties subsequent to the foreclosure sale, or that the lease in question was given to further secure the plaintiff for the amount already due him in that relation. On the contrary, the court finds that, upon the expiration of the time of redemption, the defendants recognized him as owner of the premises and became his tenants, and from time to time paid him rent for the use and occupation thereof. Upon examining the record we are satisfied that these conclusions are sustained by the evidence, and that the course of dealing between the parties subsequent to the sale, including the negotiations and agreement in respect to a repurchase of the premises by the defendants, is not inconsistent with such conclusions. These findings of fact upon these issues, we think, necessarily dispose of the case, because, if the plaintiff became and continued to be the owner of the premises upon the expiration of the time for redemption, there is no good reason why the agreement of lease above mentioned, which was entered into and accepted by defendants, should not declare and establish an existing relation of landlord and tenant, as it purports to do. Hence, the usual procedure for the recovery of the possession by plaintiff was proper and applicable to this case. The plaintiff had presumptively become possessed of the legal title under the foreclosure. The defendants necessarily assumed the burden of proving a new contract, under which the relation of debtor and creditor was continued, and that the subsequent agreements between the parties were simply new forms of security for the same debt. Upon this state of the issues, the defendants were bound to establish these allegations of fact by satisfactory proof. The issue was substantially narrowed down to these questions of fact, upon which the decision of the trial court must be deemed final.
The court also finds that the defendants remained in possession, with the understanding that they should pay rent at $100 per month, until March 15, 1880, when the parties entered into the lease in controversy, which contained a stipulation giving the defendants “the right and privilege to purchase of and from the party of the first part said land and premises, at any time prior to the expiration of this lease, for $11,117, to be paid down in cash to the party of the first part upon the demand of a deed prior to the expiration of this lease.”
Nor do the facts warrant the interposition of equity to relieve defendants from their default. It was plainly the meaning of these agreements that the privilege of purchasing the property should not remain open after the expiration of the time limited. Time was made essential upon the face of the writings. It amounted substantially do a written proposition or offer to sell upon the proposed terms. The assent or act of acceptance, whether by'payment or the fulfilment of some other condition, was necessarily to be made within the time limited; otherwise, no contract could be consummated. Pomeroy on Contracts, § 387. Equity cannot vary the terms of such a stipulation by an extension of the privilege. The time limited for acceptance or payment is, in such case, part of the contract or option, and equity cannot interfere, unless in cases where its jurisdiction can be properly invoked on the ground of fraud or mistake, which is not alleged here. Nicholls v. Maynard, 3 Atk. 519; Adams, Eq. *108, 109. It differs from the case of penalties which are annexed to contracts to secure their performance, or from the case of a forfeiture of .some estate or interest actually acquired, and from which a party may seek relief on equitable terms. Robinson v. Cropsey, 2 Edw. Ch. 138; Wells v. Smith, 7 Paige, 22; Davis v. Thomas, 1 Russ. & M. 506; Kerr v. Purdy, 51 N. Y. 629; People’s Bank v. Mitchell, 73 N. Y. 406. The fact that defendants paid considerable sums to plaintiff to se
Judgment affirmed.