64 Mo. App. 527 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1896
This case arose out of the following facts: William B. Myers owned some stone land in Jasper county, Missouri, and in December, 1892, organized the Center Creek Stone Company, with a capital of $30,000, one half paid-up shares, distributed as follows: One Laycock, one hundred and fifty shares; Wm. B.Myers, one hundred shares; Carl C. Myers (ason of Wm. B.), fifty shares. William B. Myers, president, wrote to plaintiff for prices on a machine to be used by said Center Creek Stone Company. The correspondence was afterwards carried on between Wm. B. Myers and plaintiff and culminated in Myers ordering and in plaintiff shipping to Wm. B. Myers a machine, at the price of $1,600, on February 16, 1893. The Center Creek Stone Company organized by making William B. Myers president and Carl C. Myers secretary. The evidence shows that Laycock, while a director, never had anything to do with the business of the company, or its management; that Carl C. Myers was taken sick just after the organization of the company and at the time Wm. B. Myers ordered the machine was confined to his bed, and soon thereafter died. Wm. B. Myers had full
From this judgment, the Center Creek Stone Company appealed.
I. The defendant stone company seeks to defeat the purposes of this action on the alleged claim that it was an innocent purchaser for value of the machine, without notice that Myers had not paid therefor. It is well settled that notice to, or acquired by, the officer or agent of a corporation, while in the performance of its business, is notice to, or knowledge of, the corporation. But it is contended here that even though Myers was the president and manager of the defendant corporation, yet in selling the machine to it he was acting for himself and not for his company; that his knowledge, therefore, was not that of the defendant. This contention is based on the general rule, as stated in Bank v. Lovitt, 114 Mo. 519, that: “When an officer of a corporation is dealing with it in his individual interest, the corporation is not chargeable with his uncommunicated knowledge of facts derogatory to his title to the property, which is the subject of the transaction.” I do not think the defendant stone company ought to be allowed to shield the property in controversy under cover of the foregoing rule. That principle has usually, if not always, found its application when one officer of the corporation shall have notice and then deal with other officers; and it is held in such eases that he does not, in the particular transaction, represent the corporation, but himself alone; and hence the knowledge he has under such circumstances, he is under no obligation to disclose; and hence his corporation principal will not be deemed to have notice. As, for example, in the Lovitt case, above cited, the bank sued on a note made by the defendant to Dickinson, who was vice president of the bank. Dickinson sold and tranferred the note,
The case in hand is quite different from that just noticed. Here Myers, who bought the machine from plaintiff and who immediately turned it over to the defendant stone company, was not only acting for himself as an individual, but as well personated the' defendant company; he was its alter ego. It was nothing without him; he was, in fact, the corporation, if the expression can be allowed. There were but three persons even nominally concerned in the organization of the company. One of these, Laycock, paid no attention to the conduct of the business; and the other, Myers, Jr., son of ¥m. B., was on his deathbed at the time and died soon thereafter. There was, then, the one person and only one, W. B. Myers, who could, or did, represent the defendant corporation, or who
The whole matter, then, is this: W. B. Myers, as president and sole manager of the defendant stone, company, purchased the machine from the individual W. B. Myers, and at the time said officer acquired and had full knowledge that there was a balance due thereon. This knowledge bound the corporation for whom Myers was acting, and hence it can not be classed as-an innocent purchaser for value, without notice, such as is protected by section 4914, Revised Statutes, 1889. Bank v. Cushman, 121 Mass. 490.
II. In defendant’s brief it is suggested that it was error in this action against Myers for balance due on sale of the machine, to make the stone company a party defendant and settle in the same suit plaintiff’s right to levy its. execution on the property. In our opinion, this was entirely proper. Counsel have failed to give any good reason for their position, or to cite any authority sustaining it, and we know of none. In suits against the husband, where the purpose was to subject the wife’s property to execution, because the debt was for family necessaries, it has been thought not improper, at least, to make the wife a party defendant. Bedsworth v. Bowman, 104 Mo. 44; Gabriel v. Mullen, 111 Mo. 119. This manner of proceeding
Other minor objections are made, which on examination we find without merit. The judgment here was clearly for the right party and will be affirmed.