151 Pa. 330 | Pa. | 1892
Opinion by
As the plaintiff presented his cause in the evidence it was substantially a claim for the destruction of an unharvested crop of ice. There being no circumstances of aggravation, compensation was the measure of damages to which he was entitled. And if all analogies are to be regarded'the value of the ice upon the pond at the time of its destruction was a proper subject of inquiry. , In actions for cutting timber whatever the range of the evidence may be it must all tend to show the value of the standing trees or stumpage as it is called, at the time and place of the trespass: Herdie v. Young, 55 Pa. 176 ; Coxe v. England, 65 Pa. 212; and in actions of trespass for digging and carrying away minerals, and of replevin for minerals dug and taken away by a wrongdoer, the value of the minerals in place is the measure of damages: Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. 291; Coleman’s Appeal, 62 Pa. 252; Ege v. Kille, 84 Pa. 333. But authority ought not to be needed for a proposition so plain as that to allow a recovery for the enhanced value of. anything by reason of the labor bestowed upon it by a trespasser is not to award compensation to the plaintiff but to punish the defendant. And it would be as little consonant with the rule of compensation to allow a plaintiff to recover for an enhanced value that might have been, but was not, given to property destroyed through the inadvertence or misfortune of the defendant. It however not unfrequently happens that there is no market value of property taken or destroyed at the time and place of the trespass. In such cases the value of the property in the nearest market and if necessary in an altered form, less the cost of getting it to that market and changing the form, is the measure of the damages—it is the value at the place of the trespass: Herdie v. Young, supra.
The only question in this case about which there appears to have been a serious controversy was as to the value of the ice crop destroyed and this involved an inquiry as to the quantity.
Thirty errors have been assigned, about one half of which are to the rejection of testimony which in the view herein expressed was competent. To notice them in detail would extend this opinion to an unreasonable length. The second,
The judgment is reversed and a venire facias de novo is awarded.