Nos. 76-729 and 76-730 | Ohio | Jul 6, 1977
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The controlling issue in this case may be stated thus: Is the appellee’s claim preempted by the National Labor. Belations Act?
Pursuant to Section 160(a), Title 29, U. S. Code, the National Labor Belations Board has exclusive jurisdiction to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce. Under the provisions, of Sections 8(a) and 8(b) of the National Labor Belations Act,
Since Congress has indicated an intent that the labor relations of the country be consistently enforced, the Supreme Court of the United States has set forth standards which limit the jurisdiction of both the federal and state courts in the field of labor relations. The standard is set forth in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon (1959), 359 U.S. 236" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1959-04-20" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/san-diego-building-trades-council-v-garmon-105866?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="105866">359 U. S. 236, 245, as follows:
“* * * When an activity is arguably subject to Section 7 or Section 8 of the [NLRA] Act, the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.”
However, in spite of the general rule of preemption of state regulation of conduct actually or arguably prohibited as an unfair labor practice, the Supreme Court has allowed two notable exceptions :
Examples of the latter involve acts of physical violence or concerted conduct imminently threatening violence. Although picket line violence, which intimidates employees, may violate Section 8(b)(1) of the NLRA, the states, through the exercise of traditional police powers, may quell such violence by injunction (Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc. [1957], 355 U.S. 131" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1957-12-09" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/youngdahl-v-rainfair-inc-105587?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="105587">355 U. S. 131), or by holding the union liable for compensatory and punitive damages (Automobile Workers v. Russell [1958], 356 U.S. 634" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1958-06-30" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/international-union-united-automobile-aircraft--agricultural-implement-workers-v-russell-105698?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="105698">356 U. S. 634; United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp. [1954], 347 U.S. 656" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1954-06-07" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/united-construction-workers-v-laburnum-construction-corp-105235?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="105235">347 U. S. 656). An example of arguably prohibited conduct which has been held to be a “peripheral concern” of the NLRA, and thus subject to state substantive law, is that of a union which expels a member in violation of the “contract” between the union and the member as embodied in the union constitution and by-laws. International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales (1958), 356 U.S. 617" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1958-06-30" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/international-assn-of-machinists-v-gonzales-105697?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="105697">356 U. S. 617.
The appellee’s contentions are before this court pursuant to Civ. R. 56(C). Consequently, the defendants in this action are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Moreover, although appellee classifies his claim as one solely concerning his union’s constitution and by-laws, sueh classifications are not determinative. As stated in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge (1971), 403 U.S. 274" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1971-06-14" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/amalgamated-assn-of-street-electric-railway--motor-coach-employees-of-america-v-lockridge-108370?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="108370">403 U. S. 274, at 292, preemption is “* * * designed to shield the system from Conflicting regulation of conduct. It is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern.” (Emphasis added.)
In considering the record, including Statler’s own testimony, this court holds that appellee’s claim is preempted by the NLRA. See Garmon, supra. Although Gonzales, supra, established an exception to the general rule of federal preemption, it was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s adoption in Garmon of the current preemption test. The court’s subsequent decision in Lockridge, supra, at page 295, made it clear that “the fullblown rationale of Gonzales could not survive the rule of Garmon.” Moreover, in studying the record, the realities of the appellee’s claim are apparent; the crux of his case is the defendants’ alleged interference with existing or prospective employment relations rather than internal union matters. Although the appellee has attempted to draft his pleadings within the Gonzales rationale, the fact remains that the NLRB has heretofore twice considered the appellee’s complaints alleging the illegality of the defendants’ conduct in depriving appellee from his present and future employment. Such actions constitute persuasive evidence that appellee’s claims are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
This court consequently holds that in an action by a suspended or expelled union member against his local and international unions, claiming reinstatement to good standing and monetary damages for the union’s alleged interference with his present or prospective employment, the unions
Judgment reversed.
In addition to the judicially developed exceptions referred to, Congress itself has created exceptions to the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction in other classes of cases. Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 158, Section 187, Title 29, U. S. Code, authorizes anyone injured in his business or property by .activity violative of Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, Section 158(b)(4), Title 29, U. S. Code, to recover damages in federal district court even though the underlying unfair labor practices are remediable by the Board. See Teamsters Union v. Morton (1964), 377 U.S. 252" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1964-05-25" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/local-20-teamsters-chauffeurs--helpers-union-v-morton-106827?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="106827">377 U. S. 252. Section 301 of that Act, 61 Stat.
The law is rather nebulous in this area, for an expulsion from membership may not only constitute a breach of contract, but may also have implications for the employee’s job security and may thus fall within the reach of Section 8(a) (8) which bars employer discrimination in hire and tenure encouraging union membership and of Section 8(b) (2) which bars union inducement of such employer discrimination. The Supreme Court of the United States has drawn a most elusive line
The significance of the Gonzales holding was sharply curtailed by the Supreme Court in its synthesis of the earlier pertinent cases in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge (1971), 403 U. S. 274, which requires a court to characterize the “crux” of the case as relating either to internal union matters or to job discrimination. While this appears to put a premium on artful pleading, the tone of the Loekridge opinion is such 'that it will likely be understood' effectively to bar state court actions against unions for wrongful expulsion when the expulsion has brought with it some significant impairment of employment status, or when the rights of the employee-member turn not exclusively upon the union’s constitution or by-laws but also upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Gorman, Basic Test on Labor Law Unionization and Collective Bargaining, 779-780 (1976).