STATEWIDE REAPPORTIONMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE; Williаm Gibson, Doctor; Frederick Calhoun James, Bishop; Herbert Williams, Reverend; Willie B. Owens; South Carolina Conference of the NAACP Branches, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David M. BEASLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of South Carolina; David H. Wilkins, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, Defendants-Appellees, The South Carolina Senate, Intervenor. Michael G. BURTON, as Executive Directоr on Behalf of the REPUBLICAN PARTY; William P. Collins, III; Earl Copeland; William Patrick Flack; Frank E. Gibson, III; Nancy D. Hawk; Gus Roberts, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David M. BEASLEY, in his official capacity as Governor of South Carolina; David H. Wilkins, in his official capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives, Defendants-Appellees, The South Carolina Senate, Intervenor.
Nos. 96-1086, 96-1099.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Decided Oct. 30, 1996.
99 F.3d 134
Argued Sept. 24, 1996.
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published PER CURIAM opinion. Judge NIEMEYER and Judge MOTZ wrote concurring opinions.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
The Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee and the South Carolina Republican Party appeal the denial of attorney‘s fees in this action brought pursuant to the Voting Rights Act. We affirm.
I.
In 1990, census figures indicated that congressional districts and state legislative districts were apportioned unconstitutionally. After the release of these figures, the South Carolina General Assembly established committees tо craft new redistricting plans. Deliberations continued with no success prior to the adjournment of the legislative session in June, 1991.
On October 4, 1991, the South Carolina Republican Party instituted an action in federal court alleging that the existing plans were malapportioned and unconstitutional. The party sought a declaration that the legislative process was at an impasse, thereby allowing for judicial intervention. A few weeks later, the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee (“SRAC“), an unincorporated association of private individuals and organizations, filed a similar suit. A three-judge court was constituted to hear the complaints pursuant to
In January 1992, the South Carolina Governor, Carroll A. Campbell, Jr., vetoed the plans passed by the General Assembly, requesting a plan with more mаjority black districts. When no further action was taken by February 1992, the three-judge court declared a legislative impasse, and allowed proceedings to go forward. After a three week trial, the court rejeсted redistricting plans submitted by all parties, and adopted its own plan. The State followed this plan during 1992 state elections.
SRAC, on one hand, and the Governor, on the other, appealed the court‘s decision. SRAC аsserted, inter alia, that the court had not properly applied the analysis required by
On remand, the three-judge court allowed the South Carolina General Assembly until August 1, 1995, to adopt state redistricting plans and preclear them with the Justice Department in accordance with the Voting Rights Act. Meanwhile, the Senate requested court aрproval to utilize the court-developed 1992 plans in a special October 1994 election for an open senatorial seat. SRAC and the Republican Party objected, arguing that these plans as well must bе pre-cleared
By June 1995, the General Assembly had approved and pre-cleared plans for the reapportionment of both legislative houses as well as for congressional districts in the state. The court case was dismissed two months later. SRAC and the Republican Party subsequently moved for attorney‘s fees pursuаnt to
II.
The question for our review is whether SRAC and the Republican Party prevailed, as only prevailing parties are eligible for attorneys fеes. In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), the Supreme Court clarified the applicable standard:
[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought, or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement. Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement. Otherwise the judgment or settlement cannot be said to “affec[t] the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff.”
Id. at 111, 113 S.Ct. at 573 (internal citations omitted).
This Court interpreted Farrar‘s requirements in S-1 and S-2 By and Through P-1 and P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of North Carolina, 6 F.3d 160 (4th Cir.1993) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting), vacated, 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (adopting Judge Wilkinson‘s dissent as the majority opinion), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 876, 115 S.Ct. 205, 130 L.Ed.2d 135 (1994). There, parents of handicapped students brought an action, pursuant to
Sitting en banc, a majority of this court reversed that decision. 21 F.3d 49. In doing so, the court rejected “catalyst” analysis of causation in determining prevailing party status. The court held that “[t]here is no way ... that Farrar and a broad ‘catalyst theory’ of attorneys’ fees recovery can be reconciled.” 6 F.3d at 168-69 (Wilkinson, J., dissent) (adopted by majority opinion in S-1 and S-2, 21 F.3d at 51). Rather, the court concluded that the determinative factor would be a “material alteration оf the legal relationship between the parties” as manifested by whether the plaintiff was entitled to enforce “a judgment, consent degree, or settlement against the defendant.” Id. at 168-69 (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113, 113 S.Ct. at 574).
Applying our holding in S-1 and S-2 to the instant case, the court below determined that SRAC and the Republican Party did not meet the definition of “prevailing parties.” Because the court‘s original decision was vacated by the Supreme Court, they were not entitled to enforсe any judgment against the defendants. Id. at 169 (“[T]he judgment‘s vacatur on appeal renders it a legal nullity.“).
We agree with the three-judge court‘s ruling. SRAC and the Republican Party fail to meet the standard set forth in S-1 and S-2: neither the district court‘s vacated judgment, nor the Supreme Court‘s decision to remand to the district court for further consideration in light of the Solicitor General‘s brief constitutes an enforceable judgment against the defendants. Similarly, the lowеr
Because SRAC and the Republican Party cannot establish that they meet the requirements set forth in S-1 and S-2, they are not entitled to attorney‘s fees.
AFFIRMED.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring:
To be a prevailing party in a legal action, a party must оbtain relief in the action on the merits of his claim, see Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111, 113 S.Ct. 566, 572-73, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), and not from some other process. The fee shifting statutes, such as
While I agree that S-1 and S-2 requires us to affirm in this case, I believe the question of who prevailed, even when measuring the results obtained through the political process, is so unclear that whether we apply S-1 and S-2 or evaluate who won in the political arena, I could not conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying the appellants’ attorneys fees.
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:
The parties have not established that they meet the “prevailing party” requirements of S-1 and S-2. No panel can refuse to follow a circuit precedent established by another panel, let alone one established by the entire court sitting en banc. Accordingly, I concur in the court‘s opinion and judgment.
I write separately only to indicate that I believe that the Supreme Court‘s holding in Farrar would not necessarily require the same outcоme. I note that, when we issued S-1 and S-2, our conclusion that Farrar dicta eviscerated the catalyst analysis was contrary to the view of every other circuit to address the question. In the three years since the issuance of S-1 and S-2 no circuit has follоwed our holding. Several have specifically disagreed with it. See, e.g., Brown v. Local 58, IBEW, 76 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir.1996); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951 (10th Cir.1994); Kilgour v. City of Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.1995); Zinn By Blankenship v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 275 (7th Cir.1994). See also Southeastern Fisheries Ass‘n v. Chiles, 876 F.Supp. 270, 271 (S.D.Fla.1995).
Ironically, the “catalyst” analysis was devised to address cases like the one at hand. SRAC and the Republican Party advance the classiс “but for” scenario: had it not been for the filing of their complaints in the district court, the court would not have intervened in the reapportionment process. Without such intervention, the South Carolina General Assembly would not have adopted a scheme that drew heavily from that judicially-crafted plan. Yet even if SRAC and the Republican Party did cause those results, S-1 and S-2 forecloses this argument and requires that, without further ado, we conclude that they were not prevailing parties because they did not win an enforceable judgment against the defendants.