*1 alternatively. wrongful conjunctively The trial infliction of emotional distress discharge. that Plaintiffs third cause of “[a]s court ruled outrageous being conduct action is based AFFIRMED. implied against public policy or a violation of contract, finding threshold is fa- the Court’s HANSEN, P.J., JOPLIN, J., concur. To the extent Anderson tal to it as well.” (1) above, the trial court was cor- relies on (2), theory respect Anderson

rect. With resignation,

presented no evidence that her reasons, was the result of a

for whatever employment contract which

breach of her

could be transformed into a tort.3 With re- wrongful

spect public policy to Anderson’s argument, discharge she has cited no consti- STATEWIDE FUNDING statutory public policy support tutional or as CORPORATION, position. Express admits that for her She Appellee, at-will, argues that could terminate her but v. intolerable, “an employer an not create degrading offensive and work environment” REED, Appellant. A. Winifred employee quit. an that would force We No. 85363. longstanding recognize the Oklahoma basic employment. K- principle of at-will Burk v. (Okla.1989). Corp.,

Mart Oklahoma, Appeals of Court of “public Supreme Court has indicated Division No. 4. policy exception tightly circum must be suggests proceed scribed” and that courts Sept. cautiously upon public if called to declare judi policy prior legislative some absent pronouncement. at 29.

cial record, say

Based we cannot employer, not

conduct an which does rise conduct, outrageous

to the level of and is not unlawful,

otherwise can be the basis of a

public policy wrongful discharge action.4

CONCLUSION properly

The trial court determined that alleged supervisor conduct of Anderson’s outrageous

did not cross the threshold summary judgment

conduct and that was

proper on Anderson’s claims of intentional (court sign employment agreement adopt theory

3. Anderson did refused to of constructive party upon discharge). which could be terminated either see & Also Wilson Hess-Sweitzer gave Brant, Inc., notice. Anderson two week's no- (Okla.1993) (Supreme 864 P.2d 1279 resignation. tice in her letter of Court did not have to decide whether construc- wrongful discharge tive was sufficient for termi- specifically questions 4. We do address 5 because to nation violation 85 O.S.1981 outrageous support pub- whether conduct will employment state a claim it found that the action, wrongful discharge policy lic or whether terminated, question jury for the was wheth- discharge recognized trigger- constructive employees employer er the or the initiated Large such a cause of action. See v. Acme termination). Inc., (Okla.1990) Engineering, *2 Boren, Williams, Boren, Bart A. Luttrell & P.C., City, Appellee. Oklahoma Braswell, Michael T. Braswell & Associ- ates, Inc., City, Appellant. Oklahoma REIF, Judge. appeal pro- arises from a foreclosure

ceeding. Defendant debtor Winifred Reed challenges judgment both the of foreclosure deficiency. basically and the order for She (1) by contends that the trial court erred denying petition her to vacate the foreclosure (2) judgment, by entering deficiency untimely motion and without allow- prove property’s her fair market review, Upon value. we hold that the trial denying court did not abuse its discretion in petition grounds to vacate on the ad- reject vanced Debtor. We also the as- signments concerning of error the order for deficiency and affirm. vacate, petition

In her Reed ar gued that the foreclosure and sher (1) iffs sale should be set aside because of payments arrearage she had made on the entered, just prior judgment being to default concerning lack due to of notice judgment and confirmation of the sheriffs however, undisputed, It sale. that Reed paid arrearage had not the total the time Funding Corporation creditor Statewide sought default had not she appearance entered an or filed an answer. facts, In view of these the trial court did not denying err in vacation of the foreclosure judgment, payments af- because the did not and the right to foreclose1 and her was lifted on feet Creditor’s eighty-four was filed not entitle her to notice of the default did 7,1994. days later on December judgment. As concerns the suffi- foreclosure concerning ciency confirmation of of notice 108(c) provides, pertinent part: Section that the sheriffs the record reflects nonbankruptcy ... applicable law fixes [I]f *3 ap- that notice was sent to Reed’s address commencing continuing period a or a that peared in the record.2 Her assertion in civil action a court other than a bank- that knew she was absent from Creditor against ruptcy court on a claim the debtor supported by the record. Nei- address is not period expired ... not before and such has nor payments ther the she made the notice filing petition, the date of the of the then complains, insufficiencies about which she period expire such does not until the later judg- vacation of the foreclosure warranted of— ment or the sheriffs sale. (1) period, including any the end of such controversy suspension period occurring of The over the timeliness such case; deficiency after the commencement of the of Creditor’s motion stems from fact that Reed filed the days after notice of the termi- days of the three after the sheriffs sale stay expiration of the under nation or sec- property. question is the effect of the respect tion 362 ... with to such claim. stay ninety-day period on the greater weight interpret- of the case law following the sheriffs sale in which Creditor ing supports general this section Debtor’s required a was to file motion for position bankruptcy stay that the does not in under 12 O.S.1991 686. period. and of itself toll a limitation See (Colo. Tafoya, Thurman v. P.2d initially argued brief in chief Debtor’s 1995). However, bankruptcy stay trig- a can stay prevent filing that the did not the of the ger suspension period of a limitation under deficiency, only prosecu motion for but the law, applicable including state state common tion of the motion. Debtor asserted that Boisseau, law. Id. at 1055. Turner and failure to file the motion for defi Creditor’s Lowrance, 332, Kan.App.2d v. Chartered ciency during 90-day statutory period (1993); 519-20 Peterson v. recovery any deficiency.3 In re barred Bank-Austin, Texas Commerce National argued sponse, answer brief that Creditor’s Ass’n, (Tex.Ct.App.1992). S.W.2d stay motion until could not file its was 108(c) (1994) lifted, out, points and that 11 As the Peterson case “section U.S.C. 108(c) gave remaining Creditor the of the does itself restrict the source of 90-day period lifting stay suspension specialized of the in statutes.” Indeed, deficiency. expressly In at which file the 294. section reply, challenged interpre recognizes “any suspension” Debtor Creditor’s that will be argued determining tation section counted whether the time re- 90-day period maining statutory period 30-day to run continued while the on a or the 108(c)(2) stay period pe- Debtor is was effect. maintains the “later” 90-day limitation ran out riod. that a while Peterson held oc- effect, stay leaving in that was Creditor the curred case under the Texas com- 30-day period during mon that the under law rule time which a follow stay person prevented exercising legal of the in which to file its is from dispute stay remedy by pendency legal proceed- motion. There is no that the adjudicated rights position apparently Reed’s 3.This was abandoned in fa- concerning payments position reply concerning she made on the ar- vor of the in her brief rearage judg- a credit which resulted in toward alleged untimely filing Creditor's under 11 determining 108(c)(2) (1994). event, ment. This credit was considered in any U.S.C. this deficiency. position contrary express language to the of 11 362(a)(1) (1994) National Citizens Gold, City Pa.Super. By point proceedings, in the Reed had Bank Evans v. (1995). appearance. entered an 653 A.2d 1245 allows, ings against him in should not be counted leads us to the same conclusion that determining whether limitations have barred was reached the court in Peterson: right. his lifted, After automatic has been claimant should benefit from the [common Oklahoma has similar common law rule tolling suspension] law] [i.e. of the statute Epperson, forth in Lee set 168 Okla. limitations for the (1934). syllabus The first of Lee imposed permitted bring and be suit states: remaining period granted by legal proceed- Where the character of the statute of limitations. ings is such that the law restrains one of added) (footnote (emphasis Id. at 295 omit- parties exercising legal remedy ted). another, running of the statute Lastly, Debtor contends.that the trial applicable remedy of limitations *4 allowing prove court erred not her to postponed, run, ifor it has commenced to property’s determining fair market value and suspended, during is the time the restraint deficiency summary judgment. on How proceedings incident to the continues. ever, objection review of Debtor’s to Credi 488, Kirby, The cases of McGee v. 189 Okla. summary judgment tor’s motion for and mo 199, (1941), 118 P.2d and Johnson v. deficiency tion for fails to disclose that she Johnson, 293, 745, 182 Okla. any evidentiary offered in support material (1938) (citations omitted), similarly hold that value, proposed fair market or to contro “ ‘[wjhenever person prevented from ex appraised vert the value used at the sheriffs ercising legal remedy by paramount his some Additionally, journal entry grant sale. authority, the time which he is thus ing deficiency reeites that Debtor was prevented is not to be counted him in represented by hearing counsel at the on determining whether the statute of limita pending Creditor’s motions and that ” right.’ tions has barred his arguments “heard the evidence and reasonably It 90-day propositions clear that the of counsel.” It is not clear heard, type of section 686 is the of limitations what “evidence” was but was incum pursuit upon for the of remedies bent counsel for Debtor to at least which proof Oklahoma’s common law make offer of at this time concern judicial rule was operate. property meant “The her valuation of the in order to deficiency preserve determination of the amount of this issue for review. Under the Code, post-judgment pre [under 686] is a Oklahoma Evidence “[e]rror requisite judgment pursuit predicated upon creditor’s be ruling that ... excludes process judg further satisfaction of ... evidence unless the substance of the Moore, Mehojah ment [of foreclosure].” [excluded] evidence was made known of 222, 2104(A)(2). (Okla.Ct.App.1987) P.2d (ap fer.” 12 O.S.1991 proved publication by the Oklahoma Su judgment The foreclosure and the order Court) (citations omitted). preme It is “a deficiency are AFFIRMED. supplemental order ... which allows the general a writ creditor obtain TAYLOR, P.J., concurs. satisfy deficiency execution to amount.” RAPP, C.J., dissents. “The restrictions [of 686] are entirely upon right execution.” Id. at RAPP, Judge, dissenting. Chief ease, 226. In the instant Creditor was re majorities’ vigorously I dissent from the pursuing strained from its remedies view for reasons herein stated. deficiency general determination and execu tion to previously collect the balance of a I. BACKGROUND judgment. entered This restraint was paramount authority promissory court. Reed executed note and real Applying suspen mortgage Financing Oklahoma’s common law estate to National Home sion expressly Corporation, Funding’s predeces- rule to section Statewide interest, firming on November Sheriffs Sale on sor deficiency for a filed an action on the filed its motion defaulted. Statewide Statewide 7,1994. proceedings judgment against foreclosure on Reed on December note and 15,1992. summary mortgage subsequently on December filed a motion for It judgment seeking to have Reed’s Petition to Reed, properly who Statewide served Confirming Judgment and Order Vacate appearance. trial to enter an failed dismissed. Sheriffs Sale judgment against court entered a default 20,1993. January Reed hearing argument, the trial court After motion for mortgaged property granted A Statewide’s sheriffs sale of 24,1995, May gave grant- and also was held on 1993. Statewide on March by mailing summary judg- Reed notice of the sheriffs sale ed Statewide’s by ment, peti- last address and sought notice to her known which dismissal of Reed’s purchased prop- publication. appeals. Statewide tion to vacate. Reed erty property’s appraised for the value

$25,000. On the date of Statewide filed II. ANALYSIS and once a Motion to Confirm Sheriffs Sale known again mailed notice to Reed’s last (a) Argument Parties’ published address and the notice. appeal’s dispositive issue centers on Chapter filed for Reed *5 entry deficiency judg- the trial court’s sale, days May three after the sheriffs on ment in favor of Statewide.1 court, 1993. The trial unaware of Reed’s by argues Reed the trial court erred enter- bankruptcy, Confirming entered its Order deficiency judgment against her be- 1,1993. on Sheriffs Sale June cause Statewide filed its motion for deficien- Chapter bankruptcy later Reed’s was O.S.1991, cy judgment outside 686’s Chapter to a 7 because of her converted Statewide, response, time limits. asserts Chapter plan’s failure to meet commit- ninety-day time limit for re- section 686’s motion, the ments. On Statewide’s bank- deficiency judgment by questing a was tolled ruptcy Authorizing court entered its Order therefore, bankruptcy, its motion Reed’s and Property Abandonment of and Relief From timely filed. 16,1994. Stay Automatic on stay provisions Order annulled the automatic Reed, initially ignoring the automatic Code, Bankruptcy Code, of the authorized provisions Bankruptcy asserts of the bankruptcy trustee to abandon the mort- statutory that failure to file within the nine- gaged property, and allowed Statewide ty-day period extinguished the debt. Reed continue its foreclosure action on whatever ignores equitable is an also property. interest it had in the abandoned proceeding provisions and that exist under 11 108(e) (1994) prevent a debtor court, again In state Statewide mailed Bankruptcy using Code as a shield Reed notice to confirm the sale at sheriffs extinguishment, to allow statutes of limita- address, her last known which was also the tions, run, and duration to and then to defeat bankruptcy pro- address Reed used in her the creditor dismissal of the ceeding. published It also the notice. The proceeding. confirming trial court entered an order 17,1994. sheriffs sale on October argues that because Reed’s Statewide bankruptcy proceeding bankruptcy filing produced an automatic Reed dismissed her Code, filing Bankruptcy then filed a under the also November Reed remaining ninety-day period Judgment Petition to tolled the of sec- Vacate Order Con- mailed, Petition, copy regarding required, 1. Examination of Reed's assertions de- No- Sale, Hearing presentation fault of evidence tice of Sheriff’s and the Notice of alleges Reed on Confirmation of Sheriff's Sale to Reed’s last shows them without merit. address, give proper which is also the same address Statewide failed to her notice of the known bankruptcy pleadings. addi- default and of the confirmation of sher- shown on Reed’s tion, hearing. published sale Statewide the notice. iff’s The record shows Statewide 108(c).2 (c) tion 686 under Statewide Issue Examined oc- asserts since Reed’s impression. The issue here is one of first sale, days after the sheriffs curred three statutory period The issue is whether days eighty-seven should have additional 686(1) suspended under section is tolled or from the date Reed’s dismissal stay provisions the automatic of the Fed- bankruptcy proceedings to continue its ac- Bankruptcy eral Code when a debtor in a tion.3 proceeding bankruptcy pro- foreclosure files ceedings after the of a occurrence sheriffs (b)The Statute mortgaged property prior sale of 686(1), a motion for Under filing creditor’s motion for si- must be filed either deficiency judgment judgment. multaneously with motion confirm ninety days sale or within sheriffs (d) Majority View sale.4 Failure to file the date sheriff’s split authority among There is courts deficiency judgment motion for simultaneous- which have addressed similar issues on stat- sale, ly with the motion to confirm sheriffs majori- utes of limitations and duration. The ninety-day period or within the of the ty limitations, view is that where statute of extinguishes the debt. Reliable Ins. Co. Life expiration, expires or duration while the Cook, (Okla.1979). protection debtor is under the of the Bank- undisputed It is did not file Statewide its ruptcy stay provisions, automatic Code’s deficiency judgment simultaneous- provided creditor relief under 11 U.S.C. ly with its motion to confirm sheriffs sale or grant thirty of an additional ninety days within after the date of the sher- bankruptcy stay.5 May iffs sale. The sheriffs sale was held on setting 1993. Statewide filed its motion for defi- perceived majority Cases out the ciency judgment on December more analysis view and their astute of 11 U.S.C. *6 108(c)’s6 ninety days § than legislative history after the sheriffs sale. are first exam- Tafoya, any ninety in Thurman v. in event within 1050, 5, (Colo.1995), 1054 note party states: date of the the to whom such resi- owing may due shall be make a motion in the “toll,” defining In the verb Black's Law Dic- deficiency judgment action for leave to a enter tionary suspend stop temporari- states: "To or party against notice to the whom such ly during as the statute of limitations is tolled sought attorney is or the who shall jurisdiction the defendant's absence from the appeared party have for such in such action. plaintiff's minority.” the Black’s (6th 1990). personally Dictionary Such notice shall be served Law ed. or in Thurman uses such other manner as the court the word toll in the context of section direct. 108(c) to mean that the statute of limitations Section 686 is more than statute of limita tions; suspended extinguishment. or does not continue to run. Unless it is a statute of See noted, Whitson, throughout opinion otherwise we Paper this International Co. v. 595 F.2d 559 suspend. (10th Lanes, Cir.1979); use the word “toll” to mean Apache Inc. v. National Co., (Okla. Educators Ins. 529 P.2d 984 Life part: 3. Statewide’s brief states in 1974). The dismissal of the occurred on 2, Therefore, November 1994.... Plaintiff following express majority cases the view. 2, eighty-seven days had Products, Inc., November Rogers See v. Corrosion 42 F.3d Deficiency to file its Motion for Leave to Enter (5th 1995); Lines, Inc., Cir. Aslanidis v. U.S. Judgment. Motion for Leave to Enter Defi- Cir.1993); (2d Crysen, 7 F.3d 1067 In re 166 B.R. ciency Judgment was filed December (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994); Grotting v. Hudson eighty-seven-day which was well within the Inc., (W.D.Wash.1988); Shipbuilders, 85 B.R. 568 period. (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1986); In re Baird 63 B.R. 60 (Colo.1995); Tafoya, Thurman v. O.S.1991, 686, part: 4. 12 states in Ass’n, Improvement Garrett v. Arrowhead any [N]o shall be enforced for resi- (Colo.1992). P.2d 850 remaining pre- due of the debt unsatisfied as mortgaged prop- scribed erly this Act after the 108(c), provides, part: 6. 11 U.S.C. sold, except shall have been as herein provided. Simultaneously making applicable nonbankruptcy [I]f with of law ... fixes a confirming commencing period continuing a motion for an order the sale or or a civil 28, 1978); P. minority Sept. in later accord Lawrence view is set out ined. The ¶ (15th Bankruptcy King, 108.04 Collier paragraphs. 595, 1993); H.R.Rep. No. 95th ed. see also 108(e) estab- plain reading of section A 318, Cong., reprinted in 1978 1st Sess. provide for expressly it lishes that does 5787, 6275. U.S.C.C.A.N. It tolling any statutory periods. al- Thurman, statutory period to run. lows the 108(c) short, extends the termi- P.2d at states: thirty an additional nated limitations Ap- Both the Second Circuit Court bankruptcy stay days after the is lifted Ap- Fifth peals and the Circuit Court rationale, Following Fifth annulled. this plain peals support our conclusion that the held, plain wording based on the Circuit 108(c) operate language of section does not statute, that: running limita- suspend of statute of tolling separate not create a s does pendency periods during tions plainly provision.... The statute states stay. suspended, that for the time However, does not toll while section other federal or state law must mandate period, recognizes that it Thurman also 108(c). incorporated through s and then be thirty days after the provides an additional Otherwise, party must suit within file bankruptcy stay annulling of the or termi- thirty-day grace period the end if bankruptcy proceeding nation of the stay. limitations, extinguish- applicable statute of Products, Inc., Rogers v. 42 F.3d Corrosion ment, expired. or duration has Cir.1995) omitted) (5th (citations 292, 297 “suspension peri- The reference to of such added). (emphasis 108(c)(1) stop does not od” In- running of the statute of limitations. interpretation giv- consistent with Lines, stead, as stated in Aslanidis v. U.S. full to 12 as a effect (2d Cir.1993) Inc., (empha- 7 F.3d whole. If it were concluded that section section 686 n added), language: sis 108(c) suspends ninety-day re- merely incorporates suspensions quirement filing during pending of dead- bank- expressly provided operated that are other ruptcy proceeding, lines as a “com- majority federal or state statutes. mon law restraint” as would hold, totally this would be inconsistent with Any ambiguity respect with “sus 108(c)7. meaning and intent of section pension” reference in is cleared interpretation impos- Such an would make it up by examining provision’s legislative *7 ninety-day period history. history sible for section 686’s time makes evident that 108(c)(1) Moreover, expire during stay. § 12 only “special suspen to the refers O.S.1991, non-bankruptcy any § itself does not contain sions” that are in 686 found provisions language authorizing recognizing Revenue or such a such as the Internal H11,109 (daily Cong.Rec. suspension 124 ed. or restraint which could be incor- Code. statute, strictly necessary bankruptcy action in a court other than a it is not to consider However, a claim the debtor ... and such legislative history. the statute's ex- period expired before the date of the has legislative history of the of section amination filing petition, period the does not of then such 108(c) provides support further for our inter- expire the later of— until 108(c), predecessor pretation. 11 The to section including any period, the end of such 29(f) (1976), provided specifically § U.S.C. for occurring suspension period of such on or periods statute limitations of of case; the commencement of the after (2) bankruptcy.... while an individual is in If days after notice of the termination or Congress intended section to do had expiration stay of the under section 362.... same, expressly.... the it would have stated so Congress eloquently explained by The fact that did not do so lends the Colorado Su- 7. As Thurman, (cita- preme support Court in 895 P.2d at 1056 further to our conclusion that section (footnote omitted) added) 108(c) (emphasis suspend running tions omit- does not the of a stat- ted): period ute of limitations while debtor is meaning bankruptcy proceedings. we of section Because find the involved in 108(c) apparent to be from the words of the 108(c) § imple- into 11 III. porated U.S.C. CONCLUSION statute, 11 Nor does the U.S.C. mentation. 108(c) Analysis § shows 11 U.S.C. does not 108(e), any way § in the creditor “restrain” running toll the of a statute of limitations or exercising any legal remedy as ad- extinguishment O.S.1991, 686, § under by in majority the their reliance vanced here the properly amount of time debtor is majorities’ interpretation on Lee. The clearly against protection bankruptcy under the precise the terms of section court. 108(c) 108(c) Further, contrary equitable and is na- § suspend does not Bankruptcy of of the the section and ture running the of thé statute limitations or Code, provides thirty which an additional extinguishment O.S.1991, § under expiration to maintain after the action during period protection. any wording limitations. The clear If legislature the OHahoma had intended 108(c) anticipates that a limitations tolling suspension period such a in section may expire in period while debtor is 686 in bankruptcy, the event of a it could Spinney, bankruptcy. O’Lane v. 110 Nev. provided. have so Its failure to do so now (1994). prevents, my in opinion, the creation of one

by judicial guise fiat under of a common (e) remedy.” Moreover, Minority View law “restraint of majorities’ effect ruling of the under this minority view8 holds that a statute of negate common law is to rationale the effect by bankruptcy stay. limitations is tolled of 11 U.S.C. in Oklahoma. However, appear it is noted that courts view, receding minority from the as evi- majority long-held also overlooks the by deciding denced Second Circuit. only rule that courts resort to common law Aslanidis, the Second revisited an Circuit fill a void not covered statute. In OHa- Morton, (2d case, In re 866 F.2d 561 earlier homa, supplements, law the common but Cir.1989). originally The court in Morton control, O.S.1991, does not a statute. See 12 period held tolls the limit- legislature ing judgment property hens on real until the required out period filing set for the aof stay automatic is terminated. The Morton deficiency ninety days. The Federal Bank- — court, however, explicitly failed to decide Act, 108(c), ruptcy provides in 11 U.S.C. suspend- whether the limitations expires that if filing period during this during ed or whether proceedings, given the creditor an addi- merely thirty days bank had to act thirty days tional act was lifted. the Second When Cir- Thus, stay. preclude the two statutes Aslanidis, again cuit addressed issue any usurpation common law where the distinguished its decision Morton rights parties and duties of the are set out holding only addressed Morton what Furthermore, parties’ rights statute. occurred Aslanidis, stay. statutorily 7 F.3d at 1073. The Sec- and duties statute are under each *8 Circuit then that 11 ond decided U.S.C. created derived from and are not the com- 108(e) savings § thirty-day allowed a mon law. bankruptcy proceed- upon conclusion of the placed majority has its faith in here stay limiting if ings even time had excep- Turner Both and Peterson. are clear Thus, minority expired. even Morton, inapposite ap- tions and to common law set out in that court view subse- quently adopted majority plication. view. Turner involves construction (1983); minority Major holding that 422 view statutes of limi Ill.Dec. 457 N.E.2d Lum- Morton, Inc., Remodeling tations are tolled be found in In re ber Co. v. G & B 817 S.W.2d However, (2d Cir.1989); (Mo.Ct.App.1991). F.2d 561 In re Hunters 474 it is believed Run Ltd., Cir.1989); (9th language 875 F.2d 1425 In re Nation these cases result from of the statute Co., (Bankr.D.Colo.1990); prior present Oil 112 B.R. to enactment of the 11 U.S.C. al Works, Priester, 108(c). § Iron Garbe Inc. v. 99 Ill.2d lifting the sus- notice of the permitted statute that

of a Kansas bankruptcy. or termination of the in- time limits in face of an pension of junction. Appeals con- The Kansas Court 108(e) injunction. an

strued 11 U.S.C. IV. DISSENT HOLDING statute, applying its the court tolled period, permitted ac- limitations which is a did not Statewide file its defi- ciency judgment thirty-day period within the specific in face of a Peterson tion statute. 108(e) by Bankrupt- allowed a debt in nondischargeability involved the cy Court entered its Order the bank- cov- bankruptcy due to fraud. This decision ruptcy stay and is nondischargeable created ering a debt in its favor. I thus barred using permissible exception also a fraud is hold that law also “common restraint” common law to enter an area not covered concept based on common the Oklahoma law proper application This is a of com- statute. majority usage advanced is but a equitable mon law and consistent with the majority avoid the forth vehicle to view set principles bankruptcy. The Texas court Thurman9. This law “common restraint” recognized construing it was not 11 U.S.C. concept now allows fabric of sound statu- when stated: tory good legal practice construction and practitioners having be stretched include held a court in this case [T]he inability meaning apply plain nondischargeable. above ex- claim question, the statutes cerpt reveals interest does federal 108(e), to the basic foreclo- or how not thereafter extend to whether procedure. sure law, through state statutes of limitations Thus, I would the trial reverse court’s thereof, suspension allows suit on such awarding deficiency judg- order Statewide claims. Reed, ment hold Statewide failed Peterson, 844 S.W.2d at 295. timely. to file Thus, statutory period expires if a under O.S.1991, § pendency here, are, no there

applicable federal or stat- state

utes, provides then creditor remedy by equitable granting an addition- thirty days

al to initiate or continue its action supra accompanying text See note 7.