OPINION

PARKS, Judge:

The petitioner, Leon Keith Love, Jr., entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Injury to a Minor Child (21 O.S.Supp.1982, § 843), in Tulsa County District Court, Case No. CRF-85-1862, before the Honorable Clifford E. Hopper, District Judge. Pursuant to plea negotiations, the District Attorney recommended a sentence of four (4) years, which was imposed by the trial court. Petitioner timely filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was overruled. Petitioner timely filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. On August 20, 1986, this Court issued an order directing the preparation of the transcript of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, if such hearing was reported. On September 4, 1986, counsel for petitioner filed a response stating that said hearing was not reported.

In his sole assignment of error, petitioner claims that he was mentally incompetent to enter a guilty plea. He asserts that the trial court failed to make an appropriate interrogation of the petitioner to determine whether he was competent to plead guilty. In addition, the record shows that the trial judge failed to advise the petitioner concerning his right to confront the witnesses against him, his privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, and the State‘s burden to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. An examination of the record of the plea proceeding shows that the trial court‘s only question concerning the petitioner‘s competency was whether the petitioner was “under the influence of any drugs or medication at this time?” Petitioner answered no. The presentence investigation report states that petitioner functions “at the upper end of the mild mental retardation range....” The final diagnosis was that the petitioner suffered from severe emotional problems and non-psychotic organic brain syndrome with mild mental retardation.

We find that the trial judge failed to conduct an “appropriate interrogation ... regarding the defendant‘s past and present mental state....” King v. State, 553 P.2d 529, 534 (Okl.Cr.1976). See also Burch v. State, 738 P.2d 157 (Okl.Cr.1987); Coyle v. State, 706 P.2d 547, 548 (Okl.Cr.1985). In addition, the trial court‘s failure to inform the petitioner of his right to confrontation, his right against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence, and the State‘s burden to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt resulted in petitioner‘s not being adequately advised of the nature and consequences of his guilty plea as required by King, supra. Accordingly, the petitioner must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.

On the basis of the foregoing, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, the writ of certiorari is GRANTED, and the judgment is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

BRETT, P.J., concurs.

BUSSEY, J., not participating.

Lonnie Doyle STATEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

No. F-85-385

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

June 22, 1987.

738 P.2d 565

BUSSEY, Judge

Michael C. Trewitt, Blackwell, for appellant.

Michael C. Turpen, Atty. Gen., Mary F. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

OPINION

BUSSEY, Judge:

The appellant, Lonnie Doyle Staten, was convicted of the crime of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Second Offense, in the District Court of Kay County, Case No. CRF-84-64 and was sentenced to three (3) years’ imprisonment with two (2) years’ suspended, and he appeals.

Briefly stated the pertinent facts are that on March 16, 1984, appellant, who was driving his vehicle, was stopped due to a faulty tail light. The officer who stopped appellant observed that appellant was staggering, spoke slowly and smelled of alcohol. Appellant was arrested and transported to the Blackwell jail where a breathalyzer test was administered. The test showed a blood alcohol concentration of eleven-hundredths (.11).

For his first assignment of error appellant asserts that the statute under which he was charged 47 O.S.Supp.1983, § 11-902(A)(1) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We recently addressed this identical issue in Wood v. State, 716 P.2d 707 (Okl.Cr. 1986), and held that this statute is neither vague nor unconstitutional. For the reasons set forth in Wood, we find this assignment of error meritless.

Appellant next alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his prior convictions in that the prior convictions were the result of guilty pleas and that the record in each case failed to show that his constitutional rights had been protected. This Court has consistently held that when prior felony convictions on pleas of guilty are used to enhance punishment, an affirmative showing that the defendant was represented by counsel and advised of his rights, before he entered his guilty pleas, is essential. Houston v. State, 567 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Okl.Cr. 1977).

In the present case, appellant pled guilty to three prior crimes of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in Case Nos. CRF-75-164, CRM-75-179 and T-73-136. The record clearly shows that he was represented by counsel at the time that he entered the guilty pleas, and that he pled guilty with full knowledge of his constitutional rights. Moreover, appellant did not file an appeal on any of the three prior convictions used for enhancement. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

In his third assignment of error appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to call appellant to testify at the hearing on motion to strike regarding the prior convictions in that it violated his right against self-incrimination. Initially, we note that appellant failed to cite relevant authority to support his assertion; therefore, it is waived. Wofford v. State, 581 P.2d 905 (Okl.Cr. 1978). We further find that appellant had already waived his constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination when he pled guilty in the prior cases. Trusty v. State, 501 P.2d 1142 (Okl.Cr. 1972). Consequently, this assignment of error is without merit.

The appellant finally urges that the trial court erred in receiving into evidence State‘s exhibits numbers 5-11, the court records of his prior convictions. However, having previously found that the prior convictions were admissible to enhance appellant‘s punishment, this assignment is likewise without merit.

Finding no error warranting reversal or modification, the Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED.

BRETT, P.J., concurs.

PARKS, J., specially concurs.

PARKS, Presiding Judge, specially concurring:

The procedural infirmities I noted in my dissenting opinion to Wood v. State, 716 P.2d 707, 709-10 (Okl.Cr.1986) (Parks, P.J., dissenting), have not been alleged and are not present in the instant case. Accordingly, I concur with this opinion.