*1
put its hand on him.
It cannot
of
review
the sentence
reader will re-read
If the
court,
majority
discretionary
decision
forth in the
nor overrule
as set
the trial
Question
from
parole
once
obvious
In re
opinion, it will at
become
board. Accord:
specifi-
court
Review,
that the trial
Concerning
last sentence
State Judicial
defendant-appellant under
cally placed
of Corrections Revoking Suspended Sen- court’s Order the sentence Paroles.” With Pardons and And, thereby, Mr. Adams tence. would be so stating, and the statutes specifically so free. my ken beyond it is expressing, specifically at an opinion can arrive majority that the diametrically opposed thereto.
opinion rea- the aforesaid
Finally, only not reason,
sons, for this additional to revoke jurisdiction had no
trial court July parole: On
defendant-appellant’s parole by the discharged from he was He was Services. of Correctional Office Dakota, Plaintiff of South STATE informed, Dakota so of South and Appellee, and obliga- further that he had “no stipulated, separation Department.” tion to in Article II of is found powers clause ZOSS, Defendant Barbara Jo State Constitution.
the South Dakota Appellant. in this state are government powers of 14485. No. divided, says, into three dis- exactly as it exec- legislative, departments, tinct Dakota. South powers and utive, judicial; and the on Briefs Oct. 1984. Considered departments are each of those duties of constitution. by the state prescribed 9, 1985. Decided Jan. Therefore, has ruled that it is a this Court separation powers clause violation to rule on matters which
for the Court constitutionally placed one of
been v. Brown departments. Dunker
other two Educ., 80 S.D.
County Bd. The Governor and
N.W.2d Corrections, Board of Charities Paroles, Pardons and
through the Board of grant pardons jurisdiction have exclusive Const, § IV, art. 3 and paroles. S.D. §§ XIV, upon his 1 and 2. Based
art. by the
record, officially told he had been society, es-
sovereign that his debt
sence, paid. The one and branch Depart- Executive government —the “custody supervi- his ment—who had statutorily encharged with the
sion” enforcing the conditions
“responsibility for sentencing judge,” as well
imposed defendant, had taken its rehabilitating
as defendant-appellant.
sovereign off of hand could not then suffer Branch
The Judicial
warnings, appellant indicated she under- rights her but did not re- stood Miranda spond the consent law. was She subsequently Codington taken to the Coun- Watertown, ty Detention where Center again she was read the consent law was asked take a chemical breath explained The im- test. officer further her her plied consent law to and advised requested being that she was to a submit ap- also breath The officer informed she her pellant could have own test at expense requested after was own test Thereafter, appellant administered. made questioning the accuracy statements test asked and when de- would submit to its administration she requested Initially, a blood clined officer hos- obtained directions to a local pital appellant where could receive a test; however, conferring alcohol after with officer, appel- another informed that she entitled lant was not test because she refused to take re- quested breath test.
Appellant was convicted of DWI in viola-
32-23-1,
having
tion
SDCL
two
with
Moreno,
Gen.,
Mark
Atty.
A.
Asst.
prior
pre-
convictions for DWI within the
Pierre,
plaintiff
appellee;
for
Mark V.
ceding
years,
four
in violation of SDCL
Gen., Pierre,
Meierhenry,
Atty.
Asst.
on
Appellant
32-23-4 and 32-23-4.1.
con-
brief.
tends that she
was denied
constitution-
Turbak,
Nancy
Watertown,
J.
for defend-
al
to due
and a fair trial
appellant.
ant and
when she was not allowed to
test
of her choice
Oth-
administered.
WUEST, Acting Justice.
Cada,
er states have so held. See Smith v.
115 Ariz.
Judicial
86
150
taken
transported
into
Cal.Rptr.
(1978);
Newbern,
216
In re
175
Codington County Detention
Center
862,
(1959);
Cal.App.2d
Cal.Rptr.
1
80
While at the
Watertown.
Detention Cen-
198,
Me.
79
Munsey,
v.
152
127 A.2d
State
ter, the
asked
trooper
Ms. Zoss to take a
(1956);
Alano,
v.
Commonwealth
388
read
breath test and
her the
con-
871,
1122,
(1983);
Mass.
448 N.E.2d
1126
sent advisory.
expressed
Ms. Zoss
con-
Burton,
People
Mich.App.
13
163
v.
accuracy
cern about the
of a
State,
(1969); Scarborough
N.W.2d 823
v.
requested
blood test.
When
(Miss.1972),
denied,
261 So.2d
cert.
trooper
if she
asked
wanted to submit to
613;
U.S.
93 S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
answered,
the breath
“No.”
(Mo.1972),
Snipes,
v.
This was a court at Watertown. “Stipulation There was a Facts” During trial, the course of this ar- facts, parties stipulated and without those resting trooper acknowledged that he had reader cannot understand the true refused Ms. to allow Zoss to take a blood meaning background of this case and transcript, test. Per the a blood test would Thus, holding. set its I forth in extenso reasonably have been available. The tran- stipulated facts: those script vividly reveals that re- Ms. Zoss 24, 1983, April Trooper peatedly requested
On
State
a blood test. There can
McManus arrested Barbara
Jo Zoss for
be no doubt that this
told
Zoss
Ms.
driving
hospital
while under
influence
that he
her to a nearby
of alco-
would take
opportunity
arrangements
timely
able
blood test.
test and initiated
for a blood
least,
Later,
say
illogical
To
it is
propound
to
accomplish the
to
right
that a citizen’s
acting
constitutional
will be
apparently
on
refused to do so
respected only if the citizen first waives a
jail.
at the
police
of a
advice
statutory right. Having no authorities to
warning given at the
consent
contention,
its unsound
submit
contained,
alia,
inter
time
Zoss’ arrest
holding
asks this
buttress its
on
following:
old
consent
law cases such as
driving or
you
I
arrested
1.
Birney,
Schlenker
85 S.D.
physical
control of a
being
actual
constitutional Cf. (S.D.1979). 278 N.W.2d The constitu right opportu is one of
nity to have a blood test taken this was upon
refused based unconstitutional strata
gem. South lady Dakota had this custo
