202 Mo. 12 | Mo. | 1907
This cause is brought to this court by appeal on the part of the defendant from a judgment of conviction of murder in the second degree in the criminal court of Jackson county, Missouri. The information upon which this judgment is predicated was filed by the' prosecuting attorney on the 19th day of December, 1903, in the criminal court of that county, charging the defendant, Louis Zorn, with murder in the first degree, for shooting one Albert Sechrest with ,a pistol on the 24th day of June of that year. As the correctness of this information is challenged by appellant it is well that it be reproduced here. It was as follows:
“State of Missouri, County of Jackson, ss.
“In the Criminal Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, Missouri, September Term, A. D. 1903.
“Now comes Roland Hughes, Prosecuting Attorney for the State of Missouri in and for the body of the County of Jackson, and upon his oath informs the court that Louis Zorn whose Christian name in full is unknown to said prosecuting attorney, late of the coun
“Prosecuting Attorney.
“State of Missouri, County of Jackson, ss.
“Roland Hughes, prosecuting attorney of Jackson county, Missouri, being first duly sworn, on his oath says that the facts set forth in the above and foregoing information are true according to the best of his information and belief. Roland Hughes.
“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of December, 1903. Charles Y. Renick:,
“Clerk of the Criminal Court.
“By William L. MoClanahan, Deputy Clerk.”
The record discloses that there have been three trials of this cause. In the first two trials the jury failed to agree, and on the third trial, at which the Hon. Howard Gray presided as special judge, and which was begun on the 11th of July, 1905, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree and fixed his punishment at fifteen years in the State penitentiary.
We deem it unnecessary to burden this opinion with anything like a detailed statement of the testimony of all the witnesses testifying in this cause; to do so, would require quite a volume. We shall be content with a mere reference to the testimony and what facts it tended to establish. This will be sufficient to enable us to determine the legal propositions presented by the record.
The evidence on the part of the State tended to show that the defendant, Louis Zorn, lived in a large brick house on the west side of Prospect avenue, his yard extending from Eighth to Ninth street; that is, the house of the defendant faced east on Prospect
“I, Albert L. Sechrest, realizing that I am about-to die, and having given up all hope of recovery, make this statement about the trouble during which Dr. Zorn shot me this afternoon. The hired man came to the gate; I told him not to come in; Mr. Zorn opened the gate and stepped inside; he ran his hand in his pocket and drew a pistol; I jumped back and he pointed the pistol at me.and shot; I had no weapon of any kind in my hand; I did not attempt to strike him with any club, or other weapon; the hired man did not come inside; I make this statement realizing that I am mortally wounded and I have no hope of recovery.
“A. L. Sechkest.
“E. E. Gray,
“June 23, 1902.”
Mrs. B. R. Bridgeford, one of the witnesses for the State, substantially testified as follows: That she was the wife of B. R. Bridgeford, a livestock dealer at the Kansas City stock yards; that she was sitting at her upstairs window across- the street from which she could see the back yard of the Sechrest premises; that she could see the pump therein and a small portion of the rear fence; that her attention was attracted by a pistol shot, and she looked up and saw in the Sechrest back yard between the pump and the rear fence, nearer the pump than the fence, three forms, two men and a woman, and saw a puff of smoke rising as from the shot of a pistol; that she saw one of the men clasp his hands on his stomach, and that this man, as she afterwards learned, was Mr. Sechrest; that she did not see Mr. Sechrest have any hoe in his hand; that after the shot was fired she immediately ran downstairs and out on the front porch and then saw Mr. Sechrest being as
J. W. Alexander substantially stated in his testimony that he was engaged in- the grocery business and on the 23d day of June was employed by the Missouri Dairy Company as a driver of one of its wagons; that on the evening of that day he was driving south on 9th street and as he approached the watering trough at the northwest corner of Ninth and Prospect, his attention was attracted to the Sechrest premises by some loud talking on the west side of a clump of weeds that stood in the northwest corner of the Sechrest yard; that he arose in his wagon, stepped out upon the handlebar and looked in that direction; the wagon was moving at that time; that he could not understand what was being said by the parties who were talking, but they seemed to be quarreling; that when his attention was first attracted he could not see the parties but as his wagon advanced toward the south he saw three parties, two men and a woman, in the Sechrest yard between the pump and the rear fence, about twelve or fourteen feet to the rear of the house; that the taller of the two men was facing north and the other was facing south; that on account of the board fence on the east side of the Sechrest yard he could only see the head and shoulders of the defendant with whom he was personally acquainted; that he heard a shot and saw the smoke from the pistol; he says there was a gate in' the fence on the east side of the
The testimony on the part of the defendant tends to show that Dr. Zorn and a hired man named Orton went to the premises occupied by the deceased, Albert Sechrest, which were leased to the deceased by the appellant, but which were soon to be vacated; that the defendant Zorn and Orton went over to the premises occupied by the deceased for the purpose of planting some flowers. The defendant introduced witness Paul Begalke; this witness was in the employ of the defendant Zorn; he testified in part in substance. about as follows: “On the 23d day of June, 1902,1 was cleaning up in the house about 6:30 and I heard Doctor Zorn go into the kitchen, I don’t know exactly I was upstairs or downstairs; I was cleaning up the house, I had my bucket full of paper, so I just went up and picked up the bucket and started out to the ash pile to burn it up, when I got out on the back porch I seen Dr. Zorn and this hired man walked out into the back yard; it was ten or fifteen feet in front of me, maybe farther than that; when I got out there I looked around and I seen this big fellow, Albert Schrest, he was on the back of the house; Doctor and his hired man was walking down to the gate; when I got out to the ash pile I saw again Mr. Sechrest; he was standing on the fence when Dr. Zorn and the hired fellow got to the fence; Joe Orton opened the gate and this big fellow, Mr. Sechrest, he said something, I don’t know what he
Louis Dumball was another witness introduced on the part of the defendant. His testimony tended directly to contradict that of J. W. Alexander. He testified substantially that he was at the watering trough spoken of by witness Alexander and that heheardashot fired and that he inquired of Alexander as to what was the matter over there where the shot was fired; that Alexander replied that “he didn’t know;” he then, described the Sechrest premises and about the location in the yard where the difficulty occurred, all of which tended to show that Alexander, from the point he says he was, was unable to see what he testified he did see in respect to this difficulty.
There were other witnesses introduced on the part of the defendant tending to show that where this difficulty occurred in the Sechrest premises was not at the place or point as testified to by Alexander. There was other testimony introduced on the part of the defendant tending to affect the credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of Alexander and Mrs. Bridgeford.
Witness Pike was introduced on the part of the defendant; he was a civil engineer by occupation; he made a survey of the premises and surroundings where this difficulty occurred. His testimony tended to show that witness Alexander on the part of the State, at
There was also a controverted issue in this cause as to the proper foundation being laid for the introduction of the dying declarations of the deceased. It can serve no useful purpose to undertake to detail the testimony upon that issue. In laying' the foundation the State introduced Horace S. Kimbrell and I. B. Kimbrell. The appellant upon this issue introduced Steven A. Northup, W. H. Coffey and Sepha Edmunds. We will give the testimony of the witnesses upon that issue such attention as it merits during the course of the opinion.
This is a sufficient statement to indicate the nature and character of the testimony upon which this cause was submitted to the jury, and is amply sufficient to enable us to determine the legal propositions involved. At the close of the evidence the court instructed the jury upon murder in the first and second degrees, self-defense and reasonable doubt and other phases of the case to which the testimony was applicable. It can serve no good purpose to embrace the instructions in this statement, but they will be given such consideration as we deem necessary during the course of the opinion. The cause was submitted to the jury and they returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder of the second degree, and fixing his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of fifteen years. Timely motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were filed and by the court overruled. Judgment and sentence was entered of record in conformity to the verdict and from this judgment the defendant in proper form and in due time prosecuted his appeal to this court and the record is now before us for consideration.
The record in this canse discloses the assignment of numerous errors on the part of the trial court as a basis for the reversal of this judgment. We shall give to the complaints of appellant such attention as their importance merit and demand. The record before us discloses that counsel representing the defendant on this appeal did not represent him on the trial of the case in the lower court.
I.
It is insisted by appellant that the court erred in the exclusion of the testimony of witness Sepha Edmunds, the nurse at the hospital at the time it is said that the deceased made the dying declaration which was offered in evidence. The testimony of this witness, of which complaint is made, was as follows:
“Q. Do you remember when the Rev. Dr. Northrup came? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you remember anything Mr. Sechrest said at that time with reference to getting well? A. He repeated the same things to Dr. Northup that he had to me that night and to others. Q. With reference to whether he wanted the doctor to pray for him?
“We object to that as immaterial.
“The Court. Anything that he said with reference to' his condition you may show.
“Wouldn’t it be competent to show that the declarant was an infidel?
“The Court. I have stated you can prove that if he said anything touching his condition. - I don’t want it unless it is in connection with some statement as to his hope of recovery.
“We offer that for the purpose of touching upon his infidelity.
“The Court. Objection sustained.
“Exception.”
II.
It is next insisted that the court erred in excluding the testimony of Mrs. Oliver H. Stanley, respecting the general reputation of the deceased for being a turbulent and quarrelsome man. The law upon this subject is so well settled by the uniform expressions of this court that it is hardly necessary to cite authorities touching the subject. Where a homicide occurs under such circumstances that it is doubtful whether the act was committed maliciously or from a well-grounded apprehension of danger, testimony tending
It is apparent from the record in this cause that the defense interposed and relied upon by defendant was that of self-defense. The testimony on the part of the defendant tended to show that the deceased at the time the fatal shot was fired was in a threatening attitude with a dangerous weapon in his hand and in the act of striking the defendant with such weapon. In addition to this there was also some testimony tending to show that the deceased had made some threats against the defendant. On the other hand, the evidence on the part of the State is in conflict with that introduced by the defendant and tends to show that the deceased and the defendant' were entirely in a different attitude to that as detailed by one of the witnesses for the defendant. If the court, at the time this testimony as to the reputation borne by the deceased as to being of a rash, turbulent disposition, was offered, was sufficiently advised as to the defense relied upon by the defendant, then it was manifestly error to exclude this testimony. On the other hand, if the defendant had not sufficiently developed his defense to this charge as to advise the court of its nature and character, then there could be no prejudicial error in delaying the introduction of that testimony until the defense upon which the defendant relied was suffiéiently developed to authorize its admission for the purposé of adding force to the defendant’s plea of self-defense. It is only when a showing of self-defense is made that the character and reputation of the deceased for rashness, viciousness and turbulency becomes material. As was said in State v. Harris, 59 Mo. l. c. 553-54: “A man
in.
This brings us to the consideration of the most serious proposition disclosed by the record, that is, the complaint at the action of the trial court in submitting to the jury the question of the admissibility of the dying declaration of the deceased by instruction numbered 4 in the second series of instructions given by the court in this cause. The court in submitting this question to the jury said to them:
‘ ‘ And if you believe from the evidence that Albert Sechrest made such statements, that at the time of making the same his mind was clear and that he knew what he was doing and with such knowledge made it, and that at the time he made it he was suffering from a fatal wound inflicted by defendant upon him, and which wound afterwards caused his death, and that at the time of making such statement, he had given up all' hopes of life, and then believed that death was impending and near, then it is your duty to consider it as the dying declaration of said Albert Sechrest.”
It is manifest under this instruction that the jury were required in the first instance to determine before considering the instrument of writing purporting to be the dying declaration of the deceased, as to whether or not in fact it was a dying declaration and admissible in evidence. This instruction was manifestly erroneous. While it was the province of the jury to determine the credit or weight to which such dying decía
It is fundamental that in order to authorize the admission of dying declarations in evidence it is essential that at the time they are made there must be a consciousness of impending death, and it is the exclusive province of the court to determine whether that condition exists before the declaration is admissible. [Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1451.].
The rules of law which have been repeatedly , announced by this court applicable to the admission of dying declarations, may thus be briefly stated: It is the manifest duty of the trial court as' a basis for the admission of dying declarations to hear such testimony as may be offered by the State and the defendant
It is insisted by the learned Attorney-General that no prejudicial error was committed by the court in submitting the question as to the admissibility of such dying declaration to the jury. We are unable to give our assent to this insistence. It may be conceded that had the court, after hearing all the testimony both for the State and the defendant upon the preliminary question as to the admissibility of the dying declaration, ruled that it was admissible and admitted it in evidence, the mere fact that the court erroneously again submitted such preliminary question by an instruction to the jury, would not have constituted such error as would authorize the reversal of the judgment, for in that instance the court would have properly exercised its province by passing upon the question, and the mere fact that it also required the jury to pass upon it could not be deemed as prejudicial error to the defendant. But that is not this case. The record discloses that the court first proceeded to determine this preliminary question in the absence of the jury. The State introduced its evidence and the defendant interposed an objection to the introduction of the so-called dying declaration, first, that the testimony as introduced by the State did not show the existence of such a condition of mind as would' authorize it to be considered a dying declaration, and for the further reason that the court has at this time refused the request of the defendant to require all the witnesses capable of bringing light on the subject to be brought before him. The record does not disclose that the court in the absence of the jury at that time passed on the admissibility of
It is apparent from the record before us, and we see no escape from the conclusion, that the trial court did not undertáke, and did not intend, to pass upon the admissibility of the dying declaration as made by the deceased embraced in the instrument- offered in evidence. Certainly, if such was the purpose of the court it would have, as previously indicated, heard the witnesses for the defendant which were subsequently offered by the defendant upon this preliminary question.
Upon this appeal it is clearly the duty of this court to review the action of the trial court upon the subject of dying declarations, their admissibility, etc., and the very first question which confronts the court upon this appeal is as to the sufficiency of the basis of foundation laid upon the preliminary inquiry to authorize their admission in evidence. In reviewing the testimony which constitutes the basis for the admission of the dying declarations in this cause this court must consider the entire testimony. It certainly will not be seriously contended that the court might consider the prima-facie showing as made by the State and exclude that portion of the evidence offered by the defendant. This leads us to the inquiry, if this record is to be construed as disclosing that the court determined the admissibility of the dying declaration, as to how this court is to pass on and review the testimony offered by the defendant and the rebuttal testimony offered by the State, which, as disclosed by the record, was never passed on by the trial court in reaching its conclusion that the dying declaration was admissible. This court is not authorized in reviewing testimony before the trial court, which
There should bé no guess work or inferences in
IV.
It is next contended by appellant that the court erroneously declared the law upon the facts developed in this case in its instructions to the jury numbered four and five, which are as follows:
“4. The court instructs the jury that if they find and believe from the evidence that the defendant, Louis Zorn, on the 23d day of June, 1903, intentionally shot Albert Sechrest with a pistol in a vital part of the body and that said pistol was, as used, a deadly weapon, and that said Albert Sechrest died from the effects of such shots within one year thereafter, the law presumes that the defendant intended the natural consequence of his act, and from the use of a deadly weapon the existence of malice may be inferred, and in the absence of proof or circumstances showing deliberation the defendant
“5. The court instructs the jury that if you find and believe from the evidence that the defendant provoked or began the quarrel or a difficulty with the defendant with the purpose of taMng advantage of him and of taking his life or of doing him some great bodily harm, then there is no self-defense in the case however imminent the peril of the defendant may have become in consequence of an attack made upon him by the deceased.”
It is sufficient to say of instruction numbered 4, that, while in some particulars it varies from the precedents so often approved by this court, the first part of it fully recognized the principle of law that the intentional killing of a human being by the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the body is presumed to be murder in the second degree, in the absence of proof to the contrary. [State v. Evans, 124 Mo. 397; State v. Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 137; State v. Young, 119 Mo. 495; State v. Foster, 61 Mo. 549; State v. Hudson, 59 Mo. 135.]
It is insisted by appellant that this instruction is erroneous for the reason that it iguores the provocation which might reduce the killing from murder in the «eeond to manslaughter in the fourth degree. It will
"We are unable to determine now what the evidence may develop upon the retrial of this cause, but it is sufficient to say that the law of murder in the first and second degrees as well as manslaughter in the fourth degree is well settled in this State, and should the evidence upon a retrial warrant the court in embracing and covering all those grades of the offense the presumption is that it will be done, and that the court will so modify instruction numbered 4 as to conform to the repeated rulings of this court.
Complaint is also made that the court ignored the theory which is now advanced by appellant of imperfect self-defense. We have carefully analyzed all the facts disclosed by the record and so far as is shown by the developments at the trial, the record of which is now before us, there was no imperfect self-defense in this case. He was either perfectly justified or he was not justified at all. The defendant in this cause interposed the plea of self-defense, and from the yery inception of the trial insisted that the deceased was the aggressor and wrongdoer and the right of imperfect self-defense can only arise when the defendant at the commencement of the difficulty is the aggressor or wrongdoer. The law of imperfect self-defense is very clearly stated in Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509, which has been substantially adopted by this court. The law was thus stated: “A perfect right of self-defense can
The complaint urged against instruction numbered 5 is that there was no evidence upon which to predicate it. All that is necessary to say concerning this instruction is that it is substantially in proper form and if upon the retrial of this cause there is any substantial testimony tending to show that the defendant sought or provoked the difficulty, with the felonious intent of wreaking his vengeance by killing the deceased or doing him some great personal injury, then the instruction is a very appropriate one and should be given, otherwise unless there is some substantial testimony tending to show that the defendant sought or provoked the difficulty with such intent, then it should not be given.
Y.
Appellant complains of errors committed by the court in the exclusion of testimony offered upon the preliminary inquiry in laying the proper basis or foundation for the admission of the dying' declarations of the deceased. It is insisted that the court erred in excluding evidence which tended to prove that the deceased objected to sending for n minister or his relatives. It is only necessary to say of this complaint that
VI.
Appellant insists that the court committed error in refusing to give instructions numbered 8 and 11 ashed by the defendant. These instructions sought to pi’esent to the jury the law regulating the relations of landlord and tenant and announcing the principle of law that a mere trespass would not justify a felonious assault upon the trespasser, and if a felonious assault was made upon such trespasser he would have the right to prevent the same even to the extent of killing his adversary.
The record discloses that the court gave the defendant the full benefit of an instruction fully setting forth the law of self-defense, and in no way limited the defendant’s right of self-defense by reason of the fact that the homicide occurred upon the premises occupied by the deceased. The instruction on self-defense given by the court clearly accorded to the defendant all the rights he would have possessed on premises not in the possession of the deceased. With this view we are unable to see how the defendant was prejudiced by the refusal of the instructions requested; however, we will say that notwithstanding this' instruction, the representative of the State in his argument to the jury does in certain parts of it undertake to discuss the rights of landlord and tenant. In view of the instructions given by the court this argument should not have been permitted. It is sufficient to say upon this proposition that the law upon the rights of landlord and tenant is
VII.
Finally, it is earnestly insisted that an analysis of the entire record discloses that the defendant did not have a fair and impartial trial, and numerous complaints are directed to the remarks of the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury. We will not undertake to discuss the error complained of respecting such argument, for the reason that many of the complaints now insisted upon were not properly preserved in the bill of exceptions by timely objections and exceptions to the remarks made. The law is well settled in this State upon this subject, and as demonstrated by repeated rulings, this court will not hesitate to reverse a judgment where the representative of the State has indulged in a line of argument which makes it apparent that a fair and impartial trial has been endangered. We have read very carefully the argument as preserved in the record of the prosecuting attorney, and with all due respect to his ability, energy and zeal, we must say that many things were said in the discussion of this ease which would have been better left unsaid. Our observation as to trials of criminal causes is that the State as well as the defendant is best represented by counsel who confine themselves to a discussion of the facts and questions clearly within the record. While we will not undertake to pass upon the remarks of the prosecuting attorney, for the reason before stated that the points are not properly preserved by the bill of exceptions, it is not perhaps inapp-ro
The information upon which this prosecution is based is sufficient. While it may not strictly and technically conform to the rules of grammar and rhetoric, in our opinion it fully and sufficiently informs the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation. [State v. Turlington, 102 Mo. l. c. 651; State v. Wilson, 172 Mo. l. c. 428; State v. Gregory, 178 Mo. l. c. 56; State v. Gray, 172 Mo. 435; State v. Long, 201 Mo. 664.]
The record in this cause is quite voluminous and embraces many other complaints of error committed by the trial court to which we have made no special reference; however, we will say that we have considered them and find that they are not of that character as would constitute reversible error, therefore, we deemed it only necessary to indicate our views upon the vital propositions disclosed by the record. We have given expression to such views and indicated our conclusions, and for the error pointed out the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause remanded, and it is so ordered.