171 Wis. 498 | Wis. | 1920
The record shows that on October 3, 1919, the defendant was brought into the juvenile court, Judge Karel presiding, by the probation officer to whom he had been committed as a ward of the court, on the several complaints theretofore filed against him as a delinquent. The defendant contends that the proceedings had in court on this occasion constitute a discharge of the defendant from all delinquencies, and that such discharge terminated all orders of probation theretofore entered upon the several complaints filed against him. The state claims to thé contrary.and asserts that defendant was still a ward of the court after October 3, 1919. The purposes and objects of the juvenile court act (secs. 573 — 1 to 573: — 10, Stats.) are well expressed in the opinion in State v. Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 167 N. W. 830. The proceedings are not to be conducted according to the practice and procedure governing actions. The court is to act in place of a parent and necessarily has great power which is not to be restricted by the rules of procedure followed in criminal courts. The question presented is, Could the court properly commit the defendant to the industrial school upon the record before him in view of the action of the court on October 3d? The court stated in passing on this question of committing the boy: “This boy was not sent to Waukesha [the industrial school] for stealing the saw.” There is no evidence in the record to show that he was guilty of the charges lodged against him on November 24, 1919, upon the complaint of. the officer, Kam-merling, in which proceeding the commitment was issued. So .far as the evidence discloses, he was innocent of any wrongful conduct concerning the transaction set forth in the Kammerling complaint. The court, however, held that
By the Court. — The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded to the juvenile court with directions to discharge the defendant.