*1 713 A.2d PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, JERSEY, v. THOMAS OF NEW STATE ZEIDELL, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. G. February 1998. Argued 1998 Decided June *2 Stalford, Prosecutor, P. Mark argued Assistant the cause for (John appellant A. Kaye, County Prosecutor, Monmouth attor- ney). Gilson, Counsel, Designated M. argued
Steven the cause for (Ivelisse Torres, Defender, respondent attorney). Public O’Hern, General, F. Deputy Attorney John argued the cause for (Peter curiae, Attorney Verniero, amicus General of New General, Attorney attorney). brief, Zeidell, pro letters in lieu se. G. submitted
Thomas was delivered opinion The Court COLEMAN, J. a has appeal is whether defendant who issue raised this two himself that
criminal sexual contact with observed approximately years from a eight and ten distance children second-degree sexual assault. seventy-five has committed feet Appellate Division opinion, panel divided reported majority con assault. The two convictions reversed aggressive as specific victimization and no cluded because established, necessary relational had been saultive conduct proven. v. had not been State sexual assault component for (1997). Zeidell, A.2d *3 specific victimization re dissenting judge that no was believed statutory of had quired all of elements sexual assault and that Id. 691A.2d 866. been established. R. right of of dissent below. appeals
The State as because 2:2-l(a)(2). intent to specific and hold that reverse We involving victimize sexual assault an is not an element of observer (referred to as a tender- years thirteen old a child who is less than assault). years-sexual
I -A- following offenses: two counts convicted Defendant was E.B., who ten upon assault K.B. and were second-degree old, endangering the years respectively; two counts of eight and fourth-degree children; and counts of welfare of those two two chil- to same exposing on his lewdness based with merging endangerment and lewdness counts After dren. child, upon the court sentenced defendant each sexual assaults parole ineligibility year terms five concurrent ten with Diagnostic and to the Adult Treatment Center.
-B- presented by The evidence the State that tended to establish charged the elements of the offenses consisted of what follows. S., adult, On June young Carol took her friend’s two children, E.B., cousins, C.F., K.B. and and their two J.F. and to a Asbury area beach located on the border of Park and Ocean approximately fifty yards Grove. The beach area was wide and buildings was situated between north located and south. To west, was northerly there a boardwalk that extended in a direction.
Although the was day, beach crowded earlier at the time alleged only criminal conduct Carol and the children were present. playing After the four children had been in the water for awhile, Carol, K.B. E.B. exited play and the water talk and with sitting who was aon towel near the center of the beach. J.F. and C.F. remained in the water. faced Carol the water and K.B. sat facing they spoke. right her as E.B. sat to Carol’s side and stared out the water.
Shortly p.m. areas, patrolling after 8:00 while the beach Officer Frederick Jenkins observed young an adult female with two playing beach; children the middle two other children swimming were in the water. Officer Jenkins also observed couple defendant and a at the beach area. Defendant was stand- ing ocean, at the end of the boardwalk approximately nearest the seventy-five from feet where playing. Carol and children were According Jenkins, to Officer there blocking were no obstacles Eventually, defendant’s view the beach. both the officer beach, couple leaving left the on the boardwalk *4 standing bicycle. beside a
Approximately Carol, two minutes later while K.B. and E.B. beach, still on were Carol jerking exclaimed “look at that man off over there.” K.B. and E.B. looked toward the boardwalk and saw masturbating. dispatched Carol E.B. to alert police officer. E.B. ran Officer Jenkins who described her as frantic, excited, being and “kind of scared.” When E.B. was
421 happened, “put into had to tell Officer Jenkins what unable say” officer of what she wanted to to inform the words what she K.B., observed, who also excited. arrived with was had Carol police explained why a officer was needed. Carol his intimate facing was ocean while Defendant appear anyone particular parts. At no time did he notice though even he was appear eye to make contact with children Jenkins testified that from where defendant facing them. Officer boardwalk, nothing his line obstructed standing was on the of Carol and the two children. vision
-C- trial court should have majority ruled that The below assault, acquit on two sexual grantéd motions to defendant’s necessary lacked “the rela the State’s evidence counts because under component” to sustain defendant’s convictions tional ie., 2C:14-2b, aggressive as “specific victimization N.J.S.A. Zeidell, N.J.Super. at 691 conduct.” 299 saultive factual situation that unlike the A.2d 866. court reasoned 202, (App.Div.), 606 A.2d Ridgeway, 256 873 State v. (1992), denied, 18, defen 611 A.2d where the 130 N.J. certif. him eleven-year-old girl to his ear to watch over dant called proximity to masturbate, here, in close defendant was not Zeidell, supra, looked their direction. children and never Furthermore, panel 619, although the A.2d 866. N.J.Super. at statutory victim” in the language “with a concluded require physical contact sexual assault does not definition of victim, panel it does and the held the actor between Id. at require that there be a victim. argument primary that the distinction rejected the State’s
court 2C:14-2b, statute, and the N.J.S.A the sexual assault between 2C:14-4b(l), assault statute, that sexual lewdness N.J.S.A. Id. at “exposure” parts. of intimate requires the mere more than Rather, Cannel, citing John M. New A.2d 866. Annotated, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4b' comment on Criminal Code *5 (1996-1997), majority primary found the distinction between requisite relationship the statutes to be the between the actor to Zeidell, 621-22, the victim. 691 A.2d assault, majority 866. The that to concluded commit sexual cause, invite, specifically underage must person solicit the conduct, to view whereas incidental or casual observation is sufficient to Ibid. constitute lewdness. dissenting disagreed majori- panel member of the with the
ty’s
required
conclusion that N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2b
prove
the State to
“specific
aggressive
victimization and
assaultive conduct” directed
toward a victim. Id.
691 A.2d
necessary
866. “All that is
is that the sexual act be ‘in the
view the victim whom the actor
” Ibid, (citation omitted).
present.’
knows to be
dissenting
judge found
presented
permit
that the State
sufficient
evidence
jury
reasonably
children,
infer that defendant knew the
who
only seventy-five
away,
present
were
feet
on
were
the beach and
position
in a
to observe him.
Id. at
II -A- argues majority The State opinion Appellate improperly engrafted Division an additional element onto the tender-years-sexual by requiring assault offense prove the State to specifically that defendant solicited K.B. and E.B. to watch him The State maintains that when masturbate on boardwalk. *6 conjunction with of the are read in pertinent subsections Code clearly other, has apparent Legislature that the each it becomes of- tender-years-sexual unambiguously defined the assault fense.
-B- Legislature us to how the appeal requires This determine proscribed conduct consti- distinguish when certain intended to rather than seeond-degree-tender-years-sexual assault tutes on lan- fourth-degree The answer must based lewdness. be Jersey of of Criminal Justice guage and structure the New Code (Code). re- and the The Code defines the substantive offenses state, statutory descrip- in the quired mental and the terms used principles of construction. tion the offenses. It also contains of provisions provide first outline the relevant Code We determining assault convictions framework for whether the sexual proper. in this case were general acknowledges purposes of the be
The Code some concepts describe substan- by defining terms and used to served warning give of culpability “[t]o and mental are fair tive offenses ... differentiate on proscribed!,] [t]o conduct the nature of the offenses!,] and minor ... grounds between serious reasonable consti- accurately the act and mental state which define [and][t]o (6). 2C.T-2a(4), The Code also tute each offense.” N.J.S.A susceptible of language provisions of its “is that when provides gener- further the differing interpreted it shall be constructions special purposes of the purposes in this section and the al stated with N.J.S.A 2C:l-2c. Consistent particular provision involved.” requirements of constitu- requirements, and with the the Code’s statutory descrip- decide whether the process, due we must tional unambiguous. tender-years-sexual assault was tion of Code, tender-years-sexual as “an assault defined Under the years old who is less than act contact with victim of sexual than the victim.” and the actor is at least four older A person alleging N.J.S.A 2C:14-2b. victim in this case is “a subjected by” proscribed Chapter have been to offenses of An act Code. N.J.S.A 2C:14-lb. of sexual contact through means an or actor, intentional the victim either or directly clothing, degrading or victim’s actor’s intimate for the purpose humiliating arousing gratifying victim sexually actor. Sexual sexually with contact actor himself must be view of the whom the victim knows to be present.
[N.J.S.A 2C:14-ld.] The drafters proposed Code as in 1971 included under sexual assaults an Report offense called sexual contact. 1 Final 2C:14-4, § the New Law Criminal Revision Commission (1971) (Final Report). Sexual contact with a child less than years old twelve was the most serious of such sexual assaults. Id. at 63. The definition sexual contact was taken from the Model *7 (1953). Penal 4 Report, supra, Code Tentative No. 2 Final commentary 2C:14-4, §to at 200. Sexual contact was defined as “any touching of or parts person the sexual other intimate of a for purpose arousing gratifying the of or sexual 1 desire.” Final 2C:14-4, Report, § supra, at 63. adoption
Between the
of the
Report
Commissioner’s
in 1971 and
adoption
1978,
of
Legislature changed
the
the Code in
the
the 1971
proposed
of
definition
sexual contact to include
act
touching
of
parts.
Legislature
one’s own intimate
modeled the sexual
chapter,
offenses
Chapter
a
after model statute drafted
Philadelphia
Rape
for
Center
Concern. State In Interest of
M.T.S.,
422, 440,
(1992)
129
Leigh
N.J.
commits act of sexual contact
victim
than
with
less
thirteen
age).
Chancery
2C:14-2b,
A
Division case held that N.J.S.A.
2C:14-3b,
read in
with
when
context
N.J.S.A.
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
2e(l),
2C:LF-ld, requires
and N.J.S.A
prove
State to
following elements in order to obtain a conviction under N.J.S.A
“1)
years
at
four
2C:14-2b:
defendant is
least
older than the
victim,
alleged
who was
than 13 at
less
the time
sexual
2)
assault;
through
a
contact occurred
the use of
physical
personal
no
injury
coercion which caused
severe
force
A.N.,
to the
N.J.Super.
victim.” State in Interest
267
(Ch.Div.1993)
added).
(emphasis
Physical
In State
N.J.Super.
v.
427
that
only
reported New
decision
discusses
There is
one
his
an
touches
the
of N.J.S.A 2C:14-2b to
actor who
application
the
physically
not
touch
parts in front of a child but does
supra,
Ridgeway,
him.
a defen
have the child touch
child or
second-degree
but
guilty to the crime of
sexual assault
pled
dant
claiming
inadequate
there
an
factual basis
appealed,
later
that
was
There,
203,
the
N.J.Super. at
plea.
for the
256
and
pulled
car to the side of
road
asked
his
204,
car.
at
eleven-year-old for the time when she came to his
Id.
window,
the car
she could
girl
606
873.
stood near
A.2d
When
pants open
“playing
was
with”
see that the defendant had his
and
205,
asked
parts.
Id. at
There
other
presence of
touching his intimate
in the
2b based on an actor
children,
children,
young
actor either
See, e.g.,
Slattery,
v.
239
persuading
to touch him.
State
them
534, 540,
(App.Div.1990);
571
1314
State v. Schu
N.J.Super.
A.2d
mann,
501, 504-05,
(App.Div.1987),
N.J.Super.
Based on it mistaken when concluded Appellate we Division was believe at the charges should have been dismissed that the sexual assault compo necessary relational end of the State’s ease “because the Zeidell, missing.” for a conviction on these counts was nent reasoning 866. court’s 691A.2d required specific *10 that prove was to State victimization and aggressive expands legislative description assaultive conduct of the offense. controlling statutory provisions
When the of the Code are read together, tender-years-sexual we find that a assault under (1) key They N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2b contains three elements. are: (2) old, years victim is less than who thirteen a defendant-actor (3) victim, who is at least four than older a sexual age. contact a victim with under the critical sexual contact with a purposeful touching victim involves intentional or anof part. types There are three of intentional sexual touch- ings: herself, may touch may the actor himself or the actor touch victim, or may the victim touch actor. Each such inten- touching tional must be for least purposes: one four either humiliating victim, or degrading sexually arousing or or sexu- ally gratifying Finally, if touching defendant-actor. herself, the actor of himself or the sexual must be in view present. of the victim whom the actor knows to be -C- argues only Because defendant that his conduct amounted to fourth-degree assault, lewdness and not sexual must we also focus assault, on that tender-years-sexual offense. Like the lewd- ness part statute became of the in Code was different from proposal. the 1971 proposed Code contained two forms of lewdness. One form exposure,
was called indecent
exposing
defined as the
genitals
arousing
sexually
actor’s
gratifying
any
or
the actor or
person
spouse
other than the actor’s
“under circumstances in
likely
[the
which
knows
actor]
his conduct is
to cause affront or
2C:14-5,
§
Report, supra,
alarm.” 1 Final
at 63. The indecent
exposure
proposed
under the
grouped
Chapter
Code was
with
exposure
genitals
offenses because
gratifica-
for sexual
tion
interpreted
is often
threatening
aggression.
as
supra, commentary
2C:14-5,
§
Final Report,
to
at 200-01.
proposed
was identi-
The second form of lewdness
Code
“any
indecency
It
defined as
public
open lewdness.
was
fied as
act,
likely
observed
which
knows is
to be
[the actor]
lewd
Report,
1 Final
be
or alarmed.”
others who would
affronted
2C:34-1,
generally
§
proposed
That
offense was
supra,
120.
“gross flouting of
prohibit
intended
conduct
amounted to
sexuality
nudity
community
respect
public.”
standards
2C:34-1,
§
Report,
commentary
at 301.
Final
lewdness,
Although
proposed
did not further define
Code
lustful, lecherous,
it as “conduct of a
decisional law described
Dorsey,
v.
64 N.J.
libidinous nature.” State
lascivious
(1974).
importing
also
as
“some
The lewdness statute under part as of fourth-degree offenses was enacted Code two provides: It 1978. flagrantly if he lewd A a offense does any a. commits disorderly persons person to be observed by offensive act which he knows or is reasonably expects likely
and nonconsenting be or who would affronted alarmed. other persons degree fourth if: A commits a crime of the b. person (1) arousing gratifying of or He his intimate for the exposes parts purpose where the of the actor or of other under circumstances any sexual desire person a child who is he is be observed by actor knows or reasonably expects likely age than the of is at least four older less than 13 where actor years years child. (2) arousing gratifying of or He his for the exposes purpose under circumstances where desire of the actor or of other any sexual person a who he to be observed by actor knows or is likely person reasonably expects the sexual nature disease defect is unable to understand because mental or the actor’s conduct. c. As used in this section: genitals arousing exposing
“lewd acts” shall include the or purpose gratifying the sexual desire of the actor or of other any person. INJ.S.A 2C:14-4J Therefore, Code, disorderly be under the lewdness can either a persons fourth-degree disorderly It offense a crime. is a persons engages any flagrantly offense whenever the actor lewd act, exposing genitals including and offensive actor’s own regardless of whether for the done actor’s arousal or gratification, reasonably likely which the knows expects is be non-consenting persons age observed other over the years thirteen who would be affronted or alarmed the conduct. N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4a. exposure fourth-degree
Whether such
becomes
lewdness de-
pends
identity
Fourth-degree
on the
victim.
lewdness
“b(l)”
under subsection
occurs when the
is
victim under thirteen
and the actor is at least four
older than the victim. N.J.S.A.
2C:14^4b(l).
When
victim suffers from mental
disease
defect that makes the victim unable to understand the sexual
conduct,
exposure
nature of the actor’s
fourth-degree
lewd-
“b(2).”
2C:14-4b(2).
under
ness
subsection
N.J.S.A.
Code,
Under
culpability frequently helps
criminal mental
determine both the
nature of
substantive
and its
offense
gradation.
Code
four
contains
states of criminal mental
culpability:
knowingly, recklessly,
purposely,
negligently.
and
2C:2-2(a).
represent
N.J.S.A.
Those four mental states
“
attempt
justice
‘to
greater
through
Code’s
achieve
individual
”
guilt
Harmon,
culpability.’
closer relation between
State v.
*12
(1986)
Knowlton,
(quoting
104 N.J.
Fourth-degree intentionally lewdness consists of an actor “exposing” displaying or or for himself herself sexual arousal or gratification in under circumstances which the or actor “knows reasonably expects” that she likely he or is to be observed 2C:14-4b(l). Thus, child less than thirteen old. N.J.S.A exposing displaying an actor’s limited to or lewdness or example, a “flasher” touching them. For parts rather than touching them. genitals without may expose the “streaker” seeond-degree-tender-years underlying conduct for The “intentionally” contrast, touch assault, the actor in involves sexual victim-contact) (self-contact ing his or her intimate underage child “in view” of an gratification arousal or sexual 2C:14-2b, 14-ld. N.J.S.A present. to be the actor “knows” whom and the required for lewdness Although exposure and for the intentional assault both must be required for sexual state toward gratification, the actor’s mental purpose of arousal for each offense. significantly different underage child is expose requires the actor offense non-contact lewdness reasonably expect[ing]” “knowing] or display herself himself or Code, the conduct. Under underage an child will observe intending that a knowing or equates with the actor this mens rea 2C:2-2b(l) (stating person him or her. See N.J.S.A child view of the attendant if is aware of the existence purposely acts he exists); N.J.SA it hopes” that or he “believes or circumstance 2C:2-2b(2) knowingly if he is aware (stating person acts of the existence circumstance or is aware of an attendant existence existence). contrast, sexual assault high probability of its touching “in view in only engage a sexual requires that the present. the actor knows be underage child whom of’ an lewdness, require not then, assault does Clearly, unlike require- touching. The actually observe the underage child to any require underage does not child “in the view of’ ment prohibited act all; question: mens rea it is a factual Was Alternatively, “in view of’ not? field of vision or done a child’s risks unreasonable interpreted mean that there were be could Here, act. evi- present might view the underage child that an present knew the children were that defendant dence established testimony that the field of vision. that he was their act that the actually prohibited act establishes saw the children Thus, an actual there is view. where have been in their must and as actually the defendant viewed underage child who has *13 case, defendant, presence by this whose is known the Court question need not reach the more difficult the defen- whether guilty engaged dant be if in would he sexual contact front of a view, who, present he child whom knew to be and within but for reason, actually whatever did not view or conduct. In observe the situation, the latter the “in of’ view standard could constitute a liability might basis for strict under the Code and the defendant guilty regardless be a child he knew to whether whom be contrast, present actually act. “in witnessed the view of’ might guilt standard for if constitute basis was an unrea- there might engage sonable that a child see risk however, issues, by sexual contact. Those are not raised the facts ease, in this and we decline to reach them.
There are sound reasons distinction between fourth- degree assault, tender-years-sexual lewdness and as well as their requirements. different mens rea Lewdness observable act as .an tender-years-sexual egregious is not as as the assault. It is more shocking threatening and an actor observe gratification exposure for arousal or than it is observe Moreover, display. involving conduct sexual contact is not contact; ambiguous gratification from purpose- comes its —its clear, crystal intent consequently severity fulness and are and seen, if it impact, actually predictable, its is is more and the risk seen, harm, greater. if it exposure, even is not is Mere contrast, can be a ambiguous more form of It is conduct. not inherently obviously gratifying expose rather, genitals; gratification only subjective comes from the belief the actor being that he or is she viewed. compelled by language
We are the strictures and of the Code to Legislature conclude that the did not create a unified crime of tender-years-sexual fourth-degree assault Ridge and lewdness. way, 606 A.2d Our 873. conclusion reasoning pre-Code buttressed used in decisional law holding private did encompass lewdness not the crimes of fornication, adultery, obscenity simply because, had the act of fornicating openly, been committed it would have been considered Dorsey, supra, N.J. public lewdness. *14 2A:88-1, N.J.S.A. adultery, fornica- was that
The Court’s rationale - N.J.S.A 2A:115-1.1 tion, 2A:110-1, N.J.S.A obscenity, and Dorsey, supra, 64 3.10, by separate proscribed enactments. were tender-years-sexual Similarly, the N.J. at A.2d 689. by separate fourth-degree proscribed and are assault lewdness and have different elements. enactments Legislature person that who touches his or determined a gratification in intimate for sexual or sexual her own arousal poses higher age thirteen a presence of children below safety than welfare of. those children to children risk to and intent is the fact who are older. That corroborated aggra- Legislature third-degree a although the created offense contact, that criminal sexual offense is restricted to victims vated N.J.S.A at least and less than sixteen. 2C:14- who are thirteen relationship requires proof a familiar That offense also 3a. specified aggravating child or the actor and the one of the between Ibid. What emerges age of the victim circumstances. is that touching in than presence A of a child less is critical. sexual assault if the other second-degree years a thirteen old is sexual present. are also includes elements When case, present exposing parts, as occurred in the lewdness merger offense of sexual assault and becomes lesser-iricluded Diaz, 2C:l-8a(l); the Code. N.J.S.A. State v. required (1996). N.J. A.2d 1120 pertinent of the are read We hold when the sections Code scope tender-years-sexual as- together, meaning and unambiguous. Although the of- are clear and- substantive sault 2C:14-2b, be fense is criminalized N.J.S.A. that statute must victims, 2C:14-lb, N.J.S.A. conjunction which defines read with contact, 2C:14-ld, N.J.S.A 2C:2- N.J.S.A which defines sexual N.J.S.A. 2(a), requisite culpability, which defines the mental and 2C:14-3a, aggravated so as which criminal sexual contact defines prosecution of such when victim is preclude an offense appropriate thirteen because offense is less than old tender-years-sexual assault.
Ill agree Appellate dissenting We also with the Division mem permit ber’s conclusion that the jury evidence was sufficient to to conclude that defendant committed an act of sexual contact with specific K.B. and E.B. required. and that victimization was not majority concluded that because defendant did not look at the children, any gesture them, two or make toward either proximity because neither of the children inwas close to defen dant, prove the State failed to that defendant had sexual contact Zeidell, 619,. with either of the children. noted, previously As we tender-years-sexual assault in this required proof case of sexual contact of genitals defendant’s own E.B., view K.B. and present. whom defendant knew to be *15 evidence, Based on jury reasonably could have concluded practically that it was certain that defendant saw the children. jury apparently The they believed the children when testified that they saw masturbating they approx- as sat on the beach imately seventy-five feet from where defendant’s conduct oc- Nothing him, curred. obstructed their nothing view of ob- structed his view of them. knowing Under the Code’s criminal culpability standard, obligated the State prove was to that there high probability was a presence defendant was aware of the K.B., children on the beach masturbating. while E.B. and their only cousins were the children on the beach at the time. jury The visibility could consider the clear coupled the children they him, with the fact that saw and the fact that Officer Jenkins saw only the children on the beach minutes before the criminal act occurred, deciding when culpability the mental issue.
Although the Code does not “present,” define the word it must nevertheless be ordinary meaning accorded its absent an special indication of meaning. Afanador, some State v. 134 N.J. (1993). 631A.2d 946 plain meaning “presence” “[a]ct, fact, The is an or state of being in place elsewhere, a certain call, and not sight or within or thought Law hand, being of.” Black’s place that is some ed.1990). (6th given Legislature has no Dictionary 1183 meaning “pres- special of an intent to attribute indication that the actor ordinary meaning “presence” here is ence.” The touching actor his or her young children can see the knows that compelling presented, evidence parts. intimate the face of reasonably that defendant knew jury could have found genitals. The touching him his and would see children could the children had been viewing included the beach where area Therefore, to a defendant to have playing. all children known present conduct were when eye-shot of his or her been within proscribed conduct occurred. majority’s attempt reject Appellate Division We requiring actor to engraft a new element to the offense partic to induce their act toward the victims make some overt Ridgeway on ipation in actor’s conduct. Reliance Ridgeway, Although that was a fact proposition misplaced. required it element. properly did not conclude that was the court Suffi N.J.Super. at Ridgeway, supra, 256 when, underage of an child whom victimization occurs view cient an act of sexual present, an actor commits the actor knows is herself, by or coerced by touching a solicited contact himself victim, parts by the touching of the actor’s intimate scenario, the child parts. Under each the child’s subjected [a in that the child has “been becomes a victim Further proscribed by” the N.J.S.A. 2C:14-lb. Code. contact] the fact that K.B. in this case is based on evidence of victimization they extremely frightened by what observed. and E.B. were *16 young or invite the require the actor to solicit does not Code the conduct proscribed conduct before victims to observe the tender-years-sexual assault. ripens into a
IV
dissenting opinion
appeal
us based on the
Although the
is before
sentence, defen-
an issue of excessiveness
that does not raise
Zeidell,
dant
Appellate
raised that issue in
Division.
N.J.Super.
matter is remanded to the Division to decide the exces- siveness of sentence issue.
STEIN, J., dissenting.
I
judgment
would affirm the
Appellate
Division substan
tially
Zeidell,
for the reasons
opinion.
articulated in its
State v.
613, 619-22,
(App.Div.1997).
A.2d 866
As that
opinion
demonstrates,
clearly
our
contemplates
Code
an act of
specific victimization to sustain a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
2b. See
v. Ridgeway,
State
256 N.J.Super.
606 A.2d
(App.Div.) (upholding
guilty plea to sexual assault when facts
indicated that
specifically targeted
eleven-year-old girl
himself),
denied,
witness defendant 130 N.J.
certif.
(1992); Cannel,
For reversal and remandment —Chief Justice PORITZ and HANDLER, POLLOCK, Justices GARIBALDI and COLEMAN —5.
For STEIN —1. affirmance —Justice