*1 consent, against Baumann, her husband without his State v. occurring during as to events the mar- Hocker, 610 P.2d ____ riage 450, 454-55, 556 P.2d 788-89 (1976). interpreted appeals The court of the stat- Over and above its construction of person testimony ute to forbid from a statute, appeals found no “against” person’s spouse which prejudice argue in fact. does not to Cohen during the sense that it concerns events contrary petition in his for review. marriage impliedly suggest “which at least disagree while we with the court of criminal conduct.” 169 Ariz. at statute, appeals’ construction P.2d at 214. it found that Ms. Because affirm its reversal of the remand order as testimony Cohen’s was “neither relevant privilege it relates to the anti-marital fact prejudicial nor criminal liabili- [Cohen’s] issue. interrogation ty” it held that her did not privilege. violate his marital Id. DISPOSITION disagree. The We statute con testimonial limitation. tains no substantive vacated and the case is remanded to the against” do not mean The words “for proceedings trial court for further consis- They mean “favorable unfavorable.” opinion. tent simply spouse “on behalf of” a or “on party opposing” spouse. This behalf MOELLER, V.C.J., CORCORAN and interpreted privilege court has forbid JJ., ZLAKET, FERNANDEZ, and LLOYD
any testimony, just damaging testimo Judge, Appeals, Court concur. ny, during as to events which occurred marriage non-testifying spouse unless C.J., FELDMAN, participate did not Williams, 133 Ariz. consents. See State v. matter; pursuant the determination of this Const, to Ariz. art. LLOYD § (decided previous under version of the stat FERNANDEZ, J., of the Arizona Court of privilege which did not limit the ute Two, Appeals, designated Division was concerning oc testimony events which sit his stead. during marriage); curred Whitaker, Ms. The fact that Cohen was testify the state to about events called marriage proceed occurring during the ing against her husband satisfies the stat right keep her from ute. Cohen had a Arizona, Appellee/Cross- STATE of testimony giving any events which Appellant, during marriages, just their occurred damaged his in
testimony actually which YOUNGBLOOD, Larry Appellant/Cross- terests. Because Ms. Cohen was occasion occurring ally questioned regarding events Appellee, after the the 1976 divorce or Arizona, Appellant, STATE of questions marriage, or at least asked limited the 1976- specifically were period the Cohens were not when HERRERA-RODRIGUEZ, Appellee. Joe married, privilege fact Cohen’s anti-marital in fact violated. CR-90-0053-PR, Nos. CR-89-0353-PR. the end of the But this is not Arizona, ap of an indictment is inquiry. Remand En Banc. person under in propriate where proce vestigation is denied a “substantial Jan. 12.9, Ev right.” dural Rule Ariz.R.Crim.P. privilege in violation of a
idence elicited procedural the accused a substantial denies is shown. right only prejudice actual when *2 Woods, Atty.
Grant by Joseph Gen. T. Maziarz, Gen., Phoenix, Asst. Atty. for Gen., Atty. amicus curiae Arizona in State Youngblood. Romley, Maricopa County Richard M. Atty. Gerhardt, by H. Allen Deputy County Gustafson, Atty. and Deputy John R. Pima Phoenix, County Atty., for state of Ariz. in Herrera-Rodriguez. State v. Trebesch, Dean Maricopa County W. by Klapper, Deputy Public Defender Paul Defender, Phoenix, Public for Herrera- Rodriguez. Woods, Atty.
Grant Joseph Gen. T. Maziarz, Gen., Atty. Asst. and Jessica Gif- Funkhouser, Counsel, ford Former Chief Div., Phoenix, Crim. for amicus curiae Ari- Atty. zona inGen. State v. Herrera-Rodri- guez.
Hirsh, Davis, Walker & Piccarreta Piccarreta, Tucson, Michael L. for amicus Attys. curiae Arizona for Criminal Justice.
OPINION
MARTONE, Justice. These consolidated require us to whether, decide absent bad faith on the state, part of preserve failure to evi- dence consti- tutes a denial of due of law under Article 4 of the Arizona Constitution. § We hold that it does not.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
AND FACTS
A. Youngblood
Youngblood was convicted of child moles-
tation,
kidnapping.
sexual assault and
appeals
reversed and ordered dis-
charges against Youngblood
missal of all
ground
on the
that the state violated his
process rights by
federal due
failing prop-
erly
samples
semen
from the
body
clothing.
victim’s
Stephen Neely,
County Atty. by
D.
Pima
Youngblood, 153 Ariz.
Shovlin, Deputy County
M.
Catherine
(App.1986). This court denied review. The
Gustafson,
Atty.,
Deputy
Sp.
John R.
Coun-
granted
United States
Tucson,
ty Atty.,
for state of Ariz. in State
certiorari,
petition
state’s
for
re-
writ of
Youngblood.
appeals,
versed the court of
and held
Davis, Tucson, Youngblood.
F.
Daniel
“unless
criminal defendant can show bad
police,
lying
faith on the
upon
failure to
Youngblood,
preserve potentially useful evidence does U.S.
L.Ed.2d 281
(1988),
not constitute
of due
a denial
reversed the
order of
Youngblood,
law.” Arizona v.
488 U.S.
court’s
dismissal and ordered
*3
333, 337,
charges against
109
102
the defendant be
L.Ed.2d 281
(1988).
Herrera-Rodriguez,
reinstated. State v.
164 Ariz.
What
due
raised his state
process
defendant at trial
and
defendant chose
claim in the trial
In con
court.
trast,
perform
not to
of his
There
not
tests
own.
did
assert his state
suggestion
was no
faith on the
due
claim until
had
he
been
court,
remand,
through
police.
having
ap
On
and after
court,
peals,
gone through
state
and the United States
the entire
and federal
once,
He first
system
for
Court.
raised his state
the defendant
the first
claim on
court
remand to the
time raised
state law claim under the
appeals.
appeals
The court of
should
Having
Arizona due
clause.
rejected
untimely.
have
his claim as
One
on
rebuffed
its resolution of the federal
apple
enough.
bite
One should
issue, the
held
that Ari-
not be
to hold
allowed
back a claim or issue
violated,
zona
was
reversed his
and
it. All
then use
one needs
convictions,
charges
dismissed all
and
arising
claims
issues
the same
out of
against
Youngblood,
him. State v.
164
present
nucleus
operative
facts must be
(App.1989).
Ariz.
We
time,
they
pre
ed at the same
else
granted
petition
the state’s
for review.
point litigation
cluded. At some
must come
B. Herrera-Rodriguez
to an
of finality
end. Lack
is one of the
popular
reasons for the
with
dissatisfaction
Herrera-Rodriguez
charged
was
legal system.
litigation
Piecemeal
assault,
armed
kidnapping,
burglary
sexual
an evil
avoided.1
to be
mistrial,
aggravated
After
assault.
court granted
the trial
a defense motion to
appeal,
generally
Even on direct
to preserve
because the state failed
dismiss
refuse to consider claims that are not
rape
sample
swab
from a
kit. The
finding
a cotton
raised
funda
below. “Absent
upon
error,
federal
Arizona
motion was based
mental
failure to
an issue at
raise
again,
right
there
Once
trial ... waives the
to raise
appeal.”
Gendron,
The
on
bad faith.
delivered
State
(1991).2
analysis. Hospi-
P.2d
hospital
the swab to a
With
force,
and,
greater
personnel
dry
preclusion
occur
tal
failed to air
swab
should
result,
appellate
direct
not conclusive. Re- on remand after
review
as a
tests were
Security
Protecting
failure
Double
Federalism:
Indi-
1. The dissent characterizes defendant’s
Constitution,
Liberty
expressly
claim as understand-
vidual
Under the
raise the state
Arizona
However,
able,
(1988).
The Chief Jus-
post, at
P.2d at 1159.
Ariz.St.L.J.
acknowledged
acknowledges,
tice has also
that this court will
dissent
state and federal
as the
Post,
consider the Arizona Constitution "at least when
sources.
claims
different
lawyers
adequate
judicial
have made an
record and
is federal
review of
P.2d at 1158. There
arguments."
claims,
proper
Lawyers
raised the
Id.
not state claims.
the difference.
Justice William Brennan
know
why
says
explain
urging lawyers
The
we have
to raise state claims for
dissent
failed to
has been
Brennan, Jr.,
principle
many years.
of fundamental
error does not
William J.
See
Post,
apply
to this case.
Constitutions and the Protection
Individual
(1977).
anticipates
concern
its con-
Rights,
Our own
1160. The dissent's
90 Harv.L.Rev. 489
court’s,
clusion,
regarding
dissenting
the merits.
Justice has done
same. See
Chief
Abney,
Stanley
first determines whether there is er-
G.
& David L.
Feldman
Pictures,
Paramount
relying upon
been exhausted.
Arizona due
Holmes,
Inc. v.
having
clause for
failed to
claim
raise that
(1942) (“appeals
appeal
at his
direct
judgment
from a
piecemeal,
any ques
Appeals,
by
taken
Court of
and on
certio
and ...
review
could and
rari
tion which
should have been
the United
Court.3
—
Escondido,
generally
Yee v.
pre
appeal may
the first
raised on
-,
-,
nor
court on
sented to
considered
Rhodes,
(1992).4
so
appeal.”);
But we are not
the second
Although the
petitioned
free.
us
court,
issue,
v. All
Hawkins
preclusion
review the
As we stated in
*4
Co.,
constituted,
then
A
of
Ins.
denied it.
490, 503, 733
152 Ariz.
denied,
upon
cert.
this court
to reach an
874,
declines
issue
U.S.
which
has been denied.5
turn
review
We
212,
(1987),
“[ejffi
S.Ct.
blood was no evidence of bad faith here. The Contrary to the dissent’s characterization indistinguishable facts in these new, of the role post, of bad faith as There, from those in Willits. adopted 844 P.2d at we the bad faith gave dynamite and wires to the Air Force guide long before the United States Su- destroyed which in turn them. Willits ar- preme Court did. Well gued dynamite that the and wire “might said, Youngblood Court decided “[a] showing explo- have aided in [him] [an] deprived process by defendant is not of due sion was accidental.” 96 Ariz. at the destruction of evidence unless the state P.2d at 278. We held that Willits was has acted in bad faith or the defendant is instruction, entitled to an not a dismissal. prejudiced by the Day, loss.” State v. Brady When violation results in a 490, 496, (1986). To new suggest would be bizarre to Soloman, the same effect is that, non-malignant fortuity, because of a (1980). require fundamental fairness would evidence—exculpa- Where the nature of the charges. dismissal of the The unknown, possibility tory, inculpatory, or neutral—is prejudice justify is not sufficient to cases, showing inas there can no ultimate sanction—an order of dismissal. Thus, prejudice only showing in fact. Hawk, v. Loud See implicates The bad guide bad faith to the fundamental fairness (1986). Instead, gets the defendant more component process of Arizona due than the unpreserved potentially exculpa- context of with Willits instruc- tory hardly and tion. “The touchstone of due un- evidence is therefore new certainly departure previous der both the Arizona and federal constitu- Indeed, holdings. if bad faith were read tions is fundamental fairness.” manner Melendez, Arizona Constitution the same (1992). counterpart. Arizona v. as its federal 51, 109 333, 102 Youngblood, 488 U.S. hold that absent bad faith We therefore not, The does L.Ed.2d 281 state, the failure to part on the however, agree position with the state’s could preserve evidentiary material which In that the two clauses are coterminous. tests, results of subjected to have been stead, re the defen- it reaffirms this court’s ultimate might have exonerated dant, of due meaning does not constitute a denial sponsibility interpret and Arizona Constitu- process of law under the application of the Arizona Constitution tion. clause. light reading of our own of each Here, suggest no evidence to there is approach Because I that this believe police. Nor has faith on the decision-making is cor state constitutional showing prejudice any there been rect, in the constitutional concur de the defendants were not fact. join in adopted by the Arizona nied due of law under portion opinion. Disagreeing Constitution.7 opinion’s2 application pro of that the lead Youngblood cess to and with the conclusion III. DISPOSITION cases, I majority reached in re both appeals the court of judgment following por spectfully dissent from the reversed, opinion is its va- Youngblood opinion. tions of the cated, the convictions and sentences affirmed. by the trial court are imposed Youngblood A. Preclusion: judgment affirmed, its Herrera-Rodriguez Stating that failed to assert vacated, trial court dis- the order of the the Arizona his due claim under reversed, charges is and the missing the through until he had Constitution trial. case is remanded for system re appellate entire and his case appeals, the lead manded to our court of CORCORAN,J., MOELLER, Y.C.J., and *7 pre opinion argues “Youngblood that concur. relying upon the Arizona due cluded from Justice, FELDMAN, concurring in premise Chief process clause.”3 Both the dissenting part. part and conclusion are flawed. of Arizona
Drawing
interpretation
on its
of
accepting
reasoning
precedent and
Opinion’s
1. The Lead
Position
compelling, the
case law where
pre-
opinion’s
The lead
discussion
fair
today holds that fundamental
court
dictum—language un-
clusion issue is both
ins
no more than a
requires
ness
Willits
holding—and
necessary
irrelevant to
to
Willits,
truction.1 See State
Concluding
the court.
issue
(1964). Ultimately, the
P.2d 274
free” to decide the
we are “not ...
process clause of the
that
applies the due
court
process
due
is not violated unless
“presumption of
holds that
The dissent’s reference
7.
the other evi-
the loss of evi-
and “cases in which
can demonstrate that
innocence”
us. Post at 511
is inconclusive” baffles
dence
and
from the state’s bad faith.
dence has resulted
If there is
Feldman,
at 1161 and 1164.
Also,
(Chief
Vice
Justice
a conviction
evidence to warrant
no substantial
Moeller,
Corcoran, and Jus-
Justice
Justice
Chief
beyond
without the absent
a reasonable doubt
Zlaket)
Youngblood should not
believes that
tice
evidence,
judgment
to a
the defendant is entitled
asserting
precluded
his Arizona due
If
acquittal.
Ariz.R.Crim.P.
there
of
Rule
Therefore,
rights
I refer
in this court.
is done.
no harm
substantial
such
opinion
opin-
as the "lead
Justice Martone's
ion.”
at 1155-1156.
op.
(Vice
Justice
court
Chief
A
of this
Lead
Martone)
Corcoran,
Moeller,
and Justice
Justice
applied
which due
clause it
preclusion4—having
case
constitution,
referring
review,
instead
briefing,
cited neither
granted
ordered
neither
arriving
to both federal and
argument of that issue—
nor entertained
has
its conclusion. This court
been
next to the mer
the lead
“turn[s]
See,
guilty
imprecision.
e.g.,
of similar
then,
What,
is the
its” and decides them.
Tucker,
entitled “Preclu
preceding discussion
(1988).7
P.2d
than
author’s
It is
more
sion”'1.
preclusion,
question
on the
dissertation
the Arizona
Youngblood’s failure
cite
by briefing6
argument.
uninformed
prejudice the
Constitution did not
state.
opinion’s assumption,
Contrary to
lead
compounding
the error of
At
risk
that
Youngblood did not hold back
issue.
procedurally
that
believe
every step,
In a
he
timely manner and at
necessary
respond
improper, I
think
issue,
arguing
raised the
my
opinion’s
the lead
dicta with some
deprived
him of
destruction of
get
wishing
quickly
own. The reader
a fair trial. When the United States Su-
only
the court and decided
issue before
preme
held for the first time that
begin at
B of
by it is advised to
Part
qua
of a due
bad faith was the sine
non
dissent.
process deprivation, Youngblood then
asked the state court to follow
Raised
The Issue was
cases,
Tucker,
such as
and hold
under
Youngblood
did
raise
only
Arizona Constitution bad
claim;
proper supporting
he also made the
one of
tests
a fair
It is under-
trial.
stage
proceed-
argument.
every
At
that he had not
so before.
standable
done
court,
ings, from the trial court to this
any
had previ-
Neither this court nor
other
Youngblood
argued
the destruc-
ously
aware that bad faith was the
principles
of fun-
tion
evidence violated
fact,
previously
factor.
court
fairness,
him a fair
damental
denied
abjured
subjective inquiries
such
into the
process. Young-
and thus offended due
prosecutorial psyche
similar cases.
only to
failed
cite article
section 4
blood
Court,
Superior
Pool v.
arguing
of the Arizona Constitution when
requirement of fundamental fairness.
therefore,
espoused today,
The view
Indeed, Youngblood’s original
in the
brief
inarguable
far more radical than
state
cited neither the state nor
ment
should not be allowed
“[o]ne
spoke generally of
federal constitution but
hold
a claim or issue and then use it
back
Now,
only if one
it.”8
under what is
needs
view,
opinion’s
evidently
was not alone in this omis-
the lead
*8
opinion though
litigant
prejudice, con
appeals’ original
The court of
a
suffers no
sion.
50,
rights may
destroyed simply
be
Youngblood, 153 Ariz.
734 stitutional
in State v.
lawyer
greater prescience
specify
had no
(Ct.App.1986),
P.2d 592
also did not
because a
505,
discussing
that the
of
op.
at
7.
Tucker's claim
loss
4. Lead
at
fundamentally
evidence had rendered
unfair,
depriving
process,
him due
for-
thus
of
505-506,
Lead
Even if
had failed to raise
So much for the
“merits”
claim,
finding
process.
the state
I return
Dicta is easy
preclusion
wrong
would be
as a matter of
define but sometimes hard to avoid. All of
jurisprudential policy. Although
unnecessary
it cites us are
guilty
statements.
—
Escondido,
U.S.-,
It
Yee v.
common
law
But
(1992),10
goes
preclusion
much
lead
further. The
opinion’s
preclusion
entirely
views on
are far more
discussion in the lead
Yee,
dictum,
recognized
opin-
extreme.
Court held
as such in the lead
*9
ion,
jurisdiction
that
have
to consider
and
completely
courts
a
irrelevant
issues
—Yee,
Further,
appeal.
claim first raised on
on which
case was
U.S.
the
decided.
at-,
1531;
112
at
see
the
also Daw
conclusions
reached without the
son,
283-86,
briefing
argument by
5H issue, Only denied re- Faith This court review of Good Cannot be issue, argument hear on the and Test fused to express it.
therefore should address holding remedy be The court’s that no so a and my improper dissent from jury appropriate instruction un yond a is us. next to the issue before turn defendant the state’s less the establishes non is sequitur. faith is a The issue
bad
Rather,
good
the state’s
faith.
Loss of Evidence
B.
received
the issue is whether the defendant
eviden
Disregarding
persuasive
both the
consti
the due
clause of the
what
legal analysis
tiary and
funda
requires: a fair trial under
tution
Youngblood12
and the trial
mentally
procedures. Obviously,
fair
destroyed
judge’s
finding
factual
situations,
might
a
have
some
defendant
“may
evidence
have
Herrera-
exonerated”
though
acted
had a fair trial
the state
adopts
Rodriguez,13
here
faith;
likewise,
in bad
a defendant
bright line rule that
what evi
no matter
though
have had
unfair trial even
potential
or how
its
significant
dence is lost
good
acted in
faith. The answer is
value, due
not violat
exculpatory
process is
depends
quality
fact-intensive
can demonstrate
ed unless
.evidence,
type
quantity
of the other
the state’s
that the loss
resulted from
lost,
potential
that was
val
of evidence
its
too,
signifi
This
is
analysis,
“bad faith.”14
exculpatory purposes, and similar
ue for
cantly flawed.
assume,
issues. There
no basis to
police
every
case
have acted
where
Brady Maryland
faith,
Inapplicable
in bad
fair trial has been
process always
Nor has due
been
denied.
First,
support
the court finds some
where the
have acted
satisfied
Brady Maryland,
such as
373 U.S.
having
good faith
evidence
but
lost
(1963),
L.Ed.2d
exculpatory
majori
significant
value. The
remedy for suppressed
where
ty’s bright
just
line test
that re
achieves
true,
retrial, not dismissal.15
This is
506-507,
1156-1157;
sult. At
844 P.2d at
Brady
applicable
rule is not
to this
Lembke, Note,
H.
Matthew
The Role of
When,
in Brady,
prosecution
case.
Young
Culpability
Police
in Leon and
a new
has withheld
blood,
(1990); The
76 Va.L.Rev.
pro
which the
can be
Court,
Term—Leading
duced,
appropriate remedy, “irrespec
(1989).
Cases, 103 Harv.L.Rev.
157-67
good faith of the
tive of the
or bad
Brady,
U.S. at
prosecution.”
also
the effect
overlooks
says today,
As the majority
at 1197.
presumption
of innocence.
application
Mathers,
66-67,
sense.”
Brady “makes
Its
however,
case,
makes no sense.
Presuming
the defendant
case,
innocent,
proper question
the evidence is not available
is whether
destroyed
potential
because
had such
excul-
retrial
the lost evidence
testing.
signifi-
Retrial
leave us with
its
patory
would
value
destruction
remedy to
can easi-
determining
cantly impaired
what
defense. One
same issue:
judge in
just
imagine
cases—and the trial
ly
the evidence has not
invoke when
evidently
destroyed.
Herrera-Rodriguez
believed
withheld but
order,
Young
v. Herr
description
See November
of the evidence
12. For
Maricopa
Superior
era-Rodriguez,
County
blood,
Ariz. at
P.2d at 592-94.
see 153
case No. CR-87-11124.
(as
opinion applies law
in Arizona
it existed
*10
force,
today)
compelling
dem
to fact with
until
508,
op. at
at
14. Lead
844 P.2d
1158.
believe,
onstrating,
view taken
I
the error of the
506,
op.
at 1156.
52-55,
15. Lead
at
844 P.2d
majority.
today’s
734 P.2d
by
See id. at
at 594-97.
506,
op. at
this was
judge
one17—where a “defendant
trial
un
nor the
prove
able to
acted in
bad faith
fashioned
...
the loss or destruction of evidence
a
applied
new Arizona
rule to
destruc
is nevertheless
so critical to the defense as
tion
They
of evidence
simply ap
cases.
to make a
fundamentally
criminal
trial
un
Young
plied existing Arizona law.
Henderson,
v.
Massachusetts
fair.”
411
blood,
52-55,
153 Ariz.
734
P.2d at 594-
309,
496,
(1991)
Mass.
(quot
582 N.E.2d
497
1978,
Since
the Arizona
Youngblood,
Arizona v.
ing
61,
488
history
Court has a well-settled
in cases of
(Stevens, J.,
109 S.Ct. at
concurring)
339
lost or destroyed
origin ap
evidence. The
(citations omitted)).
Hyder
ex rel.
v. Hughes,
pears to
State
If the lost
significantly impaired
261, 264,
722,
119
(1978)
Ariz.
P.2d
580
725
defense, Herrera-Rodriguez’
pro
(a rape
in adopting
case
the test
rights
cess
prejudiced. Prejudice
were
Klein,
States v. Heiden
and
898,
508
F.2d
always
independent
been an
component of
In Hughes,
(9th Cir.1974)).
902
quoted
process
Arizona’s due
clause in
in
cases
Heiden
and Klein:
“When
there is loss or
volving destroying
failing
preserve
or
evidence,
destruction
of such
we will re
See,
Tucker,
e.g.,
significant
evidence.
157
verse a defendant’s
conviction if he can
442,
Ariz. at
at 588.
759 P.2d
This has
(1)
show
bad faith or connivance on the
holding
driving
been the
under the influ
that he was
government
(2)
Montano v.
(“DUI”)
ence
such as
prejudiced the loss
the evidence.”
Court,
Superior
385,
Ariz.
149
719 P.2d
Hughes,
513
argues
preme
plurality
Court s
Arizona v.
Remarkably,
today’s majority
260,
Serna,
Youngblood.
Depart
787 P.2d
v.
v.
163
Thorne
State
Tucker,
433,
1326,
(1990),
759
Safety,
Pub.
1330
1056
ment of
long
579, adopted
guide
(Alaska 1989)(“We
P.2d
a “bad faith
n. 9
have construed
Supreme
the United
Court
States
Constitution’s due
clause
Alaska
If this means that bad faith
faith.”);
did.”20
require
showing
of bad
Lol
considered,
only
the assertion
factor we
(Del.1992)
Delaware,
ly v.
majority
(“The
chooses to follow the
of a
views
582 N.E.2d
497
rule
plurality
provisions
the United States
under
of the
unremarkable, though
Court is
I believe
than
Massachusetts Constitution is stricter
it is
re
this issue
erroneous. The court’s
Youngblood opinion____
stated in
acknowledge
doing,
it is
how
fusal to
what
police did
The fact that the
not act
ever, is remarkable.
negligently
poten
they
faith when
lost the
tially exculpatory evidence cannot in fair
ignore
should
Ari-
We
well-reasoned
dispositive
issue.”);
New
ness
authority just because
zona
four
Smagula,
578
Hampshire
N.H.
justices change
their
1215, 1217(1990)(applying
A.2d
a different
interpretation
what
constitution);
test under the state
New
now,
years
plurali-
Five
requires.
Ramos,
York v.
A.D.2d
change.
ty may
then for Arizona?
What
N.Y.S.2d
Holding
Unsup-
Majority’s
3. The
majority’s
logic
The error
becomes
ported by Authority
espousal
apparent when one considers its
generally
prompted oth- of the Willits instruction.24
These considerations have
186-91,
Willits,
today’s
P.2d at 275-
reject
Ariz. at
er state courts
view
Su-
instruc-
and that of the United States
79. The
concludes that an
op.
op.
P.2d
P.2d at
22. Lead
at 1157.
20. Lead
23. Lead
at 1157.
(quoting
op. at
P.2d at 1157
21. Lead
Day,
added)).
(emphasis
op. at
cial follow holdings agree of other state courts. I Finally, making the officers’ bad faith with the Massachusetts the litmus test determine whether a de- government potentially that when the loses fendant received what due re- evidence, exculpatory trial court must quires, majority requires our trial degree balance the culpability exactly they courts to do what should not government, materiality evi- deciding do. objective ques- Instead dence, potential prejudice and the tion whether the loss of the evidence defendant in deprived trial, protect order to the defen- of a fair will, henceforth, dant’s right constitutional due courts concentrate on trial____ subjective intent a fair If of the officers. No the loss of the evi- bene- right fit much mischief will result dence threatened the defendant’s po- judge these mini-trials on the motives fair con- discretion prosecutors. Pool, cerning lice and protect the manner in 268-70; Lolly, rights. 677 P.2d at thé defendant’s A.2d at 960. Henderson, N.E.2d at 496-97. majority’s signifi- new rule has other CONCLUSION policy Regardless cant ramifications. important whether evidence is Thus, in Youngblood, believing that the inculpatory, good policy public requires precluded, is not police that the use in preserving care it. approve appeals’ would requiring prove Instead of a defendant to judgment and reverse the of conviction. something and subjective as nebulous as a Herrera-Rodriguez, I would vacate the faith, police officer’s bad we should encour- of appeals’ opinion and affirm the age Today’s holding due care. invites bad trial court’s order dismissal. work, long so police government faith, bad does act whatever is. ZLAKET, J., concurs. Is it bad when the valu- faith collect pre- know that it able should
served, carelessly fail to so? Is it do government fails when
provide agency the law enforcement proper equipment the evi- Properly,
dence? does not
