THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In Thе Supreme Court The State, Respondent, v. Aaron Scott Young Jr., Petitioner.
Appellate Case No. 2018-001861
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court
Filed February 5, 2020
Opinion No. 27942
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS Appeal From Beaufort County Thomas W. Cooper Jr., Circuit Court Judge Heard November 20, 2019
AFFIRMED
F. Elliotte Quinn IV, of The Steinberg Law Firm, LLP, of Summerville, and Jennifer K. Dunlap, of Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, of Charleston, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody J. Brown, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone III, of Bluffton, for Respondent.
Young Jr. and his father Aaron Young Sr. (Young Sr.) willingly engaged a rival, Tyrone Robinson, in a cat-and-mouse gun battle in a residential neighborhood. The gun battle came to a tragic conclusion when Robinson shot and killed an unintended victim, an eight-year-old child who was playing in the area. The State charged all three combatants with the murder of the victim. Robinson‘s murder charge stemmed from a straightfоrward application of the doctrine of transferred intent. The Youngs’ murder charges stemmed from an application of the doctrine of mutual combat,1 under which each combatant is criminally responsible for a death caused by any of the other combatants, regardless of whether he fought with or against the killer-combatant.
Today, we hold mutual combat can properly serve as the basis for a murder charge for the death of a non-combatant under the “hand of one is the hand of all” theory of accomplice liability. Whеn two or more individuals engage in combat via a reckless shootout, they collectively trigger an escalating chain reaction that creates a high risk to any human life falling within the field of fire. In that type of gunfight, all individuals are willing to use lethal force and display a depraved indifference to human life. More importantly, an innocent bystander would not be shot but for the willingness of all combatants to turn an otherwise peaceful environment, often a residential or commercial setting, into a battlefield. In a real sense, each combatant aids and encourages all of the other combatants—whether friend or foe—to create the lethal crossfire. We
I.
Prior to the date of the gun battle, Robinson and Young Jr. had a history of violent confrontations with one another. On the day in question, Robinson drove to the Youngs’ house and began arguing with Young Jr. outside, eventually pulling out a .38 caliber revolver and moving toward Young Jr. Young Sr. was present and attempted to take Robinson‘s gun away. While the two struggled for possession of the weapon, the revolver discharged. Young Sr. backed away, but Robinson fired once or twice more at the ground by Young Sr.‘s feet. Robinson then returned to his vehicle and sped away.
This confrontation began a series of armed exchanges between the Youngs and Robinson across multiple residential neighborhoods over the next hour, wherein one side would catch up with the other, shoot, and flee. During the penultimate exchаnge, the Youngs were unable to locate Robinson but saw his unoccupied vehicle, so Young Jr. “swiss cheese[d] that car“—shooting at it over twenty times—despite the fact that he (Young Jr.) had just seen a group of children playing on a trampoline a short distance away. As the Youngs fled again, Robinson emerged from hiding and shot at their car three times, missing the Youngs, but tragically hitting the victim, who had been playing on the trampoline. Following their arrests, all three men were charged with the victim‘s murder.
Prior to the start of trial, Young Jr. moved to dismiss the murder indictment, arguing the charge was based on the theory of mutual combat, which was not a stand-alone theory of criminal responsibility in South Carolina, but instead a
The trial court denied Young Jr.‘s motion to dismiss the indictment, noting that in mutual combat situations all participating parties were responsible for their fellow combatants’ actions resulting in injuries to other participants in the combat. Although the experienced trial judge recognized the facts of this case represented an extension of the existing case law, he found Young Jr. could be held liable for the murder of the victim based on the theories of mutual combat and transferred intent, agreeing with the State‘s argument that
it would be very difficult to understand how if multiple people are shooting at each other and someone in the group is killed and everyone‘s responsible how they would also not be responsible if an innocent third party was shot.
Ultimately, the jury convicted Young Jr. of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment. Young Jr. appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Young, 424 S.C. 424, 818 S.E.2d 486 (Ct. App. 2018). We granted Young Jr.‘s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals.
II.
Young Jr. argues mutual combat cannot be used as the grounds on which to base criminal responsibility for murder, but instead may only be used as a limitation on self-defense. We disagree.
A.
“The doctrine of mutual combat has existed in South Carolina since at least 1843, but has fallen out of common use in recent years.” State v. Taylor, 356 S.C. 227, 231, 589 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2003). To constitute mutual combat, there must be a mutual intent and willingness to fight, “manifested by the acts and conduct of the parties and the circumstances attending and leading up to the combat.” Graham, 260 S.C. at 450, 196 S.E.2d at 495; see also Taylor, 356 S.C. at 235, 589 S.E.2d at 5 (“The mutual combat doctrine is triggered when both parties contribute to the resulting fight.“); Brown, 108 S.C. at 499, 95 S.E. at 63 (“[T]o constitute mutual combat, it is not necessary that there should be a positive agreement between the participating parties to enter the combat; it is sufficient if they [willfully] enter into the conflict, upon the impulse of the moment.“). The State is required to prove the rival combatants were armed for the mutual combat with deadly weapons and each combatant knew the others were armed. Taylor, 356 S.C. at 233–34, 589 S.E.2d at 4–5. Mutual combat may be the basis of either a murder or manslaughter conviction depending on the combatant‘s state of mind at the time of the killing, i.e., whether the combatant acted with malice aforethought. Id. at 232, 589 S.E.2d at 3–4 (quoting State v. Andrews, 73 S.C. 257, 260, 53 S.E. 423, 424 (1906)).
The majority of jurisdictions impose criminal responsibility on all combatants for the consequences of mutual combat. In line with the majority approach, South Carolina law has long recognized that criminal liability may be imposed on all combatants for the death of one of the participating parties because all are presumed to know and intend the consequences that naturally flow from their unlawful acts. Brown, 108 S.C. at 499–500, 95 S.E. at 63. In South Carolina and many other jurisdictions, the criminal liability stemming from mutual combat does not depend on which side(s) the combatant or the deceased fought. Id. Thus, for example, a combatant may properly be found guilty of murder for the death of a friendly co-combatant at the hands of a rival combatant. See id. In the eyes of the law, it does not matter that the combatant did not intend any harm to the friendly co-combatant. People v. Sanchez, 29 P.3d 209, 223 (Cal. 2001) (Kennard, J., concurring); see also Brown, 108 S.C. at 491–500, 95 S.E. at 61–63 (upholding the manslaughter convictions of three non-striking employees/combatants who participated in a fight between strikers and non-strikers that resulted in the death of a striker at the (accidental) hands of a fеllow striker). Rather, the death of the friendly co-combatant was a harm that both in kind and degree was within the foreseeable risks the participants expected and intended to result from the mutual combat. See Sanchez, 29 P.3d at 223 (Kennard, J., concurring); Roy v. United States, 871 A.2d 498, 507–09 & n.10 (D.C. 2005) (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 681 N.E.2d 1205, 1215 (Mass. 1997) (noting death is “a natural result of a shootout“).
However, the existence of mutual combat is not wholly dispositive of criminal liability. A combatant may withdraw from mutual combat if he “endeavors in good faith to decline further conflict, and, either by word or act, makes that fact known to his adversary.” Graham, 260 S.C. at 451, 196 S.E.2d at 496 (citation omitted). Should a combatant satisfy the requirements to withdraw from mutual combat, he may nо longer be held liable for the actions of his former co-combatants.
B.
No appellate court in South Carolina, however, has addressed the import of the mutual combat doctrine on the death of an innocent bystander. Jurisdictions that have considered a factual scenario analogоus to the present case are nearly unanimous in finding mutual combat may serve as the basis for criminal liability for all combatants charged with murder or manslaughter, regardless of who fired the fatal shot. A number of jurisdictions reached this result under an aiding and abetting theory similar to South Carolina‘s “hand of one is the hand of all” doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Spates, 779 N.W.2d 770, 777–79 (Iowa 2010) (collecting cases and adopting this approach).
For example, in Alston v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed a second-degree murder conviction of a participant in a gun battle, despite proof that the innocent bystander was shot and killed by a member of the rival group. 662 A.2d 247, 247–48 (Md. 1995), aff‘g 643 A.2d 468 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). In rejecting the defendant‘s argument that he did not aid and abet his rival in killing the bystander, the court explained the “argument rests heavily on [the defendant] disassociating himself from the [rival group‘s actions] and from the particular shot that killed [the bystander]. The relevant frame of reference, however, is [the defendant‘s] participation in the gun battle.” Id. at 252 (emphasis added). The court found significant the fact that both groups “were armed and prepared to do battle whenever and wherever their forces encountered one another” and “openеd fire, returned fire, and continued to fire in mindless disregard of the lives of the people on the street and in the surrounding houses.” Id. Likewise, the court determined the firefight demonstrated each participant was willing to use lethal force and exhibited the malice necessary to
Similarly, in People v. Russell, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld a defendant‘s second-degree murder conviction even though the State was unable to establish which of the three combatants fired the shot that fatally wounded an innocent bystander. 693 N.E.2d 193, 194 (N.Y. 1998). The court explained the State “was not required to prove which defendant fired the fatal shot when the evidence was sufficient to establish that each defendant acted with the mental culpability requirеd for the commission of depraved[-]indifference murder, and each defendant ‘intentionally aided’ the defendant who fired the fatal shot.” Id. at 195 (emphasis added). The court rejected the co-combatants’ arguments that, as adversaries in a gun battle, they did not “share[] the ‘community of purpose’ necessary for accomplice liability,” explaining that each of their respective actions made the gun battle possible, as there would not have been a firefight at all had they not been shooting at one another. Id. at 195–96 (discussing People v. Abbott, 445 N.Y.S.2d 344, 347 (App. Div. 1981),4 and citing, inter alia, People v. Fabian, 586 N.Y.S.2d 468, 471 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (“Although [the] defendants wеre trying to injure, if not kill each other, at the very same time they acted in concert to create an explosive condition which resulted inevitably in [the victims’ death and injuries].“)). The court therefore held the evidence was
We find the aiding and abetting approach outlined in Alston and Russell dovetails with our “hand of one is the hand of all” doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Harry, 420 S.C. 290, 299, 803 S.E.2d 272, 276–77 (2017) (explaining that under the “hand of one is the hand of all” doctrine, one who joins with another to accomplish an illegal purpose—whether by encouraging or aiding and abetting—is guilty as a principal). We agree with those jurisdictions that have concluded co-combatants who aid and incite one another to engage in the fight that leads to the death or injury of an innocent bystander are equally criminally liable.5 As a result, we extend our mutual combat jurisprudence to permit finding all mutual combatants criminally liable in situations where an innocent bystander is killed by one of the combatants.6 Cf. Roy, 871 A.2d at 507 (“We think it
C.
As applied here, the Youngs and Robinson were clearly engaged in mutual combat.7 In a real sense, although they were adversaries, the Youngs and Robinson jointly incited one another to continue the cat-and-mouse gun battle that resulted in the victim‘s death. While Robinson may have been the man who pullеd the trigger and formally killed the victim, he would not have fired that shot had it not been for the “aid” and “encouragement” of the Youngs. To myopically narrow the focus only to Robinson‘s actions misses the point.
We therefore find the deadly homicidal force here was not the single bullet that struck and killed the victim, but rather a collective fusillade that spanned several neighborhoods over the course of one hour. See Alston, 643 A.2d at 469; see also Roy, 871 A.2d at 507 n.10 (“[C]ourts have determined that the combined hail of bullets that result from such a battle are jointly responsible for the fatal injury, such that a determination of which defendant‘s bullet ‘actually’ caused the death is
III.
Today, we extend our jurisprudence and hold that each participant who willingly engages in mutual combat may be held accountable for the death or injury of an innocent bystander resulting from that confrontation. As each combatant aids and encourages the others to fire and continue firing the hail of bullets that results in a victim‘s death or injury, each may be found guilty under the “hand of one is the hand of all” theory of accomplice liability. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision upholding Young Jr.‘s convictions and sentences.8
We nevertheless need not reach the challenge of Young Jr. that the trial court‘s failure to instruct the jury on the end of mutual combat was reversible error.
AFFIRMED.
JAMES, FEW, JJ., and Acting Justice Aphrodite K. Konduros, concur. HEARN, J., dissenting in a separate opinion.
JUSTICE HEARN: I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority to affirm the conviction for attempted murder, I disagree with extending the doctrine of mutual combat to hold Aaron Young Jr. responsible for the murder of the bystander victim. Specifically, I find the lapse of time between when the gun shots were fired at Robinson‘s car and when the fatal shots occurred prevents the extension of the mutual combat doctrine under our “hand of one is the hand of all” theory. Moreover, even if the doctrine applied here, the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the end of mutual combat.
In extending the doctrine of mutual combat, the majority relies on several cases from other jurisdictions, all of which are factually and materially distinct from this case. Every case cited by the majority involves individuals or groups on opposite sides who engaged in a gun battle whеre both sides contemporaneously opened fire on one another. There, the gunfire was characterized as the “combined hail of bullets,” “shower of bullets,” “lethal crossfire,” and “gang-style gun play” in which both parties participated and induced the other to engage in a battle that proximately caused the death of an innocent bystander. Here, the majority portrays the events of
Even if the mutual combat charge was appropriate, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the end of mutual combat. The majority declines to reach this issue because it believes Young Jr. conceded at trial that he would have been guilty of murder through mutual combat if Robinson had shot and killed Young Sr. instead of the victim. However, in my view, this interpretation misstates the record. To gain a better understanding of the mutual combat doctrine and its application in the bystander context, the trial judge posed a hypothetical to Young Jr., stating “if the Youngs and Mr. Robinson are out therе shooting at each other, that if either one of them got shot and killed, that everybody would be guilty under mutual combat.” Young Jr. agreed, stating “there‘s no question but the fact that if Aaron Sr. had gotten shot, then everybody would be responsible, but that‘s not what happened.” I understand his response to the judge‘s hypothetical to be in the context expressed in State v. Brown, providing for criminal liability through mutual combat when another combatant is killed, and in the cases cited by the majority, where both
In addition to relying on defense counsel‘s ostensible concession, the majority seems to imply that the charge was wholly unnecessary as a matter of law because there was no indication of withdrawal. As the majority notes, the trial court believed the facts evidenced a “temporary retreat” rather than a withdrawal ending the combat. While this may have been the casе, and the jury could have agreed, the fact remains that if there was any evidence to support withdrawal, the trial judge should have given the charge. State v. Smith, 391 S.C. 408, 412, 706 S.E.2d 12, 14 (2011) (“If there is any evidence to warrant a jury instruction, a trial court must, upon request, give the instruction.“); State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 632, 545 S.E.2d 805, 819 (2001) (“If there is any evidence to support a charge, the trial judge should grant the request.“); State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 262, 513 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1999) (“It is well-settled the law to be charged is determined from the evidence presented at trial, and if any evidence exists to support a charge, it should be given. The trial court commits reversible error if it fails to give a requested charge on an issue raised by the evidence.“). At a minimum, the Youngs’ conduct of driving away constituted some evidence of their withdrawal such that a charge on this issue was warranted. Therefore, I would affirm the conviction for attempted murder and reverse on the murder conviction and jury charge issues.